CHAPTER XLIX.

SHERMAN'S CAMPAIGN IN GEORGIA--SIEGE OF ATLANTA--DEATH OF GENERAL

MCPHERSON--ATTEMPT TO CAPTURE ANDERSONVILLE--CAPTURE OF ATLANTA.

After separating from Sherman in Cincinnati I went on to Washington, as

already stated, while he returned to Nashville to assume the duties of

his new command. His military division was now composed of four

departments and embraced all the territory west of the Alleghany

Mountains and east of the Mississippi River, together with the State of

Arkansas in the trans-Mississippi. The most easterly of these was the

Department of the Ohio, General Schofield commanding; the next was the

Department of the Cumberland, General Thomas commanding; the third the

Department of the Tennessee, General McPherson commanding; and General

Steele still commanded the trans-Mississippi, or Department of Arkansas.

The last-named department was so far away that Sherman could not

communicate with it very readily after starting on his spring campaign,

and it was therefore soon transferred from his military division to that

of the Gulf, where General Canby, who had relieved General Banks, was in

command.

The movements of the armies, as I have stated in a former chapter, were

to be simultaneous, I fixing the day to start when the season should be

far enough advanced, it was hoped, for the roads to be in a condition

for the troops to march.

General Sherman at once set himself to work preparing for the task which

was assigned him to accomplish in the spring campaign. McPherson lay at

Huntsville with about twenty-four thousand men, guarding those points of

Tennessee which were regarded as most worth holding; Thomas, with over

sixty thousand men of the Army of the Cumberland, was at Chattanooga;

and Schofield, with about fourteen thousand men, was at Knoxville. With

these three armies, numbering about one hundred thousand men in all,

Sherman was to move on the day fixed for the general advance, with a

view of destroying Johnston's army and capturing Atlanta. He visited

each of these commands to inform himself as to their condition, and it

was found to be, speaking generally, good.

One of the first matters to turn his attention to was that of getting,

before the time arrived for starting, an accumulation of supplies

forward to Chattanooga, sufficiently large to warrant a movement. He

found, when he got to that place, that the trains over the single-track

railroad, which was frequently interrupted for a day or two at a time,

were only sufficient to meet the daily wants of the troops without

bringing forward any surplus of any kind. He found, however, that

trains were being used to transport all the beef cattle, horses for the

cavalry, and even teams that were being brought to the front. He at

once changed all this, and required beef cattle, teams, cavalry horses,

and everything that could travel, even the troops, to be marched, and

used the road exclusively for transporting supplies. In this way he was

able to accumulate an abundance before the time finally fixed upon for

the move, the 4th of May.

As I have said already, Johnston was at Dalton, which was nearly

one-fourth of the way between Chattanooga and Atlanta. The country is

mountainous all the way to Atlanta, abounding in mountain streams, some

of them of considerable volume. Dalton is on ground where water drains

towards Atlanta and into one of the main streams rising north-east from

there and flowing south-west--this being the general direction which all

the main streams of that section take, with smaller tributaries entering

into them. Johnston had been preparing himself for this campaign during

the entire winter. The best positions for defence had been selected all

the way from Dalton back to Atlanta, and very strongly intrenched; so

that, as he might be forced to fall back from one position, he would

have another to fall into in his rear. His position at Dalton was so

very strongly intrenched that no doubt he expected, or at least hoped,

to hold Sherman there and prevent him from getting any further. With a

less skilful general, and one disposed to take no risks, I have no doubt

that he would have succeeded.

Sherman's plan was to start Schofield, who was farthest back, a few days

in advance from Knoxville, having him move on the direct road to Dalton.

Thomas was to move out to Ringgold. It had been Sherman's intention to

cross McPherson over the Tennessee River at Huntsville or Decatur, and

move him south from there so as to have him come into the road running

from Chattanooga to Atlanta a good distance to the rear of the point

Johnston was occupying; but when that was contemplated it was hoped that

McPherson alone would have troops enough to cope with Johnston, if the

latter should move against him while unsupported by the balance of the

army. In this he was disappointed. Two of McPherson's veteran

divisions had re-enlisted on the express provision that they were to

have a furlough. This furlough had not yet expired, and they were not

back.

Then, again, Sherman had lent Banks two divisions under A. J. Smith, the

winter before, to co-operate with the trans-Mississippi forces, and this

with the express pledge that they should be back by a time specified, so

as to be prepared for this very campaign. It is hardly necessary to say

they were not returned. That department continued to absorb troops to

no purpose to the end of the war. This left McPherson so weak that the

part of the plan above indicated had to be changed. He was therefore

brought up to Chattanooga and moved from there on a road to the right of

Thomas--the two coming together about Dalton. The three armies were

abreast, all ready to start promptly on time.

Sherman soon found that Dalton was so strongly fortified that it was

useless to make any attempt to carry it by assault; and even to carry it

by regular approaches was impracticable. There was a narrowing up in

the mountain, between the National and Confederate armies, through which

a stream, a wagon road and a railroad ran. Besides, the stream had been

dammed so that the valley was a lake. Through this gorge the troops

would have to pass. McPherson was therefore sent around by the right,

to come out by the way of Snake Creek Gap into the rear of the enemy.

This was a surprise to Johnston, and about the 13th he decided to

abandon his position at Dalton.

On the 15th there was very hard fighting about Resaca; but our cavalry

having been sent around to the right got near the road in the enemy's

rear. Again Johnston fell back, our army pursuing. The pursuit was

continued to Kingston, which was reached on the 19th with very little

fighting, except that Newton's division overtook the rear of Johnston's

army and engaged it. Sherman was now obliged to halt for the purpose of

bringing up his railroad trains. He was depending upon the railroad for

all of his supplies, and as of course the railroad was wholly destroyed

as Johnston fell back, it had to be rebuilt. This work was pushed

forward night and day, and caused much less delay than most persons

would naturally expect in a mountainous country where there were so many

bridges to be rebuilt.

The campaign to Atlanta was managed with the most consummate skill, the

enemy being flanked out of one position after another all the way there.

It is true this was not accomplished without a good deal of fighting

--some of it very hard fighting, rising to the dignity of very important

battles--neither were single positions gained in a day. On the

contrary, weeks were spent at some; and about Atlanta more than a month

was consumed.

It was the 23d of May before the road was finished up to the rear of

Sherman's army and the pursuit renewed. This pursuit brought him up to

the vicinity of Allatoona. This place was very strongly intrenched, and

naturally a very defensible position. An assault upon it was not thought

of, but preparations were made to flank the enemy out of it. This was

done by sending a large force around our right, by the way of Dallas, to

reach the rear of the enemy. Before reaching there, however, they found

the enemy fortified in their way, and there resulted hard fighting for

about a week at a place called New Hope Church. On the left our troops

also were fortified, and as close up to the enemy as they could get.

They kept working still farther around to the left toward the railroad.

This was the case more particularly with the cavalry. By the 4th of

June Johnston found that he was being hemmed in so rapidly that he drew

off and Allatoona was left in our possession.

Allatoona, being an important place, was strongly intrenched for

occupation by our troops before advancing farther, and made a secondary

base of supplies. The railroad was finished up to that point, the

intrenchments completed, storehouses provided for food, and the army got

in readiness for a further advance. The rains, however, were falling in

such torrents that it was impossible to move the army by the side roads

which they would have to move upon in order to turn Johnston out of his

new position.

While Sherman's army lay here, General F. P. Blair returned to it,

bringing with him the two divisions of veterans who had been on

furlough.

Johnston had fallen back to Marietta and Kenesaw Mountain, where strong

intrenchments awaited him. At this latter place our troops made an

assault upon the enemy's lines after having got their own lines up close

to him, and failed, sustaining considerable loss. But during the

progress of the battle Schofield was gaining ground to the left; and the

cavalry on his left were gaining still more toward the enemy's rear.

These operations were completed by the 3d of July, when it was found

that Johnston had evacuated the place. He was pursued at once. Sherman

had made every preparation to abandon the railroad, leaving a strong

guard in his intrenchments. He had intended, moving out with twenty

days' rations and plenty of ammunition, to come in on the railroad again

at the Chattahoochee River. Johnston frustrated this plan by himself

starting back as above stated. This time he fell back to the

Chattahoochee.

About the 5th of July he was besieged again, Sherman getting easy

possession of the Chattahoochee River both above and below him. The

enemy was again flanked out of his position, or so frightened by

flanking movements that on the night of the 9th he fell back across the

river.

Here Johnston made a stand until the 17th, when Sherman's old tactics

prevailed again and the final movement toward Atlanta began. Johnston

was now relieved of the command, and Hood superseded him.

Johnston's tactics in this campaign do not seem to have met with much

favor, either in the eyes of the administration at Richmond, or of the

people of that section of the South in which he was commanding. The

very fact of a change of commanders being ordered under such

circumstances was an indication of a change of policy, and that now they

would become the aggressors--the very thing our troops wanted.

For my own part, I think that Johnston's tactics were right. Anything

that could have prolonged the war a year beyond the time that it did

finally close, would probably have exhausted the North to such an extent

that they might then have abandoned the contest and agreed to a

separation.

Atlanta was very strongly intrenched all the way around in a circle

about a mile and a half outside of the city. In addition to this, there

were advanced intrenchments which had to be taken before a close siege

could be commenced.

Sure enough, as indicated by the change of commanders, the enemy was

about to assume the offensive. On the 20th he came out and attacked the

Army of the Cumberland most furiously. Hooker's corps, and Newton's and

Johnson's divisions were the principal ones engaged in this contest,

which lasted more than an hour; but the Confederates were then forced to

fall back inside their main lines. The losses were quite heavy on both

sides. On this day General Gresham, since our Postmaster-General, was

very badly wounded. During the night Hood abandoned his outer lines,

and our troops were advanced. The investment had not been relinquished

for a moment during the day.

During the night of the 21st Hood moved out again, passing by our left

flank, which was then in motion to get a position farther in rear of

him, and a desperate battle ensued, which lasted most of the day of the

22d. At first the battle went very much in favor of the Confederates,

our troops being somewhat surprised. While our troops were advancing

they were struck in flank, and their flank was enveloped. But they had

become too thorough veterans to be thrown into irreparable confusion by

an unexpected attack when off their guard, and soon they were in order

and engaging the enemy, with the advantage now of knowing where their

antagonist was. The field of battle continued to expand until it

embraced about seven miles of ground. Finally, however, and before

night, the enemy was driven back into the city (*26).

It was during this battle that McPherson, while passing from one column

to another, was instantly killed. In his death the army lost one of its

ablest, purest and best generals.

Garrard had been sent out with his cavalry to get upon the railroad east

of Atlanta and to cut it in the direction of Augusta. He was successful

in this, and returned about the time of the battle. Rousseau had also

come up from Tennessee with a small division of cavalry, having crossed

the Tennessee River about Decatur and made a raid into Alabama. Finally,

when hard pressed, he had come in, striking the railroad in rear of

Sherman, and reported to him about this time.

The battle of the 22d is usually known as the Battle of Atlanta,

although the city did not fall into our hands until the 2d of September.

Preparations went on, as before, to flank the enemy out of his position.

The work was tedious, and the lines that had to be maintained were very

long. Our troops were gradually worked around to the east until they

struck the road between Decatur and Atlanta. These lines were strongly

fortified, as were those to the north and west of the city--all as close

up to the enemy's lines as practicable--in order to hold them with the

smallest possible number of men, the design being to detach an army to

move by our right and try to get upon the railroad down south of

Atlanta.

On the 27th the movement by the right flank commenced. On the 28th the

enemy struck our right flank, General Logan commanding, with great

vigor. Logan intrenched himself hastily, and by that means was enabled

to resist all assaults and inflict a great deal of damage upon the

enemy. These assaults were continued to the middle of the afternoon,

and resumed once or twice still later in the day. The enemy's losses in

these unsuccessful assaults were fearful.

During that evening the enemy in Logan's front withdrew into the town.

This now left Sherman's army close up to the Confederate lines,

extending from a point directly east of the city around by the north and

west of it for a distance of fully ten miles; the whole of this line

being intrenched, and made stronger every day they remained there.

In the latter part of July Sherman sent Stoneman to destroy the

railroads to the south, about Macon. He was then to go east and, if

possible, release our prisoners about Andersonville. There were painful

stories current at the time about the great hardships these prisoners

had to endure in the way of general bad treatment, in the way in which

they were housed, and in the way in which they were fed. Great sympathy

was felt for them; and it was thought that even if they could be turned

loose upon the country it would be a great relief to them. But the

attempt proved a failure. McCook, who commanded a small brigade, was

first reported to have been captured; but he got back, having inflicted

a good deal of damage upon the enemy. He had also taken some prisoners;

but encountering afterwards a largely superior force of the enemy he was

obliged to drop his prisoners and get back as best he could with what

men he had left. He had lost several hundred men out of his small

command. On the 4th of August Colonel Adams, commanding a little

brigade of about a thousand men, returned reporting Stoneman and all but

himself as lost. I myself had heard around Richmond of the capture of

Stoneman, and had sent Sherman word, which he received. The rumor was

confirmed there, also, from other sources. A few days after Colonel

Adams's return Colonel Capron also got in with a small detachment and

confirmed the report of the capture of Stoneman with something less than

a thousand men.

It seems that Stoneman, finding the escape of all his force was

impossible, had made arrangements for the escape of two divisions. He

covered the movement of these divisions to the rear with a force of

about seven hundred men, and at length surrendered himself and this

detachment to the commanding Confederate. In this raid, however, much

damage was inflicted upon the enemy by the destruction of cars,

locomotives, army wagons, manufactories of military supplies, etc.

On the 4th and 5th Sherman endeavored to get upon the railroad to our

right, where Schofield was in command, but these attempts failed

utterly. General Palmer was charged with being the cause of this

failure, to a great extent, by both General Sherman and General

Schofield; but I am not prepared to say this, although a question seems

to have arisen with Palmer as to whether Schofield had any right to

command him. If he did raise this question while an action was going

on, that act alone was exceedingly reprehensible.

About the same time Wheeler got upon our railroad north of Resaca and

destroyed it nearly up to Dalton. This cut Sherman off from

communication with the North for several days. Sherman responded to

this attack on his lines of communication by directing one upon theirs.

Kilpatrick started on the night of the 18th of August to reach the Macon

road about Jonesboro. He succeeded in doing so, passed entirely around

the Confederate lines of Atlanta, and was back again in his former

position on our left by the 22d. These little affairs, however,

contributed but very little to the grand result. They annoyed, it is

true, but any damage thus done to a railroad by any cavalry expedition

is soon repaired.

Sherman made preparations for a repetition of his tactics; that is, for

a flank movement with as large a force as could be got together to some

point in the enemy's rear. Sherman commenced this last movement on the

25th of August, and on the 1st of September was well up towards the

railroad twenty miles south of Atlanta. Here he found Hardee

intrenched, ready to meet him. A battle ensued, but he was unable to

drive Hardee away before night set in. Under cover of the night,

however, Hardee left of his own accord. That night Hood blew up his

military works, such as he thought would be valuable in our hands, and

decamped.

The next morning at daylight General H. W. Slocum, who was commanding

north of the city, moved in and took possession of Atlanta, and notified

Sherman. Sherman then moved deliberately back, taking three days to

reach the city, and occupied a line extending from Decatur on the left

to Atlanta in the centre, with his troops extending out of the city for

some distance to the right.

The campaign had lasted about four months, and was one of the most

memorable in history. There was but little if anything in the whole

campaign, now that it is over, to criticise at all, and nothing to

criticise severely. It was creditable alike to the general who

commanded and the army which had executed it. Sherman had on this

campaign some bright, wide-awake division and brigade commanders whose

alertness added a host to the efficiency of his command.

The troops now went to work to make themselves comfortable, and to enjoy

a little rest after their arduous campaign. The city of Atlanta was

turned into a military base. The citizens were all compelled to leave.

Sherman also very wisely prohibited the assembling of the army of

sutlers and traders who always follow in the wake of an army in the

field, if permitted to do so, from trading with the citizens and getting

the money of the soldiers for articles of but little use to them, and

for which they are made to pay most exorbitant prices. He limited the

number of these traders to one for each of his three armies.

The news of Sherman's success reached the North instantaneously, and set

the country all aglow. This was the first great political campaign for

the Republicans in their canvass of 1864. It was followed later by

Sheridan's campaign in the Shenandoah Valley; and these two campaigns

probably had more effect in settling the election of the following

November than all the speeches, all the bonfires, and all the parading

with banners and bands of music in the North.