CHAPTER XIV.

VIEWS ON MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE.

The widespread discussion we are having, just now, on the subject of

marriage and divorce, reminds me of an equally exciting one in 1860. A

very liberal bill, introduced into the Indiana legislature by Robert

Dale Owen, and which passed by a large majority, roused much public

thought on the question, and made that State free soil for unhappy wives

and husbands. A similar bill was introduced into the legislature of New

York by Mr. Ramsey, which was defeated by four votes, owing, mainly, to

the intense opposition of Horace Greeley. He and Mr. Owen had a

prolonged discussion, in the New York _Tribune_, in which Mr. Owen got

decidedly the better of the argument.

There had been several aggravated cases of cruelty to wives among the

Dutch aristocracy, so that strong influences in favor of the bill had

been brought to bear on the legislature, but the _Tribune_ thundered

every morning in its editorial column its loudest peals, which

reverberated through the State. So bitter was the opposition to divorce,

for any cause, that but few dared to take part in the discussion. I was

the only woman, for many years, who wrote and spoke on the question.

Articles on divorce, by a number of women, recently published in the

_North American Review_, are a sign of progress, showing that women dare

speak out now more freely on the relations that most deeply concern

them.

My feelings had been stirred to their depths very early in life by the

sufferings of a dear friend of mine, at whose wedding I was one of the

bridesmaids. In listening to the facts in her case, my mind was fully

made up as to the wisdom of a liberal divorce law. We read Milton's

essays on divorce, together, and were thoroughly convinced as to the

right and duty not only of separation, but of absolute divorce. While

the New York bill was pending, I was requested, by Lewis Benedict, one

of the committee who had the bill in charge, to address the legislature.

I gladly accepted, feeling that here was an opportunity not only to

support my friend in the step she had taken, but to make the path clear

for other unhappy wives who might desire to follow her example. I had no

thought of the persecution I was drawing down on myself for thus

attacking so venerable an institution. I was always courageous in saying

what I saw to be true, for the simple reason that I never dreamed of

opposition. What seemed to me to be right I thought must be equally

plain to all other rational beings. Hence I had no dread of

denunciation. I was only surprised when I encountered it, and no number

of experiences have, as yet, taught me to fear public opinion. What I

said on divorce thirty-seven years ago seems quite in line with what

many say now. The trouble was not in what I said, but that I said it too

soon, and before the people were ready to hear it. It may be, however,

that I helped them to get ready; who knows?

As we were holding a woman suffrage convention in Albany, at the time

appointed for the hearing, Ernestine L. Rose and Lucretia Mott briefly

added their views on the question. Although Mrs. Mott had urged Mrs.

Rose and myself to be as moderate as possible in our demands, she quite

unconsciously made the most radical utterance of all, in saying that

marriage was a question beyond the realm of legislation, that must be

left to the parties themselves. We rallied Lucretia on her radicalism,

and some of the journals criticised us severely; but the following

letter shows that she had no thought of receding from her position:

"Roadside, near Philadelphia,

"4th Mo., 30th, '61.

"My Dear Lydia Mott:

"I have wished, ever since parting with thee and our other dear

friends in Albany, to send thee a line, and have only waited in the

hope of contributing a little 'substantial aid' toward your neat

and valuable 'depository.' The twenty dollars inclosed is from our

Female Anti-slavery Society.

"I see the annual meeting, in New York, is not to be held this

spring. Sister Martha is here, and was expecting to attend both

anniversaries. But we now think the woman's rights meeting had

better not be attempted, and she has written Elizabeth C. Stanton

to this effect.

"I was well satisfied with being at the Albany meeting. I have

since met with the following, from a speech of Lord Brougham's,

which pleased me, as being as radical as mine in your stately Hall

of Representatives:

"'Before women can have any justice by the laws of England, there

must be a total reconstruction of the whole marriage system; for

any attempt to amend it would prove useless. The great charter, in

establishing the supremacy of law over prerogative, provides only

for justice between man and man; for woman nothing is left but

common law, accumulations and modifications of original Gothic and

Roman heathenism, which no amount of filtration through

ecclesiastical courts could change into Christian laws. They are

declared unworthy a Christian people by great jurists; still they

remain unchanged.'

"So Elizabeth Stanton will see that I have authority for going to

the root of the evil.

"Thine,

"LUCRETIA MOTT."

Those of us who met in Albany talked the matter over in regard to a free

discussion of the divorce question at the coming convention in New York.

It was the opinion of those present that, as the laws on marriage and

divorce were very unequal for man and woman, this was a legitimate

subject for discussion on our platform; accordingly I presented a series

of resolutions, at the annual convention, in New York city, to which I

spoke for over an hour. I was followed by Antoinette L, Brown, who also

presented a series of resolutions in opposition to mine. She was, in

turn, answered by Ernestine L. Rose. Wendell Phillips then arose, and,

in an impressive manner pronounced the whole discussion irrelevant to

our platform, and moved that neither the speeches nor resolutions go on

the records of the convention. As I greatly admired Wendell Phillips,

and appreciated his good opinion, I was surprised and humiliated to find

myself under the ban of his disapprobation. My face was scarlet, and I

trembled with mingled feelings of doubt and fear--doubt as to the

wisdom of my position and fear lest the convention should repudiate the

whole discussion. My emotion was so apparent that Rev. Samuel

Longfellow, a brother of the poet, who sat beside me, whispered in my

ear, "Nevertheless you are right, and the convention will sustain you."

Mr. Phillips said that as marriage concerned man and woman alike, and

the laws bore equally on them, women had no special ground for

complaint, although, in my speech, I had quoted many laws to show the

reverse. Mr. Garrison and Rev. Antoinette L. Brown were alike opposed to

Mr. Phillips' motion, and claimed that marriage and divorce were

legitimate subjects for discussion on our platform. Miss Anthony closed

the debate. She said: "I hope Mr. Phillips will withdraw his motion that

these resolutions shall not appear on the records of the convention. I

am very sure that it would be contrary to all parliamentary usage to say

that, when the speeches which enforced and advocated the resolutions are

reported and published in the proceedings, the resolutions shall not be

placed there. And as to the point that this question does not belong to

this platform--from that I totally dissent. Marriage has ever been a

one-sided matter, resting most unequally upon the sexes. By it man gains

all; woman loses all; tyrant law and lust reign supreme with him; meek

submission and ready obedience alone befit her. Woman has never been

consulted; her wish has never been taken into consideration as regards

the terms of the marriage compact. By law, public sentiment, and

religion,--from the time of Moses down to the present day,--woman has

never been thought of other than as a piece of property, to be disposed

of at the will and pleasure of man. And at this very hour, by our

statute books, by our (so-called) enlightened Christian civilization,

she has no voice whatever in saying what shall be the basis of the

relation. She must accept marriage as man proffers it, or not at all.

"And then, again, on Mr. Phillips' own ground, the discussion is

perfectly in order, since nearly all the wrongs of which we complain

grow out of the inequality of the marriage laws, that rob the wife of

the right to herself and her children; that make her the slave of the

man she marries. I hope, therefore, the resolutions will be allowed to

go out to the public; that there may be a fair report of the ideas which

have actually been presented here; that they may not be left to the

mercy of the secular press, I trust the convention will not vote to

forbid the publication of those resolutions with the proceedings."

Rev. William Hoisington (the blind preacher) followed Miss Anthony, and

said: "Publish all that you have done here, and let the public know it."

The question was then put, on the motion of Mr. Phillips, and it was

lost.

As Mr. Greeley, in commenting on the convention, took the same ground

with Mr. Phillips, that the laws on marriage and divorce were equal for

man and woman, I answered them in the following letter to the New York

_Tribune_.

"_To the Editor of the New York Tribune_:

"Sir: At our recent National Woman's Rights Convention many were

surprised to hear Wendell Phillips object to the question of

marriage and divorce as irrelevant to our platform. He said: 'We

had no right to discuss here any laws or customs but those where

inequality existed for the sexes; that the laws on marriage and

divorce rested equally on man and woman; that he suffers, as much

as she possibly could, the wrongs and abuses of an ill-assorted

marriage.'

"Now it must strike every careful thinker that an immense

difference rests in the fact that man has made the laws cunningly

and selfishly for his own purpose. From Coke down to Kent, who can

cite one clause of the marriage contract where woman has the

advantage? When man suffers from false legislation he has his

remedy in his own hands. Shall woman be denied the right of protest

against laws in which she had no voice; laws which outrage the

holiest affections of her nature; laws which transcend the limits

of human legislation, in a convention called for the express

purpose of considering her wrongs? He might as well object to a

protest against the injustice of hanging a woman, because capital

punishment bears equally on man and woman.

"The contract of marriage is by no means equal. The law permits the

girl to marry at twelve years of age, while it requires several

years more of experience on the part of the boy. In entering this

compact, the man gives up nothing that he before possessed, he is a

man still; while the legal existence of the woman is suspended

during marriage, and, henceforth, she is known but in and through

the husband. She is nameless, purseless, childless--though a woman,

an heiress, and a mother.

"Blackstone says: 'The husband and wife are one, and that one is

the husband.' Chancellor Kent, in his 'Commentaries' says: 'The

legal effects of marriage are generally deducible from the

principle of the common law, by which the husband and wife are

regarded as one person, and her legal existence and authority lost

or suspended during the continuance of the matrimonial union.'

"The wife is regarded by all legal authorities as a _feme covert_,

placed wholly _sub potestate viri_. Her moral responsibility, even,

is merged in her husband. The law takes it for granted that the

wife lives in fear of her husband; that his command is her highest

law; hence a wife is not punishable for the theft committed in the

presence of her husband. An unmarried woman can make contracts, sue

and be sued, enjoy the rights of property, to her inheritance--to

her wages--to her person--to her children; but, in marriage, she is

robbed by law of all and every natural and civil right. Kent

further says: 'The disability of the wife to contract, so as to

bind herself, arises not from want of discretion, but because she

has entered into an indissoluble connection by which she is placed

under the power and protection of her husband.' She is possessed of

certain rights until she is married; then all are suspended, to

revive, again, the moment the breath goes out of the husband's

body. (See 'Cowen's Treatise,' vol. 2, p. 709.)

"If the contract be equal, whence come the terms 'marital power,'

'marital rights,' 'obedience and restraint,' 'dominion and

control,' 'power and protection,' etc., etc.? Many cases are

stated, showing the exercise of a most questionable power over the

wife, sustained by the courts. (See 'Bishop on Divorce,' p. 489.)

"The laws on divorce are quite as unequal as those on marriage;

yea, far more so. The advantages seem to be all on one side and the

penalties on the other. In case of divorce, if the husband be not

the guilty party, the wife goes out of the partnership penniless.

(Kent, vol. 2, p. 33; 'Bishop on Divorce,' p. 492.)

"In New York, and some other States, the wife of the guilty husband

can now sue for a divorce in her own name, and the costs come out

of the husband's estate; but, in the majority of the States, she is

still compelled to sue in the name of another, as she has no means

for paying costs, even though she may have brought her thousands

into the partnership. 'The allowance to the innocent wife of _ad

interim_ alimony and money to sustain the suit, is not regarded as

a strict right in her, but of sound discretion in the court.'

('Bishop on Divorce,' p. 581.)

"'Many jurists,' says Kent, 'are of opinion that the adultery of

the husband ought not to be noticed or made subject to the same

animadversions as that of the wife, because it is not evidence of

such entire depravity nor equally injurious in its effects upon the

morals, good order, and happiness of the domestic life.

Montesquieu, Pothier, and Dr. Taylor all insist that the cases of

husband and wife ought to be distinguished, and that the violation

of the marriage vow, on the part of the wife, is the most

mischievous, and the prosecution ought to be confined to the

offense on her part. ("Esprit des Lois," tom. 3, 186; "Traité du

Contrat de Mariage," No. 516; "Elements of Civil Law," p. 254).'

"Say you, 'These are but the opinions of men'? On what else, I ask,

are the hundreds of women depending, who, this hour, demand in our

courts a release from burdensome contracts? Are not these delicate

matters left wholly to the discretion of courts? Are not young

women from the first families dragged into our courts,--into

assemblies of men exclusively,--the judges all men, the jurors all

men? No true woman there to shield them, by her presence, from

gross and impertinent questionings, to pity their misfortunes, or

to protest against their wrongs?

"The administration of justice depends far more on the opinions of

eminent jurists than on law alone, for law is powerless when at

variance with public sentiment.

"Do not the above citations clearly prove inequality? Are not the

very letter and spirit of the marriage contract based on the idea

of the supremacy of man as the keeper of woman's virtue--her sole

protector and support? Out of marriage, woman asks nothing, at this

hour, but the elective franchise. It is only in marriage that she

must demand her right to person, children, property, wages, life,

liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. How can we discuss all the

laws and conditions of marriage, without perceiving its essential

essence, end, and aim? Now, whether the institution of marriage be

human or divine, whether regarded as indissoluble by ecclesiastical

courts or dissoluble by civil courts, woman, finding herself

equally degraded in each and every phase of it, always the victim

of the institution, it is her right and her duty to sift the

relation and the compact through and through, until she finds out

the true cause of her false position. How can we go before the

legislatures of our respective States and demand new laws, or no

laws, on divorce, until we have some idea of what the true relation

is?

"We decide the whole question of slavery by settling the sacred

rights of the individual. We assert that man cannot hold property

in man, and reject the whole code of laws that conflicts with the

self-evident truth of the assertion.

"Again, I ask, is it possible to discuss all the laws of a

relation, and not touch the relation itself?

"Yours respectfully,

"Elizabeth Cady Stanton."

The discussion on the question of marriage and divorce occupied one

entire session of the convention, and called down on us severe

criticisms from the metropolitan and State press. So alarming were the

comments on what had been said that I began to feel that I had

inadvertently taken out the underpinning from the social system. Enemies

were unsparing in their denunciations, and friends ridiculed the whole

proceeding. I was constantly called on for a definition of marriage and

asked to describe home life as it would be when men changed their wives

every Christmas. Letters and newspapers poured in upon me, asking all

manner of absurd questions, until I often wept with vexation. So many

things, that I had neither thought nor said, were attributed to me that,

at times, I really doubted my own identity.

However, in the progress of events the excitement died away, the earth

seemed to turn on its axis as usual, women were given in marriage,

children were born, fires burned as brightly as ever at the domestic

altars, and family life, to all appearances, was as stable as usual.

Public attention was again roused to this subject by the

McFarland-Richardson trial, in which the former shot the latter, being

jealous of his attentions to his wife. McFarland was a brutal,

improvident husband, who had completely alienated his wife's

affections, while Mr. Richardson, who had long been a cherished

acquaintance of the family, befriended the wife in the darkest days of

her misery. She was a very refined, attractive woman, and a large circle

of warm friends stood by her through the fierce ordeal of her husband's

trial.

Though McFarland did not deny that he killed Richardson, yet he was

acquitted on the plea of insanity, and was, at the same time, made the

legal guardian of his child, a boy, then, twelve years of age, and

walked out of the court with him, hand in hand. What a travesty on

justice and common sense that, while a man is declared too insane to be

held responsible for taking the life of another, he might still be

capable of directing the life and education of a child! And what an

insult to that intelligent mother, who had devoted twelve years of her

life to his care, while his worthless father had not provided for them

the necessaries of life!

She married Mr. Richardson on his deathbed. The ceremony was performed

by Henry Ward Beecher and Rev. O.B. Frothingham, while such men as

Horace Greeley and Joshua Leavitt witnessed the solemn service. Though

no shadow had ever dimmed Mrs. Richardson's fair fame, yet she was

rudely treated in the court and robbed of her child, though by far the

most fitting parent to be intrusted with his care.

As the indignation among women was general and at white heat with regard

to her treatment, Miss Anthony suggested to me, one day, that it would

be a golden opportunity to give women a lesson on their helplessness

under the law--wholly in the power of man as to their domestic

relations, as well as to their civil and political rights. Accordingly

we decided to hold some meetings, for women alone, to protest against

the decision of this trial, the general conduct of the case, the tone of

the press, and the laws that made it possible to rob a mother of her

child.

Many ladies readily enlisted in the movement. I was invited to make the

speech on the occasion, and Miss Anthony arranged for two great

meetings, one in Apollo Hall, New York city, and one in the Academy of

Music, in Brooklyn. The result was all that we could desire. Miss

Anthony, with wonderful executive ability, made all the arrangements,

taking on her own shoulders the whole financial responsibility.

My latest thought on this question I gave in _The Arena_ of April, 1894,

from which I quote the following:

"There is a demand just now for an amendment to the United States

Constitution that shall make the laws of marriage and divorce the

same in all the States of the Union. As the suggestion comes

uniformly from those who consider the present divorce laws too

liberal, we may infer that the proposed national law is to place

the whole question on a narrower basis, rendering null and void the

laws that have been passed in a broader spirit, according to the

needs and experiences, in certain sections, of the sovereign

people. And here let us bear in mind that the widest possible law

would not make divorce obligatory on anyone, while a restricted

law, on the contrary, would compel many, marrying, perhaps, under

more liberal laws, to remain in uncongenial relations.

"As we are still in the experimental stage on this question, we are

not qualified to make a perfect law that would work satisfactorily

over so vast an area as our boundaries now embrace. I see no

evidence in what has been published on this question, of late, by

statesmen, ecclesiastics, lawyers, and judges, that any of them

have thought sufficiently on the subject to prepare a well-digested

code, or a comprehensive amendment to the national Constitution.

Some view it as a civil contract, though not governed by the laws

of other contracts; some view it as a religious ordinance--a

sacrament; some think it a relation to be regulated by the State,

others by the Church, and still others think it should be left

wholly to the individual. With this wide divergence of opinion

among our leading minds, it is quite evident that we are not

prepared for a national law.

"Moreover, as woman is the most important factor in the marriage

relation, her enfranchisement is the primal step in deciding the

basis of family life. Before public opinion on this question

crystallizes into an amendment to the national Constitution, the

wife and mother must have a voice in the governing power and must

be heard, on this great problem, in the halls of legislation.

"There are many advantages in leaving all these questions, as now,

to the States. Local self-government more readily permits of

experiments on mooted questions, which are the outcome of the needs

and convictions of the community. The smaller the area over which

legislation extends, the more pliable are the laws. By leaving the

States free to experiment in their local affairs, we can judge of

the working of different laws under varying circumstances, and thus

learn their comparative merits. The progress education has achieved

in America is due to the fact that we have left our system of

public instruction in the hands of local authorities. How

different would be the solution of the great educational question

of manual labor in the schools, if the matter had to be settled at

Washington!

"The whole nation might find itself pledged to a scheme that a few

years would prove wholly impracticable. Not only is the town

meeting, as Emerson says, 'the cradle of American liberties,' but

it is the nursery of Yankee experiment and wisdom. England, with

its clumsy national code of education, making one inflexible

standard of scholarship for the bright children of the

manufacturing districts and the dull brains of the agricultural

counties, should teach us a lesson as to the wisdom of keeping

apart state and national government.

"Before we can decide the just grounds for divorce, we must get a

clear idea of what constitutes marriage. In a true relation the

chief object is the loving companionship of man and woman, their

capacity for mutual help and happiness and for the development of

all that is noblest in each other. The second object is the

building up a home and family, a place of rest, peace, security, in

which child-life can bud and blossom like flowers in the sunshine.

"The first step toward making the ideal the real, is to educate our

sons and daughters into the most exalted ideas of the sacredness of

married life and the responsibilities of parenthood. I would have

them give, at least, as much thought to the creation of an immortal

being as the artist gives to his landscape or statue. Watch him in

his hours of solitude, communing with great Nature for days and

weeks in all her changing moods, and when at last his dream of

beauty is realized and takes a clearly defined form, behold how

patiently he works through long months and years on sky and lake,

on tree and flower; and when complete, it represents to him more

love and life, more hope and ambition, than the living child at his

side, to whose conception and antenatal development not one soulful

thought was ever given. To this impressible period of human life,

few parents give any thought; yet here we must begin to cultivate

virtues that can alone redeem the world.

"The contradictory views in which woman is represented are as

pitiful as varied. While the Magnificat to the Virgin is chanted in

all our cathedrals round the globe on each returning Sabbath day,

and her motherhood extolled by her worshipers, maternity for the

rest of womankind is referred to as a weakness, a disability, a

curse, an evidence of woman's divinely ordained subjection. Yet

surely the real woman should have some points of resemblance in

character and position with the ideal one, whom poets, novelists,

and artists portray.

"It is folly to talk of the sacredness of marriage and maternity,

while the wife is practically regarded as an inferior, a subject, a

slave. Having decided that companionship and conscientious

parenthood are the only true grounds for marriage, if the relation

brings out the worst characteristics of each party, or if the home

atmosphere is unwholesome for children, is not the very _raison

d'être_ of the union wanting, and the marriage practically

annulled? It cannot be called a holy relation,--no, not a desirable

one,--when love and mutual respect are wanting. And let us bear in

mind one other important fact: the lack of sympathy and content in

the parents indicates radical physical unsuitability, which

results in badly organized offspring. If, then, the real object of

marriage is defeated, it is for the interest of the State, as well

as the individual concerned, to see that all such pernicious unions

be legally dissolved. Inasmuch, then, as incompatibility of temper

defeats the two great objects of marriage, it should be the primal

cause for divorce.

"The true standpoint from which to view this question is individual

sovereignty, individual happiness. It is often said that the

interests of society are paramount, and first to be considered.

This was the Roman idea, the Pagan idea, that the individual was

made for the State. The central idea of barbarism has ever been the

family, the tribe, the nation--never the individual. But the great

doctrine of Christianity is the right of individual conscience and

judgment. The reason it took such a hold on the hearts of the

people was because it taught that the individual was primary; the

State, the Church, society, the family, secondary. However, a

comprehensive view of any question of human interest, shows that

the highest good and happiness of the individual and society lie in

the same direction.

"The question of divorce, like marriage, should be settled, as to

its most sacred relations, by the parties themselves; neither the

State nor the Church having any right to intermeddle therein. As to

property and children, it must be viewed and regulated as a civil

contract. Then the union should be dissolved with at least as much

deliberation and publicity as it was formed. There might be some

ceremony and witnesses to add to the dignity and solemnity of the

occasion. Like the Quaker marriage, which the parties conduct

themselves, so, in this case, without any statement of their

disagreements, the parties might simply declare that, after living

together for several years, they found themselves unsuited to each

other, and incapable of making a happy home.

"If divorce were made respectable, and recognized by society as a

duty, as well as a right, reasonable men and women could arrange

all the preliminaries, often, even, the division of property and

guardianship of children, quite as satisfactorily as it could be

done in the courts. Where the mother is capable of training the

children, a sensible father would leave them to her care rather

than place them in the hands of a stranger.

"But, where divorce is not respectable, men who have no paternal

feeling will often hold the child, not so much for its good or his

own affection, as to punish the wife for disgracing him. The love

of children is not strong in most men, and they feel but little

responsibility in regard to them. See how readily they turn off

young sons to shift for themselves, and, unless the law compelled

them to support their illegitimate children, they would never give

them a second thought. But on the mother-soul rest forever the care

and responsibility of human life. Her love for the child born out

of wedlock is often intensified by the infinite pity she feels

through its disgrace. Even among the lower animals we find the

female ever brooding over the young and helpless.

"Limiting the causes of divorce to physical defects or

delinquencies; making the proceedings public; prying into all the

personal affairs of unhappy men and women; regarding the step as

quasi criminal; punishing the guilty party in the suit; all this

will not strengthen frail human nature, will not insure happy

homes, will not banish scandals and purge society of prostitution.

"No, no; the enemy of marriage, of the State, of society is not

liberal divorce laws, but the unhealthy atmosphere that exists in

the home itself. A legislative act cannot make a unit of a divided

family."