CHAPTER XLIV.

BATTLE OF CHATTANOOGA--A GALLANT CHARGE--COMPLETE ROUT OF THE ENEMY

--PURSUIT OF THE CONFEDERATES--GENERAL BRAGG--REMARKS ON CHATTANOOGA.

At twelve o'clock at night, when all was quiet, I began to give orders

for the next day, and sent a dispatch to Willcox to encourage Burnside.

Sherman was directed to attack at daylight. Hooker was ordered to move

at the same hour, and endeavor to intercept the enemy's retreat if he

still remained; if he had gone, then to move directly to Rossville and

operate against the left and rear of the force on Missionary Ridge.

Thomas was not to move until Hooker had reached Missionary Ridge. As I

was with him on Orchard Knob, he would not move without further orders

from me.

The morning of the 25th opened clear and bright, and the whole field was

in full view from the top of Orchard Knob. It remained so all day.

Bragg's headquarters were in full view, and officers--presumably staff

officers--could be seen coming and going constantly.

The point of ground which Sherman had carried on the 24th was almost

disconnected from the main ridge occupied by the enemy. A low pass, over

which there is a wagon road crossing the hill, and near which there is a

railroad tunnel, intervenes between the two hills. The problem now was

to get to the main ridge. The enemy was fortified on the point; and back

farther, where the ground was still higher, was a second fortification

commanding the first. Sherman was out as soon as it was light enough to

see, and by sunrise his command was in motion. Three brigades held the

hill already gained. Morgan L. Smith moved along the east base of

Missionary Ridge; Loomis along the west base, supported by two brigades

of John E. Smith's division; and Corse with his brigade was between the

two, moving directly towards the hill to be captured. The ridge is

steep and heavily wooded on the east side, where M. L. Smith's troops

were advancing, but cleared and with a more gentle slope on the west

side. The troops advanced rapidly and carried the extreme end of the

rebel works. Morgan L. Smith advanced to a point which cut the enemy

off from the railroad bridge and the means of bringing up supplies by

rail from Chickamauga Station, where the main depot was located. The

enemy made brave and strenuous efforts to drive our troops from the

position we had gained, but without success. The contest lasted for two

hours. Corse, a brave and efficient commander, was badly wounded in

this assault. Sherman now threatened both Bragg's flank and his stores,

and made it necessary for him to weaken other points of his line to

strengthen his right. From the position I occupied I could see column

after column of Bragg's forces moving against Sherman. Every

Confederate gun that could be brought to bear upon the Union forces was

concentrated upon him. J. E. Smith, with two brigades, charged up the

west side of the ridge to the support of Corse's command, over open

ground and in the face of a heavy fire of both artillery and musketry,

and reached the very parapet of the enemy. He lay here for a time, but

the enemy coming with a heavy force upon his right flank, he was

compelled to fall back, followed by the foe. A few hundred yards

brought Smith's troops into a wood, where they were speedily reformed,

when they charged and drove the attacking party back to his

intrenchments.

Seeing the advance, repulse, and second advance of J. E. Smith from the

position I occupied, I directed Thomas to send a division to reinforce

him. Baird's division was accordingly sent from the right of Orchard

Knob. It had to march a considerable distance directly under the eye of

the enemy to reach its position. Bragg at once commenced massing in the

same direction. This was what I wanted. But it had now got to be late

in the afternoon, and I had expected before this to see Hooker crossing

the ridge in the neighborhood of Rossville and compelling Bragg to mass

in that direction also.

The enemy had evacuated Lookout Mountain during the night, as I expected

he would. In crossing the valley he burned the bridge over Chattanooga

Creek, and did all he could to obstruct the roads behind him. Hooker

was off bright and early, with no obstructions in his front but distance

and the destruction above named. He was detained four hours crossing

Chattanooga Creek, and thus was lost the immediate advantage I expected

from his forces. His reaching Bragg's flank and extending across it was

to be the signal for Thomas's assault of the ridge. But Sherman's

condition was getting so critical that the assault for his relief could

not be delayed any longer.

Sheridan's and Wood's divisions had been lying under arms from early

morning, ready to move the instant the signal was given. I now directed

Thomas to order the charge at once (*16). I watched eagerly to see the

effect, and became impatient at last that there was no indication of any

charge being made. The centre of the line which was to make the charge

was near where Thomas and I stood, but concealed from view by an

intervening forest. Turning to Thomas to inquire what caused the delay,

I was surprised to see Thomas J. Wood, one of the division commanders

who was to make the charge, standing talking to him. I spoke to General

Wood, asking him why he did not charge as ordered an hour before. He

replied very promptly that this was the first he had heard of it, but

that he had been ready all day to move at a moment's notice. I told him

to make the charge at once. He was off in a moment, and in an

incredibly short time loud cheering was heard, and he and Sheridan were

driving the enemy's advance before them towards Missionary Ridge. The

Confederates were strongly intrenched on the crest of the ridge in front

of us, and had a second line half-way down and another at the base. Our

men drove the troops in front of the lower line of rifle-pits so

rapidly, and followed them so closely, that rebel and Union troops went

over the first line of works almost at the same time. Many rebels were

captured and sent to the rear under the fire of their own friends higher

up the hill. Those that were not captured retreated, and were pursued.

The retreating hordes being between friends and pursuers caused the

enemy to fire high to avoid killing their own men. In fact, on that

occasion the Union soldier nearest the enemy was in the safest position.

Without awaiting further orders or stopping to reform, on our troops

went to the second line of works; over that and on for the crest--thus

effectually carrying out my orders of the 18th for the battle and of the

24th (*17) for this charge.

I watched their progress with intense interest. The fire along the

rebel line was terrific. Cannon and musket balls filled the air: but

the damage done was in small proportion to the ammunition expended. The

pursuit continued until the crest was reached, and soon our men were

seen climbing over the Confederate barriers at different points in front

of both Sheridan's and Wood's divisions. The retreat of the enemy along

most of his line was precipitate and the panic so great that Bragg and

his officers lost all control over their men. Many were captured, and

thousands threw away their arms in their flight.

Sheridan pushed forward until he reached the Chickamauga River at a

point above where the enemy crossed. He met some resistance from troops

occupying a second hill in rear of Missionary Ridge, probably to cover

the retreat of the main body and of the artillery and trains. It was

now getting dark, but Sheridan, without halting on that account pushed

his men forward up this second hill slowly and without attracting the

attention of the men placed to defend it, while he detached to the right

and left to surround the position. The enemy discovered the movement

before these dispositions were complete, and beat a hasty retreat,

leaving artillery, wagon trains, and many prisoners in our hands. To

Sheridan's prompt movement the Army of the Cumberland, and the nation,

are indebted for the bulk of the capture of prisoners, artillery, and

small-arms that day. Except for his prompt pursuit, so much in this way

would not have been accomplished.

While the advance up Mission Ridge was going forward, General Thomas

with staff, General Gordon Granger, commander of the corps making the

assault, and myself and staff occupied Orchard Knob, from which the

entire field could be observed. The moment the troops were seen going

over the last line of rebel defences, I ordered Granger to join his

command, and mounting my horse I rode to the front. General Thomas left

about the same time. Sheridan on the extreme right was already in

pursuit of the enemy east of the ridge. Wood, who commanded the

division to the left of Sheridan, accompanied his men on horseback in

the charge, but did not join Sheridan in the pursuit. To the left, in

Baird's front where Bragg's troops had massed against Sherman, the

resistance was more stubborn and the contest lasted longer. I ordered

Granger to follow the enemy with Wood's division, but he was so much

excited, and kept up such a roar of musketry in the direction the enemy

had taken, that by the time I could stop the firing the enemy had got

well out of the way. The enemy confronting Sherman, now seeing

everything to their left giving way, fled also. Sherman, however, was

not aware of the extent of our success until after nightfall, when he

received orders to pursue at daylight in the morning.

As soon as Sherman discovered that the enemy had left his front he

directed his reserves, Davis's division of the Army of the Cumberland,

to push over the pontoon-bridge at the mouth of the Chickamauga, and to

move forward to Chickamauga Station. He ordered Howard to move up the

stream some two miles to where there was an old bridge, repair it during

the night, and follow Davis at four o'clock in the morning. Morgan L.

Smith was ordered to reconnoitre the tunnel to see if that was still

held. Nothing was found there but dead bodies of men of both armies.

The rest of Sherman's command was directed to follow Howard at daylight

in the morning to get on to the railroad towards Graysville.

Hooker, as stated, was detained at Chattanooga Creek by the destruction

of the bridge at that point. He got his troops over, with the exception

of the artillery, by fording the stream at a little after three o'clock.

Leaving his artillery to follow when the bridge should be reconstructed,

he pushed on with the remainder of his command. At Rossville he came

upon the flank of a division of the enemy, which soon commenced a

retreat along the ridge. This threw them on Palmer. They could make

but little resistance in the position they were caught in, and as many

of them as could do so escaped. Many, however, were captured. Hooker's

position during the night of the 25th was near Rossville, extending east

of the ridge. Palmer was on his left, on the road to Graysville.

During the night I telegraphed to Willcox that Bragg had been defeated,

and that immediate relief would be sent to Burnside if he could hold

out; to Halleck I sent an announcement of our victory, and informed him

that forces would be sent up the valley to relieve Burnside.

Before the battle of Chattanooga opened I had taken measures for the

relief of Burnside the moment the way should be clear. Thomas was

directed to have the little steamer that had been built at Chattanooga

loaded to its capacity with rations and ammunition. Granger's corps was

to move by the south bank of the Tennessee River to the mouth of the

Holston, and up that to Knoxville accompanied by the boat. In addition

to the supplies transported by boat, the men were to carry forty rounds

of ammunition in their cartridge-boxes, and four days' rations in

haversacks.

In the battle of Chattanooga, troops from the Army of the Potomac, from

the Army of the Tennessee, and from the Army of the Cumberland

participated. In fact, the accidents growing out of the heavy rains and

the sudden rise in the Tennessee River so mingled the troops that the

organizations were not kept together, under their respective commanders,

during the battle. Hooker, on the right, had Geary's division of the

12th corps, Army of the Potomac; Osterhaus's division of the 15th corps,

Army of the Tennessee; and Cruft's division of the Army of the

Cumberland. Sherman had three divisions of his own army, Howard's corps

from the Army of the Potomac, and Jefferson C. Davis's division of the

Army of the Cumberland. There was no jealousy--hardly rivalry. Indeed,

I doubt whether officers or men took any note at the time of the fact of

this intermingling of commands. All saw a defiant foe surrounding them,

and took it for granted that every move was intended to dislodge him,

and it made no difference where the troops came from so that the end was

accomplished.

The victory at Chattanooga was won against great odds, considering the

advantage the enemy had of position, and was accomplished more easily

than was expected by reason of Bragg's making several grave mistakes:

first, in sending away his ablest corps commander with over twenty

thousand troops; second, in sending away a division of troops on the eve

of battle; third, in placing so much of a force on the plain in front of

his impregnable position.

It was known that Mr. Jefferson Davis had visited Bragg on Missionary

Ridge a short time before my reaching Chattanooga. It was reported and

believed that he had come out to reconcile a serious difference between

Bragg and Longstreet, and finding this difficult to do, planned the

campaign against Knoxville, to be conducted by the latter general. I

had known both Bragg and Longstreet before the war, the latter very

well. We had been three years at West Point together, and, after my

graduation, for a time in the same regiment. Then we served together in

the Mexican War. I had known Bragg in Mexico, and met him occasionally

subsequently. I could well understand how there might be an

irreconcilable difference between them.

Bragg was a remarkably intelligent and well-informed man, professionally

and otherwise. He was also thoroughly upright. But he was possessed of

an irascible temper, and was naturally disputatious. A man of the

highest moral character and the most correct habits, yet in the old army

he was in frequent trouble. As a subordinate he was always on the

lookout to catch his commanding officer infringing his prerogatives; as

a post commander he was equally vigilant to detect the slightest

neglect, even of the most trivial order.

I have heard in the old army an anecdote very characteristic of Bragg.

On one occasion, when stationed at a post of several companies commanded

by a field officer, he was himself commanding one of the companies and

at the same time acting as post quartermaster and commissary. He was

first lieutenant at the time, but his captain was detached on other

duty. As commander of the company he made a requisition upon the

quartermaster--himself--for something he wanted. As quartermaster he

declined to fill the requisition, and endorsed on the back of it his

reasons for so doing. As company commander he responded to this, urging

that his requisition called for nothing but what he was entitled to, and

that it was the duty of the quartermaster to fill it. As quartermaster

he still persisted that he was right. In this condition of affairs

Bragg referred the whole matter to the commanding officer of the post.

The latter, when he saw the nature of the matter referred, exclaimed:

"My God, Mr. Bragg, you have quarrelled with every officer in the army,

and now you are quarrelling with yourself!"

Longstreet was an entirely different man. He was brave, honest,

intelligent, a very capable soldier, subordinate to his superiors, just

and kind to his subordinates, but jealous of his own rights, which he

had the courage to maintain. He was never on the lookout to detect a

slight, but saw one as soon as anybody when intentionally given.

It may be that Longstreet was not sent to Knoxville for the reason

stated, but because Mr. Davis had an exalted opinion of his own military

genius, and thought he saw a chance of "killing two birds with one

stone." On several occasions during the war he came to the relief of

the Union army by means of his SUPERIOR MILITARY GENIUS.

I speak advisedly when I saw Mr. Davis prided himself on his military

capacity. He says so himself, virtually, in his answer to the notice of

his nomination to the Confederate presidency. Some of his generals have

said so in their writings since the downfall of the Confederacy.

My recollection is that my first orders for the battle of Chattanooga

were as fought. Sherman was to get on Missionary Ridge, as he did;

Hooker to cross the north end of Lookout Mountain, as he did, sweep

across Chattanooga Valley and get across the south end of the ridge near

Rossville. When Hooker had secured that position the Army of the

Cumberland was to assault in the centre. Before Sherman arrived,

however, the order was so changed as that Hooker was directed to come to

Chattanooga by the north bank of the Tennessee River. The waters in the

river, owing to heavy rains, rose so fast that the bridge at Brown's

Ferry could not be maintained in a condition to be used in crossing

troops upon it. For this reason Hooker's orders were changed by

telegraph back to what they were originally.------

NOTE.--From this point on this volume was written (with the exception of

the campaign in the Wilderness, which had been previously written) by

General Grant, after his great illness in April, and the present

arrangement of the subject-matter was made by him between the 10th and

18th of July, 1885.