CHAPTER III.
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1478.
WHEN the Florentines saw that war was inevitable, they appointed,
on June 13, the magistracy usual in such cases, the Ten of War,
among whom, beside Lorenzo de’ Medici, were Tommaso Soderini, Luigi
Guicciardini, Bongianni Gianfigliazzi, &c. At first the opinion
prevailed that it would be advisable not only to put the frontier
in a state of defence on the side of Siena and Umbria, but to make
a dangerous diversion for the enemy by an attack on Imola, the city
and territory of Girolamo, a plan, however, which they were compelled
to abandon by the swift and powerful inroad of the enemy in the
Chiana valley. They were not prepared for war, and had to provide for
everything in a hurry, and were thus unable to gain an advantage over
the enemy. It was to Lombardy that they turned for leaders and men,
and also for horses and all materials for war. Among the captains
chosen was Niccolo Orsini, Count of Pitigliano, who in later years
made himself a name in the service of the Republic of Venice, which
he retained even after the defeat at the battle of Ghiaradadda in the
war of the League of Cambray; Rodolfo Gonzaga, brother of Federigo,
Marquis of Mantua, with two of his sons; and several others. Venice
and Milan sent auxiliaries, the former under Galeotto Pico, lord of
Mirandola; those of Milan under Gian Jacopo Trivulzio, who, then
thirty-seven years old, was destined to become a celebrated leader
in the transformation of Italian tactics, Alberto Visconti, and
Giovanni Conti. The assistance of Milan was far less than had been
hoped for in Florence, owing to her own need. King Ferrante managed
to make a formidable diversion for the duchess-regent. Even before
the present complication began, he seems to have been gained over by
Sforza Maria, Duke of Bari, who had been in Naples since the November
of the preceding year, while the Duchess of Calabria took part with
her brothers against her sister-in-law, so that when the war against
Florence began, the king, with the aid of the exiles, attempted a new
enterprise, which we shall soon describe more fully, against Genoa,
the weakest point of the territory of Sforza. An enterprise so well
begun must have been the cause of very great anxiety and fear to the
regent, and made the Florentines tremble for their frontier on the side
of Liguria, where Sarzana might be exposed to an attack; and to be
prepared for this the Marchesi Gabriello and Leonardo Malaspina were
sent thither with a squadron of soldiers.
One other means was tried to withdraw the Milanese regent from the
Florentine-Venetian alliance. The Duke of Urbino endeavoured to
effect a change of opinion and bring about an alliance with Naples.
In a long letter addressed from Gubbio to his agent in Milan, Ser
Matteo,[256] he commissioned him to labour for this end with Cecco
Simonetta and Gian Jacopo Trivulzio. He was to represent to them that
Venice was the natural enemy of Milan, from whom danger was always
threatening, and that Lorenzo was a most untrustworthy ally. ‘It cannot
please me in the least that Milan relies upon her own strength or the
friendship of Lorenzo de’ Medici. For in herself she is not secure,
but endangered, and we cannot at all depend on Lorenzo’s friendship.
We have always seen, and still see plainly, that he neither desires
the peace nor safety of that State. Had he ever wished it, or did he
care for it now, he would not have chosen Messer Tommaso Soderini as
ambassador immediately on the death of Duke Galeazzo, for the former
is a thorough Venetian and more inclined to the Signory of Venice than
any one in the council. Lorenzo would not by means of this man have
urged so strongly the renewal of the bond between Venice, Milan, and
Florence, adding the declaration that the latter state would always
go hand in hand with Venice, and objecting to an agreement with the
king’s majesty. He would not twice have hindered my appearing in
Milan when he was certain that nothing was so dear to my heart as
the honour and advantage of that state. He would not have constantly
formed plots against the Milanese government with the brothers of the
deceased duke and Lord Robert (Sanseverino). He would not have taken
the trouble to lull the suspicions of the king, who desired the renewal
of the alliance with Milan and Florence, or pretended that it was not
the fitting time at present, and that it would be better to wait and
see how matters would arrange themselves at Milan. He would not have
behaved as he did lately in reference to Lord Robert, by undertaking
his defence in Florence, accusing Messer Cecco, seeking to gain the
commander over to Florentine pay, and when this failed, recommending
him to the Venetians with the same intention (Messer Cecco may be
certain of it), so that he may guide affairs there according to his
will, as long as men remain in dread of the Turks. Had he known how
lovingly the Pope behaved to the serene Duke and Duchess of Milan, he
would not have acted towards his Holiness in the manner he did. For he
has often stirred up the count (Fortebraccio) against Perugia, and then
irritated him against the Sienese, without considering how dangerous
it is for that state (Milan) to enkindle war in Italy, especially by
an old opponent of the house of Sforza, like Count Carlo, whom he
has in a certain way restored from death to life. He would, on the
contrary, have preferred the friendship of the king before every other
friendship, not only because it is more sincere, but also on account
of his relationship and greater power. If Messer Gian Jacopo says
that he suspects Lorenzo of sinning against the Holy Ghost, I am of
the same opinion, and think that he doubts God’s mercy. As he has most
indecorously insulted the king and me, who am, indeed, nothing but a
poor nobleman, he will never again trust the former, and has therefore
thrown himself into the arms of the Venetians.’ The letter finishes
with the proposal that Milan should conclude a secret compact with the
king (of Naples) in order to assure himself of his assistance in case
of need. The king’s interests were identical with those of the house of
Sforza, the rivals of Venice. Only by being in league with Naples could
they oppose Florentine machinations with decisive effect. ‘The safest
way seems to me not to wait till things have taken a turn that may
allow of no alternative. I have repeatedly remarked to Duke Galeazzo
that the state of Milan is so composed that with the first buffet
of fortune, whether coming from Lodi, or Cremona, or Ghiaradadda or
elsewhere, his power may be said to come to an end.’
Feltriers, who knew Tuscan affairs as well as those of his own little
country, and who was by no means a man given to violent impulses,
explains in a letter the frame of mind which Lorenzo’s policy had
produced in King Ferrante and Sixtus IV. even before the late events.
The principal matter, Medici’s behaviour and feeling towards Milan, may
have been falsely represented. Some facts may have been imagined—and
even a certain amount of justification is not to be denied to some of
the accusations—and who knows if, as the duke suggests, Lorenzo was
not conscious of it himself. However, the letter produced no result,
for the insufficient number of troops which came from Milan arose, as
we have said, from other causes. Even the preparations of Florence were
insufficient. In order to cover the expenses, the Ten levied taxes and
borrowed money from the banks, without, however, obtaining what they
required. The clergy were exhorted to a contribution of 50,000 gold
florins, at which the monasteries broke forth into endless complaints.
On the enemy’s side they were ready first, and the promptness with
which Siena promoted the designs of the Duke of Calabria, as well
as the docility of the Perugians, who, at the Pope’s command,[257]
dissolved the compact concluded with Florence, afforded the opponents
a great advantage. Alfonso of Calabria led twenty-five squadrons,
and five hundred select mercenaries (Provvisionati); Federigo of
Montefeltro twenty squadrons of heavy cavalry, each consisting of
twenty men-at-arms and forty archers, with the attendants mounted on
auxiliary horses. The attack was expected in the Val di Chiana.
This valley is an inland province of Tuscany, stretching from north
to south, its length, from the southern slopes of the Casentino above
Arezzo, to the southern end of the Lake of Chiusi, some forty miles,
and its greatest breadth between the suburbs of Cortona and the Poggia
di Sta. Cecilia, where a chain of hills descends along the Sienese
valley of Ombrone, about five-and-twenty miles. The Arno, coming from
the Casentino, touches the north-western end of this valley, where,
instead of pursuing a southward course seemingly prescribed by the
nature of the ground, it ‘contemptuously turns its back,’ according
to the poet’s expression,[258] on the town of Arezzo, and by a sharp
turn, created possibly in old times by an artificial cutting, takes a
direction almost parallel to its earlier one and flows towards Florence
in the north-westerly direction. At a small distance west of Arezzo it
unites with the principal Tuscan branch of the river, which gives its
name to the valley watered by it along its whole length, the Chiana or
Clanis of the ancients, the original form of which is still an unsolved
riddle, for it presents the singular appearance of its course and falls
being divided between two larger streams, the Tiber and the Arno, to
both of which it bears its waters, the drainage of the flat valley
being now facilitated by hydraulic works. It is these works which have
entirely altered the appearance of this valley in the present time,
and created a flourishing fertile land where, throughout the Middle
Ages, the miasma prevailed so terribly that the poet was reminded of
its misery in his wanderings through the place of punishment for the
makers of discord.[259] When we view the wide plain from the loftily
situated Cortona, the horizon of which is bounded by a chain of hills,
above which on the south rise the volcanic peak of Radicofani and the
immense trachyte mass of Montamiata, a splendidly green and excellently
cultivated fertile land lies before us. There are numerous hamlets
mostly elevated on the western hills, at the southern end, where
two small lakes seem to announce the neighbourhood of the greater
Trasimene—Chiusi, Chianciano, Montepulciano, Torrita, Asinalunga,
Fojano, Lucignano, Marciano, Monte San Savino. Three states join here:
the State of the Church, with its province Umbria; the land of Siena,
with the valleys of Orcia and Ombrone; and the Florentine territory,
to which by far the greater part of the Val di Chiana belonged. From
the most ancient times this Val di Chiana has always been chosen as a
battle-field, on account of its situation and uncertain boundary, as
well as on account of level suitable for military operations.
About the middle of the fifteenth century, in the Neapolitan war with
King Alfonso, this place was celebrated, as also a century later, when
Siena fell in the heroic defence of her independence.
On July 11, the enemy crossed the Florentine frontiers, and encamped
two miles below Montepulciano.[260] This lofty town was safe from
sudden attack, but the surrounding country had to suffer heavily from
the troops, who destroyed the mills, drove away the cattle, and made
numerous prisoners, spreading terror around. The principal force of
the Florentines encamped farther north, between Arbia and Chiana.
Scarcely had the news of a foreign inroad reached Florence, when a
trumpeter of the Duke of Calabria brought a brief from Sixtus IV.,
dated July 7, and addressed to the Republic. The Pope declared that
for a long time he had been unable to endure the insults offered by
Lorenzo de’ Medici to the Holy See, and that at last he had resolved
on war, in order to liberate Florence from a despotism which would
make it impossible for him to devote himself to the crusade conjointly
with the other princes, who had already once before been prevented by
this man’s fault. He hoped, therefore, that the Republic would take
reasonable measures; he demanded nothing from her but that Lorenzo
should be removed, with whom alone he was at enmity. Only the cessation
of such shameful servitude was the goal towards which he strove; and
only from these measures could he or any clear-sighted person expect
safety. Lorenzo knew the prevailing feeling too well to be seriously
alarmed at a move which sought to check him personally. But he was
obliged to bring the matter to instant decision. After the brief had
been read aloud in the Senate, he begged to be allowed to speak to the
people. Before an assembly of citizens called together in the palace,
he declared he was ready to make any sacrifice whereby the safety of
the State could be purchased, either by his banishment or death, as
their interests had always been as near to his heart as they had been
dear to his father and grandfather. He would not go over the past nor
seek to justify himself or accuse others, as the Republic had already
sufficiently displayed her sentiments on these points. But he could
not refrain from remarking that it was strange that the vicegerent of
Christ should think it right at such a time of anxiety and care to show
hatred to a single man by inflicting ruinous war on a peaceful and
flourishing neighbour. In such a condition of things he did not know
if his gratitude towards heaven for the affection shown him should be
greater, or sorrow for the variously threatening ills which without
his fault had already befallen them. He hoped that the assistance of
God, and the activity and prudence of numerous citizens, would help the
Republic to save her honour and preserve her fame. If his life would
better serve the attainment of this end than his exile or death, he
offered it and his family and possessions willingly and joyfully. As we
can easily understand, all declared themselves of one accord with him.
The result of the Pope’s letter was that all Florence declared that
it regarded Lorenzo’s cause as its own, and gave the threatened man a
guard of twelve men to protect his person.
Several great canonists and others learned in the law were questioned
as to the validity and effect of the Papal censures, and gave their
opinion that the Republic, by appealing to the future council, was,
notwithstanding the interdict, justified in letting divine service
be celebrated in the city and territory as before. The storm raged
high; the Pope and the Florentines mutually excited one another. On
June 20, the bull with which Lorenzo and the Republic were threatened
was enforced; commerce with them, and service under their flag were
forbidden.[261] A letter written on July 21 by the Signoria to the
Pope[262] contains expressions which scarcely keep within the limits
of deference to the head of the Church, making accusations against
the Senate, and appealing to the protection of the French king. It
was not calculated to soften Sixtus IV. Neither did it stop here. The
uncontrolled passion of the Pope and that total want of moderation
which made him seize the weapons of the world in order to attack
his enemies and enkindle a terrible war, affected not only the
Florentine laity, but the clergy also. Again was repeated what had
been experienced a century before under the reign of the last Pope
of Avignon, that is to say, a part of the clergy took part with the
state. A synod in Sta. Maria del Fiore was to investigate the facts of
the case, and the question of right in the Pazzi affair, and publish
its decision. Whether the assembly really took place is questionable;
a rambling document from the hand of Gentile, Bishop of Arezzo, the
head of the clerical opposition to the Pope, certainly would lead us
to suppose that the synod was convened.[263] But the tone of this
composition is so violent, the accusations against Sixtus IV. are so
immoderately passionate, exaggerated, and irreverent, the temper is
so unworthy a society of clericals and sons of the Church assembled
for a serious deliberation, that we must, for the honour of the Tuscan
clergy, believe that we have here a sample of individual invective
merely. The signature ‘Given in our cathedral of Sta. Reparata on July
23, 1478,’ which only befitted the Archbishop of Florence, Rinaldo
Orsini, whose name is not mentioned in this confused epistle, confirms
this supposition. In any case, such a declaration in a cause which
it was to defend would do far more harm than good. That even the
mere mention of the council, and especially of the council of Bâle,
embittered and disturbed the Pope, is shown from the impression made
upon him by a subsequent and most unimportant attempt to revive once
more that ecclesiastical assembly, the constant terror of the successor
of Eugenius IV., to kindle its ashes into flame, and effect on the
other side of the Alps an opposition to the unspiritual tendencies
of the Holy See which became more and more apparent. The official
defence which the Republic caused to be drawn up by their chancellor,
Bartolommeo Scala, on August 10, seems dignified and moderate
beside such attacks. The principal contents are the declarations of
Montesecco, which the composer of the letter above mentioned had also
seen, and which are followed by a short account, limited to facts, of
the events at Florence; while the assistance of the Emperor Frederick
III. and King Louis XI. is appealed to against the threatened
violence. The emperor is especially reminded that it concerns his most
faithful city of Florence and her people, always devoted to his sacred
majesty.
After receiving the Florentine answer on July 21, the Pope addressed
an autograph letter to the Duke of Urbino, in which he remarked that
the tone and contents of the answer had not alarmed him, but had only
shown that God, to punish his enemies for their sins, had deprived them
of their understanding. His cause was just. He demanded nothing but
the punishment of Lorenzo, who had behaved inimically towards God and
His church, and ungratefully to the Pope, who relied upon the duke’s
valour and devotion, and that of the Neapolitan prince. He had answered
the Venetians, God would chastise them if they acted wrongly. He had
sent Nuncios to the emperor, the Kings of France, Spain and Hungary,
to justify himself. The bull was printed; everyone would know of it.
French ambassadors were announced, and he hoped that God would inspire
him with a proper answer. They threatened disobedience and schism; it
would be as God wished; it would at all events serve some purpose, if
he, the duke, would write to the King of England, King Ferrante, his
ally, and Louis XI.[264]
They did not content themselves with writing; the Pope must have
perceived that a dangerous contest had begun. Guid’Antonio Vespucci
was sent to Rome in order to show that they would not submit to the
interdict. The government reckoned on support from the French side; not
one of the Italian allies joined the demonstration. Donato Acciaiuoli,
who still resided at home, received a commission to repair to France
to keep the king favourably inclined. He had never really recovered
from the excitement which the events in Rome had caused him, and
undertook the commission very unwillingly. As Vespucci was to thank
the Perugians, who seemed to wish to join the Florentines again, for
their friendliness, Acciaiuoli received a command to negotiate in Milan
regarding further action in common. Scarcely arrived, he fell ill, and
died on August 28. It was a heavy loss for the Republic, who honoured
his memory, as Florence possessed few abler or more respected citizens.
The moment when he arrived in Milan was not a fortunate one, for the
revolution had already taken place in Genoa, which immediately produced
a reaction on the Tuscan war, as a part of the troops in Tuscany were
called home. King Ferrante had managed the matter more cleverly. Not
only, as was easy for him, did he stir up the brothers Sforza and
Roberto Sanseverino against Genoa, but succeeded in reconciling for
the moment the chief of the great parties in the city to one another;
and meanwhile he won over Prospero Adorno, who governed Genoa for the
duchess, in order to bring thither the former doge, Lodovico Fregoso,
who lay in wait at Piombino. The Milanese garrison held out with
difficulty against the city, which had declared itself free, and had
received from Naples artillery, munitions, and men. The Duke of Atri,
Giulio Acquaviva, sailed from thence on July 22, and when a Milanese
army approached, it was completely defeated on August 7 by Sanseverino.
So far all things had prospered according to King Ferrante’s wish. But
the quarrels which never ceased to divide the nobility came to the aid
of the regent, who, in order not to leave the city in the hands of her
brothers-in-law and their faction, secretly negotiated with Battista,
one of the Fregosi, and caused Castelletto, still garrisoned by her
troops, to surrender to him, on which he took possession of the city,
which proclaimed him doge, and if not subject to Milan, was as little
dependent on Naples.[265]
Meanwhile the campaign had begun in a manner which showed beforehand
that, even without decisive battles, the Florentine territory would
be ruined. The enemy was three times as strong as the Florentines,
who were unprovided in many ways, but whose most serious deficiency
at the beginning of the war was that they had no captain-general, and
consequently failed in unity of leadership and a plan of war. The
troops were in a bad condition. The reports sent to Milan by Gian
Jacopo Trivulzio show a sad picture of the circumstances. Having set
out from Milan with a hundred men-at-arms, he had come by Pontemoli
into Tuscany, and at length reached the Aretine territory. There, at
Olmo, three miles from Arezzo, at the entrance to the Chiana valley,
where the roads divide to Cortona and Siena over Monte Sansavino,
he halted and awaited the Florentine army. His people produced a
favourable impression on the Florentine commissaries, but not so those
of the allies on him. ‘The Florentine troops,’ he writes on July
16,[266] ‘passed in such a wretched state that I was disgusted—without
order or connection, the different troops mingled together, so that I
could not distinguish them, one squadron half a mile distant from the
other.’ In the camp there was similar disorder; only a few infantry,
and those badly armed, and no sappers and miners. Besides this,
insufficient means for provisioning, so that the Milanese _condottiere_
complained that the government only seemed to think of their own
advantage, and not of the welfare of the troops. No prices were fixed;
they opened door and house to the usurers, and sought by the taxation
of imported provisions to procure money, instead of providing for the
first necessities. Under such circumstances, it availed little that
illustrious men arrived in the camp, among them Ghiberto da Correggio
and Teodoro Trivulzio, Gian Jacopo’s cousin, and, like him, afterwards
Marshal of France. The two commissaries of the army, Luigi and Jacopo
Guicciardini, with whom the Venetian ambassadors Giovanni Emo and
Bernardo Bembo were associated, could not hide the want of united
military guidance, a want which remained perceptible even when a
commission of four captains was entrusted with the representation for
the time of the captain-general. These were the Count of Pitigliano,
Galeotto Pico, Gian Jacopo Trivulzio, Alberto Visconti.
The enemy had quitted Montepulciano and turned northward, with the
evident intention of gaining the road to Florence. Without venturing
a battle, the Florentines slowly retreated, at first towards Arezzo,
then, as they saw the enemy take the direction to Siena, to cover the
Elsa valley, in which they set up their camp on the Poggio Imperiale
on a broad and flat hill overlooking the whole district by Poggibonzi,
which once bore the old castle destroyed by the Guelphs, where the
Emperor Henry VII. spent the last years of his life. Without being
molested, the enemy took in the meantime several small places situated
in the neighbouring province of Chianti, some of which offered a
gallant resistance. The open country suffered dreadfully from the
destruction of the mills and of such provisions as the soldiers
could not carry away. The havock made in the Sienese territory and
an attempt of the Florentines to win over Perugia so exasperated the
Pope as to make him publish, from the Orsini castle of Bracciano, on
August 10, a new and stronger bull against the Republic. It was on the
same day that Commines paid a visit to the Florentine head-quarters
at Poggibonzi.[267] Here at last they got a captain-general, Ercole
d’Este, Duke of Ferrara. Though son-in-law to the King of Naples
he accepted the command of the Florentine and Milanese troops, and
arrived at Florence on September 8. The Venetians were displeased
at this choice, and had protested against it in Milan and Florence
without avail. On the same day with the duke the Marquis of Saluzzo
had arrived, with nearly two hundred foot, at Pisa. It was high time.
The duke stayed four days in the city, which received him with great
distinction, and presented him with the house of Renato de’ Pazzi,
the most innocent victim of the conspiracy. On the 13th he set out for
the camp. Before the staff of command was delivered to him, which was
done for the Republic by Lorenzo, for Milan by Gian Jacopo Trivulzio,
the stars were consulted by an astrologer according to the fashion of
the times, and the afternoon of September 27 declared favourable. It
might have been expected that a more active prosecution of the war
would now begin. But the new captain-general ventured as little as
his predecessors to attack the enemy, notwithstanding his augmented
forces; and when the former considering an advance upon Florence
unadvisable, gave up his position in Chianti, and, turning again to the
Chiana valley, began the siege of Monte San Savino, it needed the most
express commands of Florence to persuade Ercole d’Este to break up his
head-quarters and approach the enemy.
The slowness of his movements and the numerous difficulties that
were raised showed how little he was disposed to advance. When the
armies had approached one another the Royalists proposed a truce of
several days, which the duke gladly accepted, and when the truce
was over, Monte San Savino capitulated on November 8. From its
protected situation and the easy provisioning of the place it was not
unimportant, and the Florentines felt the loss severely. For as at
the same time an attempt to reconquer Castellina by surprise failed
on account of the unskilful leadership of the army, the Chiana valley
and the Chianti were exposed to the devastations of the enemy, and
reprisals on the Sienese domain afforded but slight consolation. They
were not without anxiety either for other parts of the territory. In
Pistoja a project was discovered to give the town into King Ferrante’s
hands, who longed to compete with the Florentines with the help of the
Genoese and to take possession of their trading ships. Lucca was not
considered safe either; Piero Capponi represented here the interests of
the Republic. So ended the year 1478, a fruitful but unhappy year. The
war had consumed much money, ruined the country people in flourishing
districts, much injured a number of villages, and produced not one
warlike deed.
Things could not continue thus. If Milan and Venice did not fulfil
their duty to their allies better, Florence, which was in such a
bad military condition and had the war in her territory, could not
offer resistance to her enemies. Bernardo Bembo, a respected and
business-like man whom the Republic of Venice had sent as their
permanent representative, might well see the situation of affairs
without being able to cause a more energetic interposition, for they
were always negotiating with the Pope, while the Papal and Neapolitan
troops made daily progress. Tommaso Soderini went to Venice to
represent to the Republic the state of affairs. Girolamo Morelli did
the same in Milan. The Florentines proposed to attack the King of
Naples by invading his shores and summoning the Angevins once more
to Italy, and at the same time to disturb the Pope in his own states
in Romagna as well as in Umbria. But in Milan, however good the will
might be, little was to be gained, because of their own embarrassments.
The Swiss, misled by Papal and Neapolitan intrigues which broke the
treaties confirmed at Galeazzo Maria’s death, marched once more
against the frontiers of the Alps, overran Bellinzona, and defeated
the ducal troops. At the same time, on account of Genoese affairs and
disturbances in the reigning families which will soon be mentioned, the
Venetians were opposed to the removal of the war to Romagna. The other
projects seemed too complicated and uncertain. After long negotiation,
it was agreed that the Marquis of Mantua should strengthen the army
of the Duke of Ferrara and that Roberto Malatesta of Rimini, who had
dissolved his connection with the Church and passed over to the service
of Florence, should make a strong diversion in the territory of Perugia
with Carlo Fortebraccio. At the same time, the treaties with Louis XI.
had arrived at a conclusion which, though not all that could be wished
by the allies, certainly promoted their cause.