CHAPTER XXX.

1813

Amount of the Allied forces against Napoleon--Their advance towards

the Rhine--Levy of 280,000 men--Dreadful situation of the French at

Mayence--Declaration of the Allies at Frankfort--Diplomatic

correspondents--The Duc de Bassano succeeded by the Duke of Vicenza

--The conditions of the Allies vaguely accepted--Caulaincourt sent to

the headquarters of the Allies--Manifesto of the Allied powers to

the French people.--Gift of 30,000,000 from the Emperor's privy

purse--Wish to recall M. de Talleyrand--Singular advice relative to

Wellington--The French army recalled from Spain--The throne resigned

Joseph--Absurd accusation against M. Laine--Adjournment of the

Legislative Body--Napoleon's Speech to the Legislative Body--Remarks

of Napoleon reported by Cambacérès.

When the war resumed its course after the disaster of Leipsic I am

certain that the Allied sovereigns determined to treat with Napoleon

only in his own capital, as he, four years before, had refused to treat

with the Emperor of Austria except at Vienna. The latter sovereign now

completely raised the mask, and declared to the Emperor that he

would make common cause with Russia and Prussia against him. In his

declaration he made rise of the singular pretext, that the more enemies

there were against Napoleon there would be the greater chance of

speedily obliging him to accede to conditions which would at length

restore the tranquillity of which Europe stood so much in need.

This declaration on the part of Austria was an affair of no little

importance, for she had now raised an army of 260,000 men. An equal

force was enrolled beneath the Russian banners, which were advancing

towards the Rhine. Prussia had 200,000 men; the Confederation of the

Rhine 150,000: in short, including the Swedes and the Dutch, the English

troops in Spain and in the Netherlands, the Danes, who had abandoned us,

the Spaniards and Portuguese, whose courage and hopes were revived by

our reverses, Napoleon had arrayed against him upwards of a million of

armed men. Among them, too, were the Neapolitans, with Murat at their

head!

The month of November 1813 was fatal to the fortune of Napoleon. In all

parts the French armies were repulsed and driven back upon the Rhine,

while-in every direction, the Allied forces advanced towards that river.

For a considerable time I had confidently anticipated the fall of the

Empire; not because the foreign sovereigns had vowed its destruction,

but because I saw the impossibility of Napoleon defending himself

against all Europe, and because I knew that, however desperate might be

his fortune, nothing would induce him to consent to conditions which

he considered disgraceful. At this time every day was marked by a new

defection. Even the Bavarians, the natural Allies of France, they

whom the Emperor had led to victory at the commencement of the second

campaign of Vienna, they whom he had, as it were, adopted on the field

of battle, were now against us, and were the bitterest of our enemies.

Even before the battle of Leipsic, the consequences of which were so

ruinous to Napoleon, he had felt the necessity of applying to France for

a supply of troops; as if France had been inexhaustible. He directed

the Empress Regent to make this demand; and accordingly Maria Louisa

proceeded to the Senate, for the first time, in great state: but the

glories of the Empire were now on the decline. The Empress obtained a

levy of 280,000 troops, but they were no sooner enrolled than they were

sacrificed. The defection of the Bavarians considerably augmented the

difficulties which assailed the wreck of the army that had escaped from

Leipsic. The Bavarians had got before us to Hanau, a town four leagues

distant from Frankfort; there they established themselves, with the view

of cutting off our retreat; but French valour was roused, the little

town was speedily carried, and the Bavarians were repulsed with

considerable loss. The French army arrived at Mayence; if, indeed, one

may give the name of army to a few masses of men destitute, dispirited,

and exhausted by fatigue and privation. On the arrival of the troops at

Mayence no preparation had been made for receiving them: there were no

provisions, or supplies of any kind; and, as the climax of misfortune,

infectious epidemics broke out amongst the men. All the accounts I

received concurred in assuring me that their situation was dreadful:

However; without counting the wreck which escaped from the disasters of

Leipsic, and the ravages of disease; without including the 280,000 men

which had been raised by a 'Senatus-consulte, on the application of

Maria Louisa, the Emperor still possessed 120,000 good troops; but they

were in the rear, scattered along the Elbe, shut up in fortresses such

as Dantzic, Hamburg, Torgau, and Spandau. Such was the horror of our

situation that if, on the one hand, we could not resolve to abandon

them, it was at the same time impossible to aid them. In France a

universal cry was raised for peace, at whatever price it could be

purchased. In this state of things it may be said that the year 1813 was

more fatal to Napoleon than the year 1812. The disasters of Moscow were

repaired by his activity and the sacrifices of France; but the disasters

of Leipsic were irreparable.

I shall shortly speak of some negotiations in which, if I had chosen,

I might have taken a part. After the battle of Leipsic, in which France

lost, for the second time, a formidable army, all the powers allied

against Napoleon declared at Frankfort, on the 9th of November, that

they would never break the bonds which united them; that henceforth it

was not merely a Continental peace, but a general peace, that would be

demanded; and that any negotiation not having a general peace for its

object would be rejected. The Allied powers declared that France was

to be confined within her natural limits, the Rhine, the Alps, and the

Pyrenees. This was all that was to remain of the vast Empire founded by

Napoleon; but still it must be allowed it was a great deal, after the

many disasters France had experienced, and when she was menaced with

invasion by numerous and victorious armies. But Napoleon could not

accede to such proposals, for he was always ready to yield to illusion

when the truth was not satisfactory to him.

According to the proposals of the Allies at Frankfort, Germany; Italy,

and Spain were to be entirely withdrawn from the dominion of France.

England recognised the freedom of trade and navigation, and there

appeared no reason to doubt the sincerity of her professed willingness

to make great sacrifices to promote the object proposed by the Allies.

But to these offers a fatal condition was added, namely, that the

Congress should meet in a town, to be declared neutral, on the right

bank of the Rhine, where the plenipotentiaries of all the belligerent

powers were to assemble; but the course of the war was not to be impeded

by these negotiations.

--[This, system of negotiating and advancing was a realization of

Metternich's idea copying Napoleon's own former procedure. "Let us

hold always the sword in one head, and the olive branch in the

other; always ready to negotiate, but only negotiating whilst

advancing. Here is Napoleon's system: may he find enemies who will

carry on war . . . as he would carry it on himself." (Metternich

vol. ii. p. 346).]--

The Duc de Bassano (Maret), who was still Minister for Foreign Affairs,

replied, by order of Napoleon, to the overtures wade by the Allies for

a general Congress; and stated that the Emperor acceded to them, and

wished Mannheim to be chosen as the neutral town. M. Metternich replied

in a note, dated Frankfort, the 25th of November, stating that the

Allies felt no difficulty in acceding to Napoleon's choice of Mannheim

for the meeting of the Congress; but as M. de Bassano's letter contained

no mention of the general and summary bases I have just mentioned,

and which had been communicated to M. de St. Aignan at Frankfort, M.

Metternich stated that the Allies wished the Emperor Napoleon to declare

his determination respecting those bases, in order that insurmountable

difficulties might not arrest the negotiations at their very outset.

The Duke of Vicenza (Caulaincourt), who had just succeeded the Duc de

Bassano, received this letter. Trusting to the declaration of Frankfort

he thought he would be justified in treating on those bases; he

confidently relied on the consent of Napoleon. But the Allies had

now determined not to grant the limits accorded by that declaration.

Caulaincourt was therefore obliged to apply for fresh powers, which

being granted, he replied, on the 2d of December, that Napoleon accepted

the fundamental and summary bases which had been communicated by M. de

St. Aignan. To this letter M. Metternich answered that the Emperors of

Russia and Austria were gratified to find that the Emperor of France

recognised the bases judged necessary by the Allies; that the two

sovereigns would communicate without delay the official document to

their Allies, and that they were convinced that immediately on receiving

their reply the negotiations might be opened without any interruption of

the war.

We shall now see the reason why these first negotiations came to no

result. In the month of October the Allies overthrew the colossal

edifice denominated the French Empire. When led by victory to the

banks of the Rhine they declared their wish to abstain from conquest,

explained their intentions, and manifested an unalterable resolution

to abide by them. This determination of the Allies induced the French

Government to evince pacific intentions. Napoleon wished, by an apparent

desire for peace, to justify, if I may so express myself, in the eyes of

his subjects, the necessity of new sacrifices; which, according to his

proclamations, he demanded only to enable him to obtain peace on as

honourable conditions as possible. But the truth is, he was resolved not

even to listen to the offers made at Frankfort. He always represented

the limits of the Rhine as merely a compensation for the dismemberment

of Poland and the immense aggrandisement of the English possessions in

Asia. But he wanted to gain time, and, if possible, to keep the Allied

armies on the right bank of the Rhine.

The immense levies made in France, one after the other, had converted

the conscription into a sort of pressgang. Men employed in agriculture

and manufactures were dragged from their labours; and the people began

to express their dissatisfaction at the measures of Government more

loudly than they had hitherto ventured to do; yet all were willing to

make another effort, if they could have persuaded themselves that the

Emperor would henceforth confine his thoughts to France alone. Napoleon

sent Caulaincourt to the headquarters of the Allies; but that was

only for the sake of gaining time, and inducing a belief that he was

favourably disposed to peace.

The Allies having learned the immense levies of troops which Napoleon

was making, and being well acquainted with the state of feeling in

France, published the famous manifesto, addressed to the French people,

which was profusely circulated, and may be referred to as a warning to

subjects who trust to the promises of Governments.

The good faith with which the promises in the manifesto were kept may

be judged of from the Treaty of Paris. In the meantime the manifesto

did not a little contribute to alienate from Napoleon those who were

yet faithful to his cause; for, by believing in the declarations of the

Allies, they saw in him the sole obstacle to that peace which France so

ardently desired. On this point, too, the Allies were not wrong, and

I confess that I did not see without great surprise that the Duc de

Rovigo, in that part of his Memoirs where he mentions this manifesto,

reproaches those who framed it for representing the Emperor as a madman,

who replied to overtures of peace only by conscription levies: After

all, I do not intend to maintain that the declaration was entirely

sincere; with respect to the future it certainly was not. Switzerland

was already tampered with, and attempts were made to induce her to

permit the Allied troops to enter France by the bridge of Bale. Things

were going on no better in the south of France, where the Anglo-Spanish

army threatened our frontiers by the Pyrenees, and already occupied

Pampeluna; and at the same time the internal affairs of the country

were no less critical than its external position. It was in vain to levy

troops; everything essential to an army was wanting. To meet the most

pressing demands the Emperor drew out 30,000,000 from the immense

treasure which he had accumulated in the cellars and galleries of the

Pavillion Marsan, at the Tuileries. These 30,000,000 were speedily

swallowed up. Nevertheless it was an act of generosity on the part of

Napoleon, and I never could understand on what ground the Legislative

Body complained of the outlay, because, as the funds did not proceed

from the Budget, there needed no financial law to authorise their

application. Besides, why did these rigid legislators, who, while

fortune smiled on Bonaparte, dared not utter a word on the subject,

demand, previously to the gratuitous gift just mentioned, that the

350,000,000 in the Emperor's privy puree should be transferred to the

Imperial treasury and carried to the public accounts? Why did they wink

at the accumulation in the Tuileries of the contributions and exactions

levied in, conquered countries? The answer is plain: because there would

have been danger in opposing it.

Amidst the difficulties which assailed the Emperor he cast his eyes on

M. de Talleyrand. But it being required, as a condition of his receiving

the portfolio of Foreign Affairs, that he should resign his office of

Vice-Grand-Elector, M. de Talleyrand preferred a permanent post to a

portfolio, which the caprice of a moment might withdraw. I have been

informed that, in a conversation with the Emperor, M. de Talleyrand gave

him the extraordinary advice of working upon the ambition of the English

family of Wellesley, and to excite in the mind of Wellington, the lustre

of whose reputation was now dawning, ambitious projects which would

have embarrassed the coalition. Napoleon, however, did not adopt this

proposition, the issue of which he thought too uncertain, and above all,

too remote, in the urgent circumstances in which it stood. Caulaincourt

was then made Minister for Foreign Affairs, in lieu of M. Maret, who was

appointed Secretary of State, an office much better suited to him.

Meanwhile the Emperor was wholly intent on the means of repelling the

attack which was preparing against him. The critical circumstances in

which he was placed seemed to restore the energy which time had in some

measure robbed him of. He turned his eyes towards Spain, and resolved to

bring the army from that country to oppose the Allies, whose movements

indicated their intention of entering France by Switzerland. An event

occurred connected with this subject calculated to have a decided

influence on the affairs of the moment, namely, the renunciation by

Joseph, King of Spain, of all right to the crown, to be followed by the

return; as had been agreed on; of Ferdinand to his dominions. Joseph

made this sacrifice at the instigation of his brother. The treaty was

signed, but an inconceivable delay occurred in its execution, while the

torrent, which was advancing upon France, rushed forward so rapidly that

the treaty could not be carried into execution. Ferdinand, it is true,

re-ascended his throne, but from other causes.

The Emperor was deeply interested in the march of the Allies. It was

important to destroy the bridge of Bale, because the Rhine once crossed

masses of the enemy would be thrown into France. At this time I

had close relations with a foreign diplomat whom I am forbidden by

discretion to name. He told me that the enemy was advancing towards the

frontier, and that the bridge of Bale would not be destroyed, as it

had been so agreed at Berne, where the Allies had gained the day. This

astonished me, because I knew, on the other hand, from a person who

ought, to have been equally well informed,--that it was hoped the bridge

would be blown up. Being much interested in knowing the truth, I sent

on my own account, an agent to Bale who on his return told me that the

bridge would remain.

On the 19th of December the Legislative Body was convoked. It was on a

Wednesday. M. Laine was Vice-President under M. Regnier. A committee was

appointed to examine and report on the communications of the Emperor.

The report and conclusions of the committee were not satisfactory; it

was alleged that they betrayed a revolutionary tendency, of which M.

Laine was absurdly accused of having been one of the promoters; but all

who knew him must have been convinced of the falsehood of the charge.

The Emperor ordered the report to be seized, and then adjourned the

Legislative Body. Those who attentively observed the events of the time

will recollect the stupor which prevailed in Paris on the intelligence

of this seizure and of the adjournment of the Legislative Body. A

thousand conjectures were started as to what new occurrences had taken

place abroad, but nothing satisfactory was learned.

I considered this a great mistake. Who can doubt that if the Legislative

Body had taken the frank and noble step of declaring that France

accepted the conditions of Frankfort they would not have been listened

to by the Allies? But the words, "You are dishonoured if you cede a

single village acquired by a 'Senatus-consulte'," always, resounded in

Napoleon's ears: they flattered his secret thoughts, and every pacific

proposal was rejected.

The members of the adjourned Legislative Body went as usual to

take leave of the Emperor, who received them on a Sunday, and after

delivering to them the speech, which is very well known, dismissed the

rebels with great ill-humour, refusing to hear any explanation. "I

have suppressed your address," he began abruptly: "it was incendiary.

I called you round me to do good--you have done ill. Eleven-twelfths

of you are well-intentioned, the others, and above all M. Laine,

are factious intriguers, devoted to England, to all my enemies, and

corresponding through the channel of the advocate Deseze with the

Bourbons. Return to your Departments, and feel that my eye will follow

you; you have endeavoured to humble me, you may kill me, but you shall

not dishonour me. You make remonstrances; is this a time, when the

stranger invades our provinces, and 200,000 Cossacks are ready to

overflow our country? There may have been petty abuses; I never connived

at them. You, M. Raynouard, you said that. Prince Massena robbed a man

at Marseilles of his house. You lie! The General took possession of a

vacant house, and my Minister shall indemnify the proprietor. Is it thus

that you dare affront a Marshal of France who has bled for his country,

and grown gray in victory? Why did you not make your complaints in

private to me? I would have done you justice. We should wash our

dirty linen at home, and not drag it out before the world. You, call

yourselves Representatives of the Nation. It is not true; you are only

Deputies of the Departments; a small portion of the State, inferior to

the Senate, inferior even to the Council of State. The Representatives

of the People! I am alone the Representative of the People. Twice

have 24,000,000 of French called me to the throne: which of you durst

undertake such a burden? It had already overwhelmed (ecrase), your

Assemblies, and your Conventions, your Vergniauds and your Guadets,

your Jacobins and your Girondins. They are all dead! What, who are you?

nothing--all authority is in the Throne; and what is the Throne? this

wooden frame covered with velvet?--no, I am the Throne! You have added

wrong to reproaches. You have talked of concessions--concessions that

even my enemies dared not ask! I suppose if they asked Champaigne you

would have had me give them La Brie besides; but in four months I will

conquer peace, or I shall be dead! You advise! how dare you debate of

such high matters (de si graves interets)! You have put me in the front

of the battle as the cause of war--it is infamous (c'est une atrocité).

In all your committees you have excluded the friends of Government--

extraordinary commission--committee of finance--committee of the

address, all, all my enemies. M. Laine, I repeat it, is a traitor; he

is a wicked man, the others are mere intriguers. I do justice to the

eleven-twelfths; but the factions I know, and will pursue. Is it, I

ask again, is it while the enemy is in France that you should have done

this? But nature has gifted me with a determined courage--nothing can

overcome me. It cost my pride much too--I made that sacrifice; I--but I

am above your miserable declamations--I was in need of consolation, and

you would mortify me--but, no, my victories shall crush your clamours!

In three months we shall have peace, and you shall repent your folly. I

am one of those who triumph or die.

"Go back to your Departments if any one of you dare to print your

address I shall publish it in the Moniteur with notes of my own.

Go; France stands in more need of me than I do of France. I bear the

eleven-twelfths of you in my heart--I shall nominate the Deputies to the

two series which are vacant, and I shall reduce the Legislative Body

to the discharge of its proper duties. The inhabitants of Alsace and

Franche Comte have more spirit than you; they ask me for arms, I send

them, and one of my aides de camp will lead them against the enemy."

In after conversations he said of the Legislative Body that "its members

never came to Paris but to obtain some favours. They importuned the

Ministers from morning till night, and complained if they were not

immediately satisfied. When invited to dinner they burn with envy at the

splendour they see before them." I heard this from Cambacérès, who was

present when the Emperor made these remarks.