CHAPTER XX.

GENERAL FREMONT IN COMMAND--MOVEMENT AGAINST BELMONT--BATTLE OF BELMONT

--A NARROW ESCAPE--AFTER THE BATTLE.

From the occupation of Paducah up to the early part of November nothing

important occurred with the troops under my command. I was reinforced

from time to time and the men were drilled and disciplined preparatory

for the service which was sure to come. By the 1st of November I had

not fewer than 20,000 men, most of them under good drill and ready to

meet any equal body of men who, like themselves, had not yet been in an

engagement. They were growing impatient at lying idle so long, almost

in hearing of the guns of the enemy they had volunteered to fight

against. I asked on one or two occasions to be allowed to move against

Columbus. It could have been taken soon after the occupation of

Paducah; but before November it was so strongly fortified that it would

have required a large force and a long siege to capture it.

In the latter part of October General Fremont took the field in person

and moved from Jefferson City against General Sterling Price, who was

then in the State of Missouri with a considerable command. About the

first of November I was directed from department headquarters to make a

demonstration on both sides of the Mississippi River with the view of

detaining the rebels at Columbus within their lines. Before my troops

could be got off, I was notified from the same quarter that there were

some 3,000 of the enemy on the St. Francis River about fifty miles west,

or south-west, from Cairo, and was ordered to send another force against

them. I dispatched Colonel Oglesby at once with troops sufficient to

compete with the reported number of the enemy. On the 5th word came

from the same source that the rebels were about to detach a large force

from Columbus to be moved by boats down the Mississippi and up the White

River, in Arkansas, in order to reinforce Price, and I was directed to

prevent this movement if possible. I accordingly sent a regiment from

Bird's Point under Colonel W. H. L. Wallace to overtake and reinforce

Oglesby, with orders to march to New Madrid, a point some distance below

Columbus, on the Missouri side. At the same time I directed General C.

F. Smith to move all the troops he could spare from Paducah directly

against Columbus, halting them, however, a few miles from the town to

await further orders from me. Then I gathered up all the troops at

Cairo and Fort Holt, except suitable guards, and moved them down the

river on steamers convoyed by two gunboats, accompanying them myself.

My force consisted of a little over 3,000 men and embraced five

regiments of infantry, two guns and two companies of cavalry. We

dropped down the river on the 6th to within about six miles of Columbus,

debarked a few men on the Kentucky side and established pickets to

connect with the troops from Paducah.

I had no orders which contemplated an attack by the National troops, nor

did I intend anything of the kind when I started out from Cairo; but

after we started I saw that the officers and men were elated at the

prospect of at last having the opportunity of doing what they had

volunteered to do--fight the enemies of their country. I did not see

how I could maintain discipline, or retain the confidence of my command,

if we should return to Cairo without an effort to do something.

Columbus, besides being strongly fortified, contained a garrison much

more numerous than the force I had with me. It would not do, therefore,

to attack that point. About two o'clock on the morning of the 7th, I

learned that the enemy was crossing troops from Columbus to the west

bank to be dispatched, presumably, after Oglesby. I knew there was a

small camp of Confederates at Belmont, immediately opposite Columbus,

and I speedily resolved to push down the river, land on the Missouri

side, capture Belmont, break up the camp and return. Accordingly, the

pickets above Columbus were drawn in at once, and about daylight the

boats moved out from shore. In an hour we were debarking on the west

bank of the Mississippi, just out of range of the batteries at Columbus.

The ground on the west shore of the river, opposite Columbus, is low and

in places marshy and cut up with sloughs. The soil is rich and the

timber large and heavy. There were some small clearings between Belmont

and the point where we landed, but most of the country was covered with

the native forests. We landed in front of a cornfield. When the

debarkation commenced, I took a regiment down the river to post it as a

guard against surprise. At that time I had no staff officer who could

be trusted with that duty. In the woods, at a short distance below the

clearing, I found a depression, dry at the time, but which at high water

became a slough or bayou. I placed the men in the hollow, gave them

their instructions and ordered them to remain there until they were

properly relieved. These troops, with the gunboats, were to protect our

transports.

Up to this time the enemy had evidently failed to divine our intentions.

From Columbus they could, of course, see our gunboats and transports

loaded with troops. But the force from Paducah was threatening them

from the land side, and it was hardly to be expected that if Columbus

was our object we would separate our troops by a wide river. They

doubtless thought we meant to draw a large force from the east bank,

then embark ourselves, land on the east bank and make a sudden assault

on Columbus before their divided command could be united.

About eight o'clock we started from the point of debarkation, marching

by the flank. After moving in this way for a mile or a mile and a half,

I halted where there was marshy ground covered with a heavy growth of

timber in our front, and deployed a large part of my force as

skirmishers. By this time the enemy discovered that we were moving upon

Belmont and sent out troops to meet us. Soon after we had started in

line, his skirmishers were encountered and fighting commenced. This

continued, growing fiercer and fiercer, for about four hours, the enemy

being forced back gradually until he was driven into his camp. Early in

this engagement my horse was shot under me, but I got another from one

of my staff and kept well up with the advance until the river was

reached.

The officers and men engaged at Belmont were then under fire for the

first time. Veterans could not have behaved better than they did up to

the moment of reaching the rebel camp. At this point they became

demoralized from their victory and failed to reap its full reward. The

enemy had been followed so closely that when he reached the clear ground

on which his camp was pitched he beat a hasty retreat over the river

bank, which protected him from our shots and from view. This

precipitate retreat at the last moment enabled the National forces to

pick their way without hinderance through the _abatis_--the only

artificial defence the enemy had. The moment the camp was reached our

men laid down their arms and commenced rummaging the tents to pick up

trophies. Some of the higher officers were little better than the

privates. They galloped about from one cluster of men to another and at

every halt delivered a short eulogy upon the Union cause and the

achievements of the command.

All this time the troops we had been engaged with for four hours, lay

crouched under cover of the river bank, ready to come up and surrender

if summoned to do so; but finding that they were not pursued, they

worked their way up the river and came up on the bank between us and our

transports. I saw at the same time two steamers coming from the

Columbus side towards the west shore, above us, black--or gray--with

soldiers from boiler-deck to roof. Some of my men were engaged in

firing from captured guns at empty steamers down the river, out of

range, cheering at every shot. I tried to get them to turn their guns

upon the loaded steamers above and not so far away. My efforts were in

vain. At last I directed my staff officers to set fire to the camps.

This drew the fire of the enemy's guns located on the heights of

Columbus. They had abstained from firing before, probably because they

were afraid of hitting their own men; or they may have supposed, until

the camp was on fire, that it was still in the possession of their

friends. About this time, too, the men we had driven over the bank were

seen in line up the river between us and our transports. The alarm

"surrounded" was given. The guns of the enemy and the report of being

surrounded, brought officers and men completely under control. At first

some of the officers seemed to think that to be surrounded was to be

placed in a hopeless position, where there was nothing to do but

surrender. But when I announced that we had cut our way in and could

cut our way out just as well, it seemed a new revelation to officers and

soldiers. They formed line rapidly and we started back to our boats,

with the men deployed as skirmishers as they had been on entering camp.

The enemy was soon encountered, but his resistance this time was feeble.

Again the Confederates sought shelter under the river banks. We could

not stop, however, to pick them up, because the troops we had seen

crossing the river had debarked by this time and were nearer our

transports than we were. It would be prudent to get them behind us; but

we were not again molested on our way to the boats.

From the beginning of the fighting our wounded had been carried to the

houses at the rear, near the place of debarkation. I now set the troops

to bringing their wounded to the boats. After this had gone on for some

little time I rode down the road, without even a staff officer, to visit

the guard I had stationed over the approach to our transports. I knew

the enemy had crossed over from Columbus in considerable numbers and

might be expected to attack us as we were embarking. This guard would

be encountered first and, as they were in a natural intrenchment, would

be able to hold the enemy for a considerable time. My surprise was

great to find there was not a single man in the trench. Riding back to

the boat I found the officer who had commanded the guard and learned

that he had withdrawn his force when the main body fell back. At first

I ordered the guard to return, but finding that it would take some time

to get the men together and march them back to their position, I

countermanded the order. Then fearing that the enemy we had seen

crossing the river below might be coming upon us unawares, I rode out in

the field to our front, still entirely alone, to observe whether the

enemy was passing. The field was grown up with corn so tall and thick

as to cut off the view of even a person on horseback, except directly

along the rows. Even in that direction, owing to the overhanging blades

of corn, the view was not extensive. I had not gone more than a few

hundred yards when I saw a body of troops marching past me not fifty

yards away. I looked at them for a moment and then turned my horse

towards the river and started back, first in a walk, and when I thought

myself concealed from the view of the enemy, as fast as my horse could

carry me. When at the river bank I still had to ride a few hundred

yards to the point where the nearest transport lay.

The cornfield in front of our transports terminated at the edge of a

dense forest. Before I got back the enemy had entered this forest and

had opened a brisk fire upon the boats. Our men, with the exception of

details that had gone to the front after the wounded, were now either

aboard the transports or very near them. Those who were not aboard soon

got there, and the boats pushed off. I was the only man of the National

army between the rebels and our transports. The captain of a boat that

had just pushed out but had not started, recognized me and ordered the

engineer not to start the engine; he then had a plank run out for me.

My horse seemed to take in the situation. There was no path down the

bank and every one acquainted with the Mississippi River knows that its

banks, in a natural state, do not vary at any great angle from the

perpendicular. My horse put his fore feet over the bank without

hesitation or urging, and with his hind feet well under him, slid down

the bank and trotted aboard the boat, twelve or fifteen feet away, over

a single gang plank. I dismounted and went at once to the upper deck.

The Mississippi River was low on the 7th of November, 1861, so that the

banks were higher than the heads of men standing on the upper decks of

the steamers. The rebels were some distance back from the river, so

that their fire was high and did us but little harm. Our smoke-stack

was riddled with bullets, but there were only three men wounded on the

boats, two of whom were soldiers. When I first went on deck I entered

the captain's room adjoining the pilot-house, and threw myself on a

sofa. I did not keep that position a moment, but rose to go out on the

deck to observe what was going on. I had scarcely left when a musket

ball entered the room, struck the head of the sofa, passed through it

and lodged in the foot.

When the enemy opened fire on the transports our gunboats returned it

with vigor. They were well out in the stream and some distance down, so

that they had to give but very little elevation to their guns to clear

the banks of the river. Their position very nearly enfiladed the line

of the enemy while he was marching through the cornfield. The execution

was very great, as we could see at the time and as I afterwards learned

more positively. We were very soon out of range and went peacefully on

our way to Cairo, every man feeling that Belmont was a great victory and

that he had contributed his share to it.

Our loss at Belmont was 485 in killed, wounded and missing. About 125 of

our wounded fell into the hands of the enemy. We returned with 175

prisoners and two guns, and spiked four other pieces. The loss of the

enemy, as officially reported, was 642 men, killed, wounded and missing.

We had engaged about 2,500 men, exclusive of the guard left with the

transports. The enemy had about 7,000; but this includes the troops

brought over from Columbus who were not engaged in the first defence of

Belmont.

The two objects for which the battle of Belmont was fought were fully

accomplished. The enemy gave up all idea of detaching troops from

Columbus. His losses were very heavy for that period of the war.

Columbus was beset by people looking for their wounded or dead kin, to

take them home for medical treatment or burial. I learned later, when I

had moved further south, that Belmont had caused more mourning than

almost any other battle up to that time. The National troops acquired a

confidence in themselves at Belmont that did not desert them through the

war.

The day after the battle I met some officers from General Polk's

command, arranged for permission to bury our dead at Belmont and also

commenced negotiations for the exchange of prisoners. When our men went

to bury their dead, before they were allowed to land they were conducted

below the point where the enemy had engaged our transports. Some of the

officers expressed a desire to see the field; but the request was

refused with the statement that we had no dead there.

While on the truce-boat I mentioned to an officer, whom I had known both

at West Point and in the Mexican war, that I was in the cornfield near

their troops when they passed; that I had been on horseback and had worn

a soldier's overcoat at the time. This officer was on General Polk's

staff. He said both he and the general had seen me and that Polk had

said to his men, "There is a Yankee; you may try your marksmanship on

him if you wish," but nobody fired at me.

Belmont was severely criticised in the North as a wholly unnecessary

battle, barren of results, or the possibility of them from the

beginning. If it had not been fought, Colonel Oglesby would probably

have been captured or destroyed with his three thousand men. Then I

should have been culpable indeed.