CHAPTER XLVII.

THE MILITARY SITUATION--PLANS FOR THE CAMPAIGN--SHERIDAN ASSIGNED TO

COMMAND OF THE CAVALRY--FLANK MOVEMENTS--FORREST AT FORT PILLOW--GENERAL

BANKS'S EXPEDITION--COLONEL MOSBY--AN INCIDENT OF THE WILDERNESS

CAMPAIGN.

When I assumed command of all the armies the situation was about this:

the Mississippi River was guarded from St. Louis to its mouth; the line

of the Arkansas was held, thus giving us all the North-west north of

that river. A few points in Louisiana not remote from the river were

held by the Federal troops, as was also the mouth of the Rio Grande.

East of the Mississippi we held substantially all north of the Memphis

and Charleston Railroad as far east as Chattanooga, thence along the

line of the Tennessee and Holston rivers, taking in nearly all of the

State of Tennessee. West Virginia was in our hands; and that part of

old Virginia north of the Rapidan and east of the Blue Ridge we also

held. On the sea-coast we had Fortress Monroe and Norfolk in Virginia;

Plymouth, Washington and New Berne in North Carolina; Beaufort, Folly

and Morris islands, Hilton Head, Port Royal and Fort Pulaski in South

Carolina and Georgia; Fernandina, St. Augustine, Key West and Pensacola

in Florida. The balance of the Southern territory, an empire in extent,

was still in the hands of the enemy.

Sherman, who had succeeded me in the command of the military division of

the Mississippi, commanded all the troops in the territory west of the

Alleghanies and north of Natchez, with a large movable force about

Chattanooga. His command was subdivided into four departments, but the

commanders all reported to Sherman and were subject to his orders. This

arrangement, however, insured the better protection of all lines of

communication through the acquired territory, for the reason that these

different department commanders could act promptly in case of a sudden

or unexpected raid within their respective jurisdictions without

awaiting the orders of the division commander.

In the East the opposing forces stood in substantially the same

relations towards each other as three years before, or when the war

began; they were both between the Federal and Confederate capitals. It

is true, footholds had been secured by us on the sea-coast, in Virginia

and North Carolina, but, beyond that, no substantial advantage had been

gained by either side. Battles had been fought of as great severity as

had ever been known in war, over ground from the James River and

Chickahominy, near Richmond, to Gettysburg and Chambersburg, in

Pennsylvania, with indecisive results, sometimes favorable to the

National army, sometimes to the Confederate army; but in every instance,

I believe, claimed as victories for the South by the Southern press if

not by the Southern generals. The Northern press, as a whole, did not

discourage these claims; a portion of it always magnified rebel success

and belittled ours, while another portion, most sincerely earnest in

their desire for the preservation of the Union and the overwhelming

success of the Federal armies, would nevertheless generally express

dissatisfaction with whatever victories were gained because they were

not more complete.

That portion of the Army of the Potomac not engaged in guarding lines of

communication was on the northern bank of the Rapidan. The Army of

Northern Virginia confronting it on the opposite bank of the same river,

was strongly intrenched and commanded by the acknowledged ablest general

in the Confederate army. The country back to the James River is cut up

with many streams, generally narrow, deep, and difficult to cross except

where bridged. The region is heavily timbered, and the roads narrow,

and very bad after the least rain. Such an enemy was not, of course,

unprepared with adequate fortifications at convenient intervals all the

way back to Richmond, so that when driven from one fortified position

they would always have another farther to the rear to fall back into.

To provision an army, campaigning against so formidable a foe through

such a country, from wagons alone seemed almost impossible. System and

discipline were both essential to its accomplishment.

The Union armies were now divided into nineteen departments, though four

of them in the West had been concentrated into a single military

division. The Army of the Potomac was a separate command and had no

territorial limits. There were thus seventeen distinct commanders.

Before this time these various armies had acted separately and

independently of each other, giving the enemy an opportunity often of

depleting one command, not pressed, to reinforce another more actively

engaged. I determined to stop this. To this end I regarded the Army of

the Potomac as the centre, and all west to Memphis along the line

described as our position at the time, and north of it, the right wing;

the Army of the James, under General Butler, as the left wing, and all

the troops south, as a force in rear of the enemy. Some of these latter

were occupying positions from which they could not render service

proportionate to their numerical strength. All such were depleted to

the minimum necessary to hold their positions as a guard against

blockade runners; where they could not do this their positions were

abandoned altogether. In this way ten thousand men were added to the

Army of the James from South Carolina alone, with General Gillmore in

command. It was not contemplated that General Gillmore should leave his

department; but as most of his troops were taken, presumably for active

service, he asked to accompany them and was permitted to do so.

Officers and soldiers on furlough, of whom there were many thousands,

were ordered to their proper commands; concentration was the order of

the day, and to have it accomplished in time to advance at the earliest

moment the roads would permit was the problem.

As a reinforcement to the Army of the Potomac, or to act in support of

it, the 9th army corps, over twenty thousand strong, under General

Burnside, had been rendezvoused at Annapolis, Maryland. This was an

admirable position for such a reinforcement. The corps could be brought

at the last moment as a reinforcement to the Army of the Potomac, or it

could be thrown on the sea-coast, south of Norfolk, in Virginia or North

Carolina, to operate against Richmond from that direction. In fact

Burnside and the War Department both thought the 9th corps was intended

for such an expedition up to the last moment.

My general plan now was to concentrate all the force possible against

the Confederate armies in the field. There were but two such, as we

have seen, east of the Mississippi River and facing north. The Army of

Northern Virginia, General Robert E. Lee commanding, was on the south

bank of the Rapidan, confronting the Army of the Potomac; the second,

under General Joseph E. Johnston, was at Dalton, Georgia, opposed to

Sherman who was still at Chattanooga. Beside these main armies the

Confederates had to guard the Shenandoah Valley, a great storehouse to

feed their armies from, and their line of communications from Richmond

to Tennessee. Forrest, a brave and intrepid cavalry general, was in the

West with a large force; making a larger command necessary to hold what

we had gained in Middle and West Tennessee. We could not abandon any

territory north of the line held by the enemy because it would lay the

Northern States open to invasion. But as the Army of the Potomac was

the principal garrison for the protection of Washington even while it

was moving on Lee, so all the forces to the west, and the Army of the

James, guarded their special trusts when advancing from them as well as

when remaining at them. Better indeed, for they forced the enemy to

guard his own lines and resources at a greater distance from ours, and

with a greater force. Little expeditions could not so well be sent out

to destroy a bridge or tear up a few miles of railroad track, burn a

storehouse, or inflict other little annoyances. Accordingly I arranged

for a simultaneous movement all along the line. Sherman was to move

from Chattanooga, Johnston's army and Atlanta being his objective

points. (*23) Crook, commanding in West Virginia, was to move from the

mouth of the Gauley River with a cavalry force and some artillery, the

Virginia and Tennessee Railroad to be his objective. Either the enemy

would have to keep a large force to protect their communications, or see

them destroyed and a large amount of forage and provision, which they so

much needed, fall into our hands. Sigel was in command in the Valley of

Virginia. He was to advance up the valley, covering the North from an

invasion through that channel as well while advancing as by remaining

near Harper's Ferry. Every mile he advanced also gave us possession of

stores on which Lee relied. Butler was to advance by the James River,

having Richmond and Petersburg as his objective.

Before the advance commenced I visited Butler at Fort Monroe. This was

the first time I had ever met him. Before giving him any order as to

the part he was to play in the approaching campaign I invited his views.

They were very much such as I intended to direct, and as I did direct

(*24), in writing, before leaving.

General W. F. Smith, who had been promoted to the rank of major-general

shortly after the battle of Chattanooga on my recommendation, had not

yet been confirmed. I found a decided prejudice against his

confirmation by a majority of the Senate, but I insisted that his

services had been such that he should be rewarded. My wishes were now

reluctantly complied with, and I assigned him to the command of one of

the corps under General Butler. I was not long in finding out that the

objections to Smith's promotion were well founded.

In one of my early interviews with the President I expressed my

dissatisfaction with the little that had been accomplished by the

cavalry so far in the war, and the belief that it was capable of

accomplishing much more than it had done if under a thorough leader. I

said I wanted the very best man in the army for that command. Halleck

was present and spoke up, saying: "How would Sheridan do?" I replied:

"The very man I want." The President said I could have anybody I wanted.

Sheridan was telegraphed for that day, and on his arrival was assigned

to the command of the cavalry corps with the Army of the Potomac. This

relieved General Alfred Pleasonton. It was not a reflection on that

officer, however, for I did not know but that he had been as efficient

as any other cavalry commander.

Banks in the Department of the Gulf was ordered to assemble all the

troops he had at New Orleans in time to join in the general move, Mobile

to be his objective.

At this time I was not entirely decided as to whether I should move the

Army of the Potomac by the right flank of the enemy, or by his left.

Each plan presented advantages. (*25) If by his right--my left--the

Potomac, Chesapeake Bay and tributaries would furnish us an easy hauling

distance of every position the army could occupy from the Rapidan to the

James River. But Lee could, if he chose, detach or move his whole army

north on a line rather interior to the one I would have to take in

following. A movement by his left--our right--would obviate this; but

all that was done would have to be done with the supplies and ammunition

we started with. All idea of adopting this latter plan was abandoned

when the limited quantity of supplies possible to take with us was

considered. The country over which we would have to pass was so

exhausted of all food or forage that we would be obliged to carry

everything with us.

While these preparations were going on the enemy was not entirely idle.

In the West Forrest made a raid in West Tennessee up to the northern

border, capturing the garrison of four or five hundred men at Union

City, and followed it up by an attack on Paducah, Kentucky, on the banks

of the Ohio. While he was able to enter the city he failed to capture

the forts or any part of the garrison. On the first intelligence of

Forrest's raid I telegraphed Sherman to send all his cavalry against

him, and not to let him get out of the trap he had put himself into.

Sherman had anticipated me by sending troops against him before he got

my order.

Forrest, however, fell back rapidly, and attacked the troops at Fort

Pillow, a station for the protection of the navigation of the

Mississippi River. The garrison consisted of a regiment of colored

troops, infantry, and a detachment of Tennessee cavalry. These troops

fought bravely, but were overpowered. I will leave Forrest in his

dispatches to tell what he did with them.

"The river was dyed," he says, "with the blood of the slaughtered for

two hundred yards. The approximate loss was upward of five hundred

killed, but few of the officers escaping. My loss was about twenty

killed. It is hoped that these facts will demonstrate to the Northern

people that negro soldiers cannot cope with Southerners." Subsequently

Forrest made a report in which he left out the part which shocks

humanity to read.

At the East, also, the rebels were busy. I had said to Halleck that

Plymouth and Washington, North Carolina, were unnecessary to hold. It

would be better to have the garrisons engaged there added to Butler's

command. If success attended our arms both places, and others too,

would fall into our hands naturally. These places had been occupied by

Federal troops before I took command of the armies, and I knew that the

Executive would be reluctant to abandon them, and therefore explained my

views; but before my views were carried out the rebels captured the

garrison at Plymouth. I then ordered the abandonment of Washington, but

directed the holding of New Berne at all hazards. This was essential

because New Berne was a port into which blockade runners could enter.

General Banks had gone on an expedition up the Red River long before my

promotion to general command. I had opposed the movement strenuously,

but acquiesced because it was the order of my superior at the time. By

direction of Halleck I had reinforced Banks with a corps of about ten

thousand men from Sherman's command. This reinforcement was wanted back

badly before the forward movement commenced. But Banks had got so far

that it seemed best that he should take Shreveport on the Red River, and

turn over the line of that river to Steele, who commanded in Arkansas,

to hold instead of the line of the Arkansas. Orders were given

accordingly, and with the expectation that the campaign would be ended

in time for Banks to return A. J. Smith's command to where it belonged

and get back to New Orleans himself in time to execute his part in the

general plan. But the expedition was a failure. Banks did not get back

in time to take part in the programme as laid down. Nor was Smith

returned until long after the movements of May, 1864, had been begun.

The services of forty thousand veteran troops, over and above the number

required to hold all that was necessary in the Department of the Gulf,

were thus paralyzed. It is but just to Banks, however, to say that his

expedition was ordered from Washington and he was in no way responsible

except for the conduct of it. I make no criticism on this point. He

opposed the expedition.

By the 27th of April spring had so far advanced as to justify me in

fixing a day for the great move. On that day Burnside left Annapolis to

occupy Meade's position between Bull Run and the Rappahannock. Meade

was notified and directed to bring his troops forward to his advance.

On the following day Butler was notified of my intended advance on the

4th of May, and he was directed to move the night of the same day and

get as far up the James River as possible by daylight, and push on from

there to accomplish the task given him. He was also notified that

reinforcements were being collected in Washington City, which would be

forwarded to him should the enemy fall back into the trenches at

Richmond. The same day Sherman was directed to get his forces up ready

to advance on the 5th. Sigel was in Winchester and was notified to move

in conjunction with the others.

The criticism has been made by writers on the campaign from the Rapidan

to the James River that all the loss of life could have been obviated by

moving the army there on transports. Richmond was fortified and

intrenched so perfectly that one man inside to defend was more than

equal to five outside besieging or assaulting. To get possession of

Lee's army was the first great object. With the capture of his army

Richmond would necessarily follow. It was better to fight him outside

of his stronghold than in it. If the Army of the Potomac had been moved

bodily to the James River by water Lee could have moved a part of his

forces back to Richmond, called Beauregard from the south to reinforce

it, and with the balance moved on to Washington. Then, too, I ordered a

move, simultaneous with that of the Army of the Potomac, up the James

River by a formidable army already collected at the mouth of the river.

While my headquarters were at Culpeper, from the 26th of March to the

4th of May, I generally visited Washington once a week to confer with

the Secretary of War and President. On the last occasion, a few days

before moving, a circumstance occurred which came near postponing my