CHAPTER LIX.

THE CAMPAIGN IN GEORGIA--SHERMAN'S MARCH TO THE SEA--WAR ANECDOTES--THE

MARCH ON SAVANNAH--INVESTMENT OF SAVANNAH--CAPTURE OF SAVANNAH.

Let us now return to the operations in the military division of the

Mississippi, and accompany Sherman in his march to the sea.

The possession of Atlanta by us narrowed the territory of the enemy very

materially and cut off one of his two remaining lines of roads from east

to west.

A short time after the fall of Atlanta Mr. Davis visited Palmetto and

Macon and made speeches at each place. He spoke at Palmetto on the 20th

of September, and at Macon on the 22d. Inasmuch as he had relieved

Johnston and appointed Hood, and Hood had immediately taken the

initiative, it is natural to suppose that Mr. Davis was disappointed

with General Johnston's policy. My own judgment is that Johnston acted

very wisely: he husbanded his men and saved as much of his territory as

he could, without fighting decisive battles in which all might be lost.

As Sherman advanced, as I have show, his army became spread out, until,

if this had been continued, it would have been easy to destroy it in

detail. I know that both Sherman and I were rejoiced when we heard of

the change. Hood was unquestionably a brave, gallant soldier and not

destitute of ability; but unfortunately his policy was to fight the

enemy wherever he saw him, without thinking much of the consequences of

defeat.

In his speeches Mr. Davis denounced Governor Brown, of Georgia, and

General Johnston in unmeasured terms, even insinuating that their

loyalty to the Southern cause was doubtful. So far as General Johnston

is concerned, I think Davis did him a great injustice in this

particular. I had know the general before the war and strongly believed

it would be impossible for him to accept a high commission for the

purpose of betraying the cause he had espoused. There, as I have said,

I think that his policy was the best one that could have been pursued by

the whole South--protract the war, which was all that was necessary to

enable them to gain recognition in the end. The North was already

growing weary, as the South evidently was also, but with this

difference. In the North the people governed, and could stop

hostilities whenever they chose to stop supplies. The South was a

military camp, controlled absolutely by the government with soldiers to

back it, and the war could have been protracted, no matter to what

extent the discontent reached, up to the point of open mutiny of the

soldiers themselves. Mr. Davis's speeches were frank appeals to the

people of Georgia and that portion of the South to come to their relief.

He tried to assure his frightened hearers that the Yankees were rapidly

digging their own graves; that measures were already being taken to cut

them off from supplies from the North; and that with a force in front,

and cut off from the rear, they must soon starve in the midst of a

hostile people. Papers containing reports of these speeches immediately

reached the Northern States, and they were republished. Of course, that

caused no alarm so long as telegraphic communication was kept up with

Sherman.

When Hood was forced to retreat from Atlanta he moved to the south-west

and was followed by a portion of Sherman's army. He soon appeared upon

the railroad in Sherman's rear, and with his whole army began destroying

the road. At the same time also the work was begun in Tennessee and

Kentucky which Mr. Davis had assured his hearers at Palmetto and Macon

would take place. He ordered Forrest (about the ablest cavalry general

in the South) north for this purpose; and Forrest and Wheeler carried

out their orders with more or less destruction, occasionally picking up

a garrison. Forrest indeed performed the very remarkable feat of

capturing, with cavalry, two gunboats and a number of transports,

something the accomplishment of which is very hard to account for.

Hood's army had been weakened by Governor Brown's withdrawing the

Georgia State troops for the purpose of gathering in the season's crops

for the use of the people and for the use of the army. This not only

depleted Hood's forces but it served a most excellent purpose in

gathering in supplies of food and forage for the use of our army in its

subsequent march. Sherman was obliged to push on with his force and go

himself with portions of it hither and thither, until it was clearly

demonstrated to him that with the army he then had it would be

impossible to hold the line from Atlanta back and leave him any force

whatever with which to take the offensive. Had that plan been adhered

to, very large reinforcements would have been necessary; and Mr. Davis's

prediction of the destruction of the army would have been realized, or

else Sherman would have been obliged to make a successful retreat, which

Mr. Davis said in his speeches would prove more disastrous than

Napoleon's retreat from Moscow.

These speeches of Mr. Davis were not long in reaching Sherman. He took

advantage of the information they gave, and made all the preparation

possible for him to make to meet what now became expected, attempts to

break his communications. Something else had to be done: and to

Sherman's sensible and soldierly mind the idea was not long in dawning

upon him, not only that something else had to be done, but what that

something else should be.

On September 10th I telegraphed Sherman as follows:

CITY POINT, VA., Sept. 10, 1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL SHERMAN, Atlanta, Georgia.

So soon as your men are sufficiently rested, and preparations can be

made, it is desirable that another campaign should be commenced. We

want to keep the enemy constantly pressed to the end of the war. If we

give him no peace whilst the war lasts, the end cannot be distant. Now

that we have all of Mobile Bay that is valuable, I do not know but it

will be the best move to transfer Canby's troops to act upon Savannah,

whilst you move on Augusta. I should like to hear from you, however, in

this matter.

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

Sherman replied promptly:

"If I could be sure of finding provisions and ammunition at Augusta, or

Columbus, Georgia, I can march to Milledgeville, and compel Hood to give

up Augusta or Macon, and then turn on the other. * * * If you can

manage to take the Savannah River as high up as Augusta, or the

Chattahoochee as far up as Columbus, I can sweep the whole State of

Georgia."

On the 12th I sent a special messenger, one of my own staff, with a

letter inviting Sherman's views about the next campaign.

CITY POINT, VA., Sept. 12, 1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN, Commanding Mill Division of the

Mississippi.

I send Lieutenant-Colonel Porter, of my staff, with this. Colonel Porter

will explain to you the exact condition of affairs here better than I

can do in the limits of a letter. Although I feel myself strong enough

for offensive operations, I am holding on quietly to get advantage of

recruits and convalescents, who are coming forward very rapidly. My

lines are necessarily very long, extending from Deep Bottom north of the

James across the peninsula formed by the Appomattox and the James, and

south of the Appomattox to the Weldon Road. This line is very strongly

fortified, and can be held with comparatively few men, but from its

great length takes many in the aggregate. I propose, when I do move, to

extend my left so as to control what is known as the South Side, or

Lynchburg and Petersburg Road, then if possible to keep the Danville

Road cut. At the same time this move is made, I want to send a force of

from six to ten thousand men against Wilmington.

The way I propose to do this is to land the men north of Fort Fisher,

and hold that point. At the same time a large naval fleet will be

assembled there, and the iron-clads will run the batteries as they did

at Mobile. This will give us the same control of the harbor of

Wilmington that we now have of the harbor of Mobile. What you are to do

with the forces at your command, I do not see. The difficulties of

supplying your army, except when you are constantly moving, beyond where

you are, I plainly see. If it had not been for Price's movements Canby

would have sent twelve thousand more men to Mobile. From your command

on the Mississippi an equal number could have been taken. With these

forces my idea would have been to divide them, sending one half to

Mobile and the other half to Savannah. You could then move as proposed

in your telegram, so as to threaten Macon and Augusta equally.

Whichever was abandoned by the enemy you could take and open up a new

base of supplies. My object now in sending a staff officer is not so

much to suggest operations for you, as to get your views and have plans

matured by the time everything can be got ready. It will probably be

the 5th of October before any of the plans herein indicated will be

executed.

If you have any promotions to recommend, send the names forward and I

will approve them. * * *

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

This reached Sherman on September 20th.

On the 25th of September Sherman reported to Washington that Hood's

troops were in his rear. He had provided against this by sending a

division to Chattanooga and a division to Rome, Georgia, which was in

the rear of Hood, supposing that Hood would fall back in the direction

from which he had come to reach the railroad. At the same time Sherman

and Hood kept up a correspondence relative to the exchange of prisoners,

the treatment of citizens, and other matters suitable to be arranged

between hostile commanders in the field. On the 27th of September I

telegraphed Sherman as follows:

CITY POINT, VA., September 27, 1864--10.30 A.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL SHERMAN:

I have directed all recruits and new troops from the Western States to

be sent to Nashville, to receive their further orders from you. * * *

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

On the 29th Sherman sent Thomas back to Chattanooga, and afterwards to

Nashville, with another division (Morgan's) of the advanced army.

Sherman then suggested that, when he was prepared, his movements should

take place against Milledgeville and then to Savannah. His expectation

at that time was, to make this movement as soon as he could get up his

supplies. Hood was moving in his own country, and was moving light so

that he could make two miles to Sherman's one. He depended upon the

country to gather his supplies, and so was not affected by delays.

As I have said, until this unexpected state of affairs happened, Mobile

had been looked upon as the objective point of Sherman's army. It had

been a favorite move of mine from 1862, when I first suggested to the

then commander-in-chief that the troops in Louisiana, instead of

frittering away their time in the trans-Mississippi, should move

against Mobile. I recommended this from time to time until I came into

command of the army, the last of March 1864. Having the power in my own

hands, I now ordered the concentration of supplies, stores and troops,

in the department of the Gulf about New Orleans, with a view to a move

against Mobile, in support of, and in conjunction with, the other armies

operating in the field. Before I came into command, these troops had

been scattered over the trans-Mississippi department in such a way that

they could not be, or were not, gotten back in time to take any part in

the original movement; hence the consideration, which had caused Mobile

to be selected as the objective point for Sherman's army to find his

next base of supplies after having cut loose from Atlanta, no longer

existed.

General G. M. Dodge, an exceedingly efficient officer, having been badly

wounded, had to leave the army about the first of October. He was in

command of two divisions of the 16th corps, consolidated into one.

Sherman then divided his army into the right and left wings the right

commanded by General O. O. Howard and the left by General Slocum.

General Dodge's two divisions were assigned, one to each of these wings.

Howard's command embraced the 15th and 17th corps, and Slocum's the 14th

and 20th corps, commanded by Generals Jeff. C. Davis and A. S. Williams.

Generals Logan and Blair commanded the two corps composing the right

wing. About this time they left to take part in the presidential

election, which took place that year, leaving their corps to Osterhaus

and Ransom. I have no doubt that their leaving was at the earnest

solicitation of the War Department. General Blair got back in time to

resume his command and to proceed with it throughout the march to the

sea and back to the grand review at Washington. General Logan did not

return to his command until after it reached Savannah.

Logan felt very much aggrieved at the transfer of General Howard from

that portion of the Army of the Potomac which was then with the Western

Army, to the command of the Army of the Tennessee, with which army

General Logan had served from the battle of Belmont to the fall of

Atlanta--having passed successively through all grades from colonel

commanding a regiment to general commanding a brigade, division and army

corps, until upon the death of McPherson the command of the entire Army

of the Tennessee devolved upon him in the midst of a hotly contested

battle. He conceived that he had done his full duty as commander in

that engagement; and I can bear testimony, from personal observation,

that he had proved himself fully equal to all the lower positions which

he had occupied as a soldier. I will not pretend to question the motive

which actuated Sherman in taking an officer from another army to

supersede General Logan. I have no doubt, whatever, that he did this

for what he considered would be to the good of the service, which was

more important than that the personal feelings of any individual should

not be aggrieved; though I doubt whether he had an officer with him who

could have filled the place as Logan would have done. Differences of

opinion must exist between the best of friends as to policies in war,

and of judgment as to men's fitness. The officer who has the command,

however, should be allowed to judge of the fitness of the officers under

him, unless he is very manifestly wrong.

Sherman's army, after all the depletions, numbered about sixty thousand

effective men. All weak men had been left to hold the rear, and those

remaining were not only well men, but strong and hardy, so that he had

sixty thousand as good soldiers as ever trod the earth; better than any

European soldiers, because they not only worked like a machine but the

machine thought. European armies know very little what they are fighting

for, and care less. Included in these sixty thousand troops, there were

two small divisions of cavalry, numbering altogether about four thousand

men. Hood had about thirty-five to forty thousand men, independent of

Forrest, whose forces were operating in Tennessee and Kentucky, as Mr.

Davis had promised they should. This part of Mr. Davis's military plan

was admirable, and promised the best results of anything he could have

done, according to my judgment. I say this because I have criticised his

military judgment in the removal of Johnston, and also in the

appointment of Hood. I am aware, however, that there was high feeling

existing at that time between Davis and his subordinate, whom I regarded

as one of his ablest lieutenants.

On the 5th of October the railroad back from Atlanta was again very

badly broken, Hood having got on the track with his army. Sherman saw

after night, from a high point, the road burning for miles. The defence

of the railroad by our troops was very gallant, but they could not hold

points between their intrenched positions against Hood's whole army; in

fact they made no attempt to do so; but generally the intrenched

positions were held, as well as important bridges, and store located at

them. Allatoona, for instance, was defended by a small force of men

under the command of General Corse, one of the very able and efficient

volunteer officers produced by the war. He, with a small force, was cut

off from the remainder of the National army and was attacked with great

vigor by many times his own number. Sherman from his high position could

see the battle raging, with the Confederate troops between him and his

subordinate. He sent men, of course, to raise the temporary siege, but

the time that would be necessarily consumed in reaching Corse, would be

so great that all occupying the intrenchments might be dead. Corse was

a man who would never surrender. From a high position some of Sherman's

signal corps discovered a signal flag waving from a hole in the block

house at Allatoona. It was from Corse. He had been shot through the

face, but he signalled to his chief a message which left no doubt of his

determination to hold his post at all hazards. It was at this point

probably, that Sherman first realized that with the forces at his

disposal, the keeping open of his line of communication with the North

would be impossible if he expected to retain any force with which to

operate offensively beyond Atlanta. He proposed, therefore, to destroy

the roads back to Chattanooga, when all ready to move, and leave the

latter place garrisoned. Yet, before abandoning the railroad, it was

necessary that he should repair damages already done, and hold the road

until he could get forward such supplies, ordnance stores and small

rations, as he wanted to carry with him on his proposed march, and to

return to the north his surplus artillery; his object being to move

light and to have no more artillery than could be used to advantage on

the field.

Sherman thought Hood would follow him, though he proposed to prepare for

the contingency of the latter moving the other way while he was moving

south, by making Thomas strong enough to hold Tennessee and Kentucky.

I, myself, was thoroughly satisfied that Hood would go north, as he did.

On the 2d of November I telegraphed Sherman authorizing him definitely

to move according to the plan he had proposed: that is, cutting loose

from his base, giving up Atlanta and the railroad back to Chattanooga.

To strengthen Thomas he sent Stanley (4th corps) back, and also ordered

Schofield, commanding the Army of the Ohio, twelve thousand strong, to

report to him. In addition to this, A. J. Smith, who, with two

divisions of Sherman's army, was in Missouri aiding Rosecrans in driving

the enemy from that State, was under orders to return to Thomas and,

under the most unfavorable circumstances, might be expected to arrive

there long before Hood could reach Nashville.

In addition to this, the new levies of troops that were being raised in

the North-west went to Thomas as rapidly as enrolled and equipped.

Thomas, without any of these additions spoken of, had a garrison at

Chattanooga which had been strengthened by one division and garrisons at

Bridgeport, Stevenson, Decatur, Murfreesboro, and Florence. There were

already with him in Nashville ten thousand soldiers in round numbers,

and many thousands of employees in the quartermaster's and other

departments who could be put in the intrenchments in front of Nashville,

for its defence. Also, Wilson was there with ten thousand dismounted

cavalrymen, who were being equipped for the field. Thomas had at this

time about forty-five thousand men without any of the reinforcements

here above enumerated. These reinforcements gave him altogether about

seventy thousand men, without counting what might be added by the new

levies already spoken of.

About this time Beauregard arrived upon the field, not to supersede Hood

in command, but to take general charge over the entire district in which

Hood and Sherman were, or might be, operating. He made the most frantic

appeals to the citizens for assistance to be rendered in every way: by

sending reinforcements, by destroying supplies on the line of march of

the invaders, by destroying the bridges over which they would have to

cross, and by, in every way, obstructing the roads to their front. But

it was hard to convince the people of the propriety of destroying

supplies which were so much needed by themselves, and each one hoped

that his own possessions might escape.

Hood soon started north, and went into camp near Decatur, Alabama, where

he remained until the 29th of October, but without making an attack on

the garrison of that place.

The Tennessee River was patrolled by gunboats, from Muscle Shoals east;

and, also, below the second shoals out to the Ohio River. These, with

the troops that might be concentrated from the garrisons along the river

at any point where Hood might choose to attempt to cross, made it

impossible for him to cross the Tennessee at any place where it was

navigable. But Muscle Shoals is not navigable, and below them again is

another shoal which also obstructs navigation. Hood therefore moved

down to a point nearly opposite Florence, Alabama, crossed over and

remained there for some time, collecting supplies of food, forage and

ammunition. All of these had to come from a considerable distance south,

because the region in which he was then situated was mountainous, with

small valleys which produced but little, and what they had produced had

long since been exhausted. On the 1st of November I suggested to

Sherman, and also asked his views thereon, the propriety of destroying

Hood before he started on his campaign.

On the 2d of November, as stated, I approved definitely his making his

proposed campaign through Georgia, leaving Hood behind to the tender

mercy of Thomas and the troops in his command. Sherman fixed the 10th

of November as the day of starting.

Sherman started on that day to get back to Atlanta, and on the 15th the

real march to the sea commenced. The right wing, under Howard, and the

cavalry went to Jonesboro, Milledgeville, then the capital of Georgia,

being Sherman's objective or stopping place on the way to Savannah. The

left wing moved to Stone Mountain, along roads much farther east than

those taken by the right wing. Slocum was in command, and threatened

Augusta as the point to which he was moving, but he was to turn off and

meet the right wing at Milledgeville.

Atlanta was destroyed so far as to render it worthless for military

purposes before starting, Sherman himself remaining over a day to

superintend the work, and see that it was well done. Sherman's orders

for this campaign were perfect. Before starting, he had sent back all

sick, disabled and weak men, retaining nothing but the hardy,

well-inured soldiers to accompany him on his long march in prospect.

His artillery was reduced to sixty-five guns. The ammunition carried

with them was two hundred rounds for musket and gun. Small rations were

taken in a small wagon train, which was loaded to its capacity for rapid

movement. The army was expected to live on the country, and to always

keep the wagons full of forage and provisions against a possible delay

of a few days.

The troops, both of the right and left wings, made most of their advance

along the line of railroads, which they destroyed. The method adopted

to perform this work, was to burn and destroy all the bridges and

culverts, and for a long distance, at places, to tear up the track and

bend the rails. Soldiers to do this rapidly would form a line along one

side of the road with crowbars and poles, place these under the rails

and, hoisting all at once, turn over many rods of road at one time. The

ties would then be placed in piles, and the rails, as they were

loosened, would be carried and put across these log heaps. When a

sufficient number of rails were placed upon a pile of ties it would be

set on fire. This would heat the rails very much more in the middle,

that being over the main part of the fire, than at the ends, so that

they would naturally bend of their own weight; but the soldiers, to

increase the damage, would take tongs and, one or two men at each end of

the rail, carry it with force against the nearest tree and twist it

around, thus leaving rails forming bands to ornament the forest trees of

Georgia. All this work was going on at the same time, there being a

sufficient number of men detailed for that purpose. Some piled the logs

and built the fire; some put the rails upon the fire; while others would

bend those that were sufficiently heated: so that, by the time the last

bit of road was torn up, that it was designed to destroy at a certain

place, the rails previously taken up were already destroyed.

The organization for supplying the army was very complete. Each brigade

furnished a company to gather supplies of forage and provisions for the

command to which they belonged. Strict injunctions were issued against

pillaging, or otherwise unnecessarily annoying the people; but

everything in shape of food for man and forage for beast was taken. The

supplies were turned over to the brigade commissary and quartermaster,

and were issued by them to their respective commands precisely the same

as if they had been purchased. The captures consisted largely of

cattle, sheep, poultry, some bacon, cornmeal, often molasses, and

occasionally coffee or other small rations.

The skill of these men, called by themselves and the army "bummers," in

collecting their loads and getting back to their respective commands,

was marvellous. When they started out in the morning, they were always

on foot; but scarcely one of them returned in the evening without being

mounted on a horse or mule. These would be turned in for the general use

of the army, and the next day these men would start out afoot and return

again in the evening mounted.

Many of the exploits of these men would fall under the head of romance;

indeed, I am afraid that in telling some of their experiences, the

romance got the better of the truth upon which the story was founded,

and that, in the way many of these anecdotes are told, very little of

the foundation is left. I suspect that most of them consist chiefly of

the fiction added to make the stories better. In one instance it was

reported that a few men of Sherman's army passed a house where they

discovered some chickens under the dwelling. They immediately proceeded

to capture them, to add to the army's supplies. The lady of the house,

who happened to be at home, made piteous appeals to have these spared,

saying they were a few she had put away to save by permission of other

parties who had preceded and who had taken all the others that she had.

The soldiers seemed moved at her appeal; but looking at the chickens

again they were tempted and one of them replied: "The rebellion must be

suppressed if it takes the last chicken in the Confederacy," and

proceeded to appropriate the last one.

Another anecdote characteristic of these times has been told. The South,

prior to the rebellion, kept bloodhounds to pursue runaway slaves who

took refuge in the neighboring swamps, and also to hunt convicts.

Orders were issued to kill all these animals as they were met with. On

one occasion a soldier picked up a poodle, the favorite pet of its

mistress, and was carrying it off to execution when the lady made a

strong appeal to him to spare it. The soldier replied, "Madam, our

orders are to kill every bloodhound." "But this is not a bloodhound,"

said the lady. "Well, madam, we cannot tell what it will grow into if

we leave it behind," said the soldier as he went off with it.

Notwithstanding these anecdotes, and the necessary hardship they would

seem to imply, I do not believe there was much unwarrantable pillaging

considering that we were in the enemy's territory and without any

supplies except such as the country afforded.

On the 23d Sherman, with the left wing, reached Milledgeville. The right

wing was not far off: but proceeded on its way towards Savannah

destroying the road as it went. The troops at Milledgeville remained

over a day to destroy factories, buildings used for military purposes,

etc., before resuming its march.

The governor, who had been almost defying Mr. Davis before this, now

fled precipitately, as did the legislature of the State and all the

State officers. The governor, Sherman says, was careful to carry away

even his garden vegetables, while he left the archives of the State to

fall into our hands. The only military force that was opposed to

Sherman's forward march was the Georgia militia, a division under the

command of General G. W. Smith, and a battalion under Harry Wayne.

Neither the quality of the forces nor their numbers was sufficient to

even retard the progress of Sherman's army.

The people at the South became so frantic at this time at the successful

invasion of Georgia that they took the cadets from the military college

and added them to the ranks of the militia. They even liberated the

State convicts under promise from them that they would serve in the

army. I have but little doubt that the worst acts that were attributed

to Sherman's army were committed by these convicts, and by other

Southern people who ought to have been under sentence--such people as

could be found in every community, North and South--who took advantage

of their country being invaded to commit crime. They were in but little

danger of detection, or of arrest even if detected.

The Southern papers in commenting upon Sherman's movements pictured him

as in the most deplorable condition: stating that his men were

starving, that they were demoralized and wandering about almost without

object, aiming only to reach the sea coast and get under the protection

of our navy. These papers got to the North and had more or less effect

upon the minds of the people, causing much distress to all loyal persons

particularly to those who had husbands, sons or brothers with Sherman.

Mr. Lincoln seeing these accounts, had a letter written asking me if I

could give him anything that he could say to the loyal people that would

comfort them. I told him there was not the slightest occasion for

alarm; that with 60,000 such men as Sherman had with him, such a

commanding officer as he was could not be cut off in the open country.

He might possibly be prevented from reaching the point he had started

out to reach, but he would get through somewhere and would finally get

to his chosen destination: and even if worst came to worst he could

return North. I heard afterwards of Mr. Lincoln's saying, to those who

would inquire of him as to what he thought about the safety of Sherman's

army, that Sherman was all right: "Grant says they are safe with such a

general, and that if they cannot get out where they want to, they can

crawl back by the hole they went in at."

While at Milledgeville the soldiers met at the State House, organized a

legislature, and proceeded to business precisely as if they were the

legislative body belonging to the State of Georgia. The debates were

exciting, and were upon the subject of the situation the South was in at

that time, particularly the State of Georgia. They went so far as to

repeal, after a spirited and acrimonious debate, the ordinance of

secession.

The next day (24th) Sherman continued his march, going by the way of

Waynesboro and Louisville, Millen being the next objective and where the

two columns (the right and left wings) were to meet. The left wing

moved to the left of the direct road, and the cavalry still farther off

so as to make it look as though Augusta was the point they were aiming

for. They moved on all the roads they could find leading in that

direction. The cavalry was sent to make a rapid march in hope of

surprising Millen before the Union prisoners could be carried away; but

they failed in this.

The distance from Milledgeville to Millen was about one hundred miles.

At this point Wheeler, who had been ordered from Tennessee, arrived and

swelled the numbers and efficiency of the troops confronting Sherman.

Hardee, a native of Georgia, also came, but brought no troops with him.

It was intended that he should raise as large an army as possible with

which to intercept Sherman's march. He did succeed in raising some

troops, and with these and those under the command of Wheeler and Wayne,

had an army sufficient to cause some annoyance but no great detention.

Our cavalry and Wheeler's had a pretty severe engagement, in which

Wheeler was driven towards Augusta, thus giving the idea that Sherman

was probably making for that point.

Millen was reached on the 3d of December, and the march was resumed the

following day for Savannah, the final objective. Bragg had now been sent

to Augusta with some troops. Wade Hampton was there also trying to

raise cavalry sufficient to destroy Sherman's army. If he ever raised a

force it was too late to do the work expected of it. Hardee's whole

force probably numbered less than ten thousand men.

From Millen to Savannah the country is sandy and poor, and affords but

very little forage other than rice straw, which was then growing. This

answered a very good purpose as forage, and the rice grain was an

addition to the soldier's rations. No further resistance worthy of note

was met with, until within a few miles of Savannah. This place was

found to be intrenched and garrisoned. Sherman proceeded at once on his

arrival to invest the place, and found that the enemy had placed

torpedoes in the ground, which were to explode when stepped on by man or

beast. One of these exploded under an officer's horse, blowing the

animal to pieces and tearing one of the legs of the officer so badly

that it had to be amputated. Sherman at once ordered his prisoners to

the front, moving them in a compact body in advance, to either explode

the torpedoes or dig them up. No further explosion took place.

On the 10th of December the siege of Savannah commenced. Sherman then,

before proceeding any further with operations for the capture of the

place, started with some troops to open communication with our fleet,

which he expected to find in the lower harbor or as near by as the forts

of the enemy would permit. In marching to the coast he encountered Fort

McAllister, which it was necessary to reduce before the supplies he

might find on shipboard could be made available. Fort McAllister was

soon captured by an assault made by General Hazen's division.

Communication was then established with the fleet. The capture of

Savannah then only occupied a few days, and involved no great loss of

life. The garrison, however, as we shall see, was enabled to escape by

crossing the river and moving eastward.

When Sherman had opened communication with the fleet he found there a

steamer, which I had forwarded to him, carrying the accumulated mails

for his army, also supplies which I supposed he would be in need of.

General J. G. Foster, who commanded all the troops south of North

Carolina on the Atlantic sea-board, visited General Sherman before he

had opened communication with the fleet, with the view of ascertaining

what assistance he could be to him. Foster returned immediately to his

own headquarters at Hilton Head, for the purpose of sending Sherman

siege guns, and also if he should find he had them to spare, supplies of

clothing, hard bread, etc., thinking that these articles might not be

found outside. The mail on the steamer which I sent down, had been

collected by Colonel A. H. Markland of the Post Office Department, who

went in charge of it. On this same vessel I sent an officer of my staff

(Lieutenant Dunn) with the following letter to General Sherman:

CITY POINT, VA., Dec. 3, 1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN, Commanding Armies near Savannah, Ga.

The little information gleaned from the Southern press, indicating no

great obstacle to your progress, I have directed your mails (which had

been previously collected at Baltimore by Colonel Markland, Special

Agent of the Post Office Department) to be sent as far as the blockading

squadron off Savannah, to be forwarded to you as soon as heard from on

the coast.

Not liking to rejoice before the victory is assured, I abstain from

congratulating you and those under your command, until bottom has been

struck. I have never had a fear, however, for the result.

Since you left Atlanta, no very great progress has been made here. The

enemy has been closely watched though, and prevented from detaching

against you. I think not one man has gone from here, except some twelve

or fifteen hundred dismounted cavalry. Bragg has gone from Wilmington.

I am trying to take advantage of his absence to get possession of that

place. Owing to some preparations Admiral Porter and General Butler are

making to blow up Fort Fisher (which, while hoping for the best, I do

not believe a particle in), there is a delay in getting this expedition

off. I hope they will be ready to start by the 7th, and that Bragg will

not have started back by that time.

In this letter I do not intend to give you anything like directions for

future action, but will state a general idea I have, and will get your

views after you have established yourself on the sea-coast. With your

veteran army I hope to get control of the only two through routes from

east to west possessed by the enemy before the fall of Atlanta. The

condition will be filled by holding Savannah and Augusta, or by holding

any other port to the east of Savannah and Branchville. If Wilmington

falls, a force from there can co-operate with you.

Thomas has got back into the defences of Nashville, with Hood close upon

him. Decatur has been abandoned, and so have all the roads except the

main one leading to Chattanooga. Part of this falling back was

undoubtedly necessary and all of it may have been. It did not look so,

however, to me. In my opinion, Thomas far outnumbers Hood in infantry.

In cavalry, Hood has the advantage in morale and numbers. I hope yet

that Hood will be badly crippled if not destroyed. The general news you

will learn from the papers better than I could give it.

After all becomes quiet, and roads become so bad up here that there is

likely to be a week or two when nothing can be done, I will run down the

coast to see you. If you desire it, I will ask Mrs. Sherman to go with

me.

Yours truly, U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General

I quote this letter because it gives the reader a full knowledge of the

events of that period.

Sherman now (the 15th) returned to Savannah to complete its investment

and insure the surrender of the garrison. The country about Savannah is

low and marshy, and the city was well intrenched from the river above to

the river below; and assaults could not be made except along a

comparatively narrow causeway. For this reason assaults must have

resulted in serious destruction of life to the Union troops, with the

chance of failing altogether. Sherman therefore decided upon a complete

investment of the place. When he believed this investment completed, he

summoned the garrison to surrender. General Hardee, who was in command,

replied in substance that the condition of affairs was not such as

Sherman had described. He said he was in full communication with his

department and was receiving supplies constantly.

Hardee, however, was cut off entirely from all communication with the

west side of the river, and by the river itself to the north and south.

On the South Carolina side the country was all rice fields, through

which it would have been impossible to bring supplies so that Hardee had

no possible communication with the outside world except by a dilapidated

plank road starting from the west bank of the river. Sherman, receiving

this reply, proceeded in person to a point on the coast, where General

Foster had troops stationed under General Hatch, for the purpose of

making arrangements with the latter officer to go through by one of the

numerous channels running inland along that part of the coast of South

Carolina, to the plank road which General Hardee still possessed, and

thus to cut him off from the last means he had of getting supplies, if

not of communication.

While arranging for this movement, and before the attempt to execute the

plan had been commenced, Sherman received information through one of his

staff officers that the enemy had evacuated Savannah the night before.

This was the night of the 21st of December. Before evacuating the place

Hardee had blown up the navy yard. Some iron-clads had been destroyed,

as well as other property that might have been valuable to us; but he

left an immense amount of stores untouched, consisting of cotton,

railroad cars, workshops, numerous pieces of artillery, and several

thousand stands of small arms.

A little incident occurred, soon after the fall of Savannah, which

Sherman relates in his Memoirs, and which is worthy of repetition.

Savannah was one of the points where blockade runners entered. Shortly

after the city fell into our possession, a blockade runner came sailing

up serenely, not doubting but the Confederates were still in possession.

It was not molested, and the captain did not find out his mistake until

he had tied up and gone to the Custom House, where he found a new

occupant of the building, and made a less profitable disposition of his

vessel and cargo than he had expected.

As there was some discussion as to the authorship of Sherman's march to

the sea, by critics of his book when it appeared before the public, I

want to state here that no question upon that subject was ever raised

between General Sherman and myself. Circumstances made the plan on which

Sherman expected to act impracticable, as as commander of the forces he

necessarily had to devise a new on which would give more promise of

success: consequently he recommended the destruction of the railroad

back to Chattanooga, and that he should be authorized then to move, as

he did, from Atlanta forward. His suggestions were finally approved,

although they did not immediately find favor in Washington. Even when

it came to the time of starting, the greatest apprehension, as to the

propriety of the campaign he was about commence, filled the mind of the

President, induced no doubt by his advisers. This went so far as to

move the President to ask me to suspend Sherman's march for a day or two

until I could think the matter over. My recollection is, though I find

no record to show it, that out of deference to the President's wish I

did send a dispatch to Sherman asking him to wait a day or two, or else

the connections between us were already cut so that I could not do so.

However this may be, the question of who devised the plan of march from

Atlanta to Savannah is easily answered: it was clearly Sherman, and to

him also belongs the credit of its brilliant execution. It was hardly

possible that any one else than those on the spot could have devised a

new plan of campaign to supersede one that did not promise success.

(*40)

I was in favor of Sherman's plan from the time it was first submitted to

me. My chief of staff, however, was very bitterly opposed to it and, as

I learned subsequently, finding that he could not move me, he appealed

to the authorities at Washington to stop it.