CHAPTER LXIV.

INTERVIEW WITH SHERIDAN--GRAND MOVEMENT OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC

--SHERIDAN'S ADVANCE ON FIVE FORKS--BATTLE OF FIVE FORKS--PARKE AND

WRIGHT STORM THE ENEMY'S LINE--BATTLES BEFORE PETERSBURG.

Sheridan reached City Point on the 26th day of March. His horses, of

course, were jaded and many of them had lost their shoes. A few days of

rest were necessary to recuperate the animals and also to have them shod

and put in condition for moving. Immediately on General Sheridan's

arrival at City Point I prepared his instructions for the move which I

had decided upon. The movement was to commence on the 29th of the

month.

After reading the instructions I had given him, Sheridan walked out of

my tent, and I followed to have some conversation with him by himself

--not in the presence of anybody else, even of a member of my staff. In

preparing his instructions I contemplated just what took place; that is

to say, capturing Five Forks, driving the enemy from Petersburg and

Richmond and terminating the contest before separating from the enemy.

But the Nation had already become restless and discouraged at the

prolongation of the war, and many believed that it would never terminate

except by compromise. Knowing that unless my plan proved an entire

success it would be interpreted as a disastrous defeat, I provided in

these instructions that in a certain event he was to cut loose from the

Army of the Potomac and his base of supplies, and living upon the

country proceed south by the way of the Danville Railroad, or near it,

across the Roanoke, get in the rear of Johnston, who was guarding that

road, and cooperate with Sherman in destroying Johnston; then with these

combined forces to help carry out the instructions which Sherman already

had received, to act in cooperation with the armies around Petersburg

and Richmond.

I saw that after Sheridan had read his instructions he seemed somewhat

disappointed at the idea, possibly, of having to cut loose again from

the Army of the Potomac, and place himself between the two main armies

of the enemy. I said to him: "General, this portion of your

instructions I have put in merely as a blind;" and gave him the reason

for doing so, heretofore described. I told him that, as a matter of

fact, I intended to close the war right here, with this movement, and

that he should go no farther. His face at once brightened up, and

slapping his hand on his leg he said: "I am glad to hear it, and we can

do it."

Sheridan was not however to make his movement against Five Forks until

he got further instructions from me.

One day, after the movement I am about to describe had commenced, and

when his cavalry was on our extreme left and far to the rear, south,

Sheridan rode up to where my headquarters were then established, at

Dabney's Mills. He met some of my staff officers outside, and was

highly jubilant over the prospects of success, giving reasons why he

believed this would prove the final and successful effort. Although my

chief-of-staff had urged very strongly that we return to our position

about City Point and in the lines around Petersburg, he asked Sheridan

to come in to see me and say to me what he had been saying to them.

Sheridan felt a little modest about giving his advice where it had not

been asked; so one of my staff came in and told me that Sheridan had

what they considered important news, and suggested that I send for him.

I did so, and was glad to see the spirit of confidence with which he was

imbued. Knowing as I did from experience, of what great value that

feeling of confidence by a commander was, I determined to make a

movement at once, although on account of the rains which had fallen

after I had started out the roads were still very heavy. Orders were

given accordingly.

Finally the 29th of March came, and fortunately there having been a few

days free from rain, the surface of the ground was dry, giving

indications that the time had come when we could move. On that date I

moved out with all the army available after leaving sufficient force to

hold the line about Petersburg. It soon set in raining again however,

and in a very short time the roads became practically impassable for

teams, and almost so for cavalry. Sometimes a horse or mule would be

standing apparently on firm ground, when all at once one foot would

sink, and as he commenced scrambling to catch himself all his feet would

sink and he would have to be drawn by hand out of the quicksands so

common in that part of Virginia and other southern States. It became

necessary therefore to build corduroy roads every foot of the way as we

advanced, to move our artillery upon. The army had become so accustomed

to this kind of work, and were so well prepared for it, that it was done

very rapidly. The next day, March 30th, we had made sufficient progress

to the south-west to warrant me in starting Sheridan with his cavalry

over by Dinwiddie with instructions to then come up by the road leading

north-west to Five Forks, thus menacing the right of Lee's line.

This movement was made for the purpose of extending our lines to the

west as far as practicable towards the enemy's extreme right, or Five

Forks. The column moving detached from the army still in the trenches

was, excluding the cavalry, very small. The forces in the trenches were

themselves extending to the left flank. Warren was on the extreme left

when the extension began, but Humphreys was marched around later and

thrown into line between him and Five Forks.

My hope was that Sheridan would be able to carry Five Forks, get on the

enemy's right flank and rear, and force them to weaken their centre to

protect their right so that an assault in the centre might be

successfully made. General Wright's corps had been designated to make

this assault, which I intended to order as soon as information reached

me of Sheridan's success. He was to move under cover as close to the

enemy as he could get.

It is natural to suppose that Lee would understand my design to be to

get up to the South Side and ultimately to the Danville Railroad, as

soon as he had heard of the movement commenced on the 29th. These roads

were so important to his very existence while he remained in Richmond

and Petersburg, and of such vital importance to him even in case of

retreat, that naturally he would make most strenuous efforts to defend

them. He did on the 30th send Pickett with five brigades to reinforce

Five Forks. He also sent around to the right of his army some two or

three other divisions, besides directing that other troops be held in

readiness on the north side of the James River to come over on call. He

came over himself to superintend in person the defence of his right

flank.

Sheridan moved back to Dinwiddie Court-House on the night of the 30th,

and then took a road leading north-west to Five Forks. He had only his

cavalry with him. Soon encountering the rebel cavalry he met with a

very stout resistance. He gradually drove them back however until in

the neighborhood of Five Forks. Here he had to encounter other troops

besides those he had been contending with, and was forced to give way.

In this condition of affairs he notified me of what had taken place and

stated that he was falling back toward Dinwiddie gradually and slowly,

and asked me to send Wright's corps to his assistance. I replied to him

that it was impossible to send Wright's corps because that corps was

already in line close up to the enemy, where we should want to assault

when the proper time came, and was besides a long distance from him; but

the 2d (Humphreys's) and 5th (Warren's) corps were on our extreme left

and a little to the rear of it in a position to threaten the left flank

of the enemy at Five Forks, and that I would send Warren.

Accordingly orders were sent to Warren to move at once that night (the

31st) to Dinwiddie Court House and put himself in communication with

Sheridan as soon as possible, and report to him. He was very slow in

moving, some of his troops not starting until after 5 o'clock next

morning. When he did move it was done very deliberately, and on

arriving at Gravelly Run he found the stream swollen from the recent

rains so that he regarded it as not fordable. Sheridan of course knew

of his coming, and being impatient to get the troops up as soon as

possible, sent orders to him to hasten. He was also hastened or at

least ordered to move up rapidly by General Meade. He now felt that he

could not cross that creek without bridges, and his orders were changed

to move so as to strike the pursuing enemy in flank or get in their

rear; but he was so late in getting up that Sheridan determined to move

forward without him. However, Ayres's division of Warren's corps

reached him in time to be in the fight all day, most of the time

separated from the remainder of the 5th corps and fighting directly

under Sheridan.

Warren reported to Sheridan about 11 o'clock on the 1st, but the whole

of his troops were not up so as to be much engaged until late in the

afternoon. Griffin's division in backing to get out of the way of a

severe cross fire of the enemy was found marching away from the

fighting. This did not continue long, however; the division was brought

back and with Ayres's division did most excellent service during the

day. Crawford's division of the same corps had backed still farther

off, and although orders were sent repeatedly to bring it up, it was

late before it finally got to where it could be of material assistance.

Once there it did very excellent service.

Sheridan succeeded by the middle of the afternoon or a little later, in

advancing up to the point from which to make his designed assault upon

Five Forks itself. He was very impatient to make the assault and have

it all over before night, because the ground he occupied would be

untenable for him in bivouac during the night. Unless the assault was

made and was successful, he would be obliged to return to Dinwiddie

Court-House, or even further than that for the night.

It was at this junction of affairs that Sheridan wanted to get

Crawford's division in hand, and he also wanted Warren. He sent staff

officer after staff officer in search of Warren, directing that general

to report to him, but they were unable to find him. At all events

Sheridan was unable to get that officer to him. Finally he went

himself. He issued an order relieving Warren and assigning Griffin to

the command of the 5th corps. The troops were then brought up and the

assault successfully made.

I was so much dissatisfied with Warren's dilatory movements in the

battle of White Oak Road and in his failure to reach Sheridan in time,

that I was very much afraid that at the last moment he would fail

Sheridan. He was a man of fine intelligence, great earnestness, quick

perception, and could make his dispositions as quickly as any officer,

under difficulties where he was forced to act. But I had before

discovered a defect which was beyond his control, that was very

prejudicial to his usefulness in emergencies like the one just before

us. He could see every danger at a glance before he had encountered it.

He would not only make preparations to meet the danger which might

occur, but he would inform his commanding officer what others should do

while he was executing his move.

I had sent a staff officer to General Sheridan to call his attention to

these defects, and to say that as much as I liked General Warren, now

was not a time when we could let our personal feelings for any one stand

in the way of success; and if his removal was necessary to success, not

to hesitate. It was upon that authorization that Sheridan removed

Warren. I was very sorry that it had been done, and regretted still

more that I had not long before taken occasion to assign him to another

field of duty.

It was dusk when our troops under Sheridan went over the parapets of the

enemy. The two armies were mingled together there for a time in such

manner that it was almost a question which one was going to demand the

surrender of the other. Soon, however, the enemy broke and ran in every

direction; some six thousand prisoners, besides artillery and small-arms

in large quantities, falling into our hands. The flying troops were

pursued in different directions, the cavalry and 5th corps under

Sheridan pursuing the larger body which moved north-west.

This pursuit continued until about nine o'clock at night, when Sheridan

halted his troops, and knowing the importance to him of the part of the

enemy's line which had been captured, returned, sending the 5th corps

across Hatcher's Run to just south-west of Petersburg, and facing them

toward it. Merritt, with the cavalry, stopped and bivouacked west of

Five Forks.

This was the condition which affairs were in on the night of the 1st of

April. I then issued orders for an assault by Wright and Parke at four

o'clock on the morning of the 2d. I also ordered the 2d corps, General

Humphreys, and General Ord with the Army of the James, on the left, to

hold themselves in readiness to take any advantage that could be taken

from weakening in their front.

I notified Mr. Lincoln at City Point of the success of the day; in fact

I had reported to him during the day and evening as I got news, because

he was so much interested in the movements taking place that I wanted to

relieve his mind as much as I could. I notified Weitzel on the north

side of the James River, directing him, also, to keep close up to the

enemy, and take advantage of the withdrawal of troops from there to

promptly enter the city of Richmond.

I was afraid that Lee would regard the possession of Five Forks as of so

much importance that he would make a last desperate effort to retake it,

risking everything upon the cast of a single die. It was for this

reason that I had ordered the assault to take place at once, as soon as

I had received the news of the capture of Five Forks. The corps

commanders, however, reported that it was so dark that the men could not

see to move, and it would be impossible to make the assault then. But we

kept up a continuous artillery fire upon the enemy around the whole line

including that north of the James River, until it was light enough to

move, which was about a quarter to five in the morning.

At that hour Parke's and Wright's corps moved out as directed, brushed

the _abatis_ from their front as they advanced under a heavy fire of

musketry and artillery, and went without flinching directly on till they

mounted the parapets and threw themselves inside of the enemy's line.

Parke, who was on the right, swept down to the right and captured a very

considerable length of line in that direction, but at that point the

outer was so near the inner line which closely enveloped the city of

Petersburg that he could make no advance forward and, in fact, had a

very serious task to turn the lines which he had captured to the defence

of his own troops and to hold them; but he succeeded in this.

Wright swung around to his left and moved to Hatcher's Run, sweeping

everything before him. The enemy had traverses in rear of his captured

line, under cover of which he made something of a stand, from one to

another, as Wright moved on; but the latter met no serious obstacle. As

you proceed to the left the outer line becomes gradually much farther

from the inner one, and along about Hatcher's Run they must be nearly

two miles apart. Both Parke and Wright captured a considerable amount of

artillery and some prisoners--Wright about three thousand of them.

In the meantime Ord and Humphreys, in obedience to the instructions they

had received, had succeeded by daylight, or very early in the morning,

in capturing the intrenched picket-lines in their front; and before

Wright got up to that point, Ord had also succeeded in getting inside of

the enemy's intrenchments. The second corps soon followed; and the

outer works of Petersburg were in the hands of the National troops,

never to be wrenched from them again. When Wright reached Hatcher's

Run, he sent a regiment to destroy the South Side Railroad just outside

of the city.

My headquarters were still at Dabney's saw-mills. As soon as I received

the news of Wright's success, I sent dispatches announcing the fact to

all points around the line, including the troops at Bermuda Hundred and

those on the north side of the James, and to the President at City

Point. Further dispatches kept coming in, and as they did I sent the

additional news to these points. Finding at length that they were all

in, I mounted my horse to join the troops who were inside the works.

When I arrived there I rode my horse over the parapet just as Wright's

three thousand prisoners were coming out. I was soon joined inside by

General Meade and his staff.

Lee made frantic efforts to recover at least part of the lost ground.

Parke on our right was repeatedly assaulted, but repulsed every effort.

Before noon Longstreet was ordered up from the north side of the James

River thus bringing the bulk of Lee's army around to the support of his

extreme right. As soon as I learned this I notified Weitzel and

directed him to keep up close to the enemy and to have Hartsuff,

commanding the Bermuda Hundred front, to do the same thing, and if they

found any break to go in; Hartsuff especially should do so, for this

would separate Richmond and Petersburg.

Sheridan, after he had returned to Five Forks, swept down to Petersburg,

coming in on our left. This gave us a continuous line from the

Appomattox River below the city to the same river above. At eleven

o'clock, not having heard from Sheridan, I reinforced Parke with two

brigades from City Point. With this additional force he completed his

captured works for better defence, and built back from his right, so as

to protect his flank. He also carried in and made an _abatis_ between

himself and the enemy. Lee brought additional troops and artillery

against Parke even after this was done, and made several assaults with

very heavy losses.

The enemy had in addition to their intrenched line close up to

Petersburg, two enclosed works outside of it, Fort Gregg and Fort

Whitworth. We thought it had now become necessary to carry them by

assault. About one o'clock in the day, Fort Gregg was assaulted by

Foster's division of the 24th corps (Gibbon's), supported by two

brigades from Ord's command. The battle was desperate and the National

troops were repulsed several times; but it was finally carried, and

immediately the troops in Fort Whitworth evacuated the place. The guns

of Fort Gregg were turned upon the retreating enemy, and the commanding

officer with some sixty of the men of Fort Whitworth surrendered.

I had ordered Miles in the morning to report to Sheridan. In moving to

execute this order he came upon the enemy at the intersection of the

White Oak Road and the Claiborne Road. The enemy fell back to

Sutherland Station on the South Side Road and were followed by Miles.

This position, naturally a strong and defensible one, was also strongly

intrenched. Sheridan now came up and Miles asked permission from him to

make the assault, which Sheridan gave. By this time Humphreys had got

through the outer works in his front, and came up also and assumed

command over Miles, who commanded a division in his corps. I had sent

an order to Humphreys to turn to his right and move towards Petersburg.

This order he now got, and started off, thus leaving Miles alone. The

latter made two assaults, both of which failed, and he had to fall back

a few hundred yards.

Hearing that Miles had been left in this position, I directed Humphreys

to send a division back to his relief. He went himself.

Sheridan before starting to sweep down to Petersburg had sent Merritt

with his cavalry to the west to attack some Confederate cavalry that had

assembled there. Merritt drove them north to the Appomattox River.

Sheridan then took the enemy at Sutherland Station on the reverse side

from where Miles was, and the two together captured the place, with a

large number of prisoners and some pieces of artillery, and put the

remainder, portions of three Confederate corps, to flight. Sheridan

followed, and drove them until night, when further pursuit was stopped.

Miles bivouacked for the night on the ground which he with Sheridan had

carried so handsomely by assault. I cannot explain the situation here

better than by giving my dispatch to City Point that evening:

BOYDTON ROAD, NEAR PETERSBURG, April 2, 1865.--4.40 P.M.

COLONEL T. S. BOWERS, City Point.

We are now up and have a continuous line of troops, and in a few hours

will be intrenched from the Appomattox below Petersburg to the river

above. Heth's and Wilcox's divisions, such part of them as were not

captured, were cut off from town, either designedly on their part or

because they could not help it. Sheridan with the cavalry and 5th corps

is above them. Miles's division, 2d corps, was sent from the White Oak

Road to Sutherland Station on the South Side Railroad, where he met

them, and at last accounts was engaged with them. Not knowing whether

Sheridan would get up in time, General Humphreys was sent with another

division from here. The whole captures since the army started out

gunning will amount to not less than twelve thousand men, and probably

fifty pieces of artillery. I do not know the number of men and guns

accurately however. * * * I think the President might come out and pay

us a visit tomorrow.

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

During the night of April 2d our line was intrenched from the river

above to the river below. I ordered a bombardment to be commenced the

next morning at five A.M., to be followed by an assault at six o'clock;

but the enemy evacuated Petersburg early in the morning.