BOOK I.

I. [Without the virtue of patriotism], neither Caius Duilius, nor Aulus

Atilius,[293] nor Lucius Metellus, could have delivered Rome by their

courage from the terror of Carthage; nor could the two Scipios, when

the fire of the second Punic War was kindled, have quenched it in their

blood; nor, when it revived in greater force, could either Quintus

Maximus[294] have enervated it, or Marcus Marcellus have crushed it;

nor, when it was repulsed from the gates of our own city, would Scipio

have confined it within the walls of our enemies.

But Cato, at first a new and unknown man, whom all we who aspire to the

same honors consider as a pattern to lead us on to industry and virtue,

was undoubtedly at liberty to enjoy his repose at Tusculum, a most

salubrious and convenient retreat. But he, mad as some people think

him, though no necessity compelled him, preferred being tossed about

amidst the tempestuous waves of politics, even till extreme old age, to

living with all imaginable luxury in that tranquillity and relaxation.

I omit innumerable men who have separately devoted themselves to the

protection of our Commonwealth; and those whose lives are within the

memory of the present generation I will not mention, lest any one

should complain that I had invidiously forgotten himself or some one of

his family. This only I insist on--that so great is the necessity of

this virtue which nature has implanted in man, and so great is the

desire to defend the common safety of our country, that its energy has

continually overcome all the blandishments of pleasure and repose.

II. Nor is it sufficient to possess this virtue as if it were some kind

of art, unless we put it in practice. An art, indeed, though not

exercised, may still be retained in knowledge; but virtue consists

wholly in its proper use and action. Now, the noblest use of virtue is

the government of the Commonwealth, and the carrying-out in real

action, not in words only, of all those identical theories which those

philosophers discuss at every corner. For nothing is spoken by

philosophers, so far as they speak correctly and honorably, which has

not been discovered and confirmed by those persons who have been the

founders of the laws of states. For whence comes piety, or from whom

has religion been derived? Whence comes law, either that of nations, or

that which is called the civil law? Whence comes justice, faith,

equity? Whence modesty, continence, the horror of baseness, the desire

of praise and renown? Whence fortitude in labors and perils? Doubtless,

from those who have instilled some of these moral principles into men

by education, and confirmed others by custom, and sanctioned others by

laws.

Moreover, it is reported of Xenocrates, one of the sublimest

philosophers, that when some one asked him what his disciples learned,

he replied, "To do that of their own accord which they might be

compelled to do by law." That citizen, therefore, who obliges all men

to those virtuous actions, by the authority of laws and penalties, to

which the philosophers can scarcely persuade a few by the force of

their eloquence, is certainly to be preferred to the sagest of the

doctors who spend their lives in such discussions. For which of their

exquisite orations is so admirable as to be entitled to be preferred to

a well-constituted government, public justice, and good customs?

Certainly, just as I think that magnificent and imperious cities (as

Ennius says) are superior to castles and villages, so I imagine that

those who regulate such cities by their counsel and authority are far

preferable, with respect to real wisdom, to men who are unacquainted

with any kind of political knowledge. And since we are strongly

prompted to augment the prosperity of the human race, and since we do

endeavor by our counsels and exertions to render the life of man safer

and wealthier, and since we are incited to this blessing by the spur of

nature herself, let us hold on that course which has always been

pursued by all the best men, and not listen for a moment to the signals

of those who sound a retreat so loudly that they sometimes call back

even those who have made considerable progress.

III. These reasons, so certain and so evident, are opposed by those

who, on the other side, argue that the labors which must necessarily be

sustained in maintaining the Commonwealth form but a slight impediment

to the vigilant and industrious, and are only a contemptible obstacle

in such important affairs, and even in common studies, offices, and

employments. They add the peril of life, that base fear of death, which

has ever been opposed by brave men, to whom it appears far more

miserable to die by the decay of nature and old age than to be allowed

an opportunity of gallantly sacrificing that life for their country

which must otherwise be yielded up to nature.

On this point, however, our antagonists esteem themselves copious and

eloquent when they collect all the calamities of heroic men, and the

injuries inflicted on them by their ungrateful countrymen. For on this

subject they bring forward those notable examples among the Greeks; and

tell us that Miltiades, the vanquisher and conqueror of the Persians,

before even those wounds were healed which he had received in that most

glorious victory, wasted away in the chains of his fellow-citizens that

life which had been preserved from the weapons of the enemy. They cite

Themistocles, expelled and proscribed by the country which he had

rescued, and forced to flee, not to the Grecian ports which he had

preserved, but to the bosom of the barbarous power which he had

defeated. There is, indeed, no deficiency of examples to illustrate the

levity and cruelty of the Athenians to their noblest citizens--examples

which, originating and multiplying among them, are said at different

times to have abounded in our own most august empire. For we are told:

of the exile of Camillus, the disgrace of Ahala, the unpopularity of

Nasica, the expulsion of Lænas,[295] the condemnation of Opimius, the

flight of Metellus, the cruel destruction of Caius Marius, the massacre

of our chieftains, and the many atrocious crimes which followed. My own

history is by no means free from such calamities; and I imagine that

when they recollect that by my counsel and perils they were preserved

in life and liberty, they are led by that consideration to bewail my

misfortunes more deeply and affectionately. But I cannot tell why those

who sail over the seas for the sake of knowledge and experience [should

wonder at seeing still greater hazards braved in the service of the

Commonwealth].

IV. [Since], on my quitting the consulship, I swore in the assembly of

the Roman people, who re-echoed my words, that I had saved the

Commonwealth, I console myself with this remembrance for all my cares,

troubles, and injuries. Although my misfortune had more of honor than

misfortune, and more of glory than disaster; and I derive greater

pleasure from the regrets of good men than sorrow from the exultation

of the worthless. But even if it had happened otherwise, how could I

have complained, as nothing befell me which was either unforeseen, or

more painful than I expected, as a return for my illustrious actions?

For I was one who, though it was in my power to reap more profit from

leisure than most men, on account of the diversified sweetness of my

studies, in which I had lived from boyhood--or, if any public calamity

had happened, to have borne no more than an equal share with the rest

of my countrymen in the misfortune--I nevertheless did not hesitate to

oppose myself to the most formidable tempests and torrents of sedition,

for the sake of saving my countrymen, and at my own proper danger to

secure the common safety of all the rest. For our country did not beget

and educate us with the expectation of receiving no support, as I may

call it, from us; nor for the purpose of consulting nothing but our

convenience, to supply us with a secure refuge for idleness and a

tranquil spot for rest; but rather with a view of turning to her own

advantage the nobler portion of our genius, heart, and counsel; giving

us back for our private service only what she can spare from the public

interests.

V. Those apologies, therefore, in which men take refuge as an excuse

for their devoting themselves with more plausibility to mere inactivity

do certainly not deserve to be listened to; when, for instance, they

tell us that those who meddle with public affairs are generally

good-for-nothing men, with whom it is discreditable to be compared, and

miserable and dangerous to contend, especially when the multitude is in

an excited state. On which account it is not the part of a wise man to

take the reins, since he cannot restrain the insane and unregulated

movements of the common people. Nor is it becoming to a man of liberal

birth, say they, thus to contend with such vile and unrefined

antagonists, or to subject one's self to the lashings of contumely, or

to put one's self in the way of injuries which ought not to be borne by

a wise man. As if to a virtuous, brave, and magnanimous man there could

be a juster reason for seeking the government than this--to avoid being

subjected to worthless men, and to prevent the Commonwealth from being

torn to pieces by them; when, even if they were then desirous to save

her, they would not have the power.

VI. But this restriction who can approve, which would interdict the

wise man from taking any share in the government beyond such as the

occasion and necessity may compel him to? As if any greater necessity

could possibly happen to any man than happened to me. In which, how

could I have acted if I had not been consul at the time? and how could

I have been a consul unless I had maintained that course of life from

my childhood which raised me from the order of knights, in which I was

born, to the very highest station? You cannot produce _extempore_, and

just when you please, the power of assisting a commonwealth, although

it may be severely pressed by dangers, unless you have attained the

position which enables you legally to do so. And what most surprises me

in the discourses of learned men, is to hear those persons who confess

themselves incapable of steering the vessel of the State in smooth seas

(which, indeed, they never learned, and never cared to know) profess

themselves ready to assume the helm amidst the fiercest tempests. For

those men are accustomed to say openly, and indeed to boast greatly,

that they have never learned, and have never taken the least pains to

explain, the principles of either establishing or maintaining a

commonwealth; and they look on this practical science as one which

belongs not to men of learning and wisdom, but to those who have made

it their especial study. How, then, can it be reasonable for such men

to promise their assistance to the State, when they shall be compelled

to it by necessity, while they are ignorant how to govern the republic

when no necessity presses upon it, which is a much more easy task?

Indeed, though it were true that the wise man loves not to thrust

himself of his own accord into the administration of public affairs,

but that if circumstances oblige him to it, then he does not refuse the

office, yet I think that this science of civil legislation should in no

wise be neglected by the philosopher, because all resources ought to be

ready to his hand, which he knows not how soon he may be called on to

use.

VII. I have spoken thus at large for this reason, because in this work

I have proposed to myself and undertaken a discussion on the government

of a state; and in order to render it useful, I was bound, in the first

place, to do away with this pusillanimous hesitation to mingle in

public affairs. If there be any, therefore, who are too much influenced

by the authority of the philosophers, let them consider the subject for

a moment, and be guided by the opinions of those men whose authority

and credit are greatest among learned men; whom I look upon, though

some of them have not personally governed any state, as men who have

nevertheless discharged a kind of office in the republic, inasmuch as

they have made many investigations into, and left many writings

concerning, state affairs. As to those whom the Greeks entitle the

Seven Wise Men, I find that they almost all lived in the middle of

public business. Nor, indeed, is there anything in which human virtue

can more closely resemble the divine powers than in establishing new

states, or in preserving those already established.

VIII. And concerning these affairs, since it has been our good fortune

to achieve something worthy of memorial in the government of our

country, and also to have acquired some facility of explaining the

powers and resources of politics, we can treat of this subject with the

weight of personal experience and the habit of instruction and

illustration. Whereas before us many have been skilful in theory,

though no exploits of theirs are recorded; and many others have been

men of consideration in action, but unfamiliar with the arts of

exposition. Nor, indeed, is it at all our intention to establish a new

and self-invented system of government; but our purpose is rather to

recall to memory a discussion of the most illustrious men of their age

in our Commonwealth, which you and I, in our youth, when at Smyrna,

heard mentioned by Publius Rutilius Rufus, who reported to us a

conference of many days in which, in my opinion, there was nothing

omitted that could throw light on political affairs.

IX. For when, in the year of the consulship of Tuditanus and Aquilius,

Scipio Africanus, the son of Paulus Æmilius, formed the project of

spending the Latin holidays at his country-seat, where his most

intimate friends had promised him frequent visits during this season of

relaxation, on the first morning of the festival, his nephew, Quintus

Tubero, made his appearance; and when Scipio had greeted him heartily

and embraced him--How is it, my dear Tubero, said he, that I see you so

early? For these holidays must afford you a capital opportunity of

pursuing your favorite studies. Ah! replied Tubero, I can study my

books at any time, for they are always disengaged; but it is a great

privilege, my Scipio, to find you at leisure, especially in this

restless period of public affairs. You certainly have found me so, said

Scipio, but, to speak truth, I am rather relaxing from business than

from study. Nay, said Tubero, you must try to relax from your studies

too, for here are several of us, as we have appointed, all ready, if it

suits your convenience, to aid you in getting through this leisure time

of yours. I am very willing to consent, answered Scipio, and we may be

able to compare notes respecting the several topics that interest us.

X. Be it so, said Tubero; and since you invite me to discussion, and

present the opportunity, let us first examine, before any one else

arrives, what can be the nature of the parhelion, or double sun, which

was mentioned in the senate. Those that affirm they witnessed this

prodigy are neither few nor unworthy of credit, so that there is more

reason for investigation than incredulity.[296]

Ah! said Scipio, I wish we had our friend Panætius with us, who is fond

of investigating all things of this kind, but especially all celestial

phenomena. As for my opinion, Tubero, for I always tell you just what I

think, I hardly agree in these subjects with that friend of mine,

since, respecting things of which we can scarcely form a conjecture as

to their character, he is as positive as if he had seen them with his

own eyes and felt them with his own hands. And I cannot but the more

admire the wisdom of Socrates, who discarded all anxiety respecting

things of this kind, and affirmed that these inquiries concerning the

secrets of nature were either above the efforts of human reason, or

were absolutely of no consequence at all to human life.

But, then, my Africanus, replied Tubero, of what credit is the

tradition which states that Socrates rejected all these physical

investigations, and confined his whole attention to men and manners?

For, with respect to him what better authority can we cite than Plato?

in many passages of whose works Socrates speaks in such a manner that

even when he is discussing morals, and virtues, and even public affairs

and politics, he endeavors to interweave, after the fashion of

Pythagoras, the doctrines of arithmetic, geometry, and harmonic

proportions with them.

That is true, replied Scipio; but you are aware, I believe, that Plato,

after the death of Socrates, was induced to visit Egypt by his love of

science, and that after that he proceeded to Italy and Sicily, from his

desire of understanding the Pythagorean dogmas; that he conversed much

with Archytas of Tarentum and Timæus of Locris; that he collected the

works of Philolaus; and that, finding in these places the renown of

Pythagoras flourishing, he addicted himself exceedingly to the

disciples of Pythagoras, and their studies; therefore, as he loved

Socrates with his whole heart, and wished to attribute all great

discoveries to him, he interwove the Socratic elegance and subtlety of

eloquence with somewhat of the obscurity of Pythagoras, and with that

notorious gravity of his diversified arts.

XI. When Scipio had spoken thus, he suddenly saw Lucius Furius

approaching, and saluting him, and embracing him most affectionately,

he gave him a seat on his own couch. And as soon as Publius Rutilius,

the worthy reporter of the conference to us, had arrived, when we had

saluted him, he placed him by the side of Tubero. Then said Furius,

What is it that you are about? Has our entrance at all interrupted any

conversation of yours? By no means, said Scipio, for you yourself too

are in the habit of investigating carefully the subject which Tubero

was a little before proposing to examine; and our friend Rutilius, even

under the walls of Numantia, was in the habit at times of conversing

with me on questions of the same kind. What, then, was the subject of

your discussion? said Philus. We were talking, said Scipio, of the

double suns that recently appeared, and I wish, Philus, to hear what

you think of them.

XII. Just as he was speaking, a boy announced that Lælius was coming to

call on him, and that he had already left his house. Then Scipio,

putting on his sandals and robes, immediately went forth from his

chamber, and when he had walked a little time in the portico, he met

Lælius, and welcomed him and those that accompanied him, namely,

Spurius Mummius, to whom he was greatly attached, and C. Fannius and

Quintus Scævola, sons-in-law of Lælius, two very intelligent young men,

and now of the quæstorian age.[297]

When he had saluted them all, he returned through the portico, placing

Lælius in the middle; for there was in their friendship a sort of law

of reciprocal courtesy, so that in the camp Lælius paid Scipio almost

divine honors, on account of his eminent renown in war and in private

life; in his turn Scipio reverenced Lælius, even as a father, because

he was older than himself.

Then after they had exchanged a few words, as they walked up and down,

Scipio, to whom their visit was extremely welcome and agreeable, wished

to assemble them in a sunny corner of the gardens, because it was still

winter; and when they had agreed to this, there came in another friend,

a learned man, much beloved and esteemed by all of them, M. Manilius,

who, after having been most warmly welcomed by Scipio and the rest,

seated himself next to Lælius.

XIII. Then Philus, commencing the conversation, said: It does not

appear to me that the presence of our new guests need alter the subject

of our discussion, but only that it should induce us to treat it more

philosophically, and in a manner more worthy of our increased audience.

What do you allude to? said Lælius; or what was the discussion we broke

in upon? Scipio was asking me, replied Philus, what I thought of the

parhelion, or mock sun, whose recent apparition was so strongly

attested.

_Lælius._ Do you say then, my Philus, that we have sufficiently

examined those questions which concern our own houses and the

Commonwealth, that we begin to investigate the celestial mysteries?

And Philus replied: Do you think, then, that it does not concern our

houses to know what happens in that vast home which is not included in

walls of human fabrication, but which embraces the entire universe--a

home which the Gods share with us, as the common country of all

intelligent beings? Especially when, if we are ignorant of these

things, there are also many great practical truths which result from

them, and which bear directly on the welfare of our race, of which we

must be also ignorant. And here I can speak for myself, as well as for

you, Lælius, and all men who are ambitious of wisdom, that the

knowledge and consideration of the facts of nature are by themselves

very delightful.

_Lælius._ I have no objection to the discussion, especially as it is

holiday-time with us. But cannot we have the pleasure of hearing you

resume it, or are we come too late?

_Philus_. We have not yet commenced the discussion, and since the

question remains entire and unbroken, I shall have the greatest

pleasure, my Lælius, in handing over the argument to you.

_Lælius._ No, I had much rather hear you, unless, indeed, Manilius

thinks himself able to compromise the suit between the two suns, that

they may possess heaven as joint sovereigns without intruding on each

other's empire.

Then Manilius said: Are you going, Lælius, to ridicule a science in

which, in the first place, I myself excel; and, secondly, without which

no one can distinguish what is his own, and what is another's? But to

return to the point. Let us now at present listen to Philus, who seems

to me to have started a greater question than any of those that have

engaged the attention of either Publius Mucius or myself.

XIV. Then Philus said: I am not about to bring you anything new, or

anything which has been thought over or discovered by me myself. But I

recollect that Caius Sulpicius Gallus, who was a man of profound

learning, as you are aware, when this same thing was reported to have

taken place in his time, while he was staying in the house of Marcus

Marcellus, who had been his colleague in the consulship, asked to see a

celestial globe which Marcellus's grandfather had saved after the

capture of Syracuse from that magnificent and opulent city, without

bringing to his own home any other memorial out of so great a booty;

which I had often heard mentioned on account of the great fame of

Archimedes; but its appearance, however, did not seem to me

particularly striking. For that other is more elegant in form, and more

generally known, which was made by the same Archimedes, and deposited

by the same Marcellus in the Temple of Virtue at Rome. But as soon as

Gallus had begun to explain, in a most scientific manner, the principle

of this machine, I felt that the Sicilian geometrician must have

possessed a genius superior to anything we usually conceive to belong

to our nature. For Gallus assured us that that other solid and compact

globe was a very ancient invention, and that the first model had been

originally made by Thales of Miletus. That afterward Eudoxus of Cnidus,

a disciple of Plato, had traced on its surface the stars that appear in

the sky, and that many years subsequently, borrowing from Eudoxus this

beautiful design and representation, Aratus had illustrated it in his

verses, not by any science of astronomy, but by the ornament of poetic

description. He added that the figure of the globe, which displayed the

motions of the sun and moon, and the five planets, or wandering stars,

could not be represented by the primitive solid globe; and that in this

the invention of Archimedes was admirable, because he had calculated

how a single revolution should maintain unequal and diversified

progressions in dissimilar motions. In fact, when Gallus moved this

globe, we observed that the moon succeeded the sun by as many turns of

the wheel in the machine as days in the heavens. From whence it

resulted that the progress of the sun was marked as in the heavens, and

that the moon touched the point where she is obscured by the earth's

shadow at the instant the sun appears opposite.[298] * * *

XV. * * *[299] I had myself a great affection for this Gallus, and I

know that he was very much beloved and esteemed by my father Paulus. I

recollect that when I was very young, when my father, as consul,

commanded in Macedonia, and we were in the camp, our army was seized

with a pious terror, because suddenly, in a clear night, the bright and

full moon became eclipsed. And Gallus, who was then our lieutenant, the

year before that in which he was elected consul, hesitated not, next

morning, to state in the camp that it was no prodigy, and that the

phenomenon which had then appeared would always appear at certain

periods, when the sun was so placed that he could not affect the moon

with his light.

But do you mean, said Tubero, that he dared to speak thus to men almost

entirely uneducated and ignorant?

_Scipio._ He did, and with great * * * for his opinion was no result of

insolent ostentation, nor was his language unbecoming the dignity of so

wise a man: indeed, he performed a very noble action in thus freeing

his countrymen from the terrors of an idle superstition.

XVI. And they relate that in a similar way, in the great war in which

the Athenians and Lacedæmonians contended with such violent resentment,

the famous Pericles, the first man of his country in credit, eloquence,

and political genius, observing the Athenians overwhelmed with an

excessive alarm during an eclipse of the sun which caused a sudden

darkness, told them, what he had learned in the school of Anaxagoras,

that these phenomena necessarily happened at precise and regular

periods when the body of the moon was interposed between the sun and

the earth, and that if they happened not before every new moon, still

they could not possibly happen except at the exact time of the new

moon. And when he had proved this truth by his reasonings, he freed the

people from their alarms; for at that period the doctrine was new and

unfamiliar that the sun was accustomed to be eclipsed by the

interposition of the moon, which fact they say that Thales of Miletus

was the first to discover. Afterward my friend Ennius appears to have

been acquainted with the same theory, who, writing about 350[300] years

after the foundation of Rome, says, "In the nones of June the sun was

covered by the moon and night." The calculations in the astronomical

art have attained such perfection that from that day, thus described to

us by Ennius and recorded in the pontifical registers, the anterior

eclipses of the sun have been computed as far back as the nones of July

in the reign of Romulus, when that eclipse took place, in the obscurity

of which it was affirmed that Virtue bore Romulus to heaven, in spite

of the perishable nature which carried him off by the common fate of

humanity.

XVII. Then said Tubero: Do not you think, Scipio, that this

astronomical science, which every day proves so useful, just now

appeared in a different light to you,[301] * * * which the rest may

see. Moreover, who can think anything in human affairs of brilliant

importance who has penetrated this starry empire of the gods? Or who

can think anything connected with mankind long who has learned to

estimate the nature of eternity? or glorious who is aware of the

insignificance of the size of the earth, even in its whole extent, and

especially in the portion which men inhabit? And when we consider that

almost imperceptible point which we ourselves occupy unknown to the

majority of nations, can we still hope that our name and reputation can

be widely circulated? And then our estates and edifices, our cattle,

and the enormous treasures of our gold and silver, can they be esteemed

or denominated as desirable goods by him who observes their perishable

profit, and their contemptible use, and their uncertain domination,

often falling into the possession of the very worst men? How happy,

then, ought we to esteem that man who alone has it in his power, not by

the law of the Romans, but by the privilege of philosophers, to enjoy

all things as his own; not by any civil bond, but by the common right

of nature, which denies that anything can really be possessed by any

one but him who understands its true nature and use; who reckons our

dictatorships and consulships rather in the rank of necessary offices

than desirable employments, and thinks they must be endured rather as

acquittances of our debt to our country than sought for the sake of

emolument or glory--the man, in short, who can apply to himself the

sentence which Cato tells us my ancestor Africanus loved to repeat,

"that he was never so busy as when he did nothing, and never less

solitary than when alone."

For who can believe that Dionysius, when after every possible effort he

ravished from his fellow-citizens their liberty, had performed a nobler

work than Archimedes, when, without appearing to be doing anything, he

manufactured the globe which we have just been describing? Who does not

see that those men are in reality more solitary who, in the midst of a

crowd, find no one with whom they can converse congenially than those

who, without witnesses, hold communion with themselves, and enter into

the secret counsels of the sagest philosophers, while they delight

themselves in their writings and discoveries? And who would think any

one richer than the man who is in want of nothing which nature

requires; or more powerful than he who has attained all that she has

need of; or happier than he who is free from all mental perturbation;

or more secure in future than he who carries all his property in

himself, which is thus secured from shipwreck? And what power, what

magistracy, what royalty, can be preferred to a wisdom which, looking

down on all terrestrial objects as low and transitory things,

incessantly directs its attention to eternal and immutable verities,

and which is persuaded that though others are called men, none are

really so but those who are refined by the appropriate acts of

humanity?

In this sense an expression of Plato or some other philosopher appears

to me exceedingly elegant, who, when a tempest had driven his ship on

an unknown country and a desolate shore, during the alarms with which

their ignorance of the region inspired his companions, observed, they

say, geometrical figures traced in the sand, on which he immediately

told them to be of good cheer, for he had observed the indications of

Man. A conjecture he deduced, not from the cultivation of the soil

which he beheld, but from the symbols of science. For this reason,

Tubero, learning and learned men, and these your favorite studies, have

always particularly pleased me.

XVIII. Then Lælius replied: I cannot venture, Scipio, to answer your

arguments, or to [maintain the discussion either against] you, Philus,

or Manilius.[302] * * *

We had a friend in Tubero's father's family, who in these respects may

serve him as a model.

Sextus so wise, and ever on his guard.

Wise and cautious indeed he was, as Ennius justly describes him--not

because he searched for what he could never find, but because he knew

how to answer those who prayed for deliverance from cares and

difficulties. It is he who, reasoning against the astronomical studies

of Gallus, used frequently to repeat these words of Achilles in the

Iphigenia[303]:

They note the astrologic signs of heaven,

Whene'er the goats or scorpions of great Jove,

Or other monstrous names of brutal forms,

Rise in the zodiac; but not one regards

The sensible facts of earth, on which we tread,

While gazing on the starry prodigies.

He used, however, to say (and I have often listened to him with

pleasure) that for his part he thought that Zethus, in the piece of

Pacuvius, was too inimical to learning. He much preferred the

Neoptolemus of Ennius, who professes himself desirous of philosophizing

only in moderation; for that he did not think it right to be wholly

devoted to it. But though the studies of the Greeks have so many charms

for you, there are others, perhaps, nobler and more extensive, which we

may be better able to apply to the service of real life, and even to

political affairs. As to these abstract sciences, their utility, if

they possess any, lies principally in exciting and stimulating the

abilities of youth, so that they more easily acquire more important

accomplishments.

XIX. Then Tubero said: I do not mean to disagree with you, Lælius; but,

pray, what do you call more important studies?

_Lælius._ I will tell you frankly, though perhaps you will think

lightly of my opinion, since you appeared so eager in interrogating

Scipio respecting the celestial phenomena; but I happen to think that

those things which are every day before our eyes are more particularly

deserving of our attention. Why should the child of Paulus Æmilius, the

nephew of Æmilius, the descendant of such a noble family and so

glorious a republic, inquire how there can be two suns in heaven, and

not ask how there can be two senates in one Commonwealth, and, as it

were, two distinct peoples? For, as you see, the death of Tiberius

Gracchus, and the whole system of his tribuneship, has divided one

people into two parties. But the slanderers and the enemies of Scipio,

encouraged by P. Crassus and Appius Claudius, maintained, after the

death of these two chiefs, a division of nearly half the senate, under

the influence of Metellus and Mucius. Nor would they permit the

man[304] who alone could have been of service to help us out of our

difficulties during the movement of the Latins and their allies towards

rebellion, violating all our treaties in the presence of factious

triumvirs, and creating every day some fresh intrigue, to the

disturbance of the worthier and wealthier citizens. This is the reason,

young men, if you will listen to me, why you should regard this new sun

with less alarm; for, whether it does exist, or whether it does not

exist, it is, as you see, quite harmless to us. As to the manner of its

existence, we can know little or nothing; and even if we obtained the

most perfect understanding of it, this knowledge would make us but

little wiser or happier. But that there should exist a united people

and a united senate is a thing which actually may be brought about, and

it will be a great evil if it is not; and that it does not exist at

present we are aware; and we see that if it can be effected, our lives

will be both better and happier.

XX. Then Mucius said: What, then, do you consider, my Lælius, should be

our best arguments in endeavoring to bring about the object of your

wishes?

_Lælius._ Those sciences and arts which teach us how we may be most

useful to the State; for I consider that the most glorious office of

wisdom, and the noblest proof and business of virtue. In order,

therefore, that we may consecrate these holidays as much as possible to

conversations which may be profitable to the Commonwealth, let us beg

Scipio to explain to us what in his estimation appears to be the best

form of government. Then let us pass on to other points, the knowledge

of which may lead us, as I hope, to sound political views, and unfold

the causes of the dangers which now threaten us.

XXI. When Philus, Manilius, and Mummius had all expressed their great

approbation of this idea[305] * * * I have ventured [to open our

discussion] in this way, not only because it is but just that on State

politics the chief man in the State should be the principal speaker,

but also because I recollect that you, Scipio, were formerly very much

in the habit of conversing with Panætius and Polybius, two Greeks,

exceedingly learned in political questions, and that you are master of

many arguments by which you prove that by far the best condition of

government is that which our ancestors have handed down to us. And as

you, therefore, are familiar with this subject, if you will explain to

us your views respecting the general principles of a state (I speak for

my friends as well as myself), we shall feel exceedingly obliged to

you.

XXII. Then Scipio said: I must acknowledge that there is no subject of

meditation to which my mind naturally turns with more ardor and

intensity than this very one which Lælius has proposed to us. And,

indeed, as I see that in every profession, every artist who would

distinguish himself, thinks of, and aims at, and labors for no other

object but that of attaining perfection in his art, should not I, whose

main business, according to the example of my father and my ancestors,

is the advancement and right administration of government, be

confessing myself more indolent than any common mechanic if I were to

bestow on this noblest of sciences less attention and labor than they

devote to their insignificant trades? However, I am neither entirely

satisfied with the decisions which the greatest and wisest men of

Greece have left us; nor, on the other hand, do I venture to prefer my

own opinions to theirs. Therefore, I must request you not to consider

me either entirely ignorant of the Grecian literature, nor yet

disposed, especially in political questions, to yield it the

pre-eminence over our own; but rather to regard me as a true-born

Roman, not illiberally instructed by the care of my father, and

inflamed with the desire of knowledge, even from my boyhood, but still

even more familiar with domestic precepts and practices than the

literature of books.

XXIII. On this Philus said: I have no doubt, my Scipio, that no one is

superior to you in natural genius, and that you are very far superior

to every one in the practical experience of national government and of

important business. We are also acquainted with the course which your

studies have at all times taken; and if, as you say, you have given so

much attention to this science and art of politics, we cannot be too

much obliged to Lælius for introducing the subject: for I trust that

what we shall hear from you will be far more useful and available than

all the writings put together which the Greeks have written for us.

Then Scipio replied: You are raising a very high expectation of my

discourse, such as is a most oppressive burden to a man who is required

to discuss grave subjects.

And Philus said: Although that may be a difficulty, my Scipio, still

you will be sure to conquer it, as you always do; nor is there any

danger of eloquence failing you, when you begin to speak on the affairs

of a commonwealth.

XXIV. Then Scipio proceeded: I will do what you wish, as far as I can;

and I shall enter into the discussion under favor of that rule which, I

think, should be adopted by all persons in disputations of this kind,

if they wish to avoid being misunderstood; namely, that when men have

agreed respecting the proper name of the matter under discussion, it

should be stated what that name exactly means, and what it legitimately

includes. And when that point is settled, then it is fit to enter on

the discussion; for it will never be possible to arrive at an

understanding of what the character of the subject of the discussion

is, unless one first understands exactly what it is. Since, then, our

investigations relate to a commonwealth, we must first examine what

this name properly signifies.

And when Lælius had intimated his approbation of this course, Scipio

continued:

I shall not adopt, said he, in so clear and simple a manner that system

of discussion which goes back to first principles; as learned men often

do in this sort of discussion, so as to go back to the first meeting of

male and female, and then to the first birth and formation of the first

family, and define over and over again what there is in words, and in

how many manners each thing is stated. For, as I am speaking to men of

prudence, who have acted with the greatest glory in the Commonwealth,

both in peace and war, I will take care not to allow the subject of the

discussion itself to be clearer than my explanation of it. Nor have I

undertaken this task with the design of examining all its minuter

points, like a school-master; nor will I promise you in the following

discourse not to omit any single particular.

Then Lælius said: For my part, I am impatient for exactly that kind of

disquisition which you promise us.

XXV. Well, then, said Africanus, a commonwealth is a constitution of

the entire people. But the people is not every association of men,

however congregated, but the association of the entire number, bound

together by the compact of justice, and the communication of utility.

The first cause of this association is not so much the weakness of man

as a certain spirit of congregation which naturally belongs to him. For

the human race is not a race of isolated individuals, wandering and

solitary; but it is so constituted that even in the affluence of all

things [and without any need of reciprocal assistance, it spontaneously

seeks society].

XXVI. [It is necessary to presuppose] these original seeds, as it were,

since we cannot discover any primary establishment of the other

virtues, or even of a commonwealth itself. These unions, then, formed

by the principle which I have mentioned, established their headquarters

originally in certain central positions, for the convenience of the

whole population; and having fortified them by natural and artificial

means, they called this collection of houses a city or town,

distinguished by temples and public squares. Every people, therefore,

which consists of such an association of the entire multitude as I have

described, every city which consists of an assemblage of the people,

and every commonwealth which embraces every member of these

associations, must be regulated by a certain authority, in order to be

permanent.

This intelligent authority should always refer itself to that grand

first principle which established the Commonwealth. It must be

deposited in the hands of one supreme person, or intrusted to the

administration of certain delegated rulers, or undertaken by the whole

multitude. When the direction of all depends on one person, we call

this individual a king, and this form of political constitution a

kingdom. When it is in the power of privileged delegates, the State is

said to be ruled by an aristocracy; and when the people are all in all,

they call it a democracy, or popular constitution. And if the tie of

social affection, which originally united men in political associations

for the sake of public interest, maintains its force, each of these

forms of government is, I will not say perfect, nor, in my opinion,

essentially good, but tolerable, and such that one may accidentally be

better than another: either a just and wise king, or a selection of the

most eminent citizens, or even the populace itself (though this is the

least commendable form), may, if there be no interference of crime and

cupidity, form a constitution sufficiently secure.

XXVII. But in a monarchy the other members of the State are often too

much deprived of public counsel and jurisdiction; and under the rule of

an aristocracy the multitude can hardly possess its due share of

liberty, since it is allowed no share in the public deliberation, and

no power. And when all things are carried by a democracy, although it

be just and moderate, yet its very equality is a culpable levelling,

inasmuch as it allows no gradations of rank. Therefore, even if Cyrus,

the King of the Persians, was a most righteous and wise monarch, I

should still think that the interest of the people (for this is, as I

have said before, the same as the Commonwealth) could not be very

effectually promoted when all things depended on the beck and nod of

one individual. And though at present the people of Marseilles, our

clients, are governed with the greatest justice by elected magistrates

of the highest rank, still there is always in this condition of the

people a certain appearance of servitude; and when the Athenians, at a

certain period, having demolished their Areopagus, conducted all public

affairs by the acts and decrees of the democracy alone, their State, as

it no longer contained a distinct gradation of ranks, was no longer

able to retain its original fair appearance.

XXVIII. I have reasoned thus on the three forms of government, not

looking on them in their disorganized and confused conditions, but in

their proper and regular administration. These three particular forms,

however, contained in themselves, from the first, the faults and

defects I have mentioned; but they have also other dangerous vices, for

there is not one of these three forms of government which has not a

precipitous and slippery passage down to some proximate abuse. For,

after thinking of that endurable, or, as you will have it, most amiable

king, Cyrus--to name him in preference to any one else--then, to

produce a change in our minds, we behold the barbarous Phalaris, that

model of tyranny, to which the monarchical authority is easily abused

by a facile and natural inclination. And, in like manner, along-side of

the wise aristocracy of Marseilles, we might exhibit the oligarchical

faction of the thirty tyrants which once existed at Athens. And, not to

seek for other instances, among the same Athenians, we can show you

that when unlimited power was cast into the hands of the people, it

inflamed the fury of the multitude, and aggravated that universal

license which ruined their State.[306] * * *

XXIX. The worst condition of things sometimes results from a confusion

of those factious tyrannies into which kings, aristocrats, and

democrats are apt to degenerate. For thus, from these diverse elements,

there occasionally arises (as I have said before) a new kind of

government. And wonderful indeed are the revolutions and periodical

returns in natural constitutions of such alternations and vicissitudes,

which it is the part of the wise politician to investigate with the

closest attention. But to calculate their approach, and to join to this

foresight the skill which moderates the course of events, and retains

in a steady hand the reins of that authority which safely conducts the

people through all the dangers to which they expose themselves, is the

work of a most illustrious citizen, and of almost divine genius.

There is a fourth kind of government, therefore, which, in my opinion,

is preferable to all these: it is that mixed and moderate government

which is composed of the three particular forms which I have already

noticed.

XXX. _Lælius._ I am not ignorant, Scipio, that such is your opinion,

for I have often heard you say so. But I do not the less desire, if it

is not giving you too much trouble, to hear which you consider the best

of these three forms of commonwealths. For it may be of some use in

considering[307] * * *

XXXI. * * * And each commonwealth corresponds to the nature and will of

him who governs it. Therefore, in no other constitution than that in

which the people exercise sovereign power has liberty any sure abode,

than which there certainly is no more desirable blessing. And if it be

not equally established for every one, it is not even liberty at all.

And how can there be this character of equality, I do not say under a

monarchy, where slavery is least disguised or doubtful, but even in

those constitutions in which the people are free indeed in words, for

they give their suffrages, they elect officers, they are canvassed and

solicited for magistracies; but yet they only grant those things which

they are obliged to grant whether they will or not, and which are not

really in their free power, though others ask them for them? For they

are not themselves admitted to the government, to the exercise of

public authority, or to offices of select judges, which are permitted

to those only of ancient families and large fortunes. But in a free

people, as among the Rhodians and Athenians, there is no citizen

who[308] * * *

XXXII. * * * No sooner is one man, or several, elevated by wealth and

power, than they say that * * * arise from their pride and arrogance,

when the idle and the timid give way, and bow down to the insolence of

riches. But if the people knew how to maintain its rights, then they

say that nothing could be more glorious and prosperous than democracy;

inasmuch as they themselves would be the sovereign dispensers of laws,

judgments, war, peace, public treaties, and, finally, of the fortune

and life of each individual citizen; and this condition of things is

the only one which, in their opinion, can be really called a

commonwealth, that is to say, a constitution of the people. It is on

this principle that, according to them, a people often vindicates its

liberty from the domination of kings and nobles; while, on the other

hand, kings are not sought for among free peoples, nor are the power

and wealth of aristocracies. They deny, moreover, that it is fair to

reject this general constitution of freemen, on account of the vices of

the unbridled populace; but that if the people be united and inclined,

and directs all its efforts to the safety and freedom of the community,

nothing can be stronger or more unchangeable; and they assert that this

necessary union is easily obtained in a republic so constituted that

the good of all classes is the same; while the conflicting interests

that prevail in other constitutions inevitably produce dissensions;

therefore, say they, when the senate had the ascendency, the republic

had no stability; and when kings possess the power, this blessing is

still more rare, since, as Ennius expresses it,

In kingdoms there's no faith, and little love.

Wherefore, since the law is the bond of civil society, and the justice

of the law equal, by what rule can the association of citizens be held

together, if the condition of the citizens be not equal? For if the

fortunes of men cannot be reduced to this equality--if genius cannot be

equally the property of all--rights, at least, should be equal among

those who are citizens of the same republic. For what is a republic but

an association of rights?[309] * * *

XXXIII. But as to the other political constitutions, these democratical

advocates do not think they are worthy of being distinguished by the

name which they claim. For why, say they, should we apply the name of

king, the title of Jupiter the Beneficent, and not rather the title of

tyrant, to a man ambitious of sole authority and power, lording it over

a degraded multitude? For a tyrant may be as merciful as a king may be

oppressive; so that the whole difference to the people is, whether they

serve an indulgent master or a cruel one, since serve some one they

must. But how could Sparta, at the period of the boasted superiority of

her political institution, obtain a constant enjoyment of just and

virtuous kings, when they necessarily received an hereditary monarch,

good, bad, or indifferent, because he happened to be of the blood

royal? As to aristocrats, Who will endure, say they, that men should

distinguish themselves by such a title, and that not by the voice of

the people, but by their own votes? For how is such a one judged to be

best either in learning, sciences, or arts?[310] * * *

XXXIV. * * * If it does so by hap-hazard, it will be as easily upset as

a vessel if the pilot were chosen by lot from among the passengers. But

if a people, being free, chooses those to whom it can trust

itself--and, if it desires its own preservation, it will always choose

the noblest--then certainly it is in the counsels of the aristocracy

that the safety of the State consists, especially as nature has not

only appointed that these superior men should excel the inferior sort

in high virtue and courage, but has inspired the people also with the

desire of obedience towards these, their natural lords. But they say

this aristocratical State is destroyed by the depraved opinions of men,

who, through ignorance of virtue (which, as it belongs to few, can be

discerned and appreciated by few), imagine that not only rich and

powerful men, but also those who are nobly born, are necessarily the

best. And so when, through this popular error, the riches, and not the

virtue, of a few men has taken possession of the State, these chiefs

obstinately retain the title of nobles, though they want the essence of

nobility. For riches, fame, and power, without wisdom and a just method

of regulating ourselves and commanding others, are full of discredit

and insolent arrogance; nor is there any kind of government more

deformed than that in which the wealthiest are regarded as the noblest.

But when virtue governs the Commonwealth, what can be more glorious?

When he who commands the rest is himself enslaved by no lust or

passion; when he himself exhibits all the virtues to which he incites

and educates the citizens; when he imposes no law on the people which

he does not himself observe, but presents his life as a living law to

his fellow-countrymen; if a single individual could thus suffice for

all, there would be no need of more; and if the community could find a

chief ruler thus worthy of all their suffrages, none would require

elected magistrates.

It was the difficulty of forming plans which transferred the government

from a king into the hands of many; and the error and temerity of the

people likewise transferred it from the hands of the many into those of

the few. Thus, between the weakness of the monarch and the rashness of

the multitude, the aristocrats have occupied the middle place, than

which nothing can be better arranged; and while they superintend the

public interest, the people necessarily enjoy the greatest possible

prosperity, being free from all care and anxiety, having intrusted

their security to others, who ought sedulously to defend it, and not

allow the people to suspect that their advantage is neglected by their

rulers.

For as to that equality of rights which democracies so loudly boast of,

it can never be maintained; for the people themselves, so dissolute and

so unbridled, are always inclined to flatter a number of demagogues;

and there is in them a very great partiality for certain men and

dignities, so that their equality, so called, becomes most unfair and

iniquitous. For as equal honor is given to the most noble and the most

infamous, some of whom must exist in every State, then the equity which

they eulogize becomes most inequitable--an evil which never can happen

in those states which are governed by aristocracies. These reasonings,

my Lælius, and some others of the same kind, are usually brought

forward by those that so highly extol this form of political

constitution.

XXXV. Then Lælius said: But you have not told us, Scipio, which of

these three forms of government you yourself most approve.

_Scipio._ You are right to shape your question, which of the three I

most approve, for there is not one of them which I approve at all by

itself, since, as I told you, I prefer that government which is mixed

and composed of all these forms, to any one of them taken separately.

But if I must confine myself to one of these particular forms simply

and exclusively, I must confess I prefer the royal one, and praise that

as the first and best. In this, which I here choose to call the

primitive form of government, I find the title of father attached to

that of king, to express that he watches over the citizens as over his

children, and endeavors rather to preserve them in freedom than reduce

them to slavery. So that it is more advantageous for those who are

insignificant in property and capacity to be supported by the care of

one excellent and eminently powerful man. The nobles here present

themselves, who profess that they can do all this in much better style;

for they say that there is much more wisdom in many than in one, and at

least as much faith and equity. And, last of all, come the people, who

cry with a loud voice that they will render obedience neither to the

one nor the few; that even to brute beasts nothing is so dear as

liberty; and that all men who serve either kings or nobles are deprived

of it. Thus, the kings attract us by affection, the nobles by talent,

the people by liberty; and in the comparison it is hard to choose the

best.

_Lælius._ I think so too, but yet it is impossible to despatch the

other branches of the question, if you leave this primary point

undetermined.

XXXVI. _Scipio._ We must then, I suppose, imitate Aratus, who, when he

prepared himself to treat of great things, thought himself in duty

bound to begin with Jupiter.

_Lælius._ Wherefore Jupiter? and what is there in this discussion which

resembles that poem?

_Scipio._ Why, it serves to teach us that we cannot better commence our

investigations than by invoking him whom, with one voice, both learned

and unlearned extol as the universal king of all gods and men.

How so? said Lælius.

Do you, then, asked Scipio, believe in nothing which is not before your

eyes? whether these ideas have been established by the chiefs of states

for the benefit of society, that there might be believed to exist one

Universal Monarch in heaven, at whose nod (as Homer expresses it) all

Olympus trembles, and that he might be accounted both king and father

of all creatures; for there is great authority, and there are many

witnesses, if you choose to call all many, who attest that all nations

have unanimously recognized, by the decrees of their chiefs, that

nothing is better than a king, since they think that all the Gods are

governed by the divine power of one sovereign; or if we suspect that

this opinion rests on the error of the ignorant, and should be classed

among the fables, let us listen to those universal testimonies of

erudite men, who have, as it were, seen with their eyes those things to

the knowledge of which we can hardly attain by report.

What men do you mean? said Lælius.

Those, replied Scipio, who, by the investigation of nature, have

arrived at the opinion that the whole universe [is animated] by a

single Mind[311]. * * *

XXXVII. But if you please, my Lælius, I will bring forward evidences

which are neither too ancient nor in any respect barbarous.

Those, said Lælius, are what I want.

_Scipio._ You are aware that it is now not four centuries since this

city of ours has been without kings.

_Lælius._ You are correct; it is less than four centuries.

_Scipio._ Well, then, what are four centuries in the age of a state or

city? is it a long time?

_Lælius._ It hardly amounts to the age of maturity.

_Scipio._ You say truly; and yet not four centuries have elapsed since

there was a king in Rome.

_Lælius._ And he was a proud king.

_Scipio._ But who was his predecessor?

_Lælius._ He was an admirably just one; and, indeed, we must bestow the

same praise on all his predecessors as far back as Romulus, who reigned

about six centuries ago.

_Scipio._ Even he, then, is not very ancient.

_Lælius._ No; he reigned when Greece was already becoming old.

_Scipio._ Agreed. Was Romulus, then, think you, king of a barbarous

people?

_Lælius._ Why, as to that, if we were to follow the example of the

Greeks, who say that all people are either Greeks or barbarians, I am

afraid that we must confess that he was a king of barbarians; but if

this name belongs rather to manners than to languages, then I believe

the Greeks were just as barbarous as the Romans.

Then Scipio said: But with respect to the present question, we do not

so much need to inquire into the nation as into the disposition. For if

intelligent men, at a period so little remote, desired the government

of kings, you will confess that I am producing authorities that are

neither antiquated, rude, nor insignificant.

XXXVIII. Then Lælius said: I see, Scipio, that you are very

sufficiently provided with authorities; but with me, as with every fair

judge, authorities are worth less than arguments.

Scipio replied: Then, Lælius, you shall yourself make use of an

argument derived from your own senses.

_Lælius._ What senses do you mean?

_Scipio._ The feelings which you experience when at any time you happen

to feel angry with any one.

_Lælius._ That happens rather oftener than I could wish.

_Scipio._ Well, then, when you are angry, do you permit your anger to

triumph over your judgment?

No, by Hercules! said Lælius; I imitate the famous Archytas of

Tarentum, who, when he came to his villa, and found all its

arrangements were contrary to his orders, said to his steward, "Ah! you

unlucky scoundrel, I would flog you to death, if it were not that I am

in a rage with you."

Capital, said Scipio. Archytas, then, regarded unreasonable anger as a

kind of sedition and rebellion of nature which he sought to appease by

reflection. And so, if we examine avarice, the ambition of power or of

glory, or the lusts of concupiscence and licentiousness, we shall find

a certain conscience in the mind of man, which, like a king, sways by

the force of counsel all the inferior faculties and propensities; and

this, in truth, is the noblest portion of our nature; for when

conscience reigns, it allows no resting-place to lust, violence, or

temerity.

_Lælius._ You have spoken the truth.

_Scipio._ Well, then, does a mind thus governed and regulated meet your

approbation?

_Lælius._ More than anything upon earth.

_Scipio._ Then you would not approve that the evil passions, which are

innumerable, should expel conscience, and that lusts and animal

propensities should assume an ascendency over us?

_Lælius._ For my part, I can conceive nothing more wretched than a mind

thus degraded, or a man animated by a soul so licentious.

_Scipio._ You desire, then, that all the faculties of the mind should

submit to a ruling power, and that conscience should reign over them

all?

_Lælius._ Certainly, that is my wish.

_Scipio._ How, then, can you doubt what opinion to form on the subject

of the Commonwealth? in which, if the State is thrown into many hands,

it is very plain that there will be no presiding authority; for if

power be not united, it soon comes to nothing.

XXXIX. Then Lælius asked: But what difference is there, I should like

to know, between the one and the many, if justice exists equally in

many?

And Scipio said: Since I see, my Lælius, that the authorities I have

adduced have no great influence on you, I must continue to employ you

yourself as my witness in proof of what I am saying.

In what way, said Lælius, are you going to make me again support your

argument?

_Scipio._ Why, thus: I recollect, when we were lately at Formiæ, that

you told your servants repeatedly to obey the orders of more than one

master only.

_Lælius._ To be sure, those of my steward.

_Scipio._ What do you at home? Do you commit your affairs to the hands

of many persons?

_Lælius._ No, I trust them to myself alone.

_Scipio._ Well, in your whole establishment, is there any other master

but yourself?

_Lælius._ Not one.

_Scipio._ Then I think you must grant me that, as respects the State,

the government of single individuals, provided they are just, is

superior to any other.

_Lælius._ You have conducted me to this conclusion, and I entertain

very nearly that opinion.

XL. And Scipio said: You would still further agree with me, my Lælius,

if, omitting the common comparisons, that one pilot is better fitted to

steer a ship, and a physician to treat an invalid, provided they be

competent men in their respective professions, than many could be, I

should come at once to more illustrious examples.

_Lælius._ What examples do you mean?

_Scipio._ Do not you observe that it was the cruelty and pride of one

single Tarquin only that made the title of king unpopular among the

Romans?

_Lælius._ Yes, I acknowledge that.

_Scipio._ You are also aware of this fact, on which I think I shall

debate in the course of the coming discussion, that after the expulsion

of King Tarquin, the people was transported by a wonderful excess of

liberty. Then innocent men were driven into banishment; then the

estates of many individuals were pillaged, consulships were made

annual, public authorities were overawed by mobs, popular appeals took

place in all cases imaginable; then secessions of the lower orders

ensued, and, lastly, those proceedings which tended to place all powers

in the hands of the populace.

_Lælius._ I must confess this is all too true.

All these things now, said Scipio, happened during periods of peace and

tranquillity, for license is wont to prevail when there is little to

fear, as in a calm voyage or a trifling disease. But as we observe the

voyager and the invalid implore the aid of some one competent director,

as soon as the sea grows stormy and the disease alarming, so our nation

in peace and security commands, threatens, resists, appeals from, and

insults its magistrates, but in war obeys them as strictly as kings;

for public safety is, after all, rather more valuable than popular

license. And in the most serious wars, our countrymen have even chosen

the entire command to be deposited in the hands of some single chief,

without a colleague; the very name of which magistrate indicates the

absolute character of his power. For though he is evidently called

dictator because he is appointed (dicitur), yet do we still observe

him, my Lælius, in our sacred books entitled Magister Populi (the

master of the people).

This is certainly the case, said Lælius.

Our ancestors, therefore, said Scipio, acted wisely.[312] * * *

XLI. When the people is deprived of a just king, as Ennius says, after

the death of one of the best of monarchs,

They hold his memory dear, and, in the warmth

Of their discourse, they cry, O Romulus!

O prince divine, sprung from the might of Mars

To be thy country's guardian! O our sire!

Be our protector still, O heaven-begot!

Not heroes, nor lords alone, did they call those whom they lawfully

obeyed; nor merely as kings did they proclaim them; but they pronounced

them their country's guardians, their fathers, and their Gods. Nor,

indeed, without cause, for they added,

Thou, Prince, hast brought us to the gates of light.

And truly they believed that life and honor and glory had arisen to

them from the justice of their king. The same good-will would doubtless

have remained in their descendants, if the same virtues had been

preserved on the throne; but, as you see, by the injustice of one man

the whole of that kind of constitution fell into ruin.

I see it indeed, said Lælius, and I long to know the history of these

political revolutions both in our own Commonwealth and in every other.

XLII. And Scipio said: When I shall have explained my opinion

respecting the form of government which I prefer, I shall be able to

speak to you more accurately respecting the revolutions of states,

though I think that such will not take place so easily in the mixed

form of government which I recommend. With respect, however, to

absolute monarchy, it presents an inherent and invincible tendency to

revolution. No sooner does a king begin to be unjust than this entire

form of government is demolished, and he at once becomes a tyrant,

which is the worst of all governments, and one very closely related to

monarchy. If this State falls into the hands of the nobles, which is

the usual course of events, it becomes an aristocracy, or the second of

the three kinds of constitutions which I have described; for it is, as

it were, a royal--that is to say, a paternal--council of the chief men

of the State consulting for the public benefit. Or if the people by

itself has expelled or slain a tyrant, it is moderate in its conduct as

long as it has sense and wisdom, and while it rejoices in its exploit,

and applies itself to maintaining the constitution which it has

established. But if ever the people has raised its forces against a

just king and robbed him of his throne, or, as has frequently happened,

has tasted the blood of its legitimate nobles, and subjected the whole

Commonwealth to its own license, you can imagine no flood or

conflagration so terrible, or any whose violence is harder to appease

than this unbridled insolence of the populace.

XLIII. Then we see realized that which Plato so vividly describes, if I

can but express it in our language. It is by no means easy to do it

justice in translation: however, I will try.

When, says Plato, the insatiate jaws of the populace are fired with the

thirst of liberty, and when the people, urged on by evil ministers,

drains in its thirst the cup, not of tempered liberty, but unmitigated

license, then the magistrates and chiefs, if they are not utterly

subservient and remiss, and shameless promoters of the popular

licentiousness, are pursued, incriminated, accused, and cried down

under the title of despots and tyrants. I dare say you recollect the

passage.

Yes, said Lælius, it is familiar to me.

_Scipio._ Plato thus proceeds: Then those who feel in duty bound to

obey the chiefs of the State are persecuted by the insensate populace,

who call them voluntary slaves. But those who, though invested with

magistracies, wish to be considered on an equality with private

individuals, and those private individuals who labor to abolish all

distinctions between their own class and the magistrates, are extolled

with acclamations and overwhelmed with honors, so that it inevitably

happens in a commonwealth thus revolutionized that liberalism abounds

in all directions, due authority is found wanting even in private

families, and misrule seems to extend even to the animals that witness

it. Then the father fears the son, and the son neglects the father. All

modesty is banished; they become far too liberal for that. No

difference is made between the citizen and the alien; the master dreads

and cajoles his scholars, and the scholars despise their masters. The

young men assume the gravity of sages, and sages must stoop to the

follies of children, lest they should be hated and oppressed by them.

The very slaves even are under but little restraint; wives boast the

same rights as their husbands; dogs, horses, and asses are emancipated

in this outrageous excess of freedom, and run about so violently that

they frighten the passengers from the road. At length the termination

of all this infinite licentiousness is, that the minds of the citizens

become so fastidious and effeminate, that when they observe even the

slightest exertion of authority they grow angry and seditious, and thus

the laws begin to be neglected, so that the people are absolutely

without any master at all.

Then Lælius said: You have very accurately rendered the opinions which

he expressed.

XLIV. _Scipio._ Now, to return to the argument of my discourse. It

appears that this extreme license, which is the only liberty in the

eyes of the vulgar, is, according to Plato, such that from it as a sort

of root tyrants naturally arise and spring up. For as the excessive

power of an aristocracy occasions the destruction of the nobles, so

this excessive liberalism of democracies brings after it the slavery of

the people. Thus we find in the weather, the soil, and the animal

constitution the most favorable conditions are sometimes suddenly

converted by their excess into the contrary, and this fact is

especially observable in political governments; and this excessive

liberty soon brings the people collectively and individually to an

excessive servitude. For, as I said, this extreme liberty easily

introduces the reign of tyranny, the severest of all unjust slaveries.

In fact, from the midst of this unbridled and capricious populace, they

elect some one as a leader in opposition to their afflicted and

expelled nobles: some new chief, forsooth, audacious and impure, often

insolently persecuting those who have deserved well of the State, and

ready to gratify the populace at his neighbor's expense as well as his

own. Then, since the private condition is naturally exposed to fears

and alarms, the people invest him with many powers, and these are

continued in his hands. Such men, like Pisistratus of Athens, will soon

find an excuse for surrounding themselves with body-guards, and they

will conclude by becoming tyrants over the very persons who raised them

to dignity. If such despots perish by the vengeance of the better

citizens, as is generally the case, the constitution is re-established;

but if they fall by the hands of bold insurgents, then the same faction

succeeds them, which is only another species of tyranny. And the same

revolution arises from the fair system of aristocracy when any

corruption has betrayed the nobles from the path of rectitude. Thus the

power is like the ball which is flung from hand to hand: it passes from

kings to tyrants, from tyrants to the aristocracy, from them to

democracy, and from these back again to tyrants and to factions; and

thus the same kind of government is seldom long maintained.

XLV. Since these are the facts of experience, royalty is, in my

opinion, very far preferable to the three other kinds of political

constitutions. But it is itself inferior to that which is composed of

an equal mixture of the three best forms of government, united and

modified by one another. I wish to establish in a commonwealth a royal

and pre-eminent chief. Another portion of power should be deposited in

the hands of the aristocracy, and certain things should be reserved to

the judgment and wish of the multitude. This constitution, in the first

place, possesses that great equality without which men cannot long

maintain their freedom; secondly, it offers a great stability, while

the particular separate and isolated forms easily fall into their

contraries; so that a king is succeeded by a despot, an aristocracy by

a faction, a democracy by a mob and confusion; and all these forms are

frequently sacrificed to new revolutions. In this united and mixed

constitution, however, similar disasters cannot happen without the

greatest vices in public men. For there can be little to occasion

revolution in a state in which every person is firmly established in

his appropriate rank, and there are but few modes of corruption into

which we can fall.

XLVI. But I fear, Lælius, and you, my amiable and learned friends, that

if I were to dwell any longer on this argument, my words would seem

rather like the lessons of a master, and not like the free conversation

of one who is uniting with you in the consideration of truth. I shall

therefore pass on to those things which are familiar to all, and which

I have long studied. And in these matters I believe, I feel, and I

affirm that of all governments there is none which, either in its

entire constitution or the distribution of its parts, or in the

discipline of its manners, is comparable to that which our fathers

received from our earliest ancestors, and which they have handed down

to us. And since you wish to hear from me a development of this

constitution, with which you are all acquainted, I shall endeavor to

explain its true character and excellence. Thus keeping my eye fixed on

the model of our Roman Commonwealth, I shall endeavor to accommodate to

it all that I have to say on the best form of government. And by

treating the subject in this way, I think I shall be able to accomplish

most satisfactorily the task which Lælius has imposed on me.

XLVII. _Lælius._ It is a task most properly and peculiarly your own, my

Scipio; for who can speak so well as you either on the subject of the

institutions of our ancestors, since you yourself are descended from

most illustrious ancestors, or on that of the best form of a

constitution which, if we possess (though at this moment we do not,

still), when we do possess such a thing, who will be more flourishing

in it than you? or on that of providing counsels for the future, as

you, who, by dispelling two mighty perils from our city, have provided

for its safety forever?

FRAGMENTS.

XLVIII. As our country is the source of the greatest benefits, and is a

parent dearer than those who have given us life, we owe her still

warmer gratitude than belongs to our human relations. * * *

Nor would Carthage have continued to flourish during six centuries

without wisdom and good institutions. * * *

In truth, says Cicero, although the reasonings of those men may contain

most abundant fountains of science and virtue; still, if we compare

them with the achievements and complete actions of statesmen, they will

seem not to have been of so much service in the actual business of men

as of amusement for their leisure.

* * * * *

INTRODUCTION TO THE SECOND BOOK,

BY THE ORIGINAL TRANSLATOR.

In this second book of his Commonwealth, Cicero gives us a

spirited and eloquent review of the history and successive

developments of the Roman constitution. He bestows the

warmest praises on its early kings, points out the great

advantages which had resulted from its primitive monarchical

system, and explains how that system had been gradually

broken up. In order to prove the importance of reviving it,

he gives a glowing picture of the evils and disasters that

had befallen the Roman State in consequence of that

overcharge of democratic folly and violence which had

gradually gained an alarming preponderance, and describes,

with a kind of prophetic sagacity, the fruit of his political

experience, the subsequent revolutions of the Roman State,

which such a state of things would necessarily bring about.