CHAPTER XXII.

INVESTMENT OF FORT DONELSON--THE NAVAL OPERATIONS--ATTACK OF THE ENEMY

--ASSAULTING THE WORKS--SURRENDER OF THE FORT.

I informed the department commander of our success at Fort Henry and

that on the 8th I would take Fort Donelson. But the rain continued to

fall so heavily that the roads became impassable for artillery and wagon

trains. Then, too, it would not have been prudent to proceed without

the gunboats. At least it would have been leaving behind a valuable

part of our available force.

On the 7th, the day after the fall of Fort Henry, I took my staff and

the cavalry--a part of one regiment--and made a reconnoissance to within

about a mile of the outer line of works at Donelson. I had known

General Pillow in Mexico, and judged that with any force, no matter how

small, I could march up to within gunshot of any intrenchments he was

given to hold. I said this to the officers of my staff at the time. I

knew that Floyd was in command, but he was no soldier, and I judged that

he would yield to Pillow's pretensions. I met, as I expected, no

opposition in making the reconnoissance and, besides learning the

topography of the country on the way and around Fort Donelson, found

that there were two roads available for marching; one leading to the

village of Dover, the other to Donelson.

Fort Donelson is two miles north, or down the river, from Dover. The

fort, as it stood in 1861, embraced about one hundred acres of land. On

the east it fronted the Cumberland; to the north it faced Hickman's

creek, a small stream which at that time was deep and wide because of

the back-water from the river; on the south was another small stream, or

rather a ravine, opening into the Cumberland. This also was filled with

back-water from the river. The fort stood on high ground, some of it as

much as a hundred feet above the Cumberland. Strong protection to the

heavy guns in the water batteries had been obtained by cutting away

places for them in the bluff. To the west there was a line of rifle

pits some two miles back from the river at the farthest point. This

line ran generally along the crest of high ground, but in one place

crossed a ravine which opens into the river between the village and the

fort. The ground inside and outside of this intrenched line was very

broken and generally wooded. The trees outside of the rifle-pits had

been cut down for a considerable way out, and had been felled so that

their tops lay outwards from the intrenchments. The limbs had been

trimmed and pointed, and thus formed an _abatis_ in front of the greater

part of the line. Outside of this intrenched line, and extending about

half the entire length of it, is a ravine running north and south and

opening into Hickman creek at a point north of the fort. The entire

side of this ravine next to the works was one long _abatis_.

General Halleck commenced his efforts in all quarters to get

reinforcements to forward to me immediately on my departure from Cairo.

General Hunter sent men freely from Kansas, and a large division under

General Nelson, from Buell's army, was also dispatched. Orders went out

from the War Department to consolidate fragments of companies that were

being recruited in the Western States so as to make full companies, and

to consolidate companies into regiments. General Halleck did not

approve or disapprove of my going to Fort Donelson. He said nothing

whatever to me on the subject. He informed Buell on the 7th that I

would march against Fort Donelson the next day; but on the 10th he

directed me to fortify Fort Henry strongly, particularly to the land

side, saying that he forwarded me intrenching tools for that purpose. I

received this dispatch in front of Fort Donelson.

I was very impatient to get to Fort Donelson because I knew the

importance of the place to the enemy and supposed he would reinforce it

rapidly. I felt that 15,000 men on the 8th would be more effective than

50,000 a month later. I asked Flag-officer Foote, therefore, to order

his gunboats still about Cairo to proceed up the Cumberland River and

not to wait for those gone to Eastport and Florence; but the others got

back in time and we started on the 12th. I had moved McClernand out a

few miles the night before so as to leave the road as free as possible.

Just as we were about to start the first reinforcement reached me on

transports. It was a brigade composed of six full regiments commanded

by Colonel Thayer, of Nebraska. As the gunboats were going around to

Donelson by the Tennessee, Ohio and Cumberland rivers, I directed Thayer

to turn about and go under their convoy.

I started from Fort Henry with 15,000 men, including eight batteries and

part of a regiment of cavalry, and, meeting with no obstruction to

detain us, the advance arrived in front of the enemy by noon. That

afternoon and the next day were spent in taking up ground to make the

investment as complete as possible. General Smith had been directed to

leave a portion of his division behind to guard forts Henry and Heiman.

He left General Lew. Wallace with 2,500 men. With the remainder of his

division he occupied our left, extending to Hickman creek. McClernand

was on the right and covered the roads running south and south-west from

Dover. His right extended to the back-water up the ravine opening into

the Cumberland south of the village. The troops were not intrenched, but

the nature of the ground was such that they were just as well protected

from the fire of the enemy as if rifle-pits had been thrown up. Our

line was generally along the crest of ridges. The artillery was

protected by being sunk in the ground. The men who were not serving the

guns were perfectly covered from fire on taking position a little back

from the crest. The greatest suffering was from want of shelter. It

was midwinter and during the siege we had rain and snow, thawing and

freezing alternately. It would not do to allow camp-fires except far

down the hill out of sight of the enemy, and it would not do to allow

many of the troops to remain there at the same time. In the march over

from Fort Henry numbers of the men had thrown away their blankets and

overcoats. There was therefore much discomfort and absolute suffering.

During the 12th and 13th, and until the arrival of Wallace and Thayer on

the 14th, the National forces, composed of but 15,000 men, without

intrenchments, confronted an intrenched army of 21,000, without conflict

further than what was brought on by ourselves. Only one gunboat had

arrived. There was a little skirmishing each day, brought on by the

movement of our troops in securing commanding positions; but there was

no actual fighting during this time except once, on the 13th, in front

of McClernand's command. That general had undertaken to capture a

battery of the enemy which was annoying his men. Without orders or

authority he sent three regiments to make the assault. The battery was

in the main line of the enemy, which was defended by his whole army

present. Of course the assault was a failure, and of course the loss on

our side was great for the number of men engaged. In this assault

Colonel William Morrison fell badly wounded. Up to this time the

surgeons with the army had no difficulty in finding room in the houses

near our line for all the sick and wounded; but now hospitals were

overcrowded. Owing, however, to the energy and skill of the surgeons the

suffering was not so great as it might have been. The hospital

arrangements at Fort Donelson were as complete as it was possible to

make them, considering the inclemency of the weather and the lack of

tents, in a sparsely settled country where the houses were generally of

but one or two rooms.

On the return of Captain Walke to Fort Henry on the 10th, I had

requested him to take the vessels that had accompanied him on his

expedition up the Tennessee, and get possession of the Cumberland as far

up towards Donelson as possible. He started without delay, taking,

however, only his own gunboat, the Carondelet, towed by the steamer

Alps. Captain Walke arrived a few miles below Donelson on the 12th, a

little after noon. About the time the advance of troops reached a point

within gunshot of the fort on the land side, he engaged the water

batteries at long range. On the 13th I informed him of my arrival the

day before and of the establishment of most of our batteries, requesting

him at the same time to attack again that day so that I might take

advantage of any diversion. The attack was made and many shots fell

within the fort, creating some consternation, as we now know. The

investment on the land side was made as complete as the number of troops

engaged would admit of.

During the night of the 13th Flag-officer Foote arrived with the

iron-clads St. Louis, Louisville and Pittsburg and the wooden gunboats

Tyler and Conestoga, convoying Thayer's brigade. On the morning of the

14th Thayer was landed. Wallace, whom I had ordered over from Fort

Henry, also arrived about the same time. Up to this time he had been

commanding a brigade belonging to the division of General C. F. Smith.

These troops were now restored to the division they belonged to, and

General Lew. Wallace was assigned to the command of a division composed

of the brigade of Colonel Thayer and other reinforcements that arrived

the same day. This new division was assigned to the centre, giving the

two flanking divisions an opportunity to close up and form a stronger

line.

The plan was for the troops to hold the enemy within his lines, while

the gunboats should attack the water batteries at close quarters and

silence his guns if possible. Some of the gunboats were to run the

batteries, get above the fort and above the village of Dover. I had

ordered a reconnoissance made with the view of getting troops to the

river above Dover in case they should be needed there. That position

attained by the gunboats it would have been but a question of time--and

a very short time, too--when the garrison would have been compelled to

surrender.

By three in the afternoon of the 14th Flag-officer Foote was ready, and

advanced upon the water batteries with his entire fleet. After coming

in range of the batteries of the enemy the advance was slow, but a

constant fire was delivered from every gun that could be brought to bear

upon the fort. I occupied a position on shore from which I could see

the advancing navy. The leading boat got within a very short distance of

the water battery, not further off I think than two hundred yards, and I

soon saw one and then another of them dropping down the river, visibly

disabled. Then the whole fleet followed and the engagement closed for

the day. The gunboat which Flag-officer Foote was on, besides having

been hit about sixty times, several of the shots passing through near

the waterline, had a shot enter the pilot-house which killed the pilot,

carried away the wheel and wounded the flag-officer himself. The

tiller-ropes of another vessel were carried away and she, too, dropped

helplessly back. Two others had their pilot-houses so injured that they

scarcely formed a protection to the men at the wheel.

The enemy had evidently been much demoralized by the assault, but they

were jubilant when they saw the disabled vessels dropping down the river

entirely out of the control of the men on board. Of course I only

witnessed the falling back of our gunboats and felt sad enough at the

time over the repulse. Subsequent reports, now published, show that the

enemy telegraphed a great victory to Richmond. The sun went down on the

night of the 14th of February, 1862, leaving the army confronting Fort

Donelson anything but comforted over the prospects. The weather had

turned intensely cold; the men were without tents and could not keep up

fires where most of them had to stay, and, as previously stated, many

had thrown away their overcoats and blankets. Two of the strongest of

our gunboats had been disabled, presumably beyond the possibility of

rendering any present assistance. I retired this night not knowing but

that I would have to intrench my position, and bring up tents for the

men or build huts under the cover of the hills.

On the morning of the 15th, before it was yet broad day, a messenger

from Flag-officer Foote handed me a note, expressing a desire to see me

on the flag-ship and saying that he had been injured the day before so

much that he could not come himself to me. I at once made my

preparations for starting. I directed my adjutant-general to notify

each of the division commanders of my absence and instruct them to do

nothing to bring on an engagement until they received further orders,

but to hold their positions. From the heavy rains that had fallen for

days and weeks preceding and from the constant use of the roads between

the troops and the landing four to seven miles below, these roads had

become cut up so as to be hardly passable. The intense cold of the

night of the 14th-15th had frozen the ground solid. This made travel on

horseback even slower than through the mud; but I went as fast as the

roads would allow.

When I reached the fleet I found the flag-ship was anchored out in the

stream. A small boat, however, awaited my arrival and I was soon on

board with the flag-officer. He explained to me in short the condition

in which he was left by the engagement of the evening before, and

suggested that I should intrench while he returned to Mound City with

his disabled boats, expressing at the time the belief that he could have

the necessary repairs made and be back in ten days. I saw the absolute

necessity of his gunboats going into hospital and did not know but I

should be forced to the alternative of going through a siege. But the

enemy relieved me from this necessity.

When I left the National line to visit Flag-officer Foote I had no idea

that there would be any engagement on land unless I brought it on

myself. The conditions for battle were much more favorable to us than

they had been for the first two days of the investment. From the 12th

to the 14th we had but 15,000 men of all arms and no gunboats. Now we

had been reinforced by a fleet of six naval vessels, a large division of

troops under General L. Wallace and 2,500 men brought over from Fort

Henry belonging to the division of C. F. Smith. The enemy, however, had

taken the initiative. Just as I landed I met Captain Hillyer of my

staff, white with fear, not for his personal safety, but for the safety

of the National troops. He said the enemy had come out of his lines in

full force and attacked and scattered McClernand's division, which was

in full retreat. The roads, as I have said, were unfit for making fast

time, but I got to my command as soon as possible. The attack had been

made on the National right. I was some four or five miles north of our

left. The line was about three miles long. In reaching the point where

the disaster had occurred I had to pass the divisions of Smith and

Wallace. I saw no sign of excitement on the portion of the line held by

Smith; Wallace was nearer the scene of conflict and had taken part in

it. He had, at an opportune time, sent Thayer's brigade to the support

of McClernand and thereby contributed to hold the enemy within his

lines.

I saw everything favorable for us along the line of our left and centre.

When I came to the right appearances were different. The enemy had come

out in full force to cut his way out and make his escape. McClernand's

division had to bear the brunt of the attack from this combined force.

His men had stood up gallantly until the ammunition in their

cartridge-boxes gave out. There was abundance of ammunition near by

lying on the ground in boxes, but at that stage of the war it was not

all of our commanders of regiments, brigades, or even divisions, who had

been educated up to the point of seeing that their men were constantly

supplied with ammunition during an engagement. When the men found

themselves without ammunition they could not stand up against troops who

seemed to have plenty of it. The division broke and a portion fled, but

most of the men, as they were not pursued, only fell back out of range

of the fire of the enemy. It must have been about this time that Thayer

pushed his brigade in between the enemy and those of our troops that

were without ammunition. At all events the enemy fell back within his

intrenchments and was there when I got on the field.

I saw the men standing in knots talking in the most excited manner. No

officer seemed to be giving any directions. The soldiers had their

muskets, but no ammunition, while there were tons of it close at hand.

I heard some of the men say that the enemy had come out with knapsacks,

and haversacks filled with rations. They seemed to think this indicated

a determination on his part to stay out and fight just as long as the

provisions held out. I turned to Colonel J. D. Webster, of my staff,

who was with me, and said: "Some of our men are pretty badly

demoralized, but the enemy must be more so, for he has attempted to

force his way out, but has fallen back: the one who attacks first now

will be victorious and the enemy will have to be in a hurry if he gets

ahead of me." I determined to make the assault at once on our left. It

was clear to my mind that the enemy had started to march out with his

entire force, except a few pickets, and if our attack could be made on

the left before the enemy could redistribute his forces along the line,

we would find but little opposition except from the intervening _abatis_.

I directed Colonel Webster to ride with me and call out to the men as we

passed: "Fill your cartridge-boxes, quick, and get into line; the enemy

is trying to escape and he must not be permitted to do so." This acted

like a charm. The men only wanted some one to give them a command. We

rode rapidly to Smith's quarters, when I explained the situation to him

and directed him to charge the enemy's works in his front with his whole

division, saying at the same time that he would find nothing but a very

thin line to contend with. The general was off in an incredibly short

time, going in advance himself to keep his men from firing while they

were working their way through the _abatis_ intervening between them and

the enemy. The outer line of rifle-pits was passed, and the night of

the 15th General Smith, with much of his division, bivouacked within the

lines of the enemy. There was now no doubt but that the Confederates

must surrender or be captured the next day.

There seems from subsequent accounts to have been much consternation,

particularly among the officers of high rank, in Dover during the night

of the 15th. General Floyd, the commanding officer, who was a man of

talent enough for any civil position, was no soldier and, possibly, did

not possess the elements of one. He was further unfitted for command,

for the reason that his conscience must have troubled him and made him

afraid. As Secretary of War he had taken a solemn oath to maintain the

Constitution of the United States and to uphold the same against all its

enemies. He had betrayed that trust. As Secretary of War he was

reported through the northern press to have scattered the little army

the country had so that the most of it could be picked up in detail when

secession occurred. About a year before leaving the Cabinet he had

removed arms from northern to southern arsenals. He continued in the

Cabinet of President Buchanan until about the 1st of January, 1861,

while he was working vigilantly for the establishment of a confederacy

made out of United States territory. Well may he have been afraid to

fall into the hands of National troops. He would no doubt have been

tried for misappropriating public property, if not for treason, had he

been captured. General Pillow, next in command, was conceited, and

prided himself much on his services in the Mexican war. He telegraphed

to General Johnston, at Nashville, after our men were within the rebel

rifle-pits, and almost on the eve of his making his escape, that the

Southern troops had had great success all day. Johnston forwarded the

dispatch to Richmond. While the authorities at the capital were reading

it Floyd and Pillow were fugitives.

A council of war was held by the enemy at which all agreed that it would

be impossible to hold out longer. General Buckner, who was third in

rank in the garrison but much the most capable soldier, seems to have

regarded it a duty to hold the fort until the general commanding the

department, A. S. Johnston, should get back to his headquarters at

Nashville. Buckner's report shows, however, that he considered Donelson

lost and that any attempt to hold the place longer would be at the

sacrifice of the command. Being assured that Johnston was already in

Nashville, Buckner too agreed that surrender was the proper thing.

Floyd turned over the command to Pillow, who declined it. It then

devolved upon Buckner, who accepted the responsibility of the position.

Floyd and Pillow took possession of all the river transports at Dover

and before morning both were on their way to Nashville, with the brigade

formerly commanded by Floyd and some other troops, in all about 3,000.

Some marched up the east bank of the Cumberland; others went on the

steamers. During the night Forrest also, with his cavalry and some

other troops about a thousand in all, made their way out, passing

between our right and the river. They had to ford or swim over the

back-water in the little creek just south of Dover.

Before daylight General Smith brought to me the following letter from

General Buckner:

HEADQUARTERS, FORT DONELSON, February 16, 1862.

SIR:--In consideration of all the circumstances governing the present

situation of affairs at this station, I propose to the Commanding

Officer of the Federal forces the appointment of Commissioners to agree

upon terms of capitulation of the forces and fort under my command, and

in that view suggest an armistice until 12 o'clock to-day.

I am, sir, very respectfully, Your ob't se'v't, S. B. BUCKNER, Brig.

Gen. C. S. A.

To Brigadier-General U. S. Grant, Com'ding U. S. Forces, Near Fort

Donelson.

To this I responded as follows:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY IN THE FIELD, Camp near Donelson, February 16, 1862.

General S. B. BUCKNER, Confederate Army.

SIR:--Yours of this date, proposing armistice and appointment of

Commissioners to settle terms of capitulation, is just received. No

terms except an unconditional and immediate surrender can be accepted.

I propose to move immediately upon your works.

I am, sir, very respectfully, Your ob't se'v't, U. S. GRANT, Brig. Gen.

To this I received the following reply:

HEADQUARTERS, DOVER, TENNESSEE, February 16, 1862.

To Brig. Gen'l U. S. GRANT, U. S. Army.

SIR:--The distribution of the forces under my command, incident to an

unexpected change of commanders, and the overwhelming force under your

command, compel me, notwithstanding the brilliant success of the

Confederate arms yesterday, to accept the ungenerous and unchivalrous

terms which you propose.

I am, sir, Your very ob't se'v't, S. B. BUCKNER, Brig. Gen. C. S. A.

General Buckner, as soon as he had dispatched the first of the above

letters, sent word to his different commanders on the line of

rifle-pits, notifying them that he had made a proposition looking to the

surrender of the garrison, and directing them to notify National troops

in their front so that all fighting might be prevented. White flags

were stuck at intervals along the line of rifle-pits, but none over the

fort. As soon as the last letter from Buckner was received I mounted my

horse and rode to Dover. General Wallace, I found, had preceded me an

hour or more. I presume that, seeing white flags exposed in his front,

he rode up to see what they meant and, not being fired upon or halted,

he kept on until he found himself at the headquarters of General

Buckner.

I had been at West Point three years with Buckner and afterwards served

with him in the army, so that we were quite well acquainted. In the

course of our conversation, which was very friendly, he said to me that

if he had been in command I would not have got up to Donelson as easily

as I did. I told him that if he had been in command I should not have

tried in the way I did: I had invested their lines with a smaller force

than they had to defend them, and at the same time had sent a brigade

full 5,000 strong, around by water; I had relied very much upon their

commander to allow me to come safely up to the outside of their works.

I asked General Buckner about what force he had to surrender. He

replied that he could not tell with any degree of accuracy; that all the

sick and weak had been sent to Nashville while we were about Fort Henry;

that Floyd and Pillow had left during the night, taking many men with

them; and that Forrest, and probably others, had also escaped during the

preceding night: the number of casualties he could not tell; but he

said I would not find fewer than 12,000, nor more than 15,000.

He asked permission to send parties outside of the lines to bury his

dead, who had fallen on the 15th when they tried to get out. I gave

directions that his permit to pass our limits should be recognized. I

have no reason to believe that this privilege was abused, but it

familiarized our guards so much with the sight of Confederates passing

to and fro that I have no doubt many got beyond our pickets unobserved

and went on. The most of the men who went in that way no doubt thought

they had had war enough, and left with the intention of remaining out of

the army. Some came to me and asked permission to go, saying that they

were tired of the war and would not be caught in the ranks again, and I

bade them go.

The actual number of Confederates at Fort Donelson can never be given

with entire accuracy. The largest number admitted by any writer on the

Southern side, is by Colonel Preston Johnston. He gives the number at

17,000. But this must be an underestimate. The commissary general of

prisoners reported having issued rations to 14,623 Fort Donelson

prisoners at Cairo, as they passed that point. General Pillow reported

the killed and wounded at 2,000; but he had less opportunity of knowing

the actual numbers than the officers of McClernand's division, for most

of the killed and wounded fell outside their works, in front of that

division, and were buried or cared for by Buckner after the surrender

and when Pillow was a fugitive. It is known that Floyd and Pillow

escaped during the night of the 15th, taking with them not less than

3,000 men. Forrest escaped with about 1,000 and others were leaving

singly and in squads all night. It is probable that the Confederate

force at Donelson, on the 15th of February, 1862, was 21,000 in round

numbers.

On the day Fort Donelson fell I had 27,000 men to confront the

Confederate lines and guard the road four or five miles to the left,

over which all our supplies had to be drawn on wagons. During the 16th,

after the surrender, additional reinforcements arrived.

During the siege General Sherman had been sent to Smithland, at the

mouth of the Cumberland River, to forward reinforcements and supplies to

me. At that time he was my senior in rank and there was no authority of

law to assign a junior to command a senior of the same grade. But every

boat that came up with supplies or reinforcements brought a note of

encouragement from Sherman, asking me to call upon him for any

assistance he could render and saying that if he could be of service at

the front I might send for him and he would waive rank.