Chapter iii.

The character of Mr Square the philosopher, and of Mr Thwackum the

divine; with a dispute concerning----

The name of this gentleman, who had then resided some time at Mr

Allworthy's house, was Mr Square. His natural parts were not of the

first rate, but he had greatly improved them by a learned education.

He was deeply read in the antients, and a profest master of all the

works of Plato and Aristotle. Upon which great models he had

principally formed himself; sometimes according with the opinion of

the one, and sometimes with that of the other. In morals he was a

profest Platonist, and in religion he inclined to be an Aristotelian.

But though he had, as we have said, formed his morals on the Platonic

model, yet he perfectly agreed with the opinion of Aristotle, in

considering that great man rather in the quality of a philosopher or a

speculatist, than as a legislator. This sentiment he carried a great

way; indeed, so far, as to regard all virtue as matter of theory only.

This, it is true, he never affirmed, as I have heard, to any one; and

yet upon the least attention to his conduct, I cannot help thinking it

was his real opinion, as it will perfectly reconcile some

contradictions which might otherwise appear in his character.

This gentleman and Mr Thwackum scarce ever met without a disputation;

for their tenets were indeed diametrically opposite to each other.

Square held human nature to be the perfection of all virtue, and that

vice was a deviation from our nature, in the same manner as deformity

of body is. Thwackum, on the contrary, maintained that the human mind,

since the fall, was nothing but a sink of iniquity, till purified and

redeemed by grace. In one point only they agreed, which was, in all

their discourses on morality never to mention the word goodness. The

favourite phrase of the former, was the natural beauty of virtue; that

of the latter, was the divine power of grace. The former measured all

actions by the unalterable rule of right, and the eternal fitness of

things; the latter decided all matters by authority; but in doing

this, he always used the scriptures and their commentators, as the

lawyer doth his Coke upon Lyttleton, where the comment is of equal

authority with the text.

After this short introduction, the reader will be pleased to remember,

that the parson had concluded his speech with a triumphant question,

to which he had apprehended no answer; viz., Can any honour exist

independent on religion?

To this Square answered; that it was impossible to discourse

philosophically concerning words, till their meaning was first

established: that there were scarce any two words of a more vague and

uncertain signification, than the two he had mentioned; for that there

were almost as many different opinions concerning honour, as

concerning religion. “But,” says he, “if by honour you mean the true

natural beauty of virtue, I will maintain it may exist independent of

any religion whatever. Nay,” added he, “you yourself will allow it may

exist independent of all but one: so will a Mahometan, a Jew, and all

the maintainers of all the different sects in the world.”

Thwackum replied, this was arguing with the usual malice of all the

enemies to the true Church. He said, he doubted not but that all the

infidels and hereticks in the world would, if they could, confine

honour to their own absurd errors and damnable deceptions; “but

honour,” says he, “is not therefore manifold, because there are many

absurd opinions about it; nor is religion manifold, because there are

various sects and heresies in the world. When I mention religion, I

mean the Christian religion; and not only the Christian religion, but

the Protestant religion; and not only the Protestant religion, but the

Church of England. And when I mention honour, I mean that mode of

Divine grace which is not only consistent with, but dependent upon,

this religion; and is consistent with and dependent upon no other. Now

to say that the honour I here mean, and which was, I thought, all the

honour I could be supposed to mean, will uphold, much less dictate an

untruth, is to assert an absurdity too shocking to be conceived.”

“I purposely avoided,” says Square, “drawing a conclusion which I

thought evident from what I have said; but if you perceived it, I am

sure you have not attempted to answer it. However, to drop the article

of religion, I think it is plain, from what you have said, that we

have different ideas of honour; or why do we not agree in the same

terms of its explanation? I have asserted, that true honour and true

virtue are almost synonymous terms, and they are both founded on the

unalterable rule of right, and the eternal fitness of things; to which

an untruth being absolutely repugnant and contrary, it is certain that

true honour cannot support an untruth. In this, therefore, I think we

are agreed; but that this honour can be said to be founded on

religion, to which it is antecedent, if by religion be meant any

positive law--”

“I agree,” answered Thwackum, with great warmth, “with a man who

asserts honour to be antecedent to religion! Mr Allworthy, did I

agree--?”

He was proceeding when Mr Allworthy interposed, telling them very

coldly, they had both mistaken his meaning; for that he had said

nothing of true honour.--It is possible, however, he would not have

easily quieted the disputants, who were growing equally warm, had not

another matter now fallen out, which put a final end to the

conversation at present.