CHAPTER VIII

FOREIGN INTRIGUES AGAINST AMERICAN LIBERTY.

HOW THE IMPERIAL PIRATES OF FRANCE AND ENGLAND WERE FRIGHTENED OFF

THROUGH THE DIPLOMACY OF SEWARD.—OMINOUS APPEARANCE OF THE RUSSIAN

FLEET IN AMERICAN WATERS.—NAPOLEON AIMS AT THE CREATION OF AN EMPIRE

WEST OF THE MISSISSIPPI, AND THE RESTORATION OF THE OLD FRENCH

COLONIES.—PLOTTING WITH SLIDELL, BENJAMIN, LINDSAY, ROEBUCK AND

OTHERS.—URGING ENGLAND TO RECOGNIZE THE CONFEDERACY.—DISRAELI

EXPLAINS ENGLAND’S DESIGNS AND DIPLOMACY.—AFTER THE NAVAL VICTORY OF

FARRAGUT, AND THE CAPTURE OF NEW ORLEANS ENGLAND HESITATES THROUGH

FEAR, AND NAPOLEON CHANGES HIS TACTICS.—RENEWAL OF INTRIGUES BETWEEN

ENGLAND AND FRANCE.—THEIR DASTARDLY PURPOSES DEFEATED BY THE

VICTORIES OF GETTYSBURG, VICKSBURG, AND THE GENERAL TRIUMPH OF THE

UNION ARMS.

While the events related in the previous chapter were progressing

apparently towards a result that might have proved disastrous to the

dearly purchased liberties of this country, the nation was saved by

taking advantage of a circumstance that was peculiarly providential to

the Union. The Russian fleet happened to be in South American waters at

the time. Secretary Seward was apprised of the fact by a Wall Street

man. He was quick to act on the suggestion. Alexis, the brother of the

Emperor, was in command of the fleet. Seward sent him a friendly

invitation, which he instantly accepted. The spies of Napoleon and of

Scotland Yard, who were always on the alert, and who always discerned

the evil side of everything, promptly informed their employers of the

fact. The conclusion was manifest to European statesmen, who, unlike

Wall Street men, never “copper” the points given by spies. It seemed to

them clearly an alliance between the Great Empire and the Great

Republic. Extremes had met for mutual defence and safety probably for

aggressive purposes. The conspirators were frightened with their own

shadows and foiled by their own cowardice, and an apparently imminent

calamity was thus simply averted.

As the designs of the two great European powers were craftily concealed

through their evasive system of diplomacy, it has frequently been a

subject of debate as to whether they meant to take the part of the

Confederacy for the purpose of dissolving the Union. It is necessary,

therefore, to produce some tangible evidence of the intentions of these

foreign potentates in the hour of our country’s greatest peril.

The Confederate records purchased by the Government some years ago throw

a ghastly light on this subject, and gravely warn us of the Scriptural

injunction, to put no trust in kings and rulers.

The correspondence between the officials of the Confederacy and the

Confederate Commissioners, Slidell and Mason, at Paris and London, prove

to a demonstration that the ruler of France and the rulers of Great

Britain were making preparations on a large scale to take charge of this

country as soon as the Union, through their diplomatic aid, should be

dissolved. Letters from other representatives of the Confederates of

Europe go to corroborate this view of the matter. The correspondence

between Dudley, Post, Mann and Lamar, who were commissioners in various

parts of Europe, and Judah P. Benjamin, the Confederate Secretary of

State, is conclusive on the subject of European armed intervention,

which has hitherto formed a topic of dispute in the historic circles of

the Civil War.

The correspondence of Slidell, who was on familiar relations with the

Emperor of the French, gives the inside history of the intrigues of that

potentate in such clear terms, that there can be no doubt of his

intentions towards this country.

Had it not been for the superior vigilance of Mr. Dayton, the United

States Minister at Paris, several privateers would have been launched

from French ports to prey upon the commerce of the United States, and to

do similar work to that for which the Alabama was fitted out.

It would seem from the correspondence that the managers of the affairs

of Great Britain were not so anxious to encourage the South as Napoleon

was; at least they succeeded in concealing their purpose better. The

practical diplomacy of England in this affair was superior to that of

France, though the latter has still held the palm for possessing better

diplomatic plotters, who are supposed to have no superiors outside the

royal associations of the reigning power of Russia.

There is no doubt, however, that Napoleon was anxious to take positive

steps to recognize the South, while professing the most friendly

feelings in favor of the North, but he was afraid to act except in

unison with Great Britain, and he failed to bring her to time until the

favorable moment for the execution of his plans had passed.

Slidell and Mason went to Europe in January, 1862. This was perhaps the

darkest and most critical period for the cause of the Union during the

great struggle. The Commissioners carried letters with them showing the

inefficiency of the blockade of the Southern ports, the great

disadvantages and losses suffered by England and France through cutting

off the cotton supplies, and setting forth the enormous advantages that

would result if free trade with the Confederacy were established. These

were strong arguments to arouse the spirit of commercial selfishness in

favor of the South.

The ambitious designs of Napoleon were of a very towering and extensive

character. He not only expected to recover Louisiana, which his uncle in

an hour of necessity had sold to the United States, but he aimed at the

restoration of the entire old colonial empire of France on this

continent.

The Emperor was thoroughly posted in the affairs of this country. It

seems that while he had resided in a small room in Hoboken, and took his

meals at a twenty-five cent restaurant, paying for them with money

borrowed from French patriots, on the very slim prospect of reaching the

throne of France, he made the best use of his time, and he had studied

the history and geography of the United States and Canada with great

care and accuracy.

In justice to his character for gratitude, however, it must be said, in

passing, that, like young “Corneel” Vanderbilt, he paid all the money he

borrowed, and placed some of his New York and Hoboken creditors in good

positions at the Tuileries, under the Second Empire. He never forgot a

favor nor forgave an injury.

The Emperor’s knowledge of American affairs, as well as his ambitious

designs, were briefly, but at the same time very fully disclosed, in

conversation with Mr. Benjamin, at the Villa Eugenie, at Biarritz. “He

turned with peculiar and undisguised eagerness,” said Mr. Benjamin, “to

the Mexican question. He knew the very number of guns on the Morro, the

sums the United States had spent on the fortifications in Florida, the

exports and imports of Galveston and Matamoras, in fact everything which

well informed local agents could have reported to an experienced

statesman eager for information. He examined me again on Texas and its

population, the disposition of the French residents, the tendencies of

the German colonists, the feeling on the Mexican frontier. He observed

that Louisiana was nothing but French at the bottom. I was fully

persuaded that he proposed to seek in Mexico a compensation for the lost

colonies in the West Indies, which, he said, could not be recovered,

‘_sans nous brouiller avec nòs allies_,’ (without embroiling us with our

allies). He insisted upon it that France must, sooner or later, have a

foothold (_pied à terre_) on the Florida coast, for the purpose of

protecting her commerce in the Gulf, for, he added, ‘_Nous ne voulons

pas d’un autre_ _Gibraltar de ce côté là_,’ (we don’t want another

Gibraltar on that side.”)

Mr. Slidell’s predecessor at Paris, Mr. Rost, had received assurance

from the Duc de Morny, who was then next to the Emperor in his knowledge

of State affairs, that the South would be recognized. It was only a

question of time. After consulting with M. Thouvenel, Minister of

Foreign Affairs; Persigny, Minister of the Interior; Fould, Minister of

Finance; Rouher, Minister of Commerce; Baroche, President of the Council

of State; Mocquard, Private Secretary of the Emperor; Count Walewski, De

Morny and others, Slidell was satisfied that the Emperor was all right,

and he wrote to Jeff. Davis & Co. as follows:

“The Emperor has invited the English Government to join with him

in recognizing the South, but the English Government, owing to

Earl Russell, has refused to act simultaneously with him.”

This statement of Slidell was true in one sense, but it was not strictly

and diplomatically correct. There is no doubt that the English

Government would have been anxious enough to join the Emperor in any

scheme of conquest and spoliation that had a fair promise of success,

and an average chance of avenging the Boston Tea Party and the Battle of

Bunker Hill, but both powers were playing at the game of diplomacy, each

for the purpose of making the other responsible for taking the

initiative in the recognition of the South. They were both very

circumspect about committing themselves, and the Palmerston-Russell

Cabinet, with that caution which always characterized old “Pam” in

foreign affairs, would not recognize any suggestion from the Emperor

that did not bear his signature. The Emperor thought to make use of a

Mr. Lindsay, a wealthy shipowner and member of Parliament, to draw out

the English Government, but the latter was not to be committed to any

course of policy that might involve important responsibilities in the

future through any second-hand authority.

The Emperor seemed to have opened his mind very freely to Mr. Lindsay.

He told him that he would have taken steps to put an end to the blockade

of the Southern ports if the English Ministry had intimated a

willingness to act with him. He said he had forwarded intimation to this

effect through Mr. Thouvenel, but had not received a satisfactory

answer. He intimated that if England was ready, he was, and was prepared

at once to despatch a formidable fleet to the Mississippi, on condition

that England should send an equal force to demand free ingress and

egress for their merchantmen, and for the cargoes of goods and supplies

of cotton which were necessary to carry on the commerce of the world.

Napoleon was resolved to act, as he had always done, on the high ground

of conferring universal favors on humanity.

This was an old trick in his family, but it did not work effectually

this time. He said he had regarded the restoration of the Union

impossible from the first, and for that reason had deprecated the

continuance of the bloody contest, which could not lead to any other

result than separation. He authorized Mr. Lindsay to make this statement

to Lord Cowley, and to ascertain whether he would recommend the course

indicated to his Government.

It is very refreshing to reflect on the sensitive exhibition of feeling

displayed, in his ostensible attempt to stop the carnage and fratricidal

strife, by the man who planned and directed the wholesale assassinations

in connection with the sanguinary _Coup d’Etat_.

Mr. Lindsay reported back to the Emperor the substance of his interview

with Lord Cowley, who said that the English Government was not prepared

to act until further developments. It was about this time that Mr.

Seward was getting _in_ his fine diplomatic work with Earl Russell and

Palmerston, which helped materially to upset the calculations of the

Emperor.

Napoleon then requested Mr. Lindsay to see Palmerston, Russell, Derby

and Mr. Disraeli, and to gather their intentions. He desired Mr. Lindsay

to do all this of his own motion, and not as coming from him, and said

he did not wish to be embarrassed by the forms and delays of ordinary

diplomacy, because he felt the necessity of immediate action.

Lindsay again saw Earl Russell, as the accredited and special ambassador

of the Emperor, _viva voce_. The Earl informed him that he could not

receive any communications from a foreign power, except through the

regular diplomatic channel. He then sought an interview with Mr.

Disraeli, who was much more affable and communicative than the little

Lord who stood so punctiliously on ministerial ceremony.

Disraeli threw considerable light on the subject. After expressing a

deep interest in the affairs of the Confederacy, and saying that he

fully concurred in the views of the Emperor, he told Mr. Lindsay that he

had good reasons for believing that a secret understanding existed

between Earl Russell and Mr. Seward; that England, in the meantime,

would respect the Federal blockade and withhold recognition of the

South. “But if France should take the initiative,” said Mr. Disraeli in

conclusion, “any course she may adopt to put an end to the present state

of affairs will undoubtedly be supported by a large majority in

Parliament, and knowing this, Lord Russell will give a reluctant assent

to this, to avoid a change of ministry, which would otherwise certainly

follow.”

This shows that Disraeli saw very clearly through the duplicity of

English diplomacy, and that while England was profuse in her promises to

Mr. Seward, she was only waiting for the Emperor to act as pioneer in

order that she might have a safe opportunity as well as a plausible

pretext for armed intervention.

The Emperor complained that Earl Russell had divulged his views on

American affairs, as expressed through his ambassador, to Mr. Seward.

Lord Russell placed himself squarely on the “fence,” to be prepared for

any emergency. Finally, about the middle of April, the Emperor thought

it would be best that he himself should make a friendly appeal to the

Federal Government alone to open the ports, if England did not join him,

without further hesitation. He thought it would be necessary, however,

to accompany the appeal with a demonstration of force on the Southern

coasts; and if the appeal should be effective, to back it up by a

declaration of his purpose not to respect the blockade. He determined,

however, to wait a few days longer to see how England would act.

This resolution of the Emperor to make a friendly appeal to raise the

blockade was only a thin excuse to find a cause for quarrel with the

North, and it is very probable he would have acted on this determination

alone, but for an unexpected event which changed his projects, and the

apparent course of history.

About a week after this diplomatic conference, Commodores D. G.

Farragut, and D. D. Porter, with their able commanders Bailey and Bell,

had made the famous passage of forts Jackson and St. Philip, at the

mouth of the Mississippi, with the United States squadron, silenced the

Chalmette batteries and anchored in the harbor of New Orleans. After two

days’ parleying the city surrendered at discretion, or rather, the city

authorities passively and sullenly permitted Farragut, and afterwards

General Butler, to take possession of the city without shedding any

blood.

This great naval victory of Farragut’s squadron and its consequences

dampened the ardor of the Emperor. He saw the chances of backing up his

“friendly appeal” by a demonstration of force, were cut off, so far as

New Orleans and the forts of the Mississippi were concerned.

Yet, Napoleon did not totally relinquish the enterprise, on account of

this crushing defeat of the Confederacy. M. Billault, a prominent member

of Napoleon’s cabinet, after this event said to Slidell, “The cabinet,

with the probable exception of M. Thouvenel, are in favor of the South.

If New Orleans had not fallen, our recognition could not have been long

delayed, but if the Confederates should obtain successes in Virginia and

Tennessee, and hold the enemy at bay a month or two longer, we may see

an opportunity for intervention.”

The Emperor’s intentions, however, were fully revealed in an autograph

letter to General Forey, which was written in July and in which his

grasping ambition stood out in the boldest relief. He wrote: “In the

present state of civilization of the world, the prosperity of America is

not a subject of indifference to Europe, for she nourishes our

manufactures and gives life to our commerce. We are interested in having

the Republic of the United States a powerful and prosperous power, but

we are not willing to have that Republic take possession of the entire

Gulf of Mexico, command from there the Antilles as well as South

America, and monopolize the distribution of the products of the New

World. To prevent this, a stable Government must be established in

Mexico, and we will in that event have restored to the Latin race on the

other side of the Atlantic its power and prestige.”

Napoleon completely overdid the thing in this letter to General Forey.

The vaulting ambition which overleaps itself and falls on the other side

stuck out too plainly. He showed that he wanted the whole earth, and

this aroused the resentment of the South. In the following August, M.

Theron, a French consul in Texas, inspired by Napoleonic ideas of

annexation, coolly contemplated the transformation of Texas to a French

republic, and confided his project to Governor Lubbock of that State,

who apprised Jefferson Davis of the consul’s aspirations. This was too

much even for the Confederate Government, and M. Theron and the French

consul at Richmond were both politely requested to leave the Confederate

States.

Napoleon persisted in his intrigues for the purpose of getting a

foothold in this country, in spite of the rebuff which his officious

consuls had received from the Confederacy. He expressed himself desirous

of interesting some of the rest of the European powers in the cause of

the South, and again entered into confidence with Slidell on the

possibility of joint mediation on the part of England, France and

Russia. “My own preference,” said the Emperor, “is for a proposition for

an armistice for six months, with the Southern ports open to the

commerce of the world. This would put a stop to the effusion of blood”

(How tender-hearted he was!) “and hostilities would probably never be

resumed. We can urge it,” he added, “on the high grounds of humanity,

and the interests of the whole civilized world. If it be refused by the

North, it will afford good reason for recognition, and perhaps for more

active intervention.”

Mr. Slidell then suggested that if the Emperor would give some kind of

assurance that the police would not interfere, ships and munitions of

war might be sent from France to the Confederacy.

“Why could you not have the ships built as if for the Italian

Government?” suggested the Emperor. “I do not think it would be

difficult, but I will consult my ministers about it.”

Napoleon then suggested the joint appeal for the six months’ armistice

to England and Russia, which was declined by both. He then made a direct

offer of mediation to the United States Government, in the most friendly

terms, and on the “high grounds of humanity.”

The United States Government did not see it in this light, and rejected

Napoleon’s humane offer.

The Confederate agents then obtained power to build ships of war in

French ports, and to arm and equip them, and proceed to sea without

molestation from the French authorities, the Treaty of Paris forbidding

such a hostile act against a friendly power like the North to the

contrary notwithstanding. The despot of France imagined himself above

all treaties at that time.

The English Alabama was then cruising in a most successful manner. The

Emperor had a conference with Mr. Arman, a large shipbuilder, and

assured him that there would be no difficulty about building the ships

for the Confederates under the disguise of their Italian destination.

Accordingly, a contract was made for building five ships of war at

Bordeaux and Nantes, and afterwards another contract for three iron-clad

rams.

In 1863 the Emperor had a great deal of business on hand, but was still

convinced, amid all his diplomatic duties that the South should be

recognized by the European powers. He was afraid, however, of putting

his Mexican expedition in jeopardy by risking a rupture with the North.

Finally, he said: “I will make a direct proposition to England for joint

recognition. This will effectually prevent Lord Palmerston from

misrepresenting my position and wishes on the American question.”

Accordingly, he had an interview with those two worthy members of

Parliament, Messrs. Roebuck and Lindsay, at Fontainebleau, which was

said to be highly satisfactory. He authorized them to state in the House

of Commons that he was both willing and anxious to recognize the

Confederate States, with the co-operation of England.

There was a great debate in Parliament on the subject, in the midst of

which Earl Russell arose and said that Baron Gros, the French Minister,

had received no communication from his Government on American affairs.

Mr. Roebuck, who made the motion on the authority of the Emperor, was

astonished that he had been so badly fooled. It still remains a mystery,

however, why Baron Gros did not receive the advice in question from the

Emperor, because M. Mocquard, the Emperor’s Secretary, wrote to Slidell

as follows: “On the next day after the interview of Messrs. Roebuck and

Lindsay with the Emperor, the Minister of Foreign Affairs telegraphed

Baron Gros to ‘officiously’ inform Lord Palmerston that, should Great

Britain be willing to recognize the South, the Emperor would be willing

to follow her in that way.”

The only explanation that seems plausible under these circumstances is,

that the Palmerston-Russell Cabinet interrupted this telegram to Baron

Gros for diplomatic purposes, or that the Baron, seeing that the debate

in Parliament had taken an unfavorable turn, had prudently resolved to

suppress the advice from Napoleon, in order that his master might not

commit himself while England was not heart and soul with him in the

enterprise. In fact, England had begun to see that she had taken a false

position, and Mr. Gladstone’s eloquent spurt, to the effect that

“Jefferson Davis had created a nation,” was no longer the diplomatic

faith of England. She was more influenced by fear than love, as she

always is, and had begun to think, after the capture of New Orleans and

the destruction of the Confederate fleet, that the Federal Government

was capable of organizing a formidable navy. The London _Times_, which

voiced diplomatic sentiment then, said so. During this very debate on

Roebuck’s motion, Lee’s army had been beaten at Gettysburg, Vicksburg

had surrendered and victory was beginning to perch on the Northern

banners everywhere. Napoleon also drew in his horns, complaining

bitterly that “perfidious Albion” had gone back on him, and he was

afraid to permit the war ships, when finished, to leave the French ports

for any destination, and when he permitted the English privateer, the

Rappahannock, to depart, it was under the injunction that the American

minister should know nothing about it.

What Lord Palmerston called a “concatenation of circumstances”

contributed largely to force the Emperor to change his policy towards

the United States. Maximilian’s Mexican expedition was exceedingly

unpopular, trouble was brewing in several parts of the continent, and

Bismarck and Von Moltke were cunningly and deliberately weaving that net

in which the Man of Destiny, seven years later, was hopelessly entangled

at Sedan. His dream of a French American Empire beyond the Mississippi

had vanished long before his last abject act of humiliation in

surrendering the sword of France to Bismarck. And ere he died, a

miserable wreck of disappointed ambition, again a political exile, he

had the opportunity of seeing our own Republic, which he sought to

destroy, rehabilitated, and on its way to become the greatest nation in

history.

[Illustration:

THE HON. JOHN SHERMAN,

Who has taken a prominent part in financial matters since the

beginning of the war, first in making treasury notes a legal tender

in 1862; in proposing the Redemption Act in 1867, which was passed

in 1870, and in the resumption of specie payments in 1879, which was

the crowning success of the financial policy which established the

Government credit on a solid basis.

]

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