CHAPTER XL.

FIRST MEETING WITH SECRETARY STANTON--GENERAL ROSECRANS--COMMANDING

MILITARY DIVISION OF MISSISSIPPI--ANDREW JOHNSON'S ADDRESS--ARRIVAL AT

CHATTANOOGA.

The reply (to my telegram of October 16, 1863, from Cairo, announcing my

arrival at that point) came on the morning of the 17th, directing me to

proceed immediately to the Galt House, Louisville, where I would meet an

officer of the War Department with my instructions. I left Cairo within

an hour or two after the receipt of this dispatch, going by rail via

Indianapolis. Just as the train I was on was starting out of the depot

at Indianapolis a messenger came running up to stop it, saying the

Secretary of War was coming into the station and wanted to see me.

I had never met Mr. Stanton up to that time, though we had held frequent

conversations over the wires the year before, when I was in Tennessee.

Occasionally at night he would order the wires between the War

Department and my headquarters to be connected, and we would hold a

conversation for an hour or two. On this occasion the Secretary was

accompanied by Governor Brough of Ohio, whom I had never met, though he

and my father had been old acquaintances. Mr. Stanton dismissed the

special train that had brought him to Indianapolis, and accompanied me

to Louisville.

Up to this time no hint had been given me of what was wanted after I

left Vicksburg, except the suggestion in one of Halleck's dispatches

that I had better go to Nashville and superintend the operation of

troops sent to relieve Rosecrans. Soon after we started the Secretary

handed me two orders, saying that I might take my choice of them. The

two were identical in all but one particular. Both created the

"Military Division of Mississippi," (giving me the command) composed of

the Departments of the Ohio, the Cumberland, and the Tennessee, and all

the territory from the Alleghanies to the Mississippi River north of

Banks's command in the south-west. One order left the department

commanders as they were, while the other relieved Rosecrans and assigned

Thomas to his place. I accepted the latter. We reached Louisville

after night and, if I remember rightly, in a cold, drizzling rain. The

Secretary of War told me afterwards that he caught a cold on that

occasion from which he never expected to recover. He never did.

A day was spent in Louisville, the Secretary giving me the military news

at the capital and talking about the disappointment at the results of

some of the campaigns. By the evening of the day after our arrival all

matters of discussion seemed exhausted, and I left the hotel to spend

the evening away, both Mrs. Grant (who was with me) and myself having

relatives living in Louisville. In the course of the evening Mr.

Stanton received a dispatch from Mr. C. A. Dana, then in Chattanooga,

informing him that unless prevented Rosecrans would retreat, and

advising peremptory orders against his doing so.

As stated before, after the fall of Vicksburg I urged strongly upon the

government the propriety of a movement against Mobile. General

Rosecrans had been at Murfreesboro', Tennessee, with a large and

well-equipped army from early in the year 1863, with Bragg confronting

him with a force quite equal to his own at first, considering it was on

the defensive. But after the investment of Vicksburg Bragg's army was

largely depleted to strengthen Johnston, in Mississippi, who was being

reinforced to raise the siege. I frequently wrote General Halleck

suggesting that Rosecrans should move against Bragg. By so doing he

would either detain the latter's troops where they were or lay

Chattanooga open to capture. General Halleck strongly approved the

suggestion, and finally wrote me that he had repeatedly ordered

Rosecrans to advance, but that the latter had constantly failed to

comply with the order, and at last, after having held a council of war,

had replied in effect that it was a military maxim "not to fight two

decisive battles at the same time." If true, the maxim was not

applicable in this case. It would be bad to be defeated in two decisive

battles fought the same day, but it would not be bad to win them. I,

however, was fighting no battle, and the siege of Vicksburg had drawn

from Rosecrans' front so many of the enemy that his chances of victory

were much greater than they would be if he waited until the siege was

over, when these troops could be returned. Rosecrans was ordered to

move against the army that was detaching troops to raise the siege.

Finally he did move, on the 24th of June, but ten days afterwards

Vicksburg surrendered, and the troops sent from Bragg were free to

return.

It was at this time that I recommended to the general-in-chief the

movement against Mobile. I knew the peril the Army of the Cumberland

was in, being depleted continually, not only by ordinary casualties, but

also by having to detach troops to hold its constantly extending line

over which to draw supplies, while the enemy in front was as constantly

being strengthened. Mobile was important to the enemy, and in the

absence of a threatening force was guarded by little else than

artillery. If threatened by land and from the water at the same time

the prize would fall easily, or troops would have to be sent to its

defence. Those troops would necessarily come from Bragg. My judgment

was overruled, and the troops under my command were dissipated over

other parts of the country where it was thought they could render the

most service.

Soon it was discovered in Washington that Rosecrans was in trouble and

required assistance. The emergency was now too immediate to allow us to

give this assistance by making an attack in rear of Bragg upon Mobile.

It was therefore necessary to reinforce directly, and troops were sent

from every available point.

Rosecrans had very skilfully manoeuvred Bragg south of the Tennessee

River, and through and beyond Chattanooga. If he had stopped and

intrenched, and made himself strong there, all would have been right and

the mistake of not moving earlier partially compensated. But he pushed

on, with his forces very much scattered, until Bragg's troops from

Mississippi began to join him. Then Bragg took the initiative.

Rosecrans had to fall back in turn, and was able to get his army

together at Chickamauga, some miles south-east of Chattanooga, before

the main battle was brought on. The battle was fought on the 19th and

20th of September, and Rosecrans was badly defeated, with a heavy loss

in artillery and some sixteen thousand men killed, wounded and captured.

The corps under Major-General George H. Thomas stood its ground, while

Rosecrans, with Crittenden and McCook, returned to Chattanooga. Thomas

returned also, but later, and with his troops in good order. Bragg

followed and took possession of Missionary Ridge, overlooking

Chattanooga. He also occupied Lookout Mountain, west of the town, which

Rosecrans had abandoned, and with it his control of the river and the

river road as far back as Bridgeport. The National troops were now

strongly intrenched in Chattanooga Valley, with the Tennessee River

behind them and the enemy occupying commanding heights to the east and

west, with a strong line across the valley from mountain to mountain,

and with Chattanooga Creek, for a large part of the way, in front of

their line.

On the 29th Halleck telegraphed me the above results, and directed all

the forces that could be spared from my department to be sent to

Rosecrans. Long before this dispatch was received Sherman was on his

way, and McPherson was moving east with most of the garrison of

Vicksburg.

A retreat at that time would have been a terrible disaster. It would

not only have been the loss of a most important strategic position to

us, but it would have been attended with the loss of all the artillery

still left with the Army of the Cumberland and the annihilation of that

army itself, either by capture or demoralization.

All supplies for Rosecrans had to be brought from Nashville. The

railroad between this base and the army was in possession of the

government up to Bridgeport, the point at which the road crosses to the

south side of the Tennessee River; but Bragg, holding Lookout and

Raccoon mountains west of Chattanooga, commanded the railroad, the river

and the shortest and best wagon-roads, both south and north of the

Tennessee, between Chattanooga and Bridgeport. The distance between

these two places is but twenty-six miles by rail, but owing to the

position of Bragg, all supplies for Rosecrans had to be hauled by a

circuitous route north of the river and over a mountainous country,

increasing the distance to over sixty miles.

This country afforded but little food for his animals, nearly ten

thousand of which had already starved, and not enough were left to draw

a single piece of artillery or even the ambulances to convey the sick.

The men had been on half rations of hard bread for a considerable time,

with but few other supplies except beef driven from Nashville across the

country. The region along the road became so exhausted of food for the

cattle that by the time they reached Chattanooga they were much in the

condition of the few animals left alive there--"on the lift." Indeed,

the beef was so poor that the soldiers were in the habit of saying, with

a faint facetiousness, that they were living on "half rations of hard

bread and BEEF DRIED ON THE HOOF."

Nothing could be transported but food, and the troops were without

sufficient shoes or other clothing suitable for the advancing season.

What they had was well worn. The fuel within the Federal lines was

exhausted, even to the stumps of trees. There were no teams to draw it

from the opposite bank, where it was abundant. The only way of

supplying fuel, for some time before my arrival, had been to cut trees

on the north bank of the river at a considerable distance up the stream,

form rafts of it and float it down with the current, effecting a landing

on the south side within our lines by the use of paddles or poles. It

would then be carried on the shoulders of the men to their camps.

If a retreat had occurred at this time it is not probable that any of

the army would have reached the railroad as an organized body, if

followed by the enemy.

On the receipt of Mr. Dana's dispatch Mr. Stanton sent for me. Finding

that I was out he became nervous and excited, inquiring of every person

he met, including guests of the house, whether they knew where I was,

and bidding them find me and send me to him at once. About eleven

o'clock I returned to the hotel, and on my way, when near the house,

every person met was a messenger from the Secretary, apparently

partaking of his impatience to see me. I hastened to the room of the

Secretary and found him pacing the floor rapidly in his dressing-gown.

Saying that the retreat must be prevented, he showed me the dispatch. I

immediately wrote an order assuming command of the Military Division of

the Mississippi, and telegraphed it to General Rosecrans. I then

telegraphed to him the order from Washington assigning Thomas to the

command of the Army of the Cumberland; and to Thomas that he must hold

Chattanooga at all hazards, informing him at the same time that I would

be at the front as soon as possible. A prompt reply was received from

Thomas, saying, "We will hold the town till we starve." I appreciated

the force of this dispatch later when I witnessed the condition of

affairs which prompted it. It looked, indeed, as if but two courses

were open: one to starve, the other to surrender or be captured.

On the morning of the 20th of October I started, with my staff, and

proceeded as far as Nashville. At that time it was not prudent to

travel beyond that point by night, so I remained in Nashville until the

next morning. Here I met for the first time Andrew Johnson, Military

Governor of Tennessee. He delivered a speech of welcome. His composure

showed that it was by no means his maiden effort. It was long, and I

was in torture while he was delivering it, fearing something would be

expected from me in response. I was relieved, however, the people

assembled having apparently heard enough. At all events they commenced

a general hand-shaking, which, although trying where there is so much of

it, was a great relief to me in this emergency.

From Nashville I telegraphed to Burnside, who was then at Knoxville,

that important points in his department ought to be fortified, so that

they could be held with the least number of men; to Admiral Porter at

Cairo, that Sherman's advance had passed Eastport, Mississippi, that

rations were probably on their way from St. Louis by boat for supplying

his army, and requesting him to send a gunboat to convoy them; and to

Thomas, suggesting that large parties should be put at work on the

wagon-road then in use back to Bridgeport.

On the morning of the 21st we took the train for the front, reaching

Stevenson Alabama, after dark. Rosecrans was there on his way north.

He came into my car and we held a brief interview, in which he described

very clearly the situation at Chattanooga, and made some excellent

suggestions as to what should be done. My only wonder was that he had

not carried them out. We then proceeded to Bridgeport, where we stopped

for the night. From here we took horses and made our way by Jasper and

over Waldron's Ridge to Chattanooga. There had been much rain, and the

roads were almost impassable from mud, knee-deep in places, and from

wash-outs on the mountain sides. I had been on crutches since the time

of my fall in New Orleans, and had to be carried over places where it

was not safe to cross on horseback. The roads were strewn with the

debris of broken wagons and the carcasses of thousands of starved mules

and horses. At Jasper, some ten or twelve miles from Bridgeport, there

was a halt. General O. O. Howard had his headquarters there. From this

point I telegraphed Burnside to make every effort to secure five hundred

rounds of ammunition for his artillery and small-arms. We stopped for

the night at a little hamlet some ten or twelve miles farther on. The

next day we reached Chattanooga a little before dark. I went directly

to General Thomas's headquarters, and remaining there a few days, until

I could establish my own.

During the evening most of the general officers called in to pay their

respects and to talk about the condition of affairs. They pointed out

on the map the line, marked with a red or blue pencil, which Rosecrans

had contemplated falling back upon. If any of them had approved the

move they did not say so to me. I found General W. F. Smith occupying

the position of chief engineer of the Army of the Cumberland. I had

known Smith as a cadet at West Point, but had no recollection of having

met him after my graduation, in 1843, up to this time. He explained the

situation of the two armies and the topography of the country so plainly

that I could see it without an inspection. I found that he had

established a saw-mill on the banks of the river, by utilizing an old

engine found in the neighborhood; and, by rafting logs from the north

side of the river above, had got out the lumber and completed pontoons

and roadway plank for a second bridge, one flying bridge being there

already. He was also rapidly getting out the materials and constructing

the boats for a third bridge. In addition to this he had far under way

a steamer for plying between Chattanooga and Bridgeport whenever we

might get possession of the river. This boat consisted of a scow, made

of the plank sawed out at the mill, housed in, and a stern wheel

attached which was propelled by a second engine taken from some shop or

factory.

I telegraphed to Washington this night, notifying General Halleck of my

arrival, and asking to have General Sherman assigned to the command of

the Army of the Tennessee, headquarters in the field. The request was

at once complied with.