CHAPTER XXVI.

My return to Hamburg--Government Committee established there--

Anecdote of the Comte de Chaban--Napoleon's misunderstanding with

the Pope--Cardinal Fesch--Convention of a Council--Declaration

required from the Bishops--Spain in 1811--Certainty of war with

Russia--Lauriston supersedes Caulaincourt at St. Petersburg--The war

in Spain neglected--Troops of all nations at the disposal of

Bonaparte--Levy of the National Guard--Treaties with Prussia and

Austria--Capitulation renewed with Switzerland--Intrigues with

Czernischeff--Attacks of my enemies--Memorial to the Emperor--Ogier

de la Saussaye and the mysterious box--Removal of the Pope to

Fontainebleau--Anecdote of His Holiness and M. Denon--Departure of

Napoleon and Maria Louisa for Dresden--Situation of affairs in Spain

and Portugal--Rapp's account of the Emperor's journey to Dantzic--

Mutual wish for war on the part of Napoleon and Alexander--Sweden

and Turkey--Napoleon's vain attempt to detach Sweden from her

alliance with Russia.

As I took the most lively interest in all that concerned the Hanse

Towns, my first care on returning to Hamburg was to collect information

from the most respectable sources concerning the influential members

of the new Government. Davoust was at its head. On his arrival he had

established in the Duchy of Mecklenburg, in Swedish Pomerania, and

in Stralsund, the capital of that province, military posts and

custom-houses, and that in a time of profound peace with those

countries, and without any previous declaration. The omnipotence of

Napoleon, and the terror inspired by the name of Davoust, overcame all

obstacles which might have opposed those iniquitous usurpations. The

weak were forced to yield to the strong.

At Hamburg a Government Committee was formed, consisting of the Prince

of Eekmuhl as President, Comte de Chaban, Councillor of State, who

superintended the departments of the Interior and Finance, and of M.

Faure, Councillor of State, who was appointed to form and regulate the

Courts of Law. I had sometimes met M. de Chaban at Malmaison. He was

distantly related to Josephine, and had formerly been an officer in the

French Guards. He was compelled to emigrate, having been subjected to

every species of persecution during the Revolution.

M. de Chaban was among the first of the emigrants who returned to France

after the 18th Brumaire. He was at first made Sub-Prefect of Vendome,

but on the union of Tuscany with France Napoleon created him a member of

the Junta appointed to regulate the affairs of Tuscany. He next became

Prefect of Coblentz and Brussels, was made a Count by Bonaparte, and was

afterwards chosen a member of the Government Committee at Hamburg. M.

de Chaban was a man of upright principles, and he discharged his various

functions in a way that commanded esteem and attachment.

--[I recollect an anecdote which but too well depicts those

disastrous times. The Comte de Chaban, being obliged to cross

France during the Reign of Terror, was compelled to assume a

disguise. He accordingly provided himself with a smockfrock; a cart

and horses, and a load of corn. In this manner he journeyed from

place to place till he reached the frontiers. He stopped at

Rochambeau, in the Vendomais, where he was recognised by the Marshal

de Rochambeau, who to guard against exciting any suspicion among

his servants, treated him as if he had really been a carman and said

to him, "You may dine in the kitchen."--Bourrienne.]--

The Hanseatic Towns, united to the Grand Empire professedly for

their welfare, soon felt the blessings of the new organisation of

a regenerating Government. They were at once presented with; the

stamp-duty, registration, the lottery, the droits reunis, the tax on

cards, and the 'octroi'. This prodigality of presents caused, as we may

be sure, the most lively gratitude; a tax for military quarters and

for warlike supplies was imposed, but this did not relieve any one from

laving not only officers and soldiers; but even all the chiefs of the

administration and their officials billeted on them: The refineries,

breweries, and manufactures of all sorts were suppressed. The cash

chests of the Admiralty, of the charity houses, of the manufactures, of

the savings-banks, of the working classes, the funds of the prisons, the

relief meant for the infirm, the chests of the refuges, orphanages; and

of the hospitals, were all seized.

More than 200,000 men, Italian, Dutch, and French soldiers came in turn

to stay there, but only to be clothed and shod; and then they left newly

clothed from head to foot. To leave nothing to be wished for, Davoust,

from 1812, established military commissions in all the thirty-second.

military division, before he entered upon the Russian campaign. To

complete these oppressive measures he established at the same time the

High Prevotal Court of the Customs. It was at this time that M. Eudes,

the director of the ordinary customs, a strict but just man, said that

the rule of the ordinary customs would be regretted, "for till now you

have only been on roses.." The professed judgments of this court were

executed without appeal and without delay. From what I have just said

the situation and the misery of the north of Germany, and the consequent

discontent, can be judged.

During my stay in Hamburg, which on this occasion was not very long,

Napoleon's attention was particularly engaged by the campaign of

Portugal, and his discussions with the Pope. At this period the

thunderbolts of Rome were not very alarming. Yet precautions were

taken to keep secret the excommunication which Pius VII. had pronounced

against Napoleon. The event, however, got reported about, and a party

in favour of the Pope speedily rose up among the clergy, and more

particularly among the fanatics. Napoleon sent to Savona the Archbishops

of Nantes, Bourges, Treves, and Tours, to endeavour to bring about

a reconciliation with His Holiness. But all their endeavours were

unavailing, and after staying a month at Savona they returned to Paris

without having done anything. But Napoleon was not discouraged by

this first disappointment, and he shortly afterwards sent a second

deputation, which experienced the same fate as the first. Cardinal

Fesch, Napoleon's uncle, took part with the Pope. For this fact I can

vouch, though I cannot for an answer which he is said to have made

to the Emperor. I have been informed that when Napoleon was one day

speaking to his uncle about the Pope's obstinacy the Cardinal made some

observations to him on his (Bonaparte's) conduct to the Holy Father,

upon which Napoleon flew into a passion, and said that the Pope and he

were two old fools. "As for the Pope," said he, "he is too obstinate to

listen to anything. No, I am determined he shall never have Rome again.

. . . He will not remain at Savona, and where does he wish I should send

him?"--"To Heaven, perhaps," replied the Cardinal.

The truth is, the Emperor was violently irritated against Pius VII.

Observing with uneasiness the differences and difficulties to which all

these dissensions gave rise, he was anxious to put a stop to them. As

the Pope would not listen to any propositions that were made to him,

Napoleon convoked a Council, which assembled in Paris, and at which

several Italian Bishops were present. The Pope insisted that the

temporal and spiritual interests should be discussed together; and,

however disposed a certain number of prelates, particularly the

Italians, might be to separate these two points of discussion, yet the

influence of the Church and well-contrived intrigues gradually gave

preponderance to the wishes of the Pope. The Emperor, having discovered

that a secret correspondence was carried on by several of the Bishops

and Archbishops who had seats in the Council, determined to get rid of

some of them, and the Bishops of Ghent, Troyes, Tournay, and Toulouse

were arrested and sent to Vincennes. They were superseded by others.

He wished to dissolve the Council, which he saw was making no advance

towards the object he had in view, and, fearing that it might adopt some

act at variance with his supreme wish, every member of the Council was

individually required to make a declaration that the proposed changes

were conformable to the laws of the Church. It was said at the time that

they were unanimous in this individual declaration, though it is certain

that in the sittings of the Council opinions were divided. I know not

what His Holiness thought of these written opinions compared with the

verbal opinions that had been delivered, but certain it is though still

a captive at Savona, he refused to adhere to the concessions granted in

the secret declarations.

The conflicts which took place in Spain during the year 1811 were

unattended by any decisive results. Some brilliant events, indeed,

attested the courage of our troops and the skill of our generals.

Such were the battle of Albufera and the taking of Tarragona, while

Wellington was obliged to raise the siege of Badajoz. These advantages,

which were attended only by glory, encouraged Napoleon in the hope of

triumphing in the Peninsula, and enabled him to enjoy the brilliant

fetes which took place at Paris in celebration of the birth of the King

of Rome.

On his return from a tour in Holland at the end of October Napoleon

clearly saw that a rupture with Russia was inevitable. In vain he sent

Lauriston as Ambassador to St. Petersburg to supersede Caulaincourt,

who would no longer remain there: all the diplomatic skill in the world

could effect nothing with a powerful Government which had already formed

its determination. All the Cabinets in Europe were now unanimous in

wishing for the overthrow of Napoleon's power, and the people no less,

ardently wished for an order of things less fatal to their trade

and industry. In the state to which Europe was reduced no one could

counteract the wish of Russia and her allies to go to war with

France--Lauriston no more than Caulaincourt.

The war for which Napoleon was now obliged to prepare forced him to

neglect Spain, and to leave his interests in that country in a state of

real danger. Indeed, his occupation of Spain and his well-known wish to

maintain himself there were additional motives for inducing the powers

of Europe to enter upon a war which would necessarily divide Napoleon's

forces. All at once the troops which were in Italy and the north of

Germany moved towards the frontiers of the Russian Empire. From March

1811 the Emperor had all the military forces of Europe at his disposal.

It was curious to see this union of nations, distinguished by difference

of manners,

--[It should be remarked that Napoleon was far from being anxious

for the war with Russia. Metternich writing on 26th March 1811,

says "Everything seems to indicate that the Emperor Napoleon is at

present still far from desiring a war with Russia. But it is not

less true that the Emperor Alexander has given himself over, 'nolens

volens', to the war party, and that he will bring about war, because

the time is approaching when he will no longer be able to resist the

reaction of the party in the internal affairs of his Empire, or the

temper of his army. The contest between Count Romanzov and the

party opposed to that Minister seems on the point of precipitating a

war between Russia and France." This, from Metternich, is strong

evidence.]--

language, religion, and interests, all ready to fight for one man

against a power who had done nothing to offend them. Prussia herself,

though she could not pardon the injuries he had inflicted upon her,

joined his alliance, but with the intention of breaking it on the first

opportunity. When the war with Russia was first spoken of Savary and I

had frequent conversations on the subject. I communicated to him all the

intelligence I received from abroad respecting that vast enterprise. The

Duc de Rovigo shared all my forebodings; and if he and those who thought

like him had been listened to, the war would probably have been avoided.

Through him I learnt who were the individuals who urged the invasion.

The eager ambition with which they looked forward to Viceroyalties,

Duchies, and endowments blinded them to the possibility of seeing the

Cossacks in Paris.

The gigantic enterprise being determined on, vast preparations were made

for carrying it into effect. Before his departure Napoleon, who was to

take with him all the disposable troops, caused a 'Senatus-consulte' to

be issued for levying the National Guards, who were divided into

three corps. He also arranged his diplomatic affairs by concluding,

in February 1812, a treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive,

with Prussia, by virtue of which the two contracting powers mutually

guaranteed the integrity of their own possessions, and the European

possessions of the Ottoman Porte, because that power was then at war

with Russia. A similar treaty was concluded about the beginning of March

with Austria, and about the end of the same month Napoleon renewed

the capitulation of France and Switzerland. At length, in the month of

April, there came to light an evident proof of the success which had

attended M. Czernischeff's intrigues in Paris. It was ascertained that

a clerk in the War Office, named Michel, had communicated to him the

situation of the French forces in Germany. Michel was condemned to

death, for the time was gone by when Bonaparte, confident in his genius

and good fortune, could communicate his plans to the spy of General

Melas.

In March 1812, when I saw that the approaching war would necessarily

take Napoleon from France, weary of the persecutions and even threats

by which I was every day assailed, I addressed to the Emperor a memorial

explaining my conduct and showing the folly and wickedness of my

accusers. Among them was a certain Ogier de la Saussaye, who had sent

a report to the Emperor, in which the principal charge was, that I had

carried off a box containing important papers belonging to the First

Consul. The accusation of Ogier de la Saussaye terminated thus: "I add

to my report the interrogatories of MM. Westphalen, Osy, Chapeau Rouge,

Aukscher, Thierry, and Gumprecht-Mores. The evidence of the latter

bears principally on a certain mysterious box, a secret upon which it is

impossible to throw any light, but the reality of which we are bound to

believe." These are his words. The affair of the mysterious box has

been already explained. I have already informed the reader that I put my

papers into a box, which I buried lest it should be stolen from me. But

for that precaution I should not have been able to lay before the reader

the autograph documents in my possession, and which I imagine form the

most essential part of these volumes. In my memorial to the Emperor I

said, in allusion to the passage above quoted, "This, Sire, is the most

atrocious part of Ogier's report.

"Gumprecht being questioned on this point replies that the accuser has

probably, as well as himself, seen the circumstance mentioned in an

infamous pamphlet which appeared seven or eight years, ago. It was,

I think, entitled 'Le Secret du Cabinet des Tuileries,' and was very

likely at the time of its appearance denounced by the police. In that

libel it is stated, among a thousand other calumnies equally false and

absurd, 'that when I left the First Consul I carried away a box full of

important papers, that I was in consequence sent to the Temple, where

your brother Joseph came to me and offered me my liberation, and a

million of francs, if I would restore the papers, which I refused to

do,' etc. Ogier, instead of looking for this libel in Hamburg, where I

read it, has the impudence to give credit to the charge, the truth of

which could have been ascertained immediately: and he adds, 'This secret

we are bound to believe.' Your Majesty knows whether I was ever in the

Temple, and whether Joseph ever made such an offer to me." I entreated

that the Emperor would do me the favour to bring me to trial; for

certainly I should have regarded that as a favour rather than to remain

as I was, exposed to vague accusations; yet all my solicitations were in

vain. My letter to the Emperor remained unanswered; but though Bonaparte

could not spare a few moments to reply to an old friend, I learned

through Duroc the contempt he cherished for my accusers. Duroc

advised me not to be uneasy, and that in all probability the Emperor's

prejudices against me would be speedily overcome; and I must say that if

they were not overcome it was neither the fault of Duroc nor Savary, who

knew how to rightly estimate the miserable intrigues just alluded to.

Napoleon was at length determined to extend the limits of his Empire,

or rather to avenge the injuries which Russia had committed against his

Continental system. Yet, before he departed for Germany, the resolute

refusal of the Pope to submit to any arrangement urgently claimed

his consideration. Savona did not appear to him a sufficiently secure

residence for such a prisoner. He feared that when all his strength

should be removed towards the Niemen the English might carry off the

Pope, or that the Italians, excited by the clergy, whose dissatisfaction

was general in Italy, would stir up those religious dissensions which

are always fatal and difficult to quell. With the view, therefore, of

keeping the Pope under his control he removed him to Fontainebleau, and

even at one time thought of bringing him to Paris.

The Emperor appointed M. Denon to reside with the Pope at Fontainebleau;

and to afford his illustrious prisoner the society of such a man was

certainly a delicate mark of attention on the part of Napoleon. When

speaking of his residence with Pius VII. M. Denon related to me the

following anecdote. "The Pope," said he, "was much attached to me.

He always addressed me by the appellation 'my son,' and he loved to

converse with me, especially on the subject of the Egyptian expedition.

One day he asked me for my work on Egypt, which he said he wished to

read; and as you know it is not quite orthodox, and does not perfectly

agree with the creation of the world according to Genesis, I at first

hesitated; but the Pope insisted, and at length I complied with his

wish. The Holy Father assured me that he had been much interested by the

perusal of the book. I made some allusion to the delicate points; upon

which he said, 'No matter, no matter, my son; all that is exceedingly

curious, and I must confess entirely new to me.' I then," continued M.

Denon, "told His Holiness why I hesitated to lend him the work, which,

I observed, he had excommunicated, together with its author.

'Excommunicated you, my son?' resumed the Pope in a tone of affectionate

concern. 'I am very sorry for it, and assure you I was far from being

aware of any such thing.'"

When M. Denon related to me this anecdote he told me how greatly he had

admired the virtues and resignation of the Holy Father; but he added

that it would nevertheless have been easier to make him a martyr than

to induce him to yield on any point until he should be restored to

the temporal sovereignty of Rome, of which he considered himself

the depositary, and which he would not endure the reproach of having

willingly sacrificed. After settling the place of the Pope's residence

Napoleon set off for Dresden, accompanied by Maria Louisa, who had

expressed a wish to see her father.

The Russian enterprise, the most gigantic, perhaps, that the genius

of man ever conceived since the conquest of India by Alexander, now

absorbed universal attention, and defied the calculations of reason.

The Manzanares was forgotten, and nothing was thought of but the Niemen,

already so celebrated by the raft of Tilsit. Thither, as towards a

common centre, were moving men, horses, provisions, and baggage of every

kind, from all parts of Europe. The hopes of our generals and the fears

of all prudent men were directed to Russia. The war in Spain, which was

becoming more and more unfortunate, excited but a feeble interest; and

our most distinguished officers looked upon it as a disgrace to be sent

to the Peninsula. In short, it was easy to foresee that the period

was not far distant when the French would be obliged to recross the

Pyrenees. Though the truth was concealed from the Emperor on many

subjects, yet he was not deceived as to the situation of Spain in the

spring of 1812. In February the Duke of Ragusa had frankly informed him

that the armies of Spain and Portugal could not, without considerable

reinforcements of men and money, hope for any important advantages since

Ciudad-Rodrigo and Badajoz had fallen into the hands of the English.

Before he commenced his great operations on the Niemen and the Volga

Napoleon made a journey to Dantzic, and Rapp, who was then Governor of

that city, informed me of some curious particulars connected with the

Imperial visit. The fact is, that if Rapp's advice had been listened

to, and had been supported by men higher in rank than himself, Bonaparte

would not have braved the chances of the Russian war until those chances

turned against him. Speaking to me of the Russians Rapp said, "They will

soon be as wise as we are! Every time we go to war with them we teach

them how to beat us." I was struck with the originality and truth of

this observation, which at the time I heard it was new, though it has

been often repeated since.

"On leaving Dresden," said Rapp to me, "Napoleon came to Dantzic. I

expected a dressing; for, to tell you the truth, I had treated very

cavalierly both his custom-house and its officers, who were raising up

as many enemies to France as there were inhabitants in my Government.

I had also warned him of all that has since happened in Russia, but

I assure you I did not think myself quite so good a prophet. In

the beginning of 1812 I thus wrote to him: 'If your Majesty should

experience reverses you may depend on it that both Russians and Germans

will rise up in a mass to shake off the yoke. There will be a crusade,

and all your allies will abandon you. Even the King of Bavaria, on whom

you rely so confidently, will join the coalition. I except only the King

of Saxony. He, perhaps, might remain faithful to you; but his subjects

will force him to make common cause with your enemies. The King of

Naples," continued Rapp, "who had the command of the cavalry, had been

to Dantzic before the Emperor. He did not seem to take a more favourable

view of the approaching campaign than I did. Murat was dissatisfied that

the Emperor would not consent to his rejoining him in Dresden; and he

said that he would rather be a captain of grenadiers than a King such as

he was."

Here I interrupted Rapp to tell him what had fallen from Murat when I

met him in the Champs Elysees "Bah!" resumed Rapp, "Murat, brave as he

was, was a craven in Napoleon's presence! On the Emperor's arrival in

Dantzic the first thing of which he spoke to me was the alliance he had

just then concluded with Prussia and Austria. I could not refrain from

telling him that we did a great deal of mischief as allies; a fact of

which I was assured from the reports daily transmitted to me respecting

the conduct of our troops. Bonaparte tossed his bead, as you know he was

in the habit of doing when he was displeased. After a moment's silence,

dropping the familiar thee and thou, he said, 'Monsieur le General, this

is a torrent which must be allowed to run itself out. It will not last

long. I must first ascertain whether Alexander decidedly wishes for

war.' Then, suddenly changing the subject of conversation, he said,

'Have you not lately observed something extraordinary in Murat? I think

he is quite altered. Is he ill?'--'Sire,' replied I, 'Murat is not

ill, but he is out of spirits.'--'Out of spirits! but why? Is he not

satisfied with being a King?'--'Sire, Murat says he is no King.'--'That

is his own fault. Why does he make himself a Neapolitan? Why is he not a

Frenchman? When he is in his Kingdom he commits all sorts of follies. He

favours the trade of England; that I will not suffer.'

"When," continued Rapp, "he spoke of the favour extended by Murat to the

trade between Naples and England I thought my turn would come next; but

I was deceived. No more was said on the subject, and when I was about

to take my leave the Emperor said to me, as when in his best of humours,

'Rapp, you will sup with me this evening.' I accordingly supped that

evening with the Emperor, who had also invited the King of Naples and

Berthier. Next day the Emperor visited the fortress, and afterwards

returned to the Government Palace, where he received the civil and

military authorities. He again invited Murat, Berthier, and me to

supper. When we first sat down to table we were all very dull, for the

Emperor was silent; and, as you well know, under such circumstances

not even Murat himself dared to be the first to speak to him. At length

Napoleon, addressing me, inquired how far it was from Cadiz to Dantzic.

'Too far, Sire,' replied I. 'I understand you, Monsieur le General,

but in a few months the distance will be still greater.'--'So much the

worse, Sire!' Here there was another pause. Neither Murat nor Berthier,

on whom the Emperor fixed a scrutinising glance, uttered a word, and

Napoleon again broke silence, but without addressing any one of us in

particular: 'Gentlemen,' said he in a solemn and rather low tone of

voice, 'I see plainly that you are none of you inclined to fight again.

The King of Naples does not wish to leave the fine climate of his

dominions, Berthier wishes to enjoy the diversion of the chase at his

estate of Gros Bois, and Rapp is impatient to be back to his hotel in

Paris.' Would you believe it," pursued Rapp, "that neither Murat nor

Berthier said a word in reply? and the ball again came to me. I told him

frankly that what he said was perfectly true, and the King of Naples and

the Prince of Neufchatel complimented me on my spirit, and observed that

I was quite right in saying what I did. 'Well,' said I, 'since it was so

very right, why did you not follow my example, and why leave me to say

all?' You cannot conceive," added Rapp, "how confounded they both were,

and especially Murat, though he was very differently situated from

Berthier."

The negotiations which Bonaparte opened with Alexander, when he yet

wished to seem averse to war, resembled those oratorical paraphrases

which do not prevent us from coming to the conclusion we wish. The two

Emperors equally desired war; the one with the view of consolidating his

power, and the other in the hope of freeing himself from a yoke which

threatened to reduce him to a state of vassalage, for it was little

short of this to require a power like Russia to close her ports against

England for the mere purpose of favouring the interests of France.

At that time only two European powers were not tied to Napoleon's

fate--Sweden and Turkey. Napoleon was anxious to gain the alliance of

these two powers. With respect to Sweden his efforts were vain; and

though, in fact, Turkey was then at war with Russia, yet the Grand

Seignior was not now, as at the time of Sebastiani's embassy, subject to

the influence of France.

The peace, which was soon concluded at Bucharest, between Russia, and

Turkey increased Napoleon's embarrassment. The left of the Russian army,

secured by the neutrality of Turkey, was reinforced by Bagration's corps

from Moldavia: it subsequently occupied the right of the Beresina, and

destroyed the last hope of saving the wreck of the French army. It is

difficult to conceive how Turkey could have allowed the consideration of

injuries she had received from France to induce her to terminate the war

with Russia when France was attacking that power with immense forces.

The Turks never had a fairer opportunity for taking revenge on Russia,

and, unfortunately for Napoleon, they suffered it to escape.

Napoleon was not more successful when he sought the alliance of a Prince

whose fortune he had made, and who was allied to his family, but with

whom he had never been on terms of good understanding. The Emperor

Alexander had a considerable corps of troops in Finland destined to

protect that country against the Sweden, Napoleon having consented to

that occupation in order to gain the provisional consent of Alexander

to the invasion of Spain. What was the course pursued by Napoleon when,

being at war with Russia, he wished to detach Sweden from her

alliance with Alexander? He intimated to Bernadotte that he had a sure

opportunity of retaking Finland, a conquest which would gratify his

subjects and win their attachment to him. By this alliance Napoleon

wished to force Alexander not to withdraw the troops who were in the

north of his Empire, but rather to augment their numbers in order to

cover Finland and St. Petersburg. It was thus that Napoleon endeavoured

to draw the Prince Royal into his coalition. It was of little

consequence to Napoleon whether Bernadotte succeeded or not. The Emperor

Alexander would nevertheless have been obliged to increase his force

in Finland; that was all that Napoleon wished. In the gigantic struggle

upon which France and Russia were about to enter the most trivial

alliance was not to be neglected. In January 1812 Davoust invaded

Swedish Pomerania without any declaration of war, and without any

apparent motive. Was this inconceivable violation of territory likely

to dispose the Prince Royal of Sweden to the proposed alliance, even had

that alliance not been adverse to the interests of his country? That was

impossible; and Bernadotte took the part which was expected of him. He

rejected the offers of Napoleon, and prepared for coming events.

The Emperor Alexander wished to withdraw his force from Finland for the

purpose of more effectively opposing the immense army which threatened

his States. Unwilling to expose Finland to an attack on the part of

Sweden, he had an interview on the 28th of August 1812, at Abo, with

the Prince-Royal, to come to an arrangement with him for uniting their

interests. I know that the Emperor of Russia pledged himself, whatever

might happen, to protect Bernadotte against the fate of the new

dynasties, to guarantee the possession of his throne, and promised that

he should have Norway as a compensation for Finland. He even went so far

as to hint that Bernadotte might supersede Napoleon. Bernadotte adopted

all the propositions of Alexander, and from that moment Sweden made

common cause against Napoleon. The Prince Royal's conduct has been much

blamed, but the question resolved itself into one of mere political

interest. Could Bernadotte, a Swede by adoption, prefer the alliance

of an ambitious sovereign whose vengeance he had to fear, and who had

sanctioned the seizure of Finland to that of a powerful monarch, his

formidable neighbour, his protector in Sweden, and where hostility might

effectually support the hereditary claims of young Gustavus? Sweden,

in joining France, would thereby have declared herself the enemy of

England. Where, then, would have been her navy, her trade and even her

existence?