CHAPTER VI.
LORENZO DE’ MEDICI IN NAPLES. PEACE WITH THE KING AND WITH THE POPE.
ON the evening of December 10 two Neapolitan galleys arrived at the
little port of Vada, not far from the mouth of the Cecina in the Pisan
Maremma, having on board Gian Tommaso Caraffa, son of the Count of
Maddaloni, chief counsellor of the king, and Prinzivalle di Gennaro,
the confidant of the Duke of Calabria. On the following morning Lorenzo
entered Vada. ‘Pray God,’ he had written from Pisa to the Ferrarese
ambassador,[300] ‘I may journey there and back in safety, and my
purpose may be attained.’ On the afternoon of the 18th, a Saturday,
the galleys ran into the port of Naples. Informed of his approaching
arrival, the king not only sent vessels to meet and welcome him,
but his son Federigo and Ferrandino, Prince of Capua, were on the
landing-place to receive him. A great crowd had assembled to see
the man whose name had long been in the mouths of all. The house of
Pasquale Diaz Garloni, Count of Alife, opposite the Castelnuovo, the
usual residence of the king, was destined for the guest.[301] The
reception was honourable, and the first meeting with the king very
cordial.[302] Ferrante could not shake off the impression which Lorenzo
made on him personally. It must have been clear to him that if he
made it up with this man who exhibited in his youth so much shrewdness
and skill, and such great political sagacity, he could rely directly
on the Republic; and, while securing Lorenzo’s authority at home by
peace and by alliance, he would be strengthening and establishing his
own influence on Italian affairs. Thus far it must have been easy
for Lorenzo to persuade the king, who was not expected to give the
preference to a popular form of government. But a number of the most
varied considerations had to be weighed by Ferrante. He had to consider
the Pope, of whom he was not fond, and whom, remembering the position
of the Holy See at Naples, he did not trust, but whom he neither dared
nor wished to offend on account of this very position. The Venetians
had to be considered; they were dangerous neighbours for him as well
as the Pope, on account of their constant endeavours to extend their
dominion on the Adriatic coasts; while a good understanding with them
was all the more uncertain because their policy was mostly determined
by conjunctures which were foreign to the relations of the other
Italian States. Siena, too, must not be overlooked, which the king and
his son had their eye upon; nor Milan, where a change was in progress
the extent of which could not be appreciated. All this, combined with
the traditions of the policy of the times—namely the policy of a ruler
surrounded by foreign and domestic difficulties from the beginning of
his reign—must have caused Ferrante to hesitate long. Besides, it
cannot be doubted that he wished to see what turn Florentine affairs
would take in Lorenzo’s absence.
From various causes things were still unsettled in Florence. Lorenzo’s
determination and sudden journey had not made the same impression on
all the allies. Lodovico il Moro had assisted in it, and the Venetians
were taken by surprise. They expressed their distrust and vexation in
plain language. The Venetians, relates Francesco Guicciardini,[303]
persuaded themselves that peace had been concluded between Naples and
Florence; that Lorenzo had only gone thither for the ratification of
peace, and that they were left at their enemies’ discretion. But in
order to hinder the treaty in case it were not yet concluded, or, in
other words, to secure themselves, it seemed necessary for them to be
as well armed as possible. They recalled their troops from Tuscany, but
at the same time offered to Milan and Florence a renewal of the compact
hitherto existing. The news had spread as far as Rome and elsewhere
that this alliance had been dissolved on account of non-fulfilment of
the conditions, so that it seemed necessary to renew it formally. In
order not to render the negotiations with Naples more difficult, the
offer was declined in Florence. When the Venetians offered the command
of their troops to Roberto Malatesta—who would have been unable to
accept it without the consent of Florence—permission was granted him
by the latter, though unwillingly, in order not to offend Venice.
‘The ambassadors of our allies,’ wrote Bartolommeo Scala, on January
4, 1480, to Lorenzo,[304] ‘give us trouble enough. They have become
suspicious, but I do not believe they are agreed among themselves.
They besiege us daily, officially and privately, in order to obtain
news. It will not be easy to come to an understanding, especially with
the Venetians; but we must keep to that which was given to you at
your departure. The affair has its difficulties, and it will be best
to conclude it with your aid. Now when you are far away, we, like the
fools we are, have learnt to know you better.’ The Venetian ambassador
in France expressed the same anxiety that in the new alliance which
Lorenzo was endeavouring to effect at Naples, Venice would not only be
excluded, but would have to suffer herself.[305]
That the most varied tendencies were manifested at home was but
natural. Not only the ancient opponents of the Medici raised their
heads but even a few of their own party showed themselves lukewarm
or disaffected. The heavy losses made the game easy for the former.
It was said to be time to change a system which had lasted so long,
and united all political power in the hands of a comparatively small
number of families. Offices as well as burdens should for the future
be no longer dispensed at the will of these few, but be granted and
distributed by the old councils. The uncertainty of Lorenzo’s fate gave
this party courage, while it made many of his adherents inclined to
come to terms with them by a compromise. It seems, indeed, that they
thought of choosing Girolamo Morelli, the former ambassador in Milan,
as a new leader. The friends of the Medici thought they had gained much
if they prevented a change till Lorenzo’s return. Piero Guicciardini,
the historian’s father, was one of those most active in his behalf. The
unfavourable position of foreign affairs had been rendered still worse
at the moment of his departure. Without regarding the armistice still
existing, Lodovico and Agostino Fregoso had by a _coup-de-main_ seized
upon Sarzana, which had been only eleven years in the possession of
Florence. When the Republic complained to the leaders of the Neapolitan
and Papal army, these expressed themselves angry at the breach of peace
by the Genoese, and commanded them to leave the city. But they were
not expelled; and the Florentines suspected, certainly not without
ground, that the Duke of Calabria had had a hand in the game, in order
to increase, for his advantage, the number of claims in the forthcoming
treaties of peace. The military situation was likewise much injured by
the departure of the Venetians, and the exhaustion and disunion of the
Florentines gave no prospect of improvement.[306]
The connection with the lords of Romagna was also uncertain. As may
easily be understood, the latter followed the negotiations of the
Florentines with their former enemies with the greatest anxiety, for
their very existence depended on the result. This was particularly
the case with Galeotto Manfredi. After the defeat at Poggio Imperiale
Costanzo Sforza had marched to Romagna with as many men as could be
spared, in order to protect his own territories and those of the
Malatesta and Manfredi from an attack which was most to be dreaded by
the latter if it came from Imola. But the precaution was not sufficient
to pacify Galeotto. On the other side the Florentines could not submit
to the capture of their best general Roberto Malatesta, so they
ordered an ambassador and 200 men to Faenza in order to protect its
master. Gismondo Manfredi, Taddeo’s son, remained in the service of
the Republic, and also Antoniello Ordelaffi, Cecco’s son, the rightful
heir to Forli, which was withheld from him by his uncle Pino, whom the
Pope favoured. Costanzo Sforza felt safer than the other petty lords on
account of the Milanese relationship; but a real mutual confidence was
not to be thought of, even here.[307]
While affairs were in this state in Florence, Lorenzo de’ Medici was
occupied with troubles of another kind.
His appearance in Naples was exceedingly distasteful to the Pope. From
the first Sixtus had perceived the king’s inclination to agree to
favourable terms, the final result of which he easily foresaw. But,
if powerless to prevent an understanding, he would at least have a
personal share in it, and insisted that Lorenzo should come to Rome.
However, the latter showed no inclination to take the journey, and
was strengthened in his objection by Ferrante.[308] Lorenzo Giustini,
who had been deputed to Naples by the Pope, left no argument unused
to persuade him. When all this resulted in nothing, and the treaty
between the king and Florence seemed to take a favourable course,
Sixtus IV. despatched a special plenipotentiary Antonio Crivelli.
The detailed instructions given to this man put the whole course of
affairs and the relations of the Pope and king in the clearest light.
‘After the events in Florence had taken a course so displeasing to the
Church,’ says the Pope in this remarkable document,[309] ‘we held it
best to hear the king’s opinion of the imprisonment of the cardinal and
other things; and, as his Majesty by several writings not only agreed
with us, but called upon and encouraged us to take up arms, with the
offer and promise to make every exertion and put his son’s and his own
life at stake, in order to avenge this insult shown to the Holy See,
it was unanimously determined to begin the war against Lorenzo and his
adherents as the stumbling-block and disturber of the peace of Italy.
At the same time the freedom of Florence must be restored, to which we
and the king’s Majesty have pledged ourselves by autograph and other
documentary writings, being moved thereto by Lorenzo’s evil proceedings
and the disturbances caused by him in Italy. Lorenzo likewise has
endeavoured to sow dissension between us and the king, and to dissolve
the alliance in favour of one drawn up by himself.’
After the Pope had remarked that the ingratitude of Lorenzo was all
the greater because he had won treasure by means of the Holy See,
he expatiated on the course of the war, which was only begun when
spiritual weapons availed nothing, on the attempts of foreign powers
to terminate the strife with due respect to the Holy See and the king,
and the great advantages obtained in 1479. When peaceful overtures were
made by Milan, the king declined them. At the time it had been remarked
by several cardinals that he only did this in order to transfer the
negotiations to Naples, and be able to ascribe all the merit to
himself, and likewise to negotiate with Lorenzo without any regard
to the Holy See, as at present was actually the case, according to
the report of the royal ambassador. While the Pope was led to believe
that the king agreed with him in views and treatment of affairs, the
latter had let a number of other considerations influence him. They
had decided to insist upon Lorenzo’s banishment from Florence; and
then came the king’s doubt as to whether it would be possible to
attain this, and whether there was not danger of his returning like
his grandfather Cosimo. Little as the Pope believed in the validity
of the reasons urged, as he thought that the principal end of the
undertaking was overlooked, and that Lorenzo, having shown himself to
be so bad when they were doing him good, would be found still worse
now that he was irritated, he had yet persuaded himself to agree to
a reconciliation with Lorenzo as the king wished, if the conditions
demanded by him through his ambassador could be obtained, while,
if this did not happen, the war should be continued. The king had
commanded the captains of his army to continue operations although they
thought of pacification, and on the showing of the Duke of Calabria the
prospect of reconciliation offered by the enemy diminished the prospect
of success. He had answered that by negotiation he would neither tie
his own hands nor those of the army. Even then the Pope had complied
with the king’s wishes, although his son’s opinion had seemed to him
correct.
‘Scarcely had this occurred,’ continued Sixtus, ‘than the armistice
followed, which filled us with surprise and displeasure, and confirmed
us in the suspicion awakened. Therefore we refused decidedly to
acknowledge it, and only yielded to the ambassador’s urgency, and
because we perceived that we could not continue the war alone; under
the express stipulation, however, that, if the conditions of peace
should suffer thereby, we should never pardon the king for it. We made
a virtue of necessity, but to our serious displeasure, for we saw how
we missed the victory while we were deprived of the satisfaction of
liberating Florence from these tyrants, and restoring freedom and quiet
to her and peace to all Italy. The hope still remained to us that as
the king had turned us whither he wished, he would at least conclude
peace on the conditions mentioned, and would have some regard to the
honour of God, the Church, and himself. Lorenzo went to Naples. The
king announced to us he knew nothing of his movements, but in spite of
all, if Lorenzo should refuse to accept the stipulations agreed upon,
he would dismiss him. In a case of this kind we must stake the tiara
and the whole States of the Church, and his Majesty would venture the
crown and ten kingdoms, if he had them, to effect Lorenzo’s expulsion
and complete ruin.’ The Pope had demanded that Lorenzo should come
to Rome and beg for forgiveness, and that the lords of Romagna, who
were guilty of rebellion, should do the same. Lorenzo so decidedly
declined the former, that the king requested the Pope to withdraw this
demand. He, Sixtus, refused this, however, for it was a point which
the king disregarded—the only satisfaction he would receive in the
whole affair. Respecting the lords of Romagna, the king desired that
time might be afforded to them to fulfil their obligations, if the Pope
would not leave it to the king to arrange the matter with them. Both
conditions were refused, as also the proposal to send ambassadors to
Milan at the same time as the king, to settle the other conditions of
peace. The Pope had repeatedly shown that the king had it in his power
to terminate the matter by force of arms if he fulfilled the conditions
of alliance; and as Lorenzo was in his power, and would yield to him
whether willing or not, he might also be induced to negotiate. Instead,
however, of breaking with Lorenzo as he had hinted he should in case
the latter refused to accept the conditions offered him, he treated
him more kindly every day he was in Naples. The Pope wished for peace.
In order to attain this peace he had begun the war, which had already
cost him a heap of money. But he would purchase no peace with his
dishonour.
The position of affairs is rendered quite clear by these instructions.
Ferrante was inclined to come to terms with Lorenzo, but the Pope’s
representations could not fail to make some impression on him. Lorenzo
did not conceal this from himself, though he appeared content and
cheerful before others, but when alone he had many heavy and anxious
hours. His letters to the Ten prove this, by the manner in which he
describes the rising and falling of his hopes. The affairs of Romagna
increased the difficulties considerably; for if Ferrante believed that
he had freedom to act in regard to Florentine affairs, inasmuch as he
had not to pay attention to Siena, he found himself tied here towards
the Pope. Florence did not cease to urge including the dynasties of
Romagna in the peace. ‘The lords of Romagna who are in our pay,’ wrote
Agnolo della Stufa on January 4, 1480,[310] ‘are warmly commended to
you for our own honour’s sake. For if they are left to the will of
the Pope, I consider them as lost, for I know how the priests act. No
one will believe in our protection any more. If the king, as I hope,
receives us as his devoted sons, he must be also careful to preserve
us this reputation as long as he can.’ No less skill was needful to
continue the negotiation, as the Duke of Calabria, who speculated on
the weakness of the Florentines, was exceedingly disinclined towards
it. Perhaps Lorenzo’s aim would not have been attained had he not won
over the most distinguished counsellor of the king, Diomede Carafa,
Count of Maddaloni, son of that Malizia Carafa who had been so active
in the cause of King Alfonso of Aragon. In the endless street which
the people had named Spacca-Napoli, near the Dominican convent, is the
palace where he resided—a building of architectural value. In the
court of this house, once adorned with the colossal antique horse’s
head, the arms of the city, King Ferrante had on one occasion stood
waiting for the faithful servant who was to accompany him. Diomede
Carafa was a man of distinction. He had served under King Alfonso,
aided in the conquest of Naples, and penetrated within a few miles of
the capital in the Florentine war of 1452. As superintendent of finance
he had great influence on the administration—an influence which
brought him into violent opposition to the king’s private secretary,
a quarrel the fatal ending of which cast a dark shadow on the later
period of Ferrante’s reign. With the king and his children, especially
the second son Don Federigo, he stood in the most intimate connection.
He shared Lorenzo de’ Medici’s interest in literature and art; and, if
he was far from rivalling him in his high literary gifts, he showed
in several smaller works of a didactic kind, in books on war and
courtlife, in the rules of behaviour for the king’s daughters Beatrice
and Eleonora, a practical understanding, knowledge of business, and
experience of the world that was very rare.
The Count of Maddaloni was not the only one whom Lorenzo gained over
to his interest. Naples at that time was a city full of busy life and
varied culture, which had been promoted first by King Alfonso and then
by his sons, in which Lorenzo must have felt himself all the more at
home as the literary connections with his native city were various, and
many of the artistic circle which had been so intimate with his family
for three generations, beginning with Donatello, had laboured here,
while the Florentine banking-houses had the greater part of the money
matters of the Neapolitans in their own hands. From the royal family,
members of which had repeatedly been his guests, to the citizens and
country people, increasing affection was shown him, as Pope Sixtus had
said. The Duchess of Calabria, remembering old friendship, became,
as the king expressed it, his fellow-ally, and reminded him in later
years of their wanderings at the villa—probably that near the Riviera
di Chiaja of the present day—between the banks and the heights of
Vomero, then with a free prospect over sea and shore, which is now
changed into the Ferrandina palace with the adjoining gardens and
buildings. ‘The present letter will not be one of those which refer to
alliance and State affairs, but will merely bring to your remembrance
that we always think of you, although we are by no means certain that
you often think of our garden, which is now most beautiful and in full
bloom.’[311] The century was not wanting in highly-cultivated women,
but Ippolita Maria, who excelled so many in grace, also exceeded the
ladies of her time in literary knowledge; and as her familiarity with
Cicero’s writings was praised, so did she also shine in her knowledge
of Greek, in which Constantinos Lascaris had been her teacher. Her
learning did not diminish her womanly charm.[312] Lorenzo lived in
Naples _en grand seigneur_, spared no expense, gave banquets and made
presents, and dowered poor girls who came to him from the provinces.
He purchased the freedom of a hundred galley-slaves, and gave them new
clothes.[313] But that he urgently wished to attain his purpose and be
able to return home may be well understood, for the ground under him
was not safe either here or there. When the king presented him with a
beautiful horse, he remarked, in thanking him, that the man who would
be the bearer of good news needed indeed a swift steed.
At length the main conditions of the treaty were agreed upon, and
without having come to a formal conclusion Lorenzo deemed it possible
to quit Naples, and to leave further steps to the Republic. At the end
of February he departed by sea as he had arrived. Three months had
passed, a time full of doubts and fears, but crowned with success.
‘He landed,’ says Niccolò Valori, ‘in Livorno, from whence he went to
Pisa. In the harbour and town he was received with such a manifestation
of joy, with such signs of attachment and shouts of applause from
the whole population, that the place itself seemed to join in the
rejoicing. But it is impossible to describe how he was received at his
entry into Florence. Young and old, men and women, flocked together.
The people and the nobles rejoiced together to see him return safely.
To all he gave his hand kindly and gratefully. The people embraced each
other for joy.’ But a reaction soon set in. On the evening of March
17 a compact was published, which had been concluded on the 13th at
Naples by Agostino Biliotti and Niccolò Michelozzi in the name of the
Republic.[314] They had made peace; but the conditions were not easy,
and the suspicion arose among the people that the most oppressive
articles were kept secret. If all the circumstances are considered,
however, the conditions were supportable. The Florentines had been
conquered, and from whatever point of view the cause of the war might
be judged, the fact of defeat could not be denied.
On March 25, 1480, the feast of the Annunciation, peace and alliance
were formally proclaimed throughout Florence, and a grand procession
took place headed by the statue from Sta. Maria dell’Impruneta, which
was brought into the city for the purpose. The two opponents bound
themselves mutually to defend their states; the occupied places should
be restored to the Florentines, but at the king’s own time, and with
the exception of Castellina and a part of the Chianti, which was
to be given to Siena. The Duke of Calabria was to be paid a salary
under the name of _condotta_. The Pazzi imprisoned in the tower of
Volterra were to be restored to freedom. The lords of Romagna were
not included in the treaty of peace but the king pledged himself to
preserve their interests. Lorenzo had exerted himself in vain in this
respect. Ferrante out of regard for the Pope was not to be moved. The
dynasties, with the exception of the Ordelaffi, had not to complain
later, as we shall see. Efforts on behalf of the Chianti had likewise
been fruitless. Lorenzo endeavoured to show how advantageously it would
affect the future connections of the Republic with the king if their
territory remained undiminished.[315] It offended the Florentines most
of all that they did not even receive a promise respecting Sarzana, the
restitution of which they had tried to obtain during the negotiations,
in order to diminish the number of claims of compensation from their
opponents. The demand of payment to Girolamo Riario which had been
threatened them, and would indeed have been an insult, was allowed to
remain in abeyance. ‘The conditions,’ remarks Francesco Guicciardini,
‘were not unfavourable to the vanquished.’ But the populace in Florence
were not of the same opinion. That they were not satisfied with the
demeanour of Lodovico Sforza and his influence on the negotiation is
shown by a letter of the Duke of Ferrara to his ambassador, wherein he
requires him to represent to Lorenzo that he would do well to go as
much as possible hand in hand with Milan, even if some things in the
compact were displeasing. He was not to forget that Florence and Milan
were two states whose interests coincided, and whose true union would
be useful to both, as it had been before.[316]
At Rome and Milan the compact was made known on the same day as at
Florence. In the presence of the Pope and his cardinals, Ambrogio
Cerano, general of the Augustinians, announced peace[317] from the
pulpit in Sta. Maria del Popolo, where the Papal service took place on
the feast of the Annunciation.
The position with regard to Sixtus IV. remained, however, as uncertain
as before. Scarcely had Lorenzo left Naples when the king received
through Lorenzo Giustini, new proposals of agreement which appeared
to him of sufficient importance to justify his sending after Medici,
and requesting him to return from Gaeta or Pisa in order to effect an
agreement with Sixtus. The latter, so wrote the king, had displayed
the greatest readiness to agree to the proposals made by Florence and
Milan; and as Girolamo Riario had expressed himself in like manner,
Lorenzo’s return appeared to him highly desirable to bring the matter
to a conclusion, all the more so as the Pope had regarded his departure
as a sign of ill-will. He, the king, had indeed answered that this
departure had been caused by affairs at Florence; but he advised him
to announce at home that bad weather had hindered him on the way, and
as, meanwhile, the Papal decision had arrived, he had considered it
necessary to return in order not to delay the complete conclusion of
the affair. In this manner he would render the League and Milan a real
service, put an end to the Pope’s suspicion, recover his affection,
and promote the king’s interests also. The negotiation could then
proceed without delay on the part of the Milanese ambassadors, who
had a time of departure appointed them, and he would return with the
fame of having completed his work.[318] In this suggestion a cunning
intention has sometimes been suspected, as if the king, enticed by the
new proposals of the Pope, had repented his compact with Lorenzo, and
tried to get the latter into his power again in order to dictate his
will to him. Ferrante’s whole subsequent behaviour affords no ground
for such a suspicion. But that Lorenzo did not accede to the king’s
wishes is explained sufficiently by the painful suspense in which the
Papal policy had kept him so long, and by the necessity of his presence
at home. Probably, too, the king expected no result from this step,
which he was obliged to take for the sake of the Pope. Sixtus IV.
did, indeed, ratify the peace, as we have seen; but he was very ill
satisfied with the whole course of the matter, and Lorenzo Giustini,
who had conducted the negotiation, lost the confidence of the Pope
and his nephew, which he had long enjoyed.[319] Antonio Ridolfi and
Piero Masi were sent to Rome to defend the cause of the Republic. They
accomplished little. The Pope demanded that Lorenzo himself should come
to Rome, for which the latter showed no inclination, and which was also
advised against by others, Ferrara for example.[320] Sixtus complaining
that the agreement and new alliance were to the disadvantage of the
Church, allied himself with the Venetians, who regarded their ancient
relation to Milan and Florence as dissolved, and left the Florentines
still under the pressure of the interdict laid upon them.
Evils soon followed this policy in Romagna. Costanzo Sforza was in
a difficulty, but his powerful relations came to his aid this time
also against the plans of the Pope’s nephew. In Forli, on the other
hand, affairs took a turn very unfavourable for the Republic. Pino
degli Ordelaffi, whom we saw in 1466 violently freed from his brother
Cecco, almost the only one of these lords of Romagna who took the side
of Sixtus IV., had died on February 10, worn out by his dissipated
life, which made it impossible for him to support the fatigues of a
short campaign, which did not tax him heavily. In 1473 be had obtained
from the Pope the renewal of his vice-regency for his own natural
descendants, to the exclusion of his nephew Antonio or Antoniello, to
whom, according to previous family statutes, the joint government of
Forli belonged, and who, like his father, held to Florence as firmly as
Pino to the opposite party. The natural son of the latter, Sinibaldo,
a boy of thirteen years, had been acknowledged by the inhabitants of
Forli as his successor. His stepmother and guardian, Zaffiera Manfredi,
soon made herself so hated that an insurrection broke out as early as
the beginning of July, in consequence of which Antoniello on the 8th
entered Forli. Here the people were still fighting the mercenaries
of Sinibaldo, who had sought protection in the fortress of Ravaldino.
Sixtus IV. took advantage of this opportunity. The Duke of Urbino
received a command to march to Forli; Antoniello was declared deprived
of all his rights, and as the boy Sinibaldo died about this time—how
is unknown—the Pope granted Forli to Girolamo Riario as a lapsed fief.
The citizens at first showed themselves willing to defend the cause
of the rightful heir; but when the duke approached the city, and a
few skirmishes had ended unfavourably, neither provisions nor money
for a longer opposition were existing, and Antoniello recognised the
impossibility of maintaining himself. On August 8 he quitted Forli and
repaired to Florentine territory, and on the following day the Papal
army entered, and Riario was proclaimed lord of Forli. How displeased
they were in Florence to see these embittered enemies at their frontier
with increased powers, may be understood. Two conspiracies in favour of
the Ordelaffi, which broke out in the course of the year, failed, and
Antoniello, who remained in the service of the Republic, awaited better
times.
Far more serious cause of anxiety was afforded by affairs in Siena.
Peace had been proclaimed on March 25 at Siena, but the Duke of
Calabria made no sign of evacuating the territory of that Republic.
During the winter he had been frequently in the city, and he managed
to make himself beloved by the inhabitants. They gave him festivals in
the palace, balls, banquets, and masquerades; and in return he bestowed
knighthood, stood sponsor for children, and was present at the election
of magistrates. In February he had been with troops in the Maremma,
whence an attack from the Duke of Lorraine was feared. Three days after
the proclamation of peace Alfonso went to Viterbo in order to consult
with the Duke of Urbino, who was taking the baths there; and when he
returned, the city sent him to Buonconvento, where the greater part
of his troops were encamped, to meet three illustrious citizens with
the ostensible object of welcoming him, and inviting him to Siena—in
reality, to discover his intentions. For suspicion was already roused
regarding Neapolitan affairs, and not without reason. Twice already
in King Alfonso’s as well as in Ferrante’s days, the Aragonese had
sought to gain ground in Siena. The discord which had always prevailed
more in this city than in any other offered frequent opportunity for
intervention. One happened at this very time. The Duke of Calabria,
who had a residence in Siena, although he was chiefly in the camp, had
put himself in communication with the disaffected of the aristocratic
party, the Monte de’ Nove, the heads of which had lived in banishment
since 1456 or stood aloof from government. His repeated endeavours to
obtain the recall of the exiles had remained without result. It was now
attempted in another way. On the morning of June 22, the friends of the
duke, with the help of some of his troops, who were secretly admitted
into the city, seized on the piazza and palace of the commonwealth,
summoned a council of the people to which only their own adherents
were admitted, abolished the government which had existed hitherto,
and excluded its heads and partisans from office, appointing for the
next two months a new magistracy composed entirely of members of their
party. Without violence or bloodshed, an entire faction of the citizens
which had ruled the city for seventy-seven years was expelled from home
and position.
The duke was in Buonconvento when this revolution took place, either
in order not to seem to countenance it, or to avoid danger in case the
citizens rose in favour of the government, as they had done once before
in the Emperor Charles IV.’s time. He calculated that the victors would
call upon him, if only to accept the military aid without which they
were too weak to maintain themselves permanently—and he calculated
rightly. The Signory and magistrates went to meet him at the gates
on his entry; and during his stay of several days the people were
so amused by festivities that the new rulers had time to recall the
exiles, and weaken their enemies by banishment and fines. All this was
of a kind to inspire the Florentines with the most serious anxiety;
for if the Aragonese obtained a firm footing in Tuscany, their own
independence was much more endangered, for late events had shown how
inferior their military power was to that of the king. ‘Suspicion,’
remarks Machiavelli, ‘seized not only the people, but the heads of the
State likewise;’ and it is considered that the city had never been in
such danger of losing her freedom. This suspicion was strengthened by
events on the Ligurian frontier, in which from the first the Duke of
Calabria’s hand had been recognised. Sarzana was not only not given up
to the Republic, but the garrison disturbed the neighbouring territory
so that Giovanni Aldobrandini, commander of the fortress of Sarzanello,
received commands to repel force by force.
Such was the position of affairs when an unexpected occurrence
produced a decided reaction in the political situation of Central
Italy. The quarrels of the Christian princes, which armed Louis XI.
against Maximilian of Austria, and Mathias Corvinus against Ladislaus
of Poland, the Tuscan war, and the Venetian peace, had been very
advantageous for Mohammed II. The aged sultan wished to crown the
series of his conquests with a brilliant feat of arms. The Sicilian
coasts had been threatened in 1479. In May 1480 a numerous Turkish
fleet attacked Rhodes. The heroic courage of Pierre d’Aubusson and
his knights saved the island, which was held to be the bulwark of
Christendom. Returning from the fruitless siege, a part of the squadron
took a westerly direction, and, sailing by the Venetian islands of
the Ionian sea, landed a considerable number of troops—about seven
thousand men—on the southern coast of Apulia (July 28), where, after
a terrible slaughter of the neighbouring population, the blockade of
Otranto began. On August 11, after a hard struggle, the town fell into
the hands of the inhuman opponents of the Christians.
The blow was stunning. The whole of Italy was in a flame. The threat
of Mohammed to plant the Crescent instead of the Cross in Rome was
remembered. It is said that in his first terror the Pope thought of
quitting the city and retiring to Avignon. But Sixtus IV. was not a man
to lose courage. He wrote to all the Christian princes, representing
the urgent danger to them. Cardinal Gabriele Rangoni went to Naples,
Cardinal Savelli to Genoa, to mediate between the disputants, Cardinal
Giuliano Cesarini to France and England. A French fleet was to combine
with the Neapolitan. The first result for the Florentines was the
return of the Duke of Calabria to Naples. On August 1 the king had
received news of the Turks, and he immediately recalled his son.[321]
The advantage accruing to the Florentines from the new position of
affairs was so great and so evident that many voices were heard
accusing Lorenzo de’ Medici of having encouraged the sultan to attack
Apulia. The friendly relations with Mohammed II., which had been proved
at the Pazzi conspiracy, must have likewise afforded grounds for such
an accusation, the influence of which is, however, not discernible in
the subsequent attitude of the king.[322] On August 7 the duke quitted
Siena. If he accused fate of wresting from him the fruits of his two
years’ exertions in Tuscany the very moment he believed himself certain
of success, he caused those to complain who had calculated on his
assistance, and now feared having to yield for want of it. The same
Prinzivalle di Gennaro who had accompanied Lorenzo was entrusted with
the superintendence of the place which, for the present, was to remain
in the king’s hands, and be given back to the Florentines at the end
of March of the next year. The reconciliation of the Republic with
the Pope could be no longer delayed. It must have been especially
important to him to leave no cause for discontent in Florence when such
danger threatened Christendom.
At the request of King Ferrante, the Signoria, who had conducted
the government during the two last months of the year 1480 with the
Gonfaloniere Bernardo Rucellai, appointed a solemn embassy which
should request Sixtus IV. to revoke the spiritual interdict. The
most distinguished men of the city undertook the mission: Francesco
Soderini, Bishop of Volterra, and afterwards Cardinal, Luigi
Guicciardini, Bongianni Gianfigliazzi, Piero Minerbetti—who all three
possessed the dignity of knighthood—Guid’Antonio Vespucci, Maso
degli Albizzi, Gino Capponi, Jacopo Lanfredini, Domenico Pandolfini,
Giovanni Tornabuoni, Antonio de’ Medici—names some of which have
already appeared in the course of this history, others yet to be
seen. Antonio Ridolfi, who was in Rome holding the office of regular
ambassador of the Republic, was to join them. The instructions given
to the deputies[323] were conciliatory, but moderate and dignified.
‘After the disturbances permitted by God,’ it says, ‘which have been
principally pacified by the grace of his Holiness, peace and quiet
never appeared so sweet to us as at present, for the true peace of our
people devoted to the Holy See depends on the right understanding with
him whom Divine Providence has placed there, and appointed vicegerent
of Christ and successor of Peter. We know that in public and private
we have committed various errors from human weakness, which the Holy
Father has perceived better than we, and therefore send you to entreat
pardon for the same and acknowledge our guilt, and commend our city
and citizens, clergy and laity, to his protection for the future.’
But the ambassadors were at the same time recommended to watch over
the honour and interests of city and State, to give way in reasonable
matters, to refuse unreasonable and dishonourable demands prompted by
secret motives, whether they referred to a public demonstration of
obedience, payments of money, or other things; they were to depart with
their protest in case it should not seem suitable to send for fresh
instructions. The affairs of Lorenzo de’ Medici were to be included in
the general instructions; for special cases Antonio de’ Medici was to
represent him. The Archbishop Rinaldo Orsini, residing at Rome, should
be informed of all, and his mediation with the Pope claimed.
Sixtus IV. had long resolved on reconciliation. On St. Catherine’s
day, November 25, the ambassadors arrived at Rome, welcomed only by
their adherents in the State and friends, as the interdict was still
in force. Two days later they were admitted to the secret consistory,
where the Bishop of Ferrara made a suitable and well-composed speech.
On the first Advent Sunday, December 3, the solemn abrogation took
place in the portico of St. Peter’s. Before the closed bronze gate
of the central nave of the basilica, seated on a throne covered with
purple silk, surrounded by the cardinals, prelates, and officers, and
in presence of a great crowd, the Pope received the ambassadors, who
kissed his foot, and on bended knee besought his forgiveness in the
name of the city, and promised to fulfil the conditions prescribed.
Luigi Guicciardini, an aged man, spoke, but his address was brief,
and difficult to be understood from the noise. An apostolic notary
then read aloud the conditions in the presence of the fiscal advocate
and procurators, to which the ambassadors bound themselves by oath.
The Pope then addressed them, reproved them briefly for what they had
done against the Church, and then declared them free by touching the
shoulder of each lightly with a staff such as penitents were accustomed
to carry, with the words ‘Miserere mei Deus,’ to which the cardinals
responded. Hereupon the ambassadors again kissed the Pope’s foot, and
received his blessing, after which the gates were opened, and Sixtus
IV. being raised on his throne, all went into church, and high mass was
celebrated.
Peace was restored. Most of the members of the embassy returned
immediately to Florence. Only Francesco Soderini and Guid’Antonio
Vespucci remained in order to arrange matters. They also quitted Rome
on December 18 with small pomp and suite, and by no means in a cheerful
frame of mind. For among the conditions imposed on them by the Pope
was the one that the Republic should furnish fifteen galleys for the
war with the Turks;[324] a severe condition considering the depressed
position in which Florence found herself at the end of a war which had
required the hardest pecuniary sacrifices, and desolated a great part
of her territory.
_FOURTH BOOK._
THE MEDICI IN THEIR RELATION TO LITERATURE AND ART.
FIRST PART.
_THE HUMANISTS AND POPULAR LITERATURE TO THE SECOND HALF OF THE
FIFTEENTH CENTURY._