CHAPTER XXXI.

HEADQUARTERS MOVED TO HOLLY SPRINGS--GENERAL M'CLERNAND IN COMMAND

--ASSUMING COMMAND AT YOUNG'S POINT--OPERATIONS ABOVE VICKSBURG

--FORTIFICATIONS ABOUT VICKSBURG--THE CANAL--LAKE PROVIDENCE

--OPERATIONS AT YAZOO PASS.

This interruption in my communications north--I was really cut off from

communication with a great part of my own command during this time

--resulted in Sherman's moving from Memphis before McClernand could

arrive, for my dispatch of the 18th did not reach McClernand. Pemberton

got back to Vicksburg before Sherman got there. The rebel positions

were on a bluff on the Yazoo River, some miles above its mouth. The

waters were high so that the bottoms were generally overflowed, leaving

only narrow causeways of dry land between points of debarkation and the

high bluffs. These were fortified and defended at all points. The

rebel position was impregnable against any force that could be brought

against its front. Sherman could not use one-fourth of his force. His

efforts to capture the city, or the high ground north of it, were

necessarily unavailing.

Sherman's attack was very unfortunate, but I had no opportunity of

communicating with him after the destruction of the road and telegraph

to my rear on the 20th. He did not know but what I was in the rear of

the enemy and depending on him to open a new base of supplies for the

troops with me. I had, before he started from Memphis, directed him to

take with him a few small steamers suitable for the navigation of the

Yazoo, not knowing but that I might want them to supply me after cutting

loose from my base at Grenada.

On the 23d I removed my headquarters back to Holly Springs. The troops

were drawn back gradually, but without haste or confusion, finding

supplies abundant and no enemy following. The road was not damaged

south of Holly Springs by Van Dorn, at least not to an extent to cause

any delay. As I had resolved to move headquarters to Memphis, and to

repair the road to that point, I remained at Holly Springs until this

work was completed.

On the 10th of January, the work on the road from Holly Springs to Grand

Junction and thence to Memphis being completed, I moved my headquarters

to the latter place. During the campaign here described, the losses

(mostly captures) were about equal, crediting the rebels with their

Holly Springs capture, which they could not hold.

When Sherman started on his expedition down the river he had 20,000 men,

taken from Memphis, and was reinforced by 12,000 more at Helena,

Arkansas. The troops on the west bank of the river had previously been

assigned to my command. McClernand having received the orders for his

assignment reached the mouth of the Yazoo on the 2d of January, and

immediately assumed command of all the troops with Sherman, being a part

of his own corps, the 13th, and all of Sherman's, the 15th. Sherman,

and Admiral Porter with the fleet, had withdrawn from the Yazoo. After

consultation they decided that neither the army nor navy could render

service to the cause where they were, and learning that I had withdrawn

from the interior of Mississippi, they determined to return to the

Arkansas River and to attack Arkansas Post, about fifty miles up that

stream and garrisoned by about five or six thousand men. Sherman had

learned of the existence of this force through a man who had been

captured by the enemy with a steamer loaded with ammunition and other

supplies intended for his command. The man had made his escape.

McClernand approved this move reluctantly, as Sherman says. No obstacle

was encountered until the gunboats and transports were within range of

the fort. After three days' bombardment by the navy an assault was made

by the troops and marines, resulting in the capture of the place, and in

taking 5,000 prisoners and 17 guns. I was at first disposed to

disapprove of this move as an unnecessary side movement having no

especial bearing upon the work before us; but when the result was

understood I regarded it as very important. Five thousand Confederate

troops left in the rear might have caused us much trouble and loss of

property while navigating the Mississippi.

Immediately after the reduction of Arkansas Post and the capture of the

garrison, McClernand returned with his entire force to Napoleon, at the

mouth of the Arkansas River. From here I received messages from both

Sherman and Admiral Porter, urging me to come and take command in

person, and expressing their distrust of McClernand's ability and

fitness for so important and intricate an expedition.

On the 17th I visited McClernand and his command at Napoleon. It was

here made evident to me that both the army and navy were so distrustful

of McClernand's fitness to command that, while they would do all they

could to insure success, this distrust was an element of weakness. It

would have been criminal to send troops under these circumstances into

such danger. By this time I had received authority to relieve

McClernand, or to assign any person else to the command of the river

expedition, or to assume command in person. I felt great embarrassment

about McClernand. He was the senior major-general after myself within

the department. It would not do, with his rank and ambition, to assign

a junior over him. Nothing was left, therefore, but to assume the

command myself. I would have been glad to put Sherman in command, to

give him an opportunity to accomplish what he had failed in the December

before; but there seemed no other way out of the difficulty, for he was

junior to McClernand. Sherman's failure needs no apology.

On the 20th I ordered General McClernand with the entire command, to

Young's Point and Milliken's Bend, while I returned to Memphis to make

all the necessary preparation for leaving the territory behind me

secure. General Hurlbut with the 16th corps was left in command. The

Memphis and Charleston railroad was held, while the Mississippi Central

was given up. Columbus was the only point between Cairo and Memphis, on

the river, left with a garrison. All the troops and guns from the posts

on the abandoned railroad and river were sent to the front.

On the 29th of January I arrived at Young's Point and assumed command

the following day. General McClernand took exception in a most

characteristic way--for him. His correspondence with me on the subject

was more in the nature of a reprimand than a protest. It was highly

insubordinate, but I overlooked it, as I believed, for the good of the

service. General McClernand was a politician of very considerable

prominence in his State; he was a member of Congress when the secession

war broke out; he belonged to that political party which furnished all

the opposition there was to a vigorous prosecution of the war for saving

the Union; there was no delay in his declaring himself for the Union at

all hazards, and there was no uncertain sound in his declaration of

where he stood in the contest before the country. He also gave up his

seat in Congress to take the field in defence of the principles he had

proclaimed.

The real work of the campaign and siege of Vicksburg now began. The

problem was to secure a footing upon dry ground on the east side of the

river from which the troops could operate against Vicksburg. The

Mississippi River, from Cairo south, runs through a rich alluvial valley

of many miles in width, bound on the east by land running from eighty up

to two or more hundred feet above the river. On the west side the

highest land, except in a few places, is but little above the highest

water. Through this valley the river meanders in the most tortuous way,

varying in direction to all points of the compass. At places it runs to

the very foot of the bluffs. After leaving Memphis, there are no such

highlands coming to the water's edge on the east shore until Vicksburg

is reached.

The intervening land is cut up by bayous filled from the river in high

water--many of them navigable for steamers. All of them would be,

except for overhanging trees, narrowness and tortuous course, making it

impossible to turn the bends with vessels of any considerable length.

Marching across this country in the face of an enemy was impossible;

navigating it proved equally impracticable. The strategical way

according to the rule, therefore, would have been to go back to Memphis;

establish that as a base of supplies; fortify it so that the storehouses

could be held by a small garrison, and move from there along the line of

railroad, repairing as we advanced, to the Yallabusha, or to Jackson,

Mississippi. At this time the North had become very much discouraged.

Many strong Union men believed that the war must prove a failure. The

elections of 1862 had gone against the party which was for the

prosecution of the war to save the Union if it took the last man and the

last dollar. Voluntary enlistments had ceased throughout the greater

part of the North, and the draft had been resorted to to fill up our

ranks. It was my judgment at the time that to make a backward movement

as long as that from Vicksburg to Memphis, would be interpreted, by many

of those yet full of hope for the preservation of the Union, as a

defeat, and that the draft would be resisted, desertions ensue and the

power to capture and punish deserters lost. There was nothing left to be

done but to go FORWARD TO A DECISIVE VICTORY. This was in my mind from

the moment I took command in person at Young's Point.

The winter of 1862-3 was a noted one for continuous high water in the

Mississippi and for heavy rains along the lower river. To get dry land,

or rather land above the water, to encamp the troops upon, took many

miles of river front. We had to occupy the levees and the ground

immediately behind. This was so limited that one corps, the 17th, under

General McPherson, was at Lake Providence, seventy miles above

Vicksburg.

It was in January the troops took their position opposite Vicksburg.

The water was very high and the rains were incessant. There seemed no

possibility of a land movement before the end of March or later, and it

would not do to lie idle all this time. The effect would be

demoralizing to the troops and injurious to their health. Friends in

the North would have grown more and more discouraged, and enemies in the

same section more and more insolent in their gibes and denunciation of

the cause and those engaged in it.

I always admired the South, as bad as I thought their cause, for the

boldness with which they silenced all opposition and all croaking, by

press or by individuals, within their control. War at all times,

whether a civil war between sections of a common country or between

nations, ought to be avoided, if possible with honor. But, once entered

into, it is too much for human nature to tolerate an enemy within their

ranks to give aid and comfort to the armies of the opposing section or

nation.

Vicksburg, as stated before, is on the first high land coming to the

river's edge, below that on which Memphis stands. The bluff, or high

land, follows the left bank of the Yazoo for some distance and continues

in a southerly direction to the Mississippi River, thence it runs along

the Mississippi to Warrenton, six miles below. The Yazoo River leaves

the high land a short distance below Haines' Bluff and empties into the

Mississippi nine miles above Vicksburg. Vicksburg is built on this high

land where the Mississippi washes the base of the hill. Haines' Bluff,

eleven miles from Vicksburg, on the Yazoo River, was strongly fortified.

The whole distance from there to Vicksburg and thence to Warrenton was

also intrenched, with batteries at suitable distances and rifle-pits

connecting them.

From Young's Point the Mississippi turns in a north-easterly direction

to a point just above the city, when it again turns and runs

south-westerly, leaving vessels, which might attempt to run the blockade,

exposed to the fire of batteries six miles below the city before they

were in range of the upper batteries. Since then the river has made a

cut-off, leaving what was the peninsula in front of the city, an island.

North of the Yazoo was all a marsh, heavily timbered, cut up with

bayous, and much overflowed. A front attack was therefore impossible,

and was never contemplated; certainly not by me. The problem then

became, how to secure a landing on high ground east of the Mississippi

without an apparent retreat. Then commenced a series of experiments to

consume time, and to divert the attention of the enemy, of my troops and

of the public generally. I, myself, never felt great confidence that

any of the experiments resorted to would prove successful. Nevertheless

I was always prepared to take advantage of them in case they did.

In 1862 General Thomas Williams had come up from New Orleans and cut a

ditch ten or twelve feet wide and about as deep, straight across from

Young's Point to the river below. The distance across was a little over

a mile. It was Williams' expectation that when the river rose it would

cut a navigable channel through; but the canal started in an eddy from

both ends, and, of course, it only filled up with water on the rise

without doing any execution in the way of cutting. Mr. Lincoln had

navigated the Mississippi in his younger days and understood well its

tendency to change its channel, in places, from time to time. He set

much store accordingly by this canal. General McClernand had been,

therefore, directed before I went to Young's Point to push the work of

widening and deepening this canal. After my arrival the work was

diligently pushed with about 4,000 men--as many as could be used to

advantage--until interrupted by a sudden rise in the river that broke a

dam at the upper end, which had been put there to keep the water out

until the excavation was completed. This was on the 8th of March.

Even if the canal had proven a success, so far as to be navigable for

steamers, it could not have been of much advantage to us. It runs in a

direction almost perpendicular to the line of bluffs on the opposite

side, or east bank, of the river. As soon as the enemy discovered what

we were doing he established a battery commanding the canal throughout

its length. This battery soon drove out our dredges, two in number,

which were doing the work of thousands of men. Had the canal been

completed it might have proven of some use in running transports

through, under the cover of night, to use below; but they would yet have

to run batteries, though for a much shorter distance.

While this work was progressing we were busy in other directions, trying

to find an available landing on high ground on the east bank of the

river, or to make water-ways to get below the city, avoiding the

batteries.

On the 30th of January, the day after my arrival at the front, I ordered

General McPherson, stationed with his corps at Lake Providence, to cut

the levee at that point. If successful in opening a channel for

navigation by this route, it would carry us to the Mississippi River

through the mouth of the Red River, just above Port Hudson and four

hundred miles below Vicksburg by the river.

Lake Providence is a part of the old bed of the Mississippi, about a

mile from the present channel. It is six miles long and has its outlet

through Bayou Baxter, Bayou Macon, and the Tensas, Washita and Red

Rivers. The last three are navigable streams at all seasons. Bayous

Baxter and Macon are narrow and tortuous, and the banks are covered with

dense forests overhanging the channel. They were also filled with

fallen timber, the accumulation of years. The land along the

Mississippi River, from Memphis down, is in all instances highest next

to the river, except where the river washes the bluffs which form the

boundary of the valley through which it winds. Bayou Baxter, as it

reaches lower land, begins to spread out and disappears entirely in a

cypress swamp before it reaches the Macon. There was about two feet of

water in this swamp at the time. To get through it, even with vessels

of the lightest draft, it was necessary to clear off a belt of heavy

timber wide enough to make a passage way. As the trees would have to be

cut close to the bottom--under water--it was an undertaking of great

magnitude.

On the 4th of February I visited General McPherson, and remained with

him several days. The work had not progressed so far as to admit the

water from the river into the lake, but the troops had succeeded in

drawing a small steamer, of probably not over thirty tons' capacity,

from the river into the lake. With this we were able to explore the

lake and bayou as far as cleared. I saw then that there was scarcely a

chance of this ever becoming a practicable route for moving troops

through an enemy's country. The distance from Lake Providence to the

point where vessels going by that route would enter the Mississippi

again, is about four hundred and seventy miles by the main river. The

distance would probably be greater by the tortuous bayous through which

this new route would carry us. The enemy held Port Hudson, below where

the Red River debouches, and all the Mississippi above to Vicksburg.

The Red River, Washita and Tensas were, as has been said, all navigable

streams, on which the enemy could throw small bodies of men to obstruct

our passage and pick off our troops with their sharpshooters. I let the

work go on, believing employment was better than idleness for the men.

Then, too, it served as a cover for other efforts which gave a better

prospect of success. This work was abandoned after the canal proved a

failure.

Lieutenant-Colonel Wilson of my staff was sent to Helena, Arkansas, to

examine and open a way through Moon Lake and the Yazoo Pass if possible.

Formerly there was a route by way of an inlet from the Mississippi River

into Moon Lake, a mile east of the river, thence east through Yazoo Pass

to Coldwater, along the latter to the Tallahatchie, which joins the

Yallabusha about two hundred and fifty miles below Moon Lake and forms

the Yazoo River. These were formerly navigated by steamers trading with

the rich plantations along their banks; but the State of Mississippi had

built a strong levee across the inlet some years before, leaving the

only entrance for vessels into this rich region the one by way of the

mouth of the Yazoo several hundreds of miles below.

On the 2d of February this dam, or levee, was cut. The river being high

the rush of water through the cut was so great that in a very short time

the entire obstruction was washed away. The bayous were soon filled and

much of the country was overflowed. This pass leaves the Mississippi

River but a few miles below Helena. On the 24th General Ross, with his

brigade of about 4,500 men on transports, moved into this new water-way.

The rebels had obstructed the navigation of Yazoo Pass and the Coldwater

by felling trees into them. Much of the timber in this region being of

greater specific gravity than water, and being of great size, their

removal was a matter of great labor; but it was finally accomplished,

and on the 11th of March Ross found himself, accompanied by two gunboats

under the command of Lieutenant-Commander Watson Smith, confronting a

fortification at Greenwood, where the Tallahatchie and Yallabusha unite

and the Yazoo begins. The bends of the rivers are such at this point as

to almost form an island, scarcely above water at that stage of the

river. This island was fortified and manned. It was named Fort

Pemberton after the commander at Vicksburg. No land approach was

accessible. The troops, therefore, could render no assistance towards

an assault further than to establish a battery on a little piece of

ground which was discovered above water. The gunboats, however,

attacked on the 11th and again on the 13th of March. Both efforts were

failures and were not renewed. One gunboat was disabled and we lost six

men killed and twenty-five wounded. The loss of the enemy was less.

Fort Pemberton was so little above the water that it was thought that a

rise of two feet would drive the enemy out. In hope of enlisting the

elements on our side, which had been so much against us up to this time,

a second cut was made in the Mississippi levee, this time directly

opposite Helena, or six miles above the former cut. It did not

accomplish the desired result, and Ross, with his fleet, started back.

On the 22d he met Quinby with a brigade at Yazoo Pass. Quinby was the

senior of Ross, and assumed command. He was not satisfied with

returning to his former position without seeing for himself whether

anything could be accomplished. Accordingly Fort Pemberton was

revisited by our troops; but an inspection was sufficient this time

without an attack. Quinby, with his command, returned with but little

delay. In the meantime I was much exercised for the safety of Ross, not

knowing that Quinby had been able to join him. Reinforcements were of

no use in a country covered with water, as they would have to remain on

board of their transports. Relief had to come from another quarter. So

I determined to get into the Yazoo below Fort Pemberton.

Steel's Bayou empties into the Yazoo River between Haines' Bluff and its

mouth. It is narrow, very tortuous, and fringed with a very heavy

growth of timber, but it is deep. It approaches to within one mile of

the Mississippi at Eagle Bend, thirty miles above Young's Point.

Steel's Bayou connects with Black Bayou, Black Bayou with Deer Creek,

Deer Creek with Rolling Fork, Rolling Fork with the Big Sunflower River,

and the Big Sunflower with the Yazoo River about ten miles above Haines'

Bluff in a right line but probably twenty or twenty-five miles by the

winding of the river. All these waterways are of about the same nature

so far as navigation is concerned, until the Sunflower is reached; this

affords free navigation.

Admiral Porter explored this waterway as far as Deer Creek on the 14th

of March, and reported it navigable. On the next day he started with

five gunboats and four mortar-boats. I went with him for some distance.

The heavy overhanging timber retarded progress very much, as did also

the short turns in so narrow a stream. The gunboats, however, ploughed

their way through without other damage than to their appearance. The

transports did not fare so well although they followed behind. The road

was somewhat cleared for them by the gunboats. In the evening I

returned to headquarters to hurry up reinforcements. Sherman went in

person on the 16th, taking with him Stuart's division of the 15th corps.

They took large river transports to Eagle Bend on the Mississippi, where

they debarked and marched across to Steel's Bayou, where they

re-embarked on the transports. The river steamers, with their tall

smokestacks and light guards extending out, were so much impeded that

the gunboats got far ahead. Porter, with his fleet, got within a few

hundred yards of where the sailing would have been clear and free from

the obstructions caused by felling trees into the water, when he

encountered rebel sharp-shooters, and his progress was delayed by

obstructions in his front. He could do nothing with gunboats against

sharpshooters. The rebels, learning his route, had sent in about 4,000

men--many more than there were sailors in the fleet.

Sherman went back, at the request of the admiral, to clear out Black

Bayou and to hurry up reinforcements, which were far behind. On the

night of the 19th he received notice from the admiral that he had been

attacked by sharp-shooters and was in imminent peril. Sherman at once

returned through Black Bayou in a canoe, and passed on until he met a

steamer, with the last of the reinforcements he had, coming up. They

tried to force their way through Black Bayou with their steamer, but,

finding it slow and tedious work, debarked and pushed forward on foot.

It was night when they landed, and intensely dark. There was but a

narrow strip of land above water, and that was grown up with underbrush

or cane. The troops lighted their way through this with candles carried

in their hands for a mile and a half, when they came to an open

plantation. Here the troops rested until morning. They made twenty-one

miles from this resting-place by noon the next day, and were in time to

rescue the fleet. Porter had fully made up his mind to blow up the

gunboats rather than have them fall into the hands of the enemy. More

welcome visitors he probably never met than the "boys in blue" on this

occasion. The vessels were backed out and returned to their rendezvous

on the Mississippi; and thus ended in failure the fourth attempt to get

in rear of Vicksburg.