CHAPTER XVIII
1799.
Arrival at Jaffa--The siege--Beauharnais and Croisier--Four thousand
prisoners--Scarcity of provisions--Councils of war--Dreadful
necessity--The massacre--The plague--Lannes and the mountaineers--
Barbarity of Djezarr--Arrival at St Jean d'Acre, and abortive
attacks--Sir Sidney Smith--Death of Caffarelli--Duroc wounded--
Rash bathing--Insurrections in Egypt.
On arriving before Jaffa, where there were already some troops, the
first person I met was Adjutant-General Gresieux, with whom I was well
acquainted. I wished him good-day, and offered him my hand. "Good God!
what are you about?" said he, repulsing me with a very abrupt gesture;
"you may have the plague. People do not touch each other here!" I
mentioned the circumstance to Bonaparte, who said, "If he be afraid of
the plague, he will die of it." Shortly after, at St. Jean d'Acre, he
was attacked by that malady, and soon sank under it.
On the 4th of March we commenced the siege of Jaffa. That paltry place,
which, to round a sentence, was pompously styled the ancient Joppa, held
out only to the 6th of March, when it was taken by storm, and given up
to pillage. The massacre was horrible. General Bonaparte sent his aides
de camp Beauharnais and Croisier to appease the fury of the soldiers as
much as possible, and to report to him what was passing. They learned
that a considerable part of the garrison had retired into some vast
buildings, a sort of caravanserai, which formed a large enclosed court.
Beauharnais and Croisier, who were distinguished by wearing the 'aide
de camp' scarf on their arms, proceeded to that place. The Arnauts and
Albanians, of whom these refugees were almost entirely composed, cried
from the windows that they were willing to surrender upon an assurance
that they would be exempted from the massacre to which the town was
doomed; if not, they threatened to fire on the 'aides de camp', and to
defend themselves to the last extremity. The two officers thought that
they ought to accede to the proposition, notwithstanding the decree
of death which had been pronounced against the whole garrison, in
consequence of the town being taken by storm. They brought them to our
camp in two divisions, one consisting of about 2500 men, the other of
about 1600.
I was walking with General Bonaparte, in front of his tent, when he
beheld this mass of men approaching, and before he even saw his 'aides
de camp' he said to me, in a tone of profound sorrow, "What do they wish
me to do with these men? Have I food for them?--ships to convey them to
Egypt or France? Why, in the devil's name, have they served me thus?"
After their arrival, and the explanations which the General-in-Chief
demanded and listened to with anger, Eugène and Croisier received the
most severe reprimand for their conduct. But the deed was done. Four
thousand men were there. It was necessary to decide upon their fate. The
two aides de camp observed that they had found themselves alone in the
midst of numerous enemies, and that he had directed them to restrain
the carnage. "Yes, doubtless," replied the General-in-Chief, with
great warmth, "as to women, children, and old men--all the peaceable
inhabitants; but not with respect to armed soldiers. It was your duty
to die rather than bring these unfortunate creatures to me. What do you
want me to do with them?" These words were pronounced in the most angry
tone.
The prisoners were then ordered to sit down, and were placed, without
any order, in front of the tents, their hands tied behind their backs. A
sombre determination was depicted on their countenances. We gave them a
little biscuit and bread, squeezed out of the already scanty supply for
the army.
On the first day of their arrival a council of war was held in the tent
of the General-in-Chief, to determine what course should be pursued with
respect to them. The council deliberated a long time without coming to
any decision.
On the evening of the following day the daily reports of the generals
of division came in. They spoke of nothing but the insufficiency of the
rations, the complaints of the soldiers--of their murmurs and discontent
at seeing their bread given to enemies who had been withdrawn from their
vengeance, inasmuch as a decree of death, in conformity with the laws
of war, had been passed on Jaffa. All these reports were alarming, and
especially that of General Bon, in which no reserve was made. He spoke
of nothing less than the fear of a revolt, which would be justified by
the serious nature of the case.
The council assembled again. All the generals of division were summoned
to attend, and for several hours together they discussed, under separate
questions, what measures might be adopted, with the most sincere
desire to discover and execute one which would save the lives of these
unfortunate prisoners.
(1.) Should they be sent into Egypt? Could it be done?
To do so, it would be necessary to send with them a numerous escort,
which would too much weaken our little army in the enemy's country. How,
besides, could they and the escort be supported till they reached Cairo,
having no provisions to give them on setting out, and their route being
through a hostile territory, which we had exhausted, which presented no
fresh resources, and through which we, perhaps, might have to return.
(2.) Should they be embarked?
Where were the ships?--Where could they be found? All our telescopes,
directed over the sea, could not descry a single friendly sail.
Bonaparte, I affirm, would have regarded such an event as a real favour
of fortune. It was, and--I am glad to have to say it, this sole idea,
this sole hope, which made him brave, for three days, the murmurs of his
army. But in vain was help looked for seaward. It did not come.
(3.) Should the prisoners be set at liberty?
They would then instantly proceed to St. Jean d'Acre to reinforce the
pasha, or else, throwing themselves into the mountains of Nablous, would
greatly annoy our rear and right-flank, and deal out death to us, as a
recompense for the life we had given them. There could be no doubt
of this. What is a Christian dog to a Turk? It would even have been a
religious and meritorious act in the eye of the Prophet.
(4.) Could they be incorporated, disarmed, with our soldiers in the
ranks?
Here again the question of food presented itself in all its force. Next
came to be considered the danger of having such comrades while marching
through an enemy's country. What might happen in the event of a battle
before St. Jean d'Acre? Could we even tell what might occur during the
march? And, finally, what must be done with them when under the
ramparts of that town, if we should be able to take them there? The same
embarrassments with respect to the questions of provisions and security
would then recur with increased force.
The third day arrived without its being possible, anxiously as it was
desired, to come to any conclusion favourable to the preservation of
these unfortunate men. The murmurs in the camp grew louder--the evil
went on increasing--remedy appeared impossible--the danger was real and
imminent. The order for shooting the prisoners was given and executed
on the 10th of March. We did not, as has been stated, separate the
Egyptians from the other prisoners. There were no Egyptians.
Many of the unfortunate creatures composing the smaller division, which
was fired on close to the seacoast, at some distance from the other
column, succeeded in swimming to some reefs of rocks out of the reach
of musket-shot. The soldiers rested their muskets on the sand, and,
to induce the prisoners to return, employed the Egyptian signs of
reconciliation in use in the country. They came back; but as they
advanced they were killed, and disappeared among the waves.
I confine myself to these details of this act of dreadful necessity,
of which I was an eye-witness. Others, who, like myself, saw it,
have fortunately spared me the recital of the sanguinary result. This
atrocious scene, when I think of it, still makes me shudder, as it did
on the day I beheld it; and I would wish it were possible for me to
forget it, rather than be compelled to describe it. All the horrors
imagination can conceive, relative to that day of blood, would fall
short of the reality.
I have related the truth, the whole truth. I was present at all the
discussions, all the conferences, all the deliberations. I had not, as
may be supposed, a deliberative voice; but I am bound to declare that
the situation of the army, the scarcity of food, our small numerical
strength, in the midst of a country where every individual was an enemy,
would have induced me to vote in the affirmative of the proposition
which was carried into effect, if I had a vote to give. It was necessary
to be on the spot in order to understand the horrible necessity which
existed.
War, unfortunately, presents too many occasions on which a law,
immutable in all ages, and common to all nations, requires that private
interests should be sacrificed to a great general interest, and that
even humanity should be forgotten. It is for posterity to judge whether
this terrible situation was that in which Bonaparte was placed. For my
own part, I have a perfect conviction that he could not do otherwise
than yield to the dire necessity of the case. It was the advice of the
council, whose opinion was unanimous in favour of the execution, that
governed him. Indeed I ought in truth to say, that he yielded only
in the last extremity, and was one of those, perhaps, who beheld the
massacre with the deepest pain.
After the siege of Jaffa the plague began to exhibit itself with a
little more virulence. We lost between seven and eight hundred, men by
the contagion during the campaign of Syria.
--[Sir Walter Scott says, that Heaven sent this pestilence amongst
us to avenge the massacre of Jaffa]--
During our march on St. Jean d'Acre, which was commenced on the 14th of
March, the army neither obtained the brilliant triumphs nor encountered
the numerous obstacles spoken of in certain works. Nothing of importance
occurred but a rash skirmish of General Lannes who, in spite of contrary
orders from Bonaparte, obstinately pursued a troop of mountaineers into
the passes of Nablous. On returning, he found the mountaineers placed in
ambush in great numbers amongst rocks, the windings of which they were
well acquainted with, whence they fired close upon our troops, whose
situation rendered them unable to defend themselves. During the time
of this foolish and useless enterprise, especially while the firing was
brisk, Bonaparte exhibited much impatience, and it must be confessed,
his anger was but natural. The Nablousians halted at the openings of
the mountain defiles. Bonaparte reproached Lannes bitterly for having
uselessly exposed himself, and "sacrificed, without any object, a number
of brave men." Lannes excused himself by saying that the mountaineers
had defied him, and he wished to chastise the rabble. "We are not in a
condition to play the swaggerer," replied Napoleon.
In four days we arrived before St. Jean d'Acre, where we learned that
Djezzar had cut off the head of our envoy, Mailly-de-Chateau-Renaud, and
thrown his body into the sea in a sack. This cruel pasha was guilty of
a great number of similar executions. The waves frequently drove dead
bodies towards the coast, and we came upon them whilst bathing.
The details of the siege of Acre are well known. Although surrounded
by a wall, flanked with strong towers, and having, besides, a broad and
deep ditch defended by works this little fortress did not appear
likely to hold out against French valour and the skill of our corps of
engineers and artillery; but the ease and rapidity with which Jaffa
had been taken occasioned us to overlook in some degree the comparative
strength of the two places, and the difference of their respective
situations. At Jaffa we had sufficient artillery: at St. Jean d'Acre we
had not. At Jaffa we had to deal only with a garrison left to itself:
at St. Jean d'Acre we were opposed by a garrison strengthened by
reinforcements of men and supplies of provisions, supported by the
English fleet, and assisted by European Science. Sir Sidney Smith was,
beyond doubt, the man who did us the greatest injury.
--[Sir Sidney Smith was the only Englishman besides the Duke of
Wellington who defeated Napoleon in military operations. The third
Englishman opposed to him, Sir John Moore, was compelled to make a
precipitate retreat through the weakness of his force]--
Much has been said respecting his communications with the
General-in-Chief. The reproaches which the latter cast upon him for
endeavouring to seduce the soldiers and officers of the army by tempting
offers were the more singular, even if they were well founded, inasmuch
as these means are frequently employed by leaders in war.
--[At one time the French General was so disturbed by them as to
endeavour to put a stop to them; which object he effected by
interdicting all communication with the English, and signifying, in
an order of the day, that their Commodore was a madman. This, being
believed in the army, so enraged Sir Sidney Smith, that in his wrath
he sent a challenge to Napoleon. The latter replied, that he had
too many weighty affairs on his hands to trouble himself in so
trifling a matter. Had it, indeed, been the great Marlborough, it
might have been worthy his attention. Still, if the English sailor
was absolutely bent upon fighting, he would send him a bravo from
the army, and show them a small portion of neutral ground, where the
mad Commodore might land, and satisfy his humour to the full.--
(Editor of 1836 edition.)]--
As to the embarking of French prisoners on board a vessel in which
the plague existed, the improbability of the circumstance alone,
but especially the notorious facts of the case, repel this odious
accusation. I observed the conduct of Sir Sidney Smith closely at the
time, and I remarked in him a chivalric spirit, which sometimes hurried
him into trifling eccentricities; but I affirm that his behaviour
towards the French was that of a gallant enemy. I have seen many
letters, in which the writers informed him that they "were very sensible
of the good treatment which the French experienced when they fell
into his hands." Let any one examine Sir Sidney's conduct before the
capitulation of El-Arish, and after its rupture, and then they can judge
of his character.
--[Napoleon, when at St. Helena, in speaking of the siege of Acre,
said,--Sidney Smith is a brave officer. He displayed considerable
ability in the treaty for the evacuation of Egypt by the French. He
took advantage of the discontent which he found to prevail amongst
the French troops at being so long away from France, and other
circumstances. He manifested great honour in sending immediately to
Kléber the refusal of Lord Keith to ratify the treaty, which saved
the French army; if he had kept it a secret seven or eight days
longer, Cairo would have been given up to the Turks, and the French
army necessarily obliged to surrender to the English. He also
showed great humanity and honour in all his proceedings towards the
French who felt into his hands. He landed at Havre, for some
'sottise' of a bet he had made, according to some, to go to the
theatre; others said it was for espionage; however that may be, he
was arrested and confined in the Temple as a spy; and at one time it
was intended to try and execute him. Shortly after I returned from
Italy he wrote to me from his prison, to request that I would
intercede for him; but, under the circumstances in which he was
taken, I could do nothing for him. He is active, intelligent,
intriguing, and indefatigable; but I believe that he is 'mezzo
pazo'.
"The chief cause of the failure at Acre was, that he took all my
battering train, which was on board of several small vessels.
Had it not been for that, I would have taken Acre in spite of him.
He behaved very bravely, and was well seconded by Phillipeaux, a
Frenchman of talent, who had studied with me as an engineer. There
was a Major Douglas also, who behaved very gallantly. The
acquisition of five or six hundred seamen as gunners was a great
advantage to the Turks, whose spirits they revived, and whom they
showed how to defend the fortress. But he committed a great fault
in making sorties, which cost the lives of two or three hundred
brave fellows without the possibility of success. For it was
impossible he could succeed against the number of the French who
were before Acre. I would lay a wage that he lost half of his crew
in them. He dispersed Proclamations amongst my troops, which
certainly shook some of them, and I in consequence published an
order, stating that he was mad, and forbidding all communication
with him. Some days after he sent, by means of a flag of truce,
a lieutenant or a midshipman with a letter containing a challenge to
me to meet him at some place he pointed out in order to fight a
duel. I laughed at this, and sent him back an intimation that when
he brought Marlborough to fight me I would meet him. Notwithstanding
this, I like the character of the man." (Voices from
St. Helena, vol. 4, p. 208).]--
All our manoeuvres, our works, and attacks were made with that levity
and carelessness which over-confidence inspires. Kléber, whilst walking
with me one day in the lines of our camp, frequently expressed his
surprise and discontent. "The trenches," said, he, "do not come up to
my knees." Besieging artillery was, of necessity, required: we commenced
with field artillery. This encouraged the besieged, who perceived the
weakness of our resources. The besieging artillery, consisting only of
three twenty-four pounders and six eighteen pounders, was not brought up
until the end of April, and before that period three assaults had taken
place with very serious loss. On the 4th of May our powder began to
fail us. This cruel event obliged us to slacken our fire. We also wanted
shot; and an order of the day fixed a price to be given for all balls,
according to their calibre, which might be picked up after being
fired from the fortress or the two ships of the line, the 'Tiger' and
'Theseus', which were stationed on each side of the harbour. These two
vessels embarrassed the communication between the camp and the trenches;
but though they made much noise, they did little harm. A ball from one
of them killed an officer on the evening the siege was raised.
The enemy had within the walls some excellent riflemen, chiefly
Albanians. They placed stones, one over the other, on the walls, put
their firearms through the interstices, and thus, completely sheltered,
fired with destructive precision.
On the 9th of April General Caffarelli, so well known for his courage
and talents, was passing through the trench, his hand resting as he
stooped on his hip, to preserve the equilibrium which his wooden leg
impaired; his elbow only was raised above the trench. He was warned that
the enemy's shot, fired close upon us, did not miss the smallest object.
He paid no attention to any observation of this kind, and in a few
instants his elbow joint was fractured. Amputation of the arm was
judged indispensable. The General survived the operation eighteen days.
Bonaparte went regularly twice a day to his tent. By his order, added
to my friendship for Caffarelli, I scarcely ever quitted him. Shortly
before he expired he said to me, "My dear Bourrienne, be so good as to
read to me Voltaire's preface to 'Esprit des Lois'." When I returned
to the tent of the General-in-Chief he asked, "How is Caffarelli?" I
replied, "He is near his end; but he asked me to read him Voltaire's
preface to the 'Esprit de Lois', he has just fallen asleep." Bonaparte
said, "Bah! to wish to hear that preface? how singular!" He went to see
Caffarelli, but he was still asleep. I returned to him that evening and
received his last breath. He died with the utmost composure. His death
was equally regretted by the soldiers and the men of science, who
accompanied us. It was a just regret due to that distinguished man,
in whom very extensive information was united with great courage and
amiable disposition.
On the 10th of May, when an assault took place, Bonaparte proceeded at
an early hour to the trenches.
--[Sir Sidney Smith, in his official report of the assault of the
8th of May, says that Napoleon was distinctly seen directing the
operation.]--
Croisier, who was mentioned on our arrival at Damanhour and on the
capture of Jaffa, had in vain courted death since the commencement of
the siege. Life had become insupportable to him since the unfortunate
affair at Jaffa. He as usual accompanied his General to the trenches.
Believing that the termination of the siege, which was supposed to be
near, would postpone indefinitely the death which he sought, he mounted
a battery. In this situation his tall figure uselessly provoked all the
enemy's shots. "Croisier, come down, I command you; you have no business
there," cried Bonaparte, in a loud and imperative tone. Croisier
remained without making any reply. A moment after a ball passed through
his right leg. Amputation was not considered indispensable. On the day
of our departure he was placed on a litter, which was borne by sixteen
men alternately, eight at a time. I received his farewell between Gaza
and El-Arish, where he died of tetanus. His modest tomb will not be
often visited.
The siege of St. Jean d'Acre lasted sixty days. During that time eight
assaults and twelve sorties took place. In the assault of the 8th of May
more than 200 men penetrated into the town. Victory was already shouted;
but the breach having been taken in reverse by the Turks, it was not
approached without some degree of hesitation, and the men who had
entered were not supported. The streets were barricaded. The cries, the
howlings of the women, who ran through the streets throwing, according
to the custom of the country, dust in the air, excited the male
inhabitants to a desperate resistance, which rendered unavailing
this short occupation of the town, by a handful of men, who, finding
themselves left without assistance, retreated towards the breach. Many
who could not reach it perished in the town.
During this assault Duroc, who was in the trench, was wounded in
the right thigh by the splinter from a shell fired against the
fortifications. Fortunately this accident only carried away the flesh
from the bone, which remained untouched. He had a tent in common with
several other 'aides de camp'; but for his better accommodation I gave
him mine, and I scarcely ever quitted him. Entering his tent one day
about noon, I found him in a profound sleep. The excessive heat had
compelled him to throw off all covering, and part of his wound was
exposed. I perceived a scorpion which had crawled up the leg of the
camp-bed and approached very near to the wound. I was just in time to
hurl it to the ground. The sudden motion of my hand awoke Duroc.
We often bathed in the sea. Sometimes the English, perhaps after taking
a double allowance of grog, would fire at our heads, which appeared
above water. I am not aware that any accident was occasioned by their
cannonade; but as we were beyond reach of their guns, we paid scarcely
any attention to the firing. It was seen a subject of amusement to us.
Had our attack on St. Jean d'Acre been less precipitate, and had the
siege been undertaken according to the rules of war, the place would
not have held out three days; one assault, like that of the 8th of May,
would have been sufficient. If, in the situation in which we were on the
day when we first came in sight of the ramparts of Acre; we had made
a less inconsiderate estimate of the strength of the place; if we had
likewise taken into consideration the active co-operation of the English
and the Ottoman Porte, our absolute want of artillery of sufficient
calibre, our scarcity of gunpowder and the difficulty of procuring food,
we certainly should not have undertaken the siege; and that would have
been by far the wisest course.
Towards the end of the siege the General-in-Chief received intelligence
of some trifling insurrections in northern Egypt. An angel had excited
them, and the heavenly messenger, who had condescended to assume a name,
was called the Mahdi, or El Mohdy. This religious extravagance, however,
did not last long, and tranquillity was soon restored. All that the
fanatic Mahdi, who shrouded himself in mystery, succeeded in doing was
to attack our rear by some vagabonds, whose illusions were dissipated by
a few musket shots.