CHAPTER XXVIII.

ADVANCE OF VAN DORN AND PRICE--PRICE ENTERS IUKA--BATTLE OF IUKA.

At this time, September 4th, I had two divisions of the Army of the

Mississippi stationed at Corinth, Rienzi, Jacinto and Danville. There

were at Corinth also Davies' division and two brigades of McArthur's,

besides cavalry and artillery. This force constituted my left wing, of

which Rosecrans was in command. General Ord commanded the centre, from

Bethel to Humboldt on the Mobile and Ohio railroad and from Jackson to

Bolivar where the Mississippi Central is crossed by the Hatchie River.

General Sherman commanded on the right at Memphis with two of his

brigades back at Brownsville, at the crossing of the Hatchie River by

the Memphis and Ohio railroad. This made the most convenient

arrangement I could devise for concentrating all my spare forces upon

any threatened point. All the troops of the command were within

telegraphic communication of each other, except those under Sherman. By

bringing a portion of his command to Brownsville, from which point there

was a railroad and telegraph back to Memphis, communication could be had

with that part of my command within a few hours by the use of couriers.

In case it became necessary to reinforce Corinth, by this arrangement

all the troops at Bolivar, except a small guard, could be sent by rail

by the way of Jackson in less than twenty-four hours; while the troops

from Brownsville could march up to Bolivar to take their place.

On the 7th of September I learned of the advance of Van Dorn and Price,

apparently upon Corinth. One division was brought from Memphis to

Bolivar to meet any emergency that might arise from this move of the

enemy. I was much concerned because my first duty, after holding the

territory acquired within my command, was to prevent further reinforcing

of Bragg in Middle Tennessee. Already the Army of Northern Virginia had

defeated the army under General Pope and was invading Maryland. In the

Centre General Buell was on his way to Louisville and Bragg marching

parallel to him with a large Confederate force for the Ohio River.

I had been constantly called upon to reinforce Buell until at this time

my entire force numbered less than 50,000 men, of all arms. This

included everything from Cairo south within my jurisdiction. If I too

should be driven back, the Ohio River would become the line dividing the

belligerents west of the Alleghanies, while at the East the line was

already farther north than when hostilities commenced at the opening of

the war. It is true Nashville was never given up after its first

capture, but it would have been isolated and the garrison there would

have been obliged to beat a hasty retreat if the troops in West

Tennessee had been compelled to fall back. To say at the end of the

second year of the war the line dividing the contestants at the East was

pushed north of Maryland, a State that had not seceded, and at the West

beyond Kentucky, another State which had been always loyal, would have

been discouraging indeed. As it was, many loyal people despaired in the

fall of 1862 of ever saving the Union. The administration at Washington

was much concerned for the safety of the cause it held so dear. But I

believe there was never a day when the President did not think that, in

some way or other, a cause so just as ours would come out triumphant.

Up to the 11th of September Rosecrans still had troops on the railroad

east of Corinth, but they had all been ordered in. By the 12th all were

in except a small force under Colonel Murphy of the 8th Wisconsin. He

had been detained to guard the remainder of the stores which had not yet

been brought in to Corinth.

On the 13th of September General Sterling Price entered Iuka, a town

about twenty miles east of Corinth on the Memphis and Charleston

railroad. Colonel Murphy with a few men was guarding the place. He

made no resistance, but evacuated the town on the approach of the enemy.

I was apprehensive lest the object of the rebels might be to get troops

into Tennessee to reinforce Bragg, as it was afterwards ascertained to

be. The authorities at Washington, including the general-in-chief of

the army, were very anxious, as I have said, about affairs both in East

and Middle Tennessee; and my anxiety was quite as great on their account

as for any danger threatening my command. I had not force enough at

Corinth to attack Price even by stripping everything; and there was

danger that before troops could be got from other points he might be far

on his way across the Tennessee. To prevent this all spare forces at

Bolivar and Jackson were ordered to Corinth, and cars were concentrated

at Jackson for their transportation. Within twenty-four hours from the

transmission of the order the troops were at their destination, although

there had been a delay of four hours resulting from the forward train

getting off the track and stopping all the others. This gave a

reinforcement of near 8,000 men, General Ord in command. General

Rosecrans commanded the district of Corinth with a movable force of

about 9,000 independent of the garrison deemed necessary to be left

behind. It was known that General Van Dorn was about a four days' march

south of us, with a large force. It might have been part of his plan to

attack at Corinth, Price coming from the east while he came up from the

south. My desire was to attack Price before Van Dorn could reach

Corinth or go to his relief.

General Rosecrans had previously had his headquarters at Iuka, where his

command was spread out along the Memphis and Charleston railroad

eastward. While there he had a most excellent map prepared showing all

the roads and streams in the surrounding country. He was also

personally familiar with the ground, so that I deferred very much to him

in my plans for the approach. We had cars enough to transport all of

General Ord's command, which was to go by rail to Burnsville, a point on

the road about seven miles west of Iuka. From there his troops were to

march by the north side of the railroad and attack Price from the

north-west, while Rosecrans was to move eastward from his position south

of Corinth by way of the Jacinto road. A small force was to hold the

Jacinto road where it turns to the north-east, while the main force

moved on the Fulton road which comes into Iuka further east. This plan

was suggested by Rosecrans.

Bear Creek, a few miles to the east of the Fulton road, is a formidable

obstacle to the movement of troops in the absence of bridges, all of

which, in September, 1862, had been destroyed in that vicinity. The

Tennessee, to the north-east, not many miles away, was also a formidable

obstacle for an army followed by a pursuing force. Ord was on the

north-west, and even if a rebel movement had been possible in that

direction it could have brought only temporary relief, for it would have

carried Price's army to the rear of the National forces and isolated it

from all support. It looked to me that, if Price would remain in Iuka

until we could get there, his annihilation was inevitable.

On the morning of the 18th of September General Ord moved by rail to

Burnsville, and there left the cars and moved out to perform his part of

the programme. He was to get as near the enemy as possible during the

day and intrench himself so as to hold his position until the next

morning. Rosecrans was to be up by the morning of the 19th on the two

roads before described, and the attack was to be from all three quarters

simultaneously. Troops enough were left at Jacinto and Rienzi to detain

any cavalry that Van Dorn might send out to make a sudden dash into

Corinth until I could be notified. There was a telegraph wire along the

railroad, so there would be no delay in communication. I detained cars

and locomotives enough at Burnsville to transport the whole of Ord's

command at once, and if Van Dorn had moved against Corinth instead of

Iuka I could have thrown in reinforcements to the number of 7,000 or

8,000 before he could have arrived. I remained at Burnsville with a

detachment of about 900 men from Ord's command and communicated with my

two wings by courier. Ord met the advance of the enemy soon after

leaving Burnsville. Quite a sharp engagement ensued, but he drove the

rebels back with considerable loss, including one general officer

killed. He maintained his position and was ready to attack by daylight

the next morning. I was very much disappointed at receiving a dispatch

from Rosecrans after midnight from Jacinto, twenty-two miles from Iuka,

saying that some of his command had been delayed, and that the rear of

his column was not yet up as far as Jacinto. He said, however, that he

would still be at Iuka by two o'clock the next day. I did not believe

this possible because of the distance and the condition of the roads,

which was bad; besides, troops after a forced march of twenty miles are

not in a good condition for fighting the moment they get through. It

might do in marching to relieve a beleaguered garrison, but not to make

an assault. I immediately sent Ord a copy of Rosecrans' dispatch and

ordered him to be in readiness to attack the moment he heard the sound

of guns to the south or south-east. He was instructed to notify his

officers to be on the alert for any indications of battle. During the

19th the wind blew in the wrong direction to transmit sound either

towards the point where Ord was, or to Burnsville where I had remained.

A couple of hours before dark on the 19th Rosecrans arrived with the

head of his column at Barnets, the point where the Jacinto road to Iuka

leaves the road going east. He here turned north without sending any

troops to the Fulton road. While still moving in column up the Jacinto

road he met a force of the enemy and had his advance badly beaten and

driven back upon the main road. In this short engagement his loss was

considerable for the number engaged, and one battery was taken from him.

The wind was still blowing hard and in the wrong direction to transmit

sounds towards either Ord or me. Neither he nor I nor any one in either

command heard a gun that was fired upon the battle-field. After the

engagement Rosecrans sent me a dispatch announcing the result. This was

brought by a courier. There was no road between Burnsville and the

position then occupied by Rosecrans and the country was impassable for a

man on horseback. The courier bearing the message was compelled to move

west nearly to Jacinto before he found a road leading to Burnsville.

This made it a late hour of the night before I learned of the battle

that had taken place during the afternoon. I at once notified Ord of

the fact and ordered him to attack early in the morning. The next

morning Rosecrans himself renewed the attack and went into Iuka with but

little resistance. Ord also went in according to orders, without

hearing a gun from the south of town but supposing the troops coming

from the south-west must be up by that time. Rosecrans, however, had

put no troops upon the Fulton road, and the enemy had taken advantage of

this neglect and retreated by that road during the night. Word was soon

brought to me that our troops were in Iuka. I immediately rode into

town and found that the enemy was not being pursued even by the cavalry.

I ordered pursuit by the whole of Rosecrans' command and went on with

him a few miles in person. He followed only a few miles after I left

him and then went into camp, and the pursuit was continued no further.

I was disappointed at the result of the battle of Iuka--but I had so

high an opinion of General Rosecrans that I found no fault at the time.