CHAPTER LXX.

THE END OF THE WAR--THE MARCH TO WASHINGTON--ONE OF LINCOLN'S ANECDOTES

--GRAND REVIEW AT WASHINGTON--CHARACTERISTICS OF LINCOLN AND STANTON

--ESTIMATE OF THE DIFFERENT CORPS COMMANDERS.

Things began to quiet down, and as the certainty that there would be no

more armed resistance became clearer, the troops in North Carolina and

Virginia were ordered to march immediately to the capital, and go into

camp there until mustered out. Suitable garrisons were left at the

prominent places throughout the South to insure obedience to the laws

that might be enacted for the government of the several States, and to

insure security to the lives and property of all classes. I do not know

how far this was necessary, but I deemed it necessary, at that time,

that such a course should be pursued. I think now that these garrisons

were continued after they ceased to be absolutely required; but it is

not to be expected that such a rebellion as was fought between the

sections from 1861 to 1865 could terminate without leaving many serious

apprehensions in the mind of the people as to what should be done.

Sherman marched his troops from Goldsboro, up to Manchester, on the

south side of the James River, opposite Richmond, and there put them in

camp, while he went back to Savannah to see what the situation was

there.

It was during this trip that the last outrage was committed upon him.

Halleck had been sent to Richmond to command Virginia, and had issued

orders prohibiting even Sherman's own troops from obeying his,

Sherman's, orders. Sherman met the papers on his return, containing

this order of Halleck, and very justly felt indignant at the outrage.

On his arrival at Fortress Monroe returning from Savannah, Sherman

received an invitation from Halleck to come to Richmond and be his

guest. This he indignantly refused, and informed Halleck, furthermore,

that he had seen his order. He also stated that he was coming up to

take command of his troops, and as he marched through it would probably

be as well for Halleck not to show himself, because he (Sherman) would

not be responsible for what some rash person might do through

indignation for the treatment he had received. Very soon after that,

Sherman received orders from me to proceed to Washington City, and to go

into camp on the south side of the city pending the mustering-out of the

troops.

There was no incident worth noting in the march northward from

Goldsboro, to Richmond, or in that from Richmond to Washington City.

The army, however, commanded by Sherman, which had been engaged in all

the battles of the West and had marched from the Mississippi through the

Southern States to the sea, from there to Goldsboro, and thence to

Washington City, had passed over many of the battle-fields of the Army

of the Potomac, thus having seen, to a greater extent than any other

body of troops, the entire theatre of the four years' war for the

preservation of the Union.

The march of Sherman's army from Atlanta to the sea and north to

Goldsboro, while it was not accompanied with the danger that was

anticipated, yet was magnificent in its results, and equally magnificent

in the way it was conducted. It had an important bearing, in various

ways, upon the great object we had in view, that of closing the war.

All the States east of the Mississippi River up to the State of Georgia,

had felt the hardships of the war. Georgia, and South Carolina, and

almost all of North Carolina, up to this time, had been exempt from

invasion by the Northern armies, except upon their immediate sea coasts.

Their newspapers had given such an account of Confederate success, that

the people who remained at home had been convinced that the Yankees had

been whipped from first to last, and driven from pillar to post, and

that now they could hardly be holding out for any other purpose than to

find a way out of the war with honor to themselves.

Even during this march of Sherman's the newspapers in his front were

proclaiming daily that his army was nothing better than a mob of men who

were frightened out of their wits and hastening, panic-stricken, to try

to get under the cover of our navy for protection against the Southern

people. As the army was seen marching on triumphantly, however, the

minds of the people became disabused and they saw the true state of

affairs. In turn they became disheartened, and would have been glad to

submit without compromise.

Another great advantage resulting from this march, and which was

calculated to hasten the end, was the fact that the great storehouse of

Georgia was entirely cut off from the Confederate armies. As the troops

advanced north from Savannah, the destruction of the railroads in South

Carolina and the southern part of North Carolina, further cut off their

resources and left the armies still in Virginia and North Carolina

dependent for supplies upon a very small area of country, already very

much exhausted of food and forage.

In due time the two armies, one from Burkesville Junction and the other

from the neighborhood of Raleigh, North Carolina, arrived and went into

camp near the Capital, as directed. The troops were hardy, being inured

to fatigue, and they appeared in their respective camps as ready and fit

for duty as they had ever been in their lives. I doubt whether an equal

body of men of any nation, take them man for man, officer for officer,

was ever gotten together that would have proved their equal in a great

battle.

The armies of Europe are machines; the men are brave and the officers

capable; but the majority of the soldiers in most of the nations of

Europe are taken from a class of people who are not very intelligent and

who have very little interest in the contest in which they are called

upon to take part. Our armies were composed of men who were able to

read, men who knew what they were fighting for, and could not be induced

to serve as soldiers, except in an emergency when the safety of the

nation was involved, and so necessarily must have been more than equal

to men who fought merely because they were brave and because they were

thoroughly drilled and inured to hardships.

There was nothing of particular importance occurred during the time

these troops were in camp before starting North.

I remember one little incident which I will relate as an anecdote

characteristic of Mr. Lincoln. It occurred a day after I reached

Washington, and about the time General Meade reached Burkesville with

the army. Governor Smith of Virginia had left Richmond with the

Confederate States government, and had gone to Danville. Supposing I

was necessarily with the army at Burkesville, he addressed a letter to

me there informing me that, as governor of the Commonwealth of the State

of Virginia, he had temporarily removed the State capital from Richmond

to Danville, and asking if he would be permitted to perform the

functions of his office there without molestation by the Federal

authorities. I give this letter only in substance. He also inquired of

me whether in case he was not allowed to perform the duties of his

office, he with a few others might not be permitted to leave the country

and go abroad without interference. General Meade being informed that a

flag of truce was outside his pickets with a letter to me, at once sent

out and had the letter brought in without informing the officer who

brought it that I was not present. He read the letter and telegraphed

me its contents. Meeting Mr. Lincoln shortly after receiving this

dispatch, I repeated its contents to him. Mr. Lincoln, supposing I was

asking for instructions, said, in reply to that part of Governor Smith's

letter which inquired whether he with a few friends would be permitted

to leave the country unmolested, that his position was like that of a

certain Irishman (giving the name) he knew in Springfield who was very

popular with the people, a man of considerable promise, and very much

liked. Unfortunately he had acquired the habit of drinking, and his

friends could see that the habit was growing on him. These friends

determined to make an effort to save him, and to do this they drew up a

pledge to abstain from all alcoholic drinks. They asked Pat to join

them in signing the pledge, and he consented. He had been so long out

of the habit of using plain water as a beverage that he resorted to

soda-water as a substitute. After a few days this began to grow

distasteful to him. So holding the glass behind him, he said: "Doctor,

couldn't you drop a bit of brandy in that unbeknownst to myself."

I do not remember what the instructions were the President gave me, but

I know that Governor Smith was not permitted to perform the duties of

his office. I also know that if Mr. Lincoln had been spared, there

would have been no efforts made to prevent any one from leaving the

country who desired to do so. He would have been equally willing to

permit the return of the same expatriated citizens after they had time

to repent of their choice.

On the 18th of May orders were issued by the adjutant-general for a

grand review by the President and his cabinet of Sherman's and Meade's

armies. The review commenced on the 23d and lasted two days. Meade's

army occupied over six hours of the first day in passing the grand stand

which had been erected in front of the President's house. Sherman

witnessed this review from the grand stand which was occupied by the

President and his cabinet. Here he showed his resentment for the cruel

and harsh treatment that had unnecessarily been inflicted upon him by

the Secretary of War, by refusing to take his extended hand.

Sherman's troops had been in camp on the south side of the Potomac.

During the night of the 23d he crossed over and bivouacked not far from

the Capitol. Promptly at ten o'clock on the morning of the 24th, his

troops commenced to pass in review. Sherman's army made a different

appearance from that of the Army of the Potomac. The latter had been

operating where they received directly from the North full supplies of

food and clothing regularly: the review of this army therefore was the

review of a body of 65,000 well-drilled, well-disciplined and orderly

soldiers inured to hardship and fit for any duty, but without the

experience of gathering their own food and supplies in an enemy's

country, and of being ever on the watch. Sherman's army was not so

well-dressed as the Army of the Potomac, but their marching could not

be excelled; they gave the appearance of men who had been thoroughly

drilled to endure hardships, either by long and continuous marches or

through exposure to any climate, without the ordinary shelter of a camp.

They exhibited also some of the order of march through Georgia where the

"sweet potatoes sprung up from the ground" as Sherman's army went

marching through. In the rear of a company there would be a captured

horse or mule loaded with small cooking utensils, captured chickens and

other food picked up for the use of the men. Negro families who had

followed the army would sometimes come along in the rear of a company,

with three or four children packed upon a single mule, and the mother

leading it.

The sight was varied and grand: nearly all day for two successive days,

from the Capitol to the Treasury Building, could be seen a mass of

orderly soldiers marching in columns of companies. The National flag

was flying from almost every house and store; the windows were filled

with spectators; the door-steps and side-walks were crowded with colored

people and poor whites who did not succeed in securing better quarters

from which to get a view of the grand armies. The city was about as

full of strangers who had come to see the sights as it usually is on

inauguration day when a new President takes his seat.

It may not be out of place to again allude to President Lincoln and the

Secretary of War, Mr. Stanton, who were the great conspicuous figures in

the executive branch of the government. There is no great difference of

opinion now, in the public mind, as to the characteristics of the

President. With Mr. Stanton the case is different. They were the very

opposite of each other in almost every particular, except that each

possessed great ability. Mr. Lincoln gained influence over men by

making them feel that it was a pleasure to serve him. He preferred

yielding his own wish to gratify others, rather than to insist upon

having his own way. It distressed him to disappoint others. In matters

of public duty, however, he had what he wished, but in the least

offensive way. Mr. Stanton never questioned his own authority to

command, unless resisted. He cared nothing for the feeling of others.

In fact it seemed to be pleasanter to him to disappoint than to gratify.

He felt no hesitation in assuming the functions of the executive, or in

acting without advising with him. If his act was not sustained, he

would change it--if he saw the matter would be followed up until he did

so.

It was generally supposed that these two officials formed the complement

of each other. The Secretary was required to prevent the President's

being imposed upon. The President was required in the more responsible

place of seeing that injustice was not done to others. I do not know

that this view of these two men is still entertained by the majority of

the people. It is not a correct view, however, in my estimation. Mr.

Lincoln did not require a guardian to aid him in the fulfilment of a

public trust.

Mr. Lincoln was not timid, and he was willing to trust his generals in

making and executing their plans. The Secretary was very timid, and it

was impossible for him to avoid interfering with the armies covering the

capital when it was sought to defend it by an offensive movement against

the army guarding the Confederate capital. He could see our weakness,

but he could not see that the enemy was in danger. The enemy would not

have been in danger if Mr. Stanton had been in the field. These

characteristics of the two officials were clearly shown shortly after

Early came so near getting into the capital.

Among the army and corps commanders who served with me during the war

between the States, and who attracted much public attention, but of

whose ability as soldiers I have not yet given any estimate, are Meade,

Hancock, Sedgwick, Burnside, Terry and Hooker. There were others of

great merit, such as Griffin, Humphreys, Wright and Mackenzie. Of those

first named, Burnside at one time had command of the Army of the

Potomac, and later of the Army of the Ohio. Hooker also commanded the

Army of the Potomac for a short time.

General Meade was an officer of great merit, with drawbacks to his

usefulness that were beyond his control. He had been an officer of the

engineer corps before the war, and consequently had never served with

troops until he was over forty-six years of age. He never had, I

believe, a command of less than a brigade. He saw clearly and

distinctly the position of the enemy, and the topography of the country

in front of his own position. His first idea was to take advantage of

the lay of the ground, sometimes without reference to the direction we

wanted to move afterwards. He was subordinate to his superiors in rank

to the extent that he could execute an order which changed his own plans

with the same zeal he would have displayed if the plan had been his own.

He was brave and conscientious, and commanded the respect of all who

knew him. He was unfortunately of a temper that would get beyond his

control, at times, and make him speak to officers of high rank in the

most offensive manner. No one saw this fault more plainly than he

himself, and no one regretted it more. This made it unpleasant at

times, even in battle, for those around him to approach him even with

information. In spite of this defect he was a most valuable officer and

deserves a high place in the annals of his country.

General Burnside was an officer who was generally liked and respected.

He was not, however, fitted to command an army. No one knew this better

than himself. He always admitted his blunders, and extenuated those of

officers under him beyond what they were entitled to. It was hardly his

fault that he was ever assigned to a separate command.

Of Hooker I saw but little during the war. I had known him very well

before, however. Where I did see him, at Chattanooga, his achievement

in bringing his command around the point of Lookout Mountain and into

Chattanooga Valley was brilliant. I nevertheless regarded him as a

dangerous man. He was not subordinate to his superiors. He was

ambitious to the extent of caring nothing for the rights of others. His

disposition was, when engaged in battle, to get detached from the main

body of the army and exercise a separate command, gathering to his

standard all he could of his juniors.

Hancock stands the most conspicuous figure of all the general officers

who did not exercise a separate command. He commanded a corps longer

than any other one, and his name was never mentioned as having committed

in battle a blunder for which he was responsible. He was a man of very

conspicuous personal appearance. Tall, well-formed and, at the time of

which I now write, young and fresh-looking, he presented an appearance

that would attract the attention of an army as he passed. His genial

disposition made him friends, and his personal courage and his presence

with his command in the thickest of the fight won for him the confidence

of troops serving under him. No matter how hard the fight, the 2d corps

always felt that their commander was looking after them.

Sedgwick was killed at Spottsylvania before I had an opportunity of

forming an estimate of his qualifications as a soldier from personal

observation. I had known him in Mexico when both of us were

lieutenants, and when our service gave no indication that either of us

would ever be equal to the command of a brigade. He stood very high in

the army, however, as an officer and a man. He was brave and

conscientious. His ambition was not great, and he seemed to dread

responsibility. He was willing to do any amount of battling, but always

wanted some one else to direct. He declined the command of the Army of

the Potomac once, if not oftener.

General Alfred H. Terry came into the army as a volunteer without a

military education. His way was won without political influence up to

an important separate command--the expedition against Fort Fisher, in

January, 1865. His success there was most brilliant, and won for him

the rank of brigadier-general in the regular army and of major-general

of volunteers. He is a man who makes friends of those under him by his

consideration of their wants and their dues. As a commander, he won

their confidence by his coolness in action and by his clearness of

perception in taking in the situation under which he was placed at any

given time.

Griffin, Humphreys, and Mackenzie were good corps commanders, but came

into that position so near to the close of the war as not to attract

public attention. All three served as such, in the last campaign of the

armies of the Potomac and the James, which culminated at Appomattox

Court House, on the 9th of April, 1865. The sudden collapse of the

rebellion monopolized attention to the exclusion of almost everything

else. I regarded Mackenzie as the most promising young officer in the

army. Graduating at West Point, as he did, during the second year of

the war, he had won his way up to the command of a corps before its

close. This he did upon his own merit and without influence.

CONCLUSION.

The cause of the great War of the Rebellion against the United Status

will have to be attributed to slavery. For some years before the war

began it was a trite saying among some politicians that "A state half

slave and half free cannot exist." All must become slave or all free,

or the state will go down. I took no part myself in any such view of

the case at the time, but since the war is over, reviewing the whole

question, I have come to the conclusion that the saying is quite true.

Slavery was an institution that required unusual guarantees for its

security wherever it existed; and in a country like ours where the

larger portion of it was free territory inhabited by an intelligent and

well-to-do population, the people would naturally have but little

sympathy with demands upon them for its protection. Hence the people of

the South were dependent upon keeping control of the general government

to secure the perpetuation of their favorite institution. They were

enabled to maintain this control long after the States where slavery

existed had ceased to have the controlling power, through the assistance

they received from odd men here and there throughout the Northern

States. They saw their power waning, and this led them to encroach upon

the prerogatives and independence of the Northern States by enacting

such laws as the Fugitive Slave Law. By this law every Northern man

was obliged, when properly summoned, to turn out and help apprehend

the runaway slave of a Southern man. Northern marshals became

slave-catchers, and Northern courts had to contribute to the support

and protection of the institution.

This was a degradation which the North would not permit any longer than

until they could get the power to expunge such laws from the statute

books. Prior to the time of these encroachments the great majority of

the people of the North had no particular quarrel with slavery, so long

as they were not forced to have it themselves. But they were not

willing to play the role of police for the South in the protection of

this particular institution.

In the early days of the country, before we had railroads, telegraphs

and steamboats--in a word, rapid transit of any sort--the States were

each almost a separate nationality. At that time the subject of slavery

caused but little or no disturbance to the public mind. But the country

grew, rapid transit was established, and trade and commerce between the

States got to be so much greater than before, that the power of the

National government became more felt and recognized and, therefore, had

to be enlisted in the cause of this institution.

It is probably well that we had the war when we did. We are better off

now than we would have been without it, and have made more rapid

progress than we otherwise should have made. The civilized nations of

Europe have been stimulated into unusual activity, so that commerce,

trade, travel, and thorough acquaintance among people of different

nationalities, has become common; whereas, before, it was but the few

who had ever had the privilege of going beyond the limits of their own

country or who knew anything about other people. Then, too, our

republican institutions were regarded as experiments up to the breaking

out of the rebellion, and monarchical Europe generally believed that our

republic was a rope of sand that would part the moment the slightest

strain was brought upon it. Now it has shown itself capable of dealing

with one of the greatest wars that was ever made, and our people have

proven themselves to be the most formidable in war of any nationality.

But this war was a fearful lesson, and should teach us the necessity of

avoiding wars in the future.

The conduct of some of the European states during our troubles shows the

lack of conscience of communities where the responsibility does not come

upon a single individual. Seeing a nation that extended from ocean to

ocean, embracing the better part of a continent, growing as we were

growing in population, wealth and intelligence, the European nations

thought it would be well to give us a check. We might, possibly, after

a while threaten their peace, or, at least, the perpetuity of their

institutions. Hence, England was constantly finding fault with the

administration at Washington because we were not able to keep up an

effective blockade. She also joined, at first, with France and Spain in

setting up an Austrian prince upon the throne in Mexico, totally

disregarding any rights or claims that Mexico had of being treated as an

independent power. It is true they trumped up grievances as a pretext,

but they were only pretexts which can always be found when wanted.

Mexico, in her various revolutions, had been unable to give that

protection to the subjects of foreign nations which she would have liked

to give, and some of her revolutionary leaders had forced loans from

them. Under pretence of protecting their citizens, these nations seized

upon Mexico as a foothold for establishing a European monarchy upon our

continent, thus threatening our peace at home. I, myself, regarded this

as a direct act of war against the United States by the powers engaged,

and supposed as a matter of course that the United States would treat it

as such when their hands were free to strike. I often spoke of the

matter to Mr. Lincoln and the Secretary of War, but never heard any

special views from them to enable me to judge what they thought or felt

about it. I inferred that they felt a good deal as I did, but were

unwilling to commit themselves while we had our own troubles upon our

hands.

All of the powers except France very soon withdrew from the armed

intervention for the establishment of an Austrian prince upon the throne

of Mexico; but the governing people of these countries continued to the

close of the war to throw obstacles in our way. After the surrender of

Lee, therefore, entertaining the opinion here expressed, I sent Sheridan

with a corps to the Rio Grande to have him where he might aid Juarez in

expelling the French from Mexico. These troops got off before they

could be stopped; and went to the Rio Grande, where Sheridan distributed

them up and down the river, much to the consternation of the troops in

the quarter of Mexico bordering on that stream. This soon led to a

request from France that we should withdraw our troops from the Rio

Grande and to negotiations for the withdrawal of theirs. Finally

Bazaine was withdrawn from Mexico by order of the French Government.

From that day the empire began to totter. Mexico was then able to

maintain her independence without aid from us.

France is the traditional ally and friend of the United States. I did

not blame France for her part in the scheme to erect a monarchy upon the

ruins of the Mexican Republic. That was the scheme of one man, an

imitator without genius or merit. He had succeeded in stealing the

government of his country, and made a change in its form against the

wishes and instincts of his people. He tried to play the part of the

first Napoleon, without the ability to sustain that role. He sought by

new conquests to add to his empire and his glory; but the signal failure

of his scheme of conquest was the precursor of his own overthrow.

Like our own war between the States, the Franco-Prussian war was an

expensive one; but it was worth to France all it cost her people. It

was the completion of the downfall of Napoleon III. The beginning was

when he landed troops on this continent. Failing here, the prestige of

his name--all the prestige he ever had--was gone. He must achieve a

success or fall. He tried to strike down his neighbor, Prussia--and

fell.

I never admired the character of the first Napoleon; but I recognize his

great genius. His work, too, has left its impress for good on the face

of Europe. The third Napoleon could have no claim to having done a good

or just act.

To maintain peace in the future it is necessary to be prepared for war.

There can scarcely be a possible chance of a conflict, such as the last

one, occurring among our own people again; but, growing as we are, in

population, wealth and military power, we may become the envy of nations

which led us in all these particulars only a few years ago; and unless

we are prepared for it we may be in danger of a combined movement being

some day made to crush us out. Now, scarcely twenty years after the

war, we seem to have forgotten the lessons it taught, and are going on

as if in the greatest security, without the power to resist an invasion

by the fleets of fourth-rate European powers for a time until we could

prepare for them.

We should have a good navy, and our sea-coast defences should be put in

the finest possible condition. Neither of these cost much when it is

considered where the money goes, and what we get in return. Money

expended in a fine navy, not only adds to our security and tends to

prevent war in the future, but is very material aid to our commerce with

foreign nations in the meantime. Money spent upon sea-coast defences is

spent among our own people, and all goes back again among the people.

The work accomplished, too, like that of the navy, gives us a feeling of

security.

England's course towards the United States during the rebellion

exasperated the people of this country very much against the mother

country. I regretted it. England and the United States are natural

allies, and should be the best of friends. They speak one language, and

are related by blood and other ties. We together, or even either

separately, are better qualified than any other people to establish

commerce between all the nationalities of the world.

England governs her own colonies, and particularly those embracing

the people of different races from her own, better than any other

nation. She is just to the conquered, but rigid. She makes them

self-supporting, but gives the benefit of labor to the laborer. She

does not seem to look upon the colonies as outside possessions which she

is at liberty to work for the support and aggrandizement of the home

government.

The hostility of England to the United States during our rebellion was

not so much real as it was apparent. It was the hostility of the

leaders of one political party. I am told that there was no time during

the civil war when they were able to get up in England a demonstration

in favor of secession, while these were constantly being gotten up in

favor of the Union, or, as they called it, in favor of the North. Even

in Manchester, which suffered so fearfully by having the cotton cut off

from her mills, they had a monster demonstration in favor of the North

at the very time when their workmen were almost famishing.

It is possible that the question of a conflict between races may come up

in the future, as did that between freedom and slavery before. The

condition of the colored man within our borders may become a source of

anxiety, to say the least. But he was brought to our shores by

compulsion, and he now should be considered as having as good a right to

remain here as any other class of our citizens. It was looking to a

settlement of this question that led me to urge the annexation of Santo

Domingo during the time I was President of the United States.

Santo Domingo was freely offered to us, not only by the administration,

but by all the people, almost without price. The island is upon our

shores, is very fertile, and is capable of supporting fifteen millions

of people. The products of the soil are so valuable that labor in her

fields would be so compensated as to enable those who wished to go there

to quickly repay the cost of their passage. I took it that the colored

people would go there in great numbers, so as to have independent states

governed by their own race. They would still be States of the Union,

and under the protection of the General Government; but the citizens

would be almost wholly colored.

By the war with Mexico, we had acquired, as we have seen, territory

almost equal in extent to that we already possessed. It was seen that

the volunteers of the Mexican war largely composed the pioneers to

settle up the Pacific coast country. Their numbers, however, were

scarcely sufficient to be a nucleus for the population of the important

points of the territory acquired by that war. After our rebellion, when

so many young men were at liberty to return to their homes, they found

they were not satisfied with the farm, the store, or the work-shop of

the villages, but wanted larger fields. The mines of the mountains

first attracted them; but afterwards they found that rich valleys and

productive grazing and farming lands were there. This territory, the

geography of which was not known to us at the close of the rebellion, is

now as well mapped as any portion of our country. Railroads traverse it

in every direction, north, south, east, and west. The mines are worked.

The high lands are used for grazing purposes, and rich agricultural

lands are found in many of the valleys. This is the work of the

volunteer. It is probable that the Indians would have had control of

these lands for a century yet but for the war. We must conclude,

therefore, that wars are not always evils unmixed with some good.

Prior to the rebellion the great mass of the people were satisfied to

remain near the scenes of their birth. In fact an immense majority of

the whole people did not feel secure against coming to want should they

move among entire strangers. So much was the country divided into small

communities that localized idioms had grown up, so that you could almost

tell what section a person was from by hearing him speak. Before, new

territories were settled by a "class"; people who shunned contact with

others; people who, when the country began to settle up around them,

would push out farther from civilization. Their guns furnished meat,

and the cultivation of a very limited amount of the soil, their bread

and vegetables. All the streams abounded with fish. Trapping would

furnish pelts to be brought into the States once a year, to pay for

necessary articles which they could not raise--powder, lead, whiskey,

tobacco and some store goods. Occasionally some little articles of

luxury would enter into these purchases--a quarter of a pound of tea,

two or three pounds of coffee, more of sugar, some playing cards, and if

anything was left over of the proceeds of the sale, more whiskey.

Little was known of the topography of the country beyond the settlements

of these frontiersmen. This is all changed now. The war begot a spirit

of independence and enterprise. The feeling now is, that a youth must

cut loose from his old surroundings to enable him to get up in the

world. There is now such a commingling of the people that particular

idioms and pronunciation are no longer localized to any great extent;

the country has filled up "from the centre all around to the sea";

railroads connect the two oceans and all parts of the interior; maps,

nearly perfect, of every part of the country are now furnished the

student of geography.

The war has made us a nation of great power and intelligence. We have

but little to do to preserve peace, happiness and prosperity at home,

and the respect of other nations. Our experience ought to teach us the

necessity of the first; our power secures the latter.

I feel that we are on the eve of a new era, when there is to be great

harmony between the Federal and Confederate. I cannot stay to be a

living witness to the correctness of this prophecy; but I feel it within

me that it is to be so. The universally kind feeling expressed for me

at a time when it was supposed that each day would prove my last, seemed

to me the beginning of the answer to "Let us have peace."

The expression of these kindly feelings were not restricted to a section

of the country, nor to a division of the people. They came from

individual citizens of all nationalities; from all denominations--the

Protestant, the Catholic, and the Jew; and from the various societies of

the land--scientific, educational, religious or otherwise. Politics did

not enter into the matter at all.

I am not egotist enough to suppose all this significance should be given

because I was the object of it. But the war between the States was a

very bloody and a very costly war. One side or the other had to yield

principles they deemed dearer than life before it could be brought to an

end. I commanded the whole of the mighty host engaged on the victorious

side. I was, no matter whether deservedly so or not, a representative

of that side of the controversy. It is a significant and gratifying

fact that Confederates should have joined heartily in this spontaneous

move. I hope the good feeling inaugurated may continue to the end.

APPENDIX.

REPORT OF LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT, OF THE UNITED STATES ARMIES

1864-65.

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES, WASHINGTON, D. C., July 22,

1865.

HON. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations

of the Armies of the United States from the date of my appointment to

command the same.

From an early period in the rebellion I had been impressed with the idea

that active and continuous operations of all the troops that could be

brought into the field, regardless of season and weather, were necessary

to a speedy termination of the war. The resources of the enemy and his

numerical strength were far inferior to ours; but as an offset to this,

we had a vast territory, with a population hostile to the government, to

garrison, and long lines of river and railroad communications to

protect, to enable us to supply the operating armies.

The armies in the East and West acted independently and without concert,

like a balky team, no two ever pulling together, enabling the enemy to

use to great advantage his interior lines of communication for

transporting troops from East to West, reinforcing the army most

vigorously pressed, and to furlough large numbers, during seasons of

inactivity on our part, to go to their homes and do the work of

producing, for the support of their armies. It was a question whether

our numerical strength and resources were not more than balanced by

these disadvantages and the enemy's superior position.

From the first, I was firm in the conviction that no peace could be had

that would be stable and conducive to the happiness of the people, both

North and South, until the military power of the rebellion was entirely

broken.

I therefore determined, first, to use the greatest number of troops

practicable against the armed force of the enemy; preventing him from

using the same force at different seasons against first one and then

another of our armies, and the possibility of repose for refitting and

producing necessary supplies for carrying on resistance. Second, to

hammer continuously against the armed force of the enemy and his

resources, until by mere attrition, if in no other way, there should be

nothing left to him but an equal submission with the loyal section of

our common country to the constitution and laws of the land.

These views have been kept constantly in mind, and orders given and

campaigns made to carry them out. Whether they might have been better

in conception and execution is for the people, who mourn the loss of

friends fallen, and who have to pay the pecuniary cost, to say. All I

can say is, that what I have done has been done conscientiously, to the

best of my ability, and in what I conceived to be for the best interests

of the whole country.

At the date when this report begins, the situation of the contending

forces was about as follows: The Mississippi River was strongly

garrisoned by Federal troops, from St. Louis, Missouri, to its mouth.

The line of the Arkansas was also held, thus giving us armed possession

of all west of the Mississippi, north of that stream. A few points in

Southern Louisiana, not remote from the river, were held by us, together

with a small garrison at and near the mouth of the Rio Grande. All the

balance of the vast territory of Arkansas, Louisiana, and Texas was in

the almost undisputed possession of the enemy, with an army of probably

not less than eighty thousand effective men, that could have been

brought into the field had there been sufficient opposition to have

brought them out. The let-alone policy had demoralized this force so

that probably but little more than one-half of it was ever present in

garrison at any one time. But the one-half, or forty thousand men, with

the bands of guerillas scattered through Missouri, Arkansas, and along

the Mississippi River, and the disloyal character of much of the

population, compelled the use of a large number of troops to keep

navigation open on the river, and to protect the loyal people to the

west of it. To the east of the Mississippi we held substantially with

the line of the Tennessee and Holston rivers, running eastward to

include nearly all of the State of Tennessee. South of Chattanooga, a

small foothold had been obtained in Georgia, sufficient to protect East

Tennessee from incursions from the enemy's force at Dalton, Georgia.

West Virginia was substantially within our lines. Virginia, with the

exception of the northern border, the Potomac River, a small area about

the mouth of James River, covered by the troops at Norfolk and Fort

Monroe, and the territory covered by the Army of the Potomac lying along

the Rapidan, was in the possession of the enemy. Along the sea-coast

footholds had been obtained at Plymouth, Washington, and New Bern, in

North Carolina; Beaufort, Folly and Morris Islands, Hilton Head, Fort

Pulaski, and Port Royal, in South Carolina; Fernandina and St.

Augustine, in Florida. Key West and Pensacola were also in our

possession, while all the important ports were blockaded by the navy.

The accompanying map, a copy of which was sent to General Sherman and

other commanders in March, 1864, shows by red lines the territory

occupied by us at the beginning of the rebellion, and at the opening of

the campaign of 1864, while those in blue are the lines which it was

proposed to occupy.

Behind the Union lines there were many bands of guerillas and a large

population disloyal to the government, making it necessary to guard

every foot of road or river used in supplying our armies. In the South,

a reign of military despotism prevailed, which made every man and boy

capable of bearing arms a soldier; and those who could not bear arms in

the field acted as provosts for collecting deserters and returning them.

This enabled the enemy to bring almost his entire strength into the

field.

The enemy had concentrated the bulk of his forces east of the

Mississippi into two armies, commanded by Generals R. E. Lee and J. E.

Johnston, his ablest and best generals. The army commanded by Lee

occupied the south bank of the Rapidan, extending from Mine Run

westward, strongly intrenched, covering and defending Richmond, the

rebel capital, against the Army of the Potomac. The army under Johnston

occupied a strongly intrenched position at Dalton, Georgia, covering and

defending Atlanta, Georgia, a place of great importance as a railroad

centre, against the armies under Major-General W. T. Sherman. In

addition to these armies he had a large cavalry force under Forrest, in

North-east Mississippi; a considerable force, of all arms, in the

Shenandoah Valley, and in the western part of Virginia and extreme

eastern part of Tennessee; and also confronting our sea-coast garrisons,

and holding blockaded ports where we had no foothold upon land.

These two armies, and the cities covered and defended by them, were the

main objective points of the campaign.

Major-General W. T. Sherman, who was appointed to the command of the

Military Division of the Mississippi, embracing all the armies and

territory east of the Mississippi River to the Alleghanies and the

Department of Arkansas, west of the Mississippi, had the immediate

command of the armies operating against Johnston.

Major-General George G. Meade had the immediate command of the Army of

the Potomac, from where I exercised general supervision of the movements

of all our armies.

General Sherman was instructed to move against Johnston's army, to break

it up, and to go into the interior of the enemy's country as far as he

could, inflicting all the damage he could upon their war resources. If

the enemy in his front showed signs of joining Lee, to follow him up to

the full extent of his ability, while I would prevent the concentration

of Lee upon him, if it was in the power of the Army of the Potomac to do

so. More specific written instructions were not given, for the reason

that I had talked over with him the plans of the campaign, and was

satisfied that he understood them and would execute them to the fullest

extent possible.

Major-General N. P. Banks, then on an expedition up Red River against

Shreveport, Louisiana (which had been organized previous to my

appointment to command), was notified by me on the 15th of March, of the

importance it was that Shreveport should be taken at the earliest

possible day, and that if he found that the taking of it would occupy

from ten to fifteen days' more time than General Sherman had given his

troops to be absent from their command, he would send them back at the

time specified by General Sherman, even if it led to the abandonment of

the main object of the Red River expedition, for this force was

necessary to movements east of the Mississippi; that should his

expedition prove successful, he would hold Shreveport and the Red River

with such force as he might deem necessary, and return the balance of

his troops to the neighborhood of New Orleans, commencing no move for

the further acquisition of territory, unless it was to make that then

held by him more easily held; that it might be a part of the spring

campaign to move against Mobile; that it certainly would be, if troops

enough could be obtained to make it without embarrassing other

movements; that New Orleans would be the point of departure for such an

expedition; also, that I had directed General Steele to make a real move

from Arkansas, as suggested by him (General Banks), instead of a

demonstration, as Steele thought advisable.

On the 31st of March, in addition to the foregoing notification and

directions, he was instructed as follows:

"1st. If successful in your expedition against Shreveport, that you

turn over the defence of the Red River to General Steele and the navy.

"2d. That you abandon Texas entirely, with the exception of your hold

upon the Rio Grande. This can be held with four thousand men, if they

will turn their attention immediately to fortifying their positions. At

least one-half of the force required for this service might be taken

from the colored troops.

"3d. By properly fortifying on the Mississippi River, the force to

guard it from Port Hudson to New Orleans can be reduced to ten thousand

men, if not to a less number. Six thousand more would then hold all the

rest of the territory necessary to hold until active operations can

again be resumed west of the river. According to your last return, this

would give you a force of over thirty thousand effective men with which

to move against Mobile. To this I expect to add five thousand men from

Missouri. If however, you think the force here stated too small to hold

the territory regarded as necessary to hold possession of, I would say

concentrate at least twenty-five thousand men of your present command

for operations against Mobile. With these and such additions as I can

give you from elsewhere, lose no time in making a demonstration, to be

followed by an attack upon Mobile. Two or more iron-clads will be

ordered to report to Admiral Farragut. This gives him a strong naval

fleet with which to co-operate. You can make your own arrangements with

the admiral for his co-operation, and select your own line of approach.

My own idea of the matter is that Pascagoula should be your base; but,

from your long service in the Gulf Department, you will know best about

the matter. It is intended that your movements shall be co-operative

with movements elsewhere, and you cannot now start too soon. All I

would now add is, that you commence the concentration of your forces at

once. Preserve a profound secrecy of what you intend doing, and start

at the earliest possible moment.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

"MAJOR-GENERAL N. P. BANKS."

Major-General Meade was instructed that Lee's army would be his

objective point; that wherever Lee went he would go also. For his

movement two plans presented themselves: One to cross the Rapidan below

Lee, moving by his right flank; the other above, moving by his left.

Each presented advantages over the other, with corresponding objections.

By crossing above, Lee would be cut off from all chance of ignoring

Richmond or going north on a raid. But if we took this route, all we

did would have to be done whilst the rations we started with held out;

besides, it separated us from Butler, so that he could not be directed

how to cooperate. If we took the other route, Brandy Station could be

used as a base of supplies until another was secured on the York or

James rivers. Of these, however, it was decided to take the lower

route.

The following letter of instruction was addressed to Major-General B. F.

Butler:

"FORT MONROE, VIRGINIA, April 2, 1864.

"GENERAL:-In the spring campaign, which it is desirable shall commence

at as early a day as practicable, it is proposed to have cooperative

action of all the armies in the field, as far as this object can be

accomplished.

"It will not be possible to unite our armies into two or three large

ones to act as so many units, owing to the absolute necessity of holding

on to the territory already taken from the enemy. But, generally

speaking, concentration can be practically effected by armies moving to

the interior of the enemy's country from the territory they have to

guard. By such movement, they interpose themselves between the enemy

and the country to be guarded, thereby reducing the number necessary to

guard important points, or at least occupy the attention of a part of

the enemy's force, if no greater object is gained. Lee's army and

Richmond being the greater objects towards which our attention must be

directed in the next campaign, it is desirable to unite all the force we

can against them. The necessity of covering Washington with the Army of

the Potomac, and of covering your department with your army, makes it

impossible to unite these forces at the beginning of any move. I

propose, therefore, what comes nearest this of anything that seems

practicable: The Army of the Potomac will act from its present base,

Lee's army being the objective point. You will collect all the forces

from your command that can be spared from garrison duty--I should say

not less than twenty thousand effective men--to operate on the south

side of James River, Richmond being your objective point. To the force

you already have will be added about ten thousand men from South

Carolina, under Major-General Gillmore, who will command them in person.

Major-General W. F. Smith is ordered to report to you, to command the

troops sent into the field from your own department.

"General Gillmore will be ordered to report to you at Fortress Monroe,

with all the troops on transports, by the 18th instant, or as soon

thereafter as practicable. Should you not receive notice by that time

to move, you will make such disposition of them and your other forces as

you may deem best calculated to deceive the enemy as to the real move to

be made.

"When you are notified to move, take City Point with as much force as

possible. Fortify, or rather intrench, at once, and concentrate all

your troops for the field there as rapidly as you can. From City Point

directions cannot be given at this time for your further movements.

"The fact that has already been stated--that is, that Richmond is to be

your objective point, and that there is to be co-operation between your

force and the Army of the Potomac--must be your guide. This indicates

the necessity of your holding close to the south bank of the James River

as you advance. Then, should the enemy be forced into his intrenchments

in Richmond, the Army of the Potomac would follow, and by means of

transports the two armies would become a unit.

"All the minor details of your advance are left entirely to your

direction. If, however, you think it practicable to use your cavalry

south of you, so as to cut the railroad about Hicksford, about the time

of the general advance, it would be of immense advantage.

"You will please forward for my information, at the earliest practicable

day, all orders, details, and instructions you may give for the

execution of this order.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

"MAJOR-GENERAL B. F. BUTLER."

On the 16th these instructions were substantially reiterated. On the

19th, in order to secure full co-operation between his army and that of

General Meade, he was informed that I expected him to move from Fort

Monroe the same day that General Meade moved from Culpeper. The exact

time I was to telegraph him as soon as it was fixed, and that it would

not be earlier than the 27th of April; that it was my intention to fight

Lee between Culpeper and Richmond, if he would stand. Should he,

however, fall back into Richmond, I would follow up and make a junction

with his (General Butler's) army on the James River; that, could I be

certain he would be able to invest Richmond on the south side, so as to

have his left resting on the James, above the city, I would form the

junction there; that circumstances might make this course advisable

anyhow; that he should use every exertion to secure footing as far up

the south side of the river as he could, and as soon as possible after

the receipt of orders to move; that if he could not carry the city, he

should at least detain as large a force there as possible.

In co-operation with the main movements against Lee and Johnston, I was

desirous of using all other troops necessarily kept in departments

remote from the fields of immediate operations, and also those kept in

the background for the protection of our extended lines between the

loyal States and the armies operating against them.

A very considerable force, under command of Major-General Sigel, was so

held for the protection of West Virginia, and the frontiers of Maryland

and Pennsylvania. Whilst these troops could not be withdrawn to distant

fields without exposing the North to invasion by comparatively small

bodies of the enemy, they could act directly to their front, and give

better protection than if lying idle in garrison. By such a movement

they would either compel the enemy to detach largely for the protection

of his supplies and lines of communication, or he would lose them.

General Sigel was therefore directed to organize all his available force

into two expeditions, to move from Beverly and Charleston, under command

of Generals Ord and Crook, against the East Tennessee and Virginia

Railroad. Subsequently, General Ord having been relieved at his own

request, General Sigel was instructed at his own suggestion, to give up

the expedition by Beverly, and to form two columns, one under General

Crook, on the Kanawha, numbering about ten thousand men, and one on the

Shenandoah, numbering about seven thousand men. The one on the

Shenandoah to assemble between Cumberland and the Shenandoah, and the

infantry and artillery advanced to Cedar Creek with such cavalry as

could be made available at the moment, to threaten the enemy in the

Shenandoah Valley, and advance as far as possible; while General Crook

would take possession of Lewisburg with part of his force and move down

the Tennessee Railroad, doing as much damage as he could, destroying the

New River Bridge and the salt-works, at Saltville, Va.

Owing to the weather and bad condition of the roads, operations were

delayed until the 1st of May, when, everything being in readiness and

the roads favorable, orders were given for a general movement of all the

armies not later than the 4th of May.

My first object being to break the military power of the rebellion, and

capture the enemy's important strongholds, made me desirous that General

Butler should succeed in his movement against Richmond, as that would

tend more than anything else, unless it were the capture of Lee's army,

to accomplish this desired result in the East. If he failed, it was my

determination, by hard fighting, either to compel Lee to retreat, or to

so cripple him that he could not detach a large force to go north, and

still retain enough for the defence of Richmond. It was well

understood, by both Generals Butler and Meade, before starting on the

campaign, that it was my intention to put both their armies south of the

James River, in case of failure to destroy Lee without it.

Before giving General Butler his instructions, I visited him at Fort

Monroe, and in conversation pointed out the apparent importance of

getting possession of Petersburg, and destroying railroad communication

as far south as possible. Believing, however, in the practicability of

capturing Richmond unless it was reinforced, I made that the objective

point of his operations. As the Army of the Potomac was to move

simultaneously with him, Lee could not detach from his army with safety,

and the enemy did not have troops elsewhere to bring to the defence of

the city in time to meet a rapid movement from the north of James River.

I may here state that, commanding all the armies as I did, I tried, as

far as possible, to leave General Meade in independent command of the

Army of the Potomac. My instructions for that army were all through

him, and were general in their nature, leaving all the details and the

execution to him. The campaigns that followed proved him to be the

right man in the right place. His commanding always in the presence of

an officer superior to him in rank, has drawn from him much of that

public attention that his zeal and ability entitle him to, and which he

would otherwise have received.

The movement of the Army of the Potomac commenced early on the morning

of the 4th of May, under the immediate direction and orders of

Major-General Meade, pursuant to instructions. Before night, the whole

army was across the Rapidan (the fifth and sixth corps crossing at

Germania Ford, and the second corps at Ely's Ford, the cavalry, under

Major-General Sheridan, moving in advance,) with the greater part of its

trains, numbering about four thousand wagons, meeting with but slight

opposition. The average distance travelled by the troops that day was

about twelve miles. This I regarded as a great success, and it removed

from my mind the most serious apprehensions I had entertained, that of

crossing the river in the face of an active, large, well-appointed, and

ably commanded army, and how so large a train was to be carried through

a hostile country, and protected. Early on the 5th, the advance corps

(the fifth, Major-General G. K. Warren commanding) met and engaged the

enemy outside his intrenchments near Mine Run. The battle raged

furiously all day, the whole army being brought into the fight as fast

as the corps could be got upon the field, which, considering the density

of the forest and narrowness of the roads, was done with commendable

promptness.

General Burnside, with the ninth corps, was, at the time the Army of the

Potomac moved, left with the bulk of his corps at the crossing of the

Rappahannock River and Alexandria Railroad, holding the road back to

Bull Run, with instructions not to move until he received notice that a

crossing of the Rapidan was secured, but to move promptly as soon as

such notice was received. This crossing he was apprised of on the

afternoon of the 4th. By six o'clock of the morning of the 6th he was

leading his corps into action near the Wilderness Tavern, some of his

troops having marched a distance of over thirty miles, crossing both the

Rappahannock and Rapidan rivers. Considering that a large proportion,

probably two-thirds of his command, was composed of new troops,

unaccustomed to marches, and carrying the accoutrements of a soldier,

this was a remarkable march.

The battle of the Wilderness was renewed by us at five o'clock on the

morning of the 6th, and continued with unabated fury until darkness set

in, each army holding substantially the same position that they had on

the evening of the 5th. After dark, the enemy made a feeble attempt to

turn our right flank, capturing several hundred prisoners and creating

considerable confusion. But the promptness of General Sedgwick, who was

personally present and commanded that part of our line, soon reformed it

and restored order. On the morning of the 7th, reconnoissances showed

that the enemy had fallen behind his intrenched lines, with pickets to

the front, covering a part of the battle-field. From this it was

evident to my mind that the two days' fighting had satisfied him of his

inability to further maintain the contest in the open field,

notwithstanding his advantage of position, and that he would wait an

attack behind his works. I therefore determined to push on and put my

whole force between him and Richmond; and orders were at once issued for

a movement by his right flank. On the night of the 7th, the march was

commenced towards Spottsylvania Court House, the fifth corps moving on

the most direct road. But the enemy having become apprised of our

movement, and having the shorter line, was enabled to reach there first.

On the 8th, General Warren met a force of the enemy, which had been sent

out to oppose and delay his advance, to gain time to fortify the line

taken up at Spottsylvania. This force was steadily driven back on the

main force, within the recently constructed works, after considerable

fighting, resulting in severe loss to both sides. On the morning of the

9th, General Sheridan started on a raid against the enemy's lines of

communication with Richmond. The 9th, 10th, and 11th were spent in

manoeuvring and fighting, without decisive results. Among the killed on

the 9th was that able and distinguished soldier Major-General John

Sedgwick, commanding the sixth army corps. Major-General H. G. Wright

succeeded him in command. Early on the morning of the 12th a general

attack was made on the enemy in position. The second corps,

Major-General Hancock commanding, carried a salient of his line,

capturing most of Johnson's division of Ewell's corps and twenty pieces

of artillery. But the resistance was so obstinate that the advantage

gained did not prove decisive. The 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th, 17th, and

18th, were consumed in manoeuvring and awaiting the arrival of

reinforcements from Washington. Deeming it impracticable to make any

further attack upon the enemy at Spottsylvania Court House, orders were

issued on the 15th with a view to a movement to the North Anna, to

commence at twelve o'clock on the night of the 19th. Late in the

afternoon of the 19th, Ewell's corps came out of its works on our

extreme right flank; but the attack was promptly repulsed, with heavy

loss. This delayed the movement to the North Anna until the night of the

21st, when it was commenced. But the enemy again, having the shorter

line, and being in possession of the main roads, was enabled to reach

the North Anna in advance of us, and took position behind it. The fifth

corps reached the North Anna on the afternoon of the 23d, closely

followed by the sixth corps. The second and ninth corps got up about the

same time, the second holding the railroad bridge, and the ninth lying

between that and Jericho Ford. General Warren effected a crossing the

same afternoon, and got a position without much opposition. Soon after

getting into position he was violently attacked, but repulsed the enemy

with great slaughter. On the 25th, General Sheridan rejoined the Army

of the Potomac from the raid on which he started from Spottsylvania,

having destroyed the depots at Beaver Dam and Ashland stations, four

trains of cars, large supplies of rations, and many miles of

railroad-track; recaptured about four hundred of our men on their way to

Richmond as prisoners of war; met and defeated the enemy's cavalry at

Yellow Tavern; carried the first line of works around Richmond (but

finding the second line too strong to be carried by assault), recrossed

to the north bank of the Chickahominy at Meadow Bridge under heavy fire,

and moved by a detour to Haxall's Landing, on the James River, where he

communicated with General Butler. This raid had the effect of drawing

off the whole of the enemy's cavalry force, making it comparatively easy

to guard our trains.

General Butler moved his main force up the James River, in pursuance of

instructions, on the 4th of May, General Gillmore having joined him with

the tenth corps. At the same time he sent a force of one thousand eight

hundred cavalry, by way of West Point, to form a junction with him

wherever he might get a foothold, and a force of three thousand cavalry,

under General Kautz, from Suffolk, to operate against the road south of

Petersburg and Richmond. On the 5th, he occupied, without opposition,

both City Point and Bermuda Hundred, his movement being a complete

surprise. On the 6th, he was in position with his main army, and

commenced intrenching. On the 7th he made a reconnoissance against the

Petersburg and Richmond Railroad, destroying a portion of it after some

fighting. On the 9th he telegraphed as follows:

"HEADQUARTERS, NEAR BERMUDA LANDING, May 9, 1864.

"HON. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War.

"Our operations may be summed up in a few words. With one thousand

seven hundred cavalry we have advanced up the Peninsula, forced the

Chickahominy, and have safely, brought them to their present position.

These were colored cavalry, and are now holding our advance pickets

towards Richmond.

"General Kautz, with three thousand cavalry from Suffolk, on the same

day with our movement up James River, forced the Black Water, burned the

railroad bridge at Stony Creek, below Petersburg, cutting into

Beauregard's force at that point.

"We have landed here, intrenched ourselves, destroyed many miles of

railroad, and got a position which, with proper supplies, we can hold

out against the whole of Lee's army. I have ordered up the supplies.

"Beauregard, with a large portion of his force, was left south by the

cutting of the railroads by Kautz. That portion which reached

Petersburg under Hill I have whipped to-day, killing and wounding many,

and taking many prisoners, after a severe and well-contested fight.

"General Grant will not be troubled with any further reinforcements to

Lee from Beauregard's force.

"BENJ. F. BUTLER, Major-General."

On the evening of the 13th and morning of the 14th he carried a portion

of the enemy's first line of defences at Drury's Bluff, or Fort Darling,

with small loss. The time thus consumed from the 6th lost to us the

benefit of the surprise and capture of Richmond and Petersburg,

enabling, as it did, Beauregard to collect his loose forces in North and

South Carolina, and bring them to the defence of those places. On the

16th, the enemy attacked General Butler in his position in front of

Drury's Bluff. He was forced back, or drew back, into his intrenchments

between the forks of the James and Appomattox rivers, the enemy

intrenching strongly in his front, thus covering his railroads, the

city, and all that was valuable to him. His army, therefore, though in

a position of great security, was as completely shut off from further

operations directly against Richmond as if it had been in a bottle

strongly corked. It required but a comparatively small force of the

enemy to hold it there.

On the 12th, General Kautz, with his cavalry, was started on a raid

against the Danville Railroad, which he struck at Coalfield, Powhatan,

and Chula Stations, destroying them, the railroad-track, two freight

trains, and one locomotive, together with large quantities of commissary

and other stores; thence, crossing to the South Side Road, struck it at

Wilson's, Wellsville, and Black's and White's Stations, destroying the

road and station-houses; thence he proceeded to City Point, which he

reached on the 18th.

On the 19th of April, and prior to the movement of General Butler, the

enemy, with a land force under General Hoke and an iron-clad ram,

attacked Plymouth, N. C., commanded by General H. W. Wessells, and our

gunboats there, and, after severe fighting, the place was carried by

assault, and the entire garrison and armament captured. The gunboat

Smithfield was sunk, and the Miami disabled.

The army sent to operate against Richmond having hermetically sealed

itself up at Bermuda Hundred, the enemy was enabled to bring the most,

if not all, the reinforcements brought from the south by Beauregard

against the Army of the Potomac. In addition to this reinforcement, a

very considerable one, probably not less than fifteen thousand men, was

obtained by calling in the scattered troops under Breckinridge from the

western part of Virginia.

The position of Bermuda Hundred was as easy to defend as it was

difficult to operate from against the enemy. I determined, therefore,

to bring from it all available forces, leaving enough only to secure

what had been gained; and accordingly, on the 22d, I directed that they

be sent forward, under command of Major-General W. F. Smith, to join the

Army of the Potomac.

On the 24th of May, the 9th army corps, commanded by Major-General A. E.

Burnside, was assigned to the Army of the Potomac, and from this time

forward constituted a portion of Major-General Meade's command.

Finding the enemy's position on the North Anna stronger than either of

his previous ones, I withdrew on the night of the 26th to the north bank

of the North Anna, and moved via Hanover Town to turn the enemy's

position by his right.

Generals Torbert's and Merritt's divisions of cavalry, under Sheridan,

and the 6th corps, led the advance, crossed the Pamunkey River at

Hanover Town, after considerable fighting, and on the 28th the two

divisions of cavalry had a severe, but successful engagement with the

enemy at Hawes's Shop. On the 29th and 30th we advanced, with heavy

skirmishing, to the Hanover Court House and Cold Harbor Road, and

developed the enemy's position north of the Chickahominy. Late on the

evening of the last day the enemy came out and attacked our left, but

was repulsed with very considerable loss. An attack was immediately

ordered by General Meade, along his whole line, which resulted in

driving the enemy from a part of his intrenched skirmish line.

On the 31st, General Wilson's division of cavalry destroyed the railroad

bridges over the South Anna River, after defeating the enemy's cavalry.

General Sheridan, on the same day, reached Cold Harbor, and held it

until relieved by the 6th corps and General Smith's command, which had

just arrived, via White House, from General Butler's army.

On the 1st day of June an attack was made at five P.M. by the 6th corps

and the troops under General Smith, the other corps being held in

readiness to advance on the receipt of orders. This resulted in our

carrying and holding the enemy's first line of works in front of the

right of the 6th corps, and in front of General Smith. During the

attack the enemy made repeated assaults on each of the corps not engaged

in the main attack, but was repulsed with heavy loss in every instance.

That night he made several assaults to regain what he had lost in the

day, but failed. The 2d was spent in getting troops into position for

an attack on the 3d. On the 3d of June we again assaulted the enemy's

works, in the hope of driving him from his position. In this attempt

our loss was heavy, while that of the enemy, I have reason to believe,

was comparatively light. It was the only general attack made from the

Rapidan to the James which did not inflict upon the enemy losses to

compensate for our own losses. I would not be understood as saying that

all previous attacks resulted in victories to our arms, or accomplished

as much as I had hoped from them; but they inflicted upon the enemy

severe losses, which tended, in the end, to the complete overthrow of

the rebellion.

From the proximity of the enemy to his defences around Richmond, it was

impossible, by any flank movement, to interpose between him and the

city. I was still in a condition to either move by his left flank, and

invest Richmond from the north side, or continue my move by his right

flank to the south side of the James. While the former might have been

better as a covering for Washington, yet a full survey of all the ground

satisfied me that it would be impracticable to hold a line north and

east of Richmond that would protect the Fredericksburg Railroad, a long,

vulnerable line, which would exhaust much of our strength to guard, and

that would have to be protected to supply the army, and would leave open

to the enemy all his lines of communication on the south side of the

James. My idea, from the start, had been to beat Lee's army north of

Richmond, if possible. Then, after destroying his lines of

communication north of the James River, to transfer the army to the

south side, and besiege Lee in Richmond, or follow him south if he

should retreat. After the battle of the Wilderness, it was evident that

the enemy deemed it of the first importance to run no risks with the

army he then had. He acted purely on the defensive, behind breastworks,

or feebly on the offensive immediately in front of them, and where, in

case of repulse, he could easily retire behind them. Without a greater

sacrifice of life than I was willing to make, all could not be

accomplished that I had designed north of Richmond. I therefore

determined to continue to hold substantially the ground we then

occupied, taking advantage of any favorable circumstances that might

present themselves, until the cavalry could be sent to Charlottesville

and Gordonsville to effectually break up the railroad connection between

Richmond and the Shenandoah Valley and Lynchburg; and when the cavalry

got well off, to move the army to the south side of the James River, by

the enemy's right flank, where I felt I could cut off all his sources of

supply, except by the canal.

On the 7th, two divisions of cavalry, under General Sheridan, got off on

the expedition against the Virginia Central Railroad, with instructions

to Hunter, whom I hoped he would meet near Charlottesville, to join his

forces to Sheridan's, and after the work laid out for them was

thoroughly done, to join the Army of the Potomac by the route laid down

in Sheridan's instructions.

On the 10th of June, General Butler sent a force of infantry, under

General Gillmore, and of cavalry under General Kautz, to capture

Petersburg, if possible, and destroy the railroad and common bridges

across the Appomattox. The cavalry carried the works on the south side,

and penetrated well in towards the town, but were forced to retire.

General Gillmore, finding the works which he approached very strong, and

deeming an assault impracticable, returned to Bermuda Hundred without

attempting one.

Attaching great importance to the possession of Petersburg, I sent back

to Bermuda Hundred and City Point, General Smith's command by water, via

the White House, to reach there in advance of the Army of the Potomac.

This was for the express purpose of securing Petersburg before the

enemy, becoming aware of our intention, could reinforce the place.

The movement from Cold Harbor commenced after dark on the evening of the

12th. One division of cavalry, under General Wilson, and the 5th corps,

crossed the Chickahominy at Long Bridge, and moved out to White Oak

Swamp, to cover the crossings of the other corps. The advance corps

reached James River, at Wilcox's Landing and Charles City Court House,

on the night of the 13th.

During three long years the Armies of the Potomac and Northern Virginia

had been confronting each other. In that time they had fought more

desperate battles than it probably ever before fell to the lot of two

armies to fight, without materially changing the vantage ground of

either. The Southern press and people, with more shrewdness than was

displayed in the North, finding that they had failed to capture

Washington and march on to New York, as they had boasted they would do,

assumed that they only defended their Capital and Southern territory.

Hence, Antietam, Gettysburg, and all the other battles that had been

fought, were by them set down as failures on our part, and victories for

them. Their army believed this. It produced a morale which could only

be overcome by desperate and continuous hard fighting. The battles of

the Wilderness, Spottsylvania, North Anna and Cold Harbor, bloody and

terrible as they were on our side, were even more damaging to the enemy,

and so crippled him as to make him wary ever after of taking the

offensive. His losses in men were probably not so great, owing to the

fact that we were, save in the Wilderness, almost invariably the

attacking party; and when he did attack, it was in the open field. The

details of these battles, which for endurance and bravery on the part of

the soldiery, have rarely been surpassed, are given in the report of

Major-General Meade, and the subordinate reports accompanying it.

During the campaign of forty-three days, from the Rapidan to the James

River, the army had to be supplied from an ever-shifting base, by

wagons, over narrow roads, through a densely wooded country, with a lack

of wharves at each new base from which to conveniently discharge

vessels. Too much credit cannot, therefore, be awarded to the

quartermaster and commissary departments for the zeal and efficiency

displayed by them. Under the general supervision of the chief

quartermaster, Brigadier-General R. Ingalls, the trains were made to

occupy all the available roads between the army and our water-base, and

but little difficulty was experienced in protecting them.

The movement in the Kanawha and Shenandoah valleys, under General Sigel,

commenced on the 1st of May. General Crook, who had the immediate

command of the Kanawha expedition, divided his forces into two columns,

giving one, composed of cavalry, to General Averell. They crossed the

mountains by separate routes. Averell struck the Tennessee and Virginia

Railroad, near Wytheville, on the 10th, and proceeding to New River and

Christiansburg, destroyed the road, several important bridges and

depots, including New River Bridge, forming a junction with Crook at

Union on the 15th. General Sigel moved up the Shenandoah Valley, met

the enemy at New Market on the 15th, and, after a severe engagement, was

defeated with heavy loss, and retired behind Cedar Creek. Not regarding

the operations of General Sigel as satisfactory, I asked his removal

from command, and Major-General Hunter appointed to supersede him. His

instructions were embraced in the following dispatches to Major-General

H. W. Halleck, chief of staff of the army:

"NEAR SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT HOUSE, VA. "May 20, 1864.

* * * * * * * "The enemy are

evidently relying for supplies greatly on such as are brought over the

branch road running through Staunton. On the whole, therefore, I think

it would be better for General Hunter to move in that direction; reach

Staunton and Gordonsville or Charlottesville, if he does not meet too

much opposition. If he can hold at bay a force equal to his own, he

will be doing good service. * * *

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

"MAJOR-GENERAL H. W. HALLECK."

"JERICHO FORD, VA., May 25, 1864.

"If Hunter can possibly get to Charlottesville and Lynchburg, he should

do so, living on the country. The railroads and canal should be

destroyed beyond possibility of repairs for weeks. Completing this, he

could find his way back to his original base, or from about Gordonsville

join this army.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

"MAJOR-GENERAL H. W. HALLECK."

General Hunter immediately took up the offensive, and, moving up the

Shenandoah Valley, met the enemy on the 5th of June at Piedmont, and,

after a battle of ten hours, routed and defeated him, capturing on the

field of battle one thousand five hundred men, three pieces of

artillery, and three hundred stand of small arms. On the 8th of the

same month he formed a junction with Crook and Averell at Staunton, from

which place he moved direct on Lynchburg, via Lexington, which place he

reached and invested on the 16th day of June. Up to this time he was

very successful; and but for the difficulty of taking with him

sufficient ordnance stores over so long a march, through a hostile

country, he would, no doubt, have captured that, to the enemy important,

point. The destruction of the enemy's supplies and manufactories was

very great. To meet this movement under General Hunter, General Lee

sent a force, perhaps equal to a corps, a part of which reached

Lynchburg a short time before Hunter. After some skirmishing on the

17th and 18th, General Hunter, owing to a want of ammunition to give

battle, retired from before the place. Unfortunately, this want of

ammunition left him no choice of route for his return but by way of

Kanawha. This lost to us the use of his troops for several weeks from

the defence of the North.

Had General Hunter moved by way of Charlottesville, instead of

Lexington, as his instructions contemplated, he would have been in a

position to have covered the Shenandoah Valley against the enemy, should

the force he met have seemed to endanger it. If it did not, he would

have been within easy distance of the James River Canal, on the main

line of communication between Lynchburg and the force sent for its

defence. I have never taken exception to the operations of General

Hunter, and am not now disposed to find fault with him, for I have no

doubt he acted within what he conceived to be the spirit of his

instructions and the interests of the service. The promptitude of his

movements and his gallantry should entitle him to the commendation of

his country.

To return to the Army of the Potomac: The 2d corps commenced crossing

the James River on the morning of the 14th by ferry-boats at Wilcox's

Landing. The laying of the pontoon-bridge was completed about midnight

of the 14th, and the crossing of the balance of the army was rapidly

pushed forward by both bridge and ferry.

After the crossing had commenced, I proceeded by steamer to Bermuda

Hundred to give the necessary orders for the immediate capture of

Petersburg.

The instructions to General Butler were verbal, and were for him to send

General Smith immediately, that night, with all the troops he could give

him without sacrificing the position he then held. I told him that I

would return at once to the Army of the Potomac, hasten its crossing and

throw it forward to Petersburg by divisions as rapidly as it could be

done, that we could reinforce our armies more rapidly there than the

enemy could bring troops against us. General Smith got off as directed,

and confronted the enemy's pickets near Petersburg before daylight next

morning, but for some reason that I have never been able to

satisfactorily understand, did not get ready to assault his main lines

until near sundown. Then, with a part of his command only, he made the

assault, and carried the lines north-east of Petersburg from the

Appomattox River, for a distance of over two and a half miles, capturing

fifteen pieces of artillery and three hundred prisoners. This was about

seven P.M. Between the line thus captured and Petersburg there were no

other works, and there was no evidence that the enemy had reinforced

Petersburg with a single brigade from any source. The night was clear

the moon shining brightly and favorable to further operations. General

Hancock, with two divisions of the 2d corps, reached General Smith just

after dark, and offered the service of these troops as he (Smith) might

wish, waiving rank to the named commander, who he naturally supposed

knew best the position of affairs, and what to do with the troops. But

instead of taking these troops and pushing at once into Petersburg, he

requested General Hancock to relieve a part of his line in the captured

works, which was done before midnight.

By the time I arrived the next morning the enemy was in force. An attack

was ordered to be made at six o'clock that evening by the troops under

Smith and the 2d and 9th corps. It required until that time for the 9th

corps to get up and into position. The attack was made as ordered, and

the fighting continued with but little intermission until six o'clock

the next morning, and resulted in our carrying the advance and some of

the main works of the enemy to the right (our left) of those previously

captured by General Smith, several pieces of artillery, and over four

hundred prisoners.

The 5th corps having got up, the attacks were renewed and persisted in

with great vigor on the 17th and 18th, but only resulted in forcing the

enemy into an interior line, from which he could not be dislodged. The

advantages of position gained by us were very great. The army then

proceeded to envelop Petersburg towards the South Side Railroad as far

as possible without attacking fortifications.

On the 16th the enemy, to reinforce Petersburg, withdrew from a part of

his intrenchment in front of Bermuda Hundred, expecting, no doubt, to

get troops from north of the James to take the place of those withdrawn

before we could discover it. General Butler, taking advantage of this,

at once moved a force on the railroad between Petersburg and Richmond.

As soon as I was apprised of the advantage thus gained, to retain it I

ordered two divisions of the 6th corps, General Wright commanding, that

were embarking at Wilcox's Landing, under orders for City Point, to

report to General Butler at Bermuda Hundred, of which General Butler was

notified, and the importance of holding a position in advance of his

present line urged upon him.

About two o'clock in the afternoon General Butler was forced back to the

line the enemy had withdrawn from in the morning. General Wright, with

his two divisions, joined General Butler on the forenoon of the 17th,

the latter still holding with a strong picket-line the enemy's works.

But instead of putting these divisions into the enemy's works to hold

them, he permitted them to halt and rest some distance in the rear of

his own line. Between four and five o'clock in the afternoon the enemy

attacked and drove in his pickets and re-occupied his old line.

On the night of the 20th and morning of the 21st a lodgment was effected

by General Butler, with one brigade of infantry, on the north bank of

the James, at Deep Bottom, and connected by pontoon-bridge with Bermuda

Hundred.

On the 19th, General Sheridan, on his return from his expedition against

the Virginia Central Railroad, arrived at the White House just as the

enemy's cavalry was about to attack it, and compelled it to retire. The

result of this expedition was, that General Sheridan met the enemy's

cavalry near Trevilian Station, on the morning of the 11th of June, whom

he attacked, and after an obstinate contest drove from the field in

complete rout. He left his dead and nearly all his wounded in our

hands, and about four hundred prisoners and several hundred horses. On

the 12th he destroyed the railroad from Trevilian Station to Louisa

Court House. This occupied until three o'clock P.M., when he advanced

in the direction of Gordonsville. He found the enemy reinforced by

infantry, behind well-constructed rifle-pits, about five miles from the

latter place and too strong to successfully assault. On the extreme

right, however, his reserve brigade carried the enemy's works twice, and

was twice driven therefrom by infantry. Night closed the contest. Not

having sufficient ammunition to continue the engagement, and his animals

being without forage (the country furnishing but inferior grazing), and

hearing nothing from General Hunter, he withdrew his command to the

north side of the North Anna, and commenced his return march, reaching

White House at the time before stated. After breaking up the depot at

that place, he moved to the James River, which he reached safely after

heavy fighting. He commenced crossing on the 25th, near Fort Powhatan,

without further molestation, and rejoined the Army of the Potomac.

On the 22d, General Wilson, with his own division of cavalry of the Army

of the Potomac, and General Kautz's division of cavalry of the Army of

the James moved against the enemy's railroads south of Richmond.

Striking the Weldon Railroad at Reams's Station, destroying the depot

and several miles of the road, and the South Side road about fifteen

miles from Petersburg, to near Nottoway Station, where he met and

defeated a force of the enemy's cavalry. He reached Burkesville Station

on the afternoon of the 23d, and from there destroyed the Danville

Railroad to Roanoke Bridge, a distance of twenty-five miles, where he

found the enemy in force, and in a position from which he could not

dislodge him. He then commenced his return march, and on the 28th met

the enemy's cavalry in force at the Weldon Railroad crossing of Stony

Creek, where he had a severe but not decisive engagement. Thence he

made a detour from his left with a view of reaching Reams's Station

(supposing it to be in our possession). At this place he was met by the

enemy's cavalry, supported by infantry, and forced to retire, with the

loss of his artillery and trains. In this last encounter, General

Kautz, with a part of his command, became separated, and made his way

into our lines. General Wilson, with the remainder of his force,

succeeded in crossing the Nottoway River and coming in safely on our

left and rear. The damage to the enemy in this expedition more than

compensated for the losses we sustained. It severed all connection by

railroad with Richmond for several weeks.

With a view of cutting the enemy's railroad from near Richmond to the

Anna rivers, and making him wary of the situation of his army in the

Shenandoah, and, in the event of failure in this, to take advantage of

his necessary withdrawal of troops from Petersburg, to explode a mine

that had been prepared in front of the 9th corps and assault the enemy's

lines at that place, on the night of the 26th of July the 2d corps and

two divisions of the cavalry corps and Kautz's cavalry were crossed to

the north bank of the James River and joined the force General Butler

had there. On the 27th the enemy was driven from his intrenched

position, with the loss of four pieces of artillery. On the 28th our

lines were extended from Deep Bottom to New Market Road, but in getting

this position were attacked by the enemy in heavy force. The fighting

lasted for several hours, resulting in considerable loss to both sides.

The first object of this move having failed, by reason of the very large

force thrown there by the enemy, I determined to take advantage of the

diversion made, by assaulting Petersburg before he could get his force

back there. One division of the 2d corps was withdrawn on the night of

the 28th, and moved during the night to the rear of the 18th corps, to

relieve that corps in the line, that it might be foot-loose in the

assault to be made. The other two divisions of the 2d corps and

Sheridan's cavalry were crossed over on the night of the 29th and moved

in front of Petersburg. On the morning of the 30th, between four and

five o'clock, the mine was sprung, blowing up a battery and most of a

regiment, and the advance of the assaulting column, formed of the 9th

corps, immediately took possession of the crater made by the explosion,

and the line for some distance to the right and left of it, and a

detached line in front of it, but for some cause failed to advance

promptly to the ridge beyond. Had they done this, I have every reason

to believe that Petersburg would have fallen. Other troops were

immediately pushed forward, but the time consumed in getting them up

enabled the enemy to rally from his surprise (which had been complete),

and get forces to this point for its defence. The captured line thus

held being untenable, and of no advantage to us, the troops were

withdrawn, but not without heavy loss. Thus terminated in disaster what

promised to be the most successful assault of the campaign.

Immediately upon the enemy's ascertaining that General Hunter was

retreating from Lynchburg by way of the Kanawha River, thus laying the

Shenandoah Valley open for raid into Maryland and Pennsylvania, he

returned northward and moved down that valley. As soon as this movement

of the enemy was ascertained, General Hunter, who had reached the

Kanawha River, was directed to move his troops without delay, by river

and railroad, to Harper's Ferry; but owing to the difficulty of

navigation by reason of low water and breaks in the railroad, great

delay was experienced in getting there. It became necessary, therefore,

to find other troops to check this movement of the enemy. For this

purpose the 6th corps was taken from the armies operating against

Richmond, to which was added the 19th corps, then fortunately beginning

to arrive in Hampton Roads from the Gulf Department, under orders issued

immediately after the ascertainment of the result of the Red River

expedition. The garrisons of Baltimore and Washington were at this time

made up of heavy-artillery regiments, hundred days' men, and detachments

from the invalid corps. One division under command of General Ricketts,

of the 6th corps, was sent to Baltimore, and the remaining two divisions

of the 6th corps, under General Wright, were subsequently sent to

Washington. On the 3d of July the enemy approached Martinsburg.

General Sigel, who was in command of our forces there, retreated across

the Potomac at Shepherdtown; and General Weber, commanding at Harper's

Ferry, crossed the occupied Hagerstown, moving a strong column towards

Frederick City. General Wallace, with Rickett's division and his own

command, the latter mostly new and undisciplined troops, pushed out from

Baltimore with great promptness, and met the enemy in force on the

Monocacy, near the crossing of the railroad bridge. His force was not

sufficient to insure success, but he fought the enemy nevertheless, and

although it resulted in a defeat to our arms, yet it detained the enemy,

and thereby served to enable General Wright to reach Washington with two

division of the 6th corps, and the advance of the 19th corps, before

him. From Monocacy the enemy moved on Washington, his cavalry advance

reaching Rockville on the evening of the 10th. On the 12th a

reconnoissance was thrown out in front of Fort Stevens, to ascertain the

enemy's position and force. A severe skirmish ensued, in which we lost

about two hundred and eighty in killed and wounded. The enemy's loss

was probably greater. He commenced retreating during the night.

Learning the exact condition of affairs at Washington, I requested by

telegraph, at forty-five minutes past eleven P.M., on the 12th, the

assignment of Major-General H. G. Wright to the command of all the

troops that could be made available to operate in the field against the

enemy, and directed that he should get outside of the trenches with all

the force he could, and push Early to the last moment. General Wright

commenced the pursuit on the 13th; on the 18th the enemy was overtaken

at Snicker's Ferry, on the Shenandoah, when a sharp skirmish occurred;

and on the 20th, General Averell encountered and defeated a portion of

the rebel army at Winchester, capturing four pieces of artillery and

several hundred prisoners.

Learning that Early was retreating south towards Lynchburg or Richmond,

I directed that the 6th and 19th corps be got back to the armies

operating against Richmond, so that they might be used in a movement

against Lee before the return of the troops sent by him into the valley;

and that Hunter should remain in the Shenandoah Valley, keeping between

any force of the enemy and Washington, acting on the defensive as much

as possible. I felt that if the enemy had any notion of returning, the

fact would be developed before the 6th and 19th corps could leave

Washington. Subsequently, the 19th corps was excepted form the order to

return to the James.

About the 25th it became evident that the enemy was again advancing upon

Maryland and Pennsylvania, and the 6th corps, then at Washington, was

ordered back to the vicinity of Harper's Ferry. The rebel force moved

down the valley, and sent a raiding party into Pennsylvania which on the

30th burned Chambersburg, and then retreated, pursued by our cavalry,

towards Cumberland. They were met and defeated by General Kelley, and

with diminished numbers escaped into the mountains of West Virginia.

From the time of the first raid the telegraph wires were frequently down

between Washington and City Point, making it necessary to transmit

messages a part of the way by boat. It took from twenty-four to

thirty-six hours to get dispatches through and return answers would be

received showing a different state of facts from those on which they

were based, causing confusion and apparent contradiction of orders that

must have considerably embarrassed those who had to execute them, and

rendered operations against the enemy less effective than they otherwise

would have been. To remedy this evil, it was evident to my mind that

some person should have the supreme command of all the forces in the

Department of West Virginia, Washington, Susquehanna, and the Middle

Department, and I so recommended.

On the 2d of August, I ordered General Sheridan to report in person to

Major-General Halleck, chief of staff, at Washington, with a view to his

assignment to the command of all the forces against Early. At this time

the enemy was concentrated in the neighborhood of Winchester, while our

forces, under General Hunter, were concentrated on the Monocacy, at the

crossing of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, leaving open to the enemy

Western Maryland and Southern Pennsylvania. From where I was, I

hesitated to give positive orders for the movement of our forces at

Monocacy, lest by so doing I should expose Washington. Therefore, on the

4th, I left City Point to visit Hunter's command, and determine for

myself what was best to be done. On arrival there, and after

consultation with General Hunter, I issued to him the following

instructions:

"MONOCACY BRIDGE, MARYLAND, August 5, 1864--8 P.M.

"GENERAL:--Concentrate all your available force without delay in the

vicinity of Harper's Ferry, leaving only such railroad guards and

garrisons for public property as may be necessary. Use, in this

concentrating, the railroad, if by so doing time can be saved. From

Harper's Ferry, if it is found that the enemy has moved north of the

Potomac in large force, push north, following him and attacking him

wherever found; follow him, if driven south of the Potomac, as long as

it is safe to do so. If it is ascertained that the enemy has but a

small force north of the Potomac, then push south with the main force,

detaching under a competent commander, a sufficient force to look after

the raiders, and drive them to their homes. In detaching such a force,

the brigade of the cavalry now en route from Washington via Rockville

may be taken into account.

"There are now on their way to join you three other brigades of the best

cavalry, numbering at least five thousand men and horses. These will be

instructed, in the absence of further orders, to join you by the south

side of the Potomac. One brigade will probably start to-morrow. In

pushing up the Shenandoah Valley, where it is expected you will have to

go first or last, it is desirable that nothing should be left to invite

the enemy to return. Take all provisions, forage, and stock wanted for

the use of your command; such as cannot be consumed, destroy. It is not

desirable that the buildings should be destroyed--they should rather be

protected; but the people should be informed that, so long as an army

can subsist among them, recurrence of theses raids must be expected, and

we are determined to stop them at all hazards.

"Bear in mind, the object is to drive the enemy south; and to do this

you want to keep him always in sight. Be guided in your course by the

course he takes.

"Make your own arrangements for supplies of all kinds, giving regular

vouchers for such as may be taken from loyal citizens in the country

through which you march.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

"MAJOR-GENERAL D. HUNTER."

The troops were immediately put in motion, and the advance reached

Halltown that night.

General Hunter having, in our conversation, expressed a willingness to

be relieved from command, I telegraphed to have General Sheridan, then

at Washington, sent to Harper's Ferry by the morning train, with orders

to take general command of all the troops in the field, and to call on

General Hunter at Monocacy, who would turn over to him my letter of

instructions. I remained at Monocacy until General Sheridan arrived, on

the morning of the 6th, and, after a conference with him in relation to

military affairs in that vicinity, I returned to City Point by way of

Washington.

On the 7th of August, the Middle Department, and the Departments of West

Virginia, Washington, and Susquehanna, were constituted into the "Middle

Military Division," and Major-General Sheridan was assigned to

temporary command of the same.

Two divisions of cavalry, commanded by Generals Torbert and Wilson, were

sent to Sheridan from the Army of the Potomac. The first reached him at

Harper's Ferry about the 11th of August.

His operations during the month of August and the fore part of September

were both of an offensive and defensive character, resulting in many

severe skirmishes, principally by the cavalry, in which we were

generally successful, but no general engagement took place. The two

armies lay in such a position--the enemy on the west bank of the Opequon

Creek covering Winchester, and our forces in front of Berryville--that

either could bring on a battle at any time. Defeat to us would lay open

to the enemy the States of Maryland and Pennsylvania for long distances

before another army could be interposed to check him. Under these

circumstances I hesitated about allowing the initiative to be taken.

Finally, the use of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and the Chesapeake

and Ohio Canal, which were both obstructed by the enemy, became so

indispensably necessary to us, and the importance of relieving

Pennsylvania and Maryland from continuously threatened invasion so

great, that I determined the risk should be taken. But fearing to

telegraph the order for an attack without knowing more than I did of

General Sheridan's feelings as to what would be the probable result, I

left City Point on the 15th of September to visit him at his

headquarters, to decide, after conference with him, what should be done.

I met him at Charlestown, and he pointed out so distinctly how each army

lay; what he could do the moment he was authorized, and expressed such

confidence of success, that I saw there were but two words of

instructions necessary--Go in! For the conveniences of forage, the

teams for supplying the army were kept at Harper's Ferry. I asked him

if he could get out his teams and supplies in time to make an attack on

the ensuing Tuesday morning. His reply was, that he could before

daylight on Monday. He was off promptly to time, and I may here add,

that the result was such that I have never since deemed it necessary to

visit General Sheridan before giving him orders.

Early on the morning of the 19th, General Sheridan attacked General

Early at the crossing on the Opequon Creek, and after a most sanguinary

and bloody battle, lasting until five o'clock in the evening, defeated

him with heavy loss, carrying his entire position from Opequon Creek to

Winchester, capturing several thousand prisoners and five pieces of

artillery. The enemy rallied, and made a stand in a strong position at

Fisher's Hill, where he was attacked, and again defeated with heavy loss

on the 20th [22d]. Sheridan pursued him with great energy through

Harrisonburg, Staunton, and the gaps of the Blue Ridge. After stripping

the upper valley of most of the supplies and provisions for the rebel

army, he returned to Strasburg, and took position on the north side of

Cedar Creek.

Having received considerable reinforcements, General Early again

returned to the valley, and, on the 9th of October, his cavalry

encountered ours near Strasburg, where the rebels were defeated, with

the loss of eleven pieces of artillery and three hundred and fifty

prisoners. On the night of the 18th, the enemy crossed the mountains

which separate the branches of the Shenandoah, forded the North Fork,

and early on the morning of the 19th, under cover of the darkness and

the fog, surprised and turned our left flank, and captured the batteries

which enfiladed our whole line. Our troops fell back with heavy loss

and in much confusion, but were finally rallied between Middletown and

Newtown. At this juncture, General Sheridan, who was at Winchester when

the battle commenced arrived on the field, arranged his lines just in

time to repulse a heavy attack of the enemy, and immediately assuming

the offensive, he attacked in turn with great vigor. The enemy was

defeated with great slaughter, and the loss of most of his artillery and

trains, and the trophies he had captured in the morning. The wreck of

his army escaped during the night, and fled in the direction of Staunton

and Lynchburg. Pursuit was made to Mount Jackson. Thus ended this, the

enemy's last attempt to invade the North via the Shenandoah Valley. I

was now enabled to return the 6th corps to the Army of the Potomac, and

to send one division from Sheridan's army to the Army of the James, and

another to Savannah, Georgia, to hold Sherman's new acquisitions on the

sea-coast, and thus enable him to move without detaching from his force

for that purpose.

Reports from various sources led me to believe that the enemy had

detached three divisions from Petersburg to reinforce Early in the

Shenandoah Valley. I therefore sent the 2d corps and Gregg's division

of cavalry, of the Army of the Potomac, and a force of General Butler's

army, on the night of the 13th of August, to threaten Richmond from the

north side of the James, to prevent him from sending troops away, and,

if possible, to draw back those sent. In this move we captured six

pieces of artillery and several hundred prisoners, detained troops that

were under marching orders, and ascertained that but one division

(Kershaw's), of the three reputed detached, had gone.

The enemy having withdrawn heavily from Petersburg to resist this

movement, the 5th corps, General Warren commanding, was moved out on the

18th, and took possession of the Weldon Railroad. During the day he had

considerable fighting. To regain possession of the road, the enemy made

repeated and desperate assaults, but was each time repulsed with great

loss. On the night of the 20th, the troops on the north side of the

James were withdrawn, and Hancock and Gregg returned to the front at

Petersburg. On the 25th, the 2d corps and Gregg's division of cavalry,

while at Reams's Station destroying the railroad, were attacked, and

after desperate fighting, a part of our line gave way, and five pieces

of artillery fell into the hands of the enemy.

By the 12th of September, a branch railroad was completed from the City

Point and Petersburg Railroad to the Weldon Railroad, enabling us to

supply, without difficulty, in all weather, the army in front of

Petersburg.

The extension of our lines across the Weldon Railroad compelled the

enemy to so extend his, that it seemed he could have but few troops

north of the James for the defence of Richmond. On the night of the

28th, the 10th corps, Major-General Birney, and the 18th corps,

Major-General Ord commanding, of General Butler's army, were crossed to

the north side of the James, and advanced on the morning of the 29th,

carrying the very strong fortifications and intrenchments below

Chaffin's Farm, known as Fort Harrison, capturing fifteen pieces of

artillery, and the New Market Road and intrenchments. This success was

followed up by a gallant assault upon Fort Gilmer, immediately in front

of the Chaffin Farm fortifications, in which we were repulsed with heavy

loss. Kautz's cavalry was pushed forward on the road to the right of

this, supported by infantry, and reached the enemy's inner line, but was

unable to get further. The position captured from the enemy was so

threatening to Richmond, that I determined to hold it. The enemy made

several desperate attempts to dislodge us, all of which were

unsuccessful, and for which he paid dearly. On the morning of the 30th,

General Meade sent out a reconnoissance with a view to attacking the

enemy's line, if it was found sufficiently weakened by withdrawal of

troops to the north side. In this reconnoissance we captured and held

the enemy's works near Poplar Spring Church. In the afternoon, troops

moving to get to the left of the point gained were attacked by the enemy

in heavy force, and compelled to fall back until supported by the forces

holding the captured works. Our cavalry under Gregg was also attacked,

but repulsed the enemy with great loss.

On the 7th of October, the enemy attacked Kautz's cavalry north of the

James, and drove it back with heavy loss in killed, wounded, and

prisoners, and the loss of all the artillery eight or nine pieces. This

he followed up by an attack on our intrenched infantry line, but was

repulsed with severe slaughter. On the 13th, a reconnoissance was sent

out by General Butler, with a view to drive the enemy from some new

works he was constructing, which resulted in very heavy loss to us.

On the 27th, the Army of the Potomac, leaving only sufficient men to

hold its fortified line, moved by the enemy's right flank. The 2d

corps, followed by two divisions of the 5th corps, with the cavalry in

advance and covering our left flank, forced a passage of Hatcher's Run,

and moved up the south side of it towards the South Side Railroad, until

the 2d corps and part of the cavalry reached the Boydton Plank Road

where it crosses Hatcher's Run. At this point we were six miles distant

from the South Side Railroad, which I had hoped by this movement to

reach and hold. But finding that we had not reached the end of the

enemy's fortifications, and no place presenting itself for a successful

assault by which he might be doubled up and shortened, I determined to

withdraw to within our fortified line. Orders were given accordingly.

Immediately upon receiving a report that General Warren had connected

with General Hancock, I returned to my headquarters. Soon after I left

the enemy moved out across Hatcher's Run, in the gap between Generals

Hancock and Warren, which was not closed as reported, and made a

desperate attack on General Hancock's right and rear. General Hancock

immediately faced his corps to meet it, and after a bloody combat drove

the enemy within his works, and withdrew that night to his old position.

In support of this movement, General Butler made a demonstration on the

north side of the James, and attacked the enemy on the Williamsburg

Road, and also on the York River Railroad. In the former he was

unsuccessful; in the latter he succeeded in carrying a work which was

afterwards abandoned, and his forces withdrawn to their former

positions.

From this time forward the operations in front of Petersburg and

Richmond, until the spring campaign of 1865, were confined to the

defence and extension of our lines, and to offensive movements for

crippling the enemy's lines of communication, and to prevent his

detaching any considerable force to send south. By the 7th of February,

our lines were extended to Hatcher's Run, and the Weldon Railroad had

been destroyed to Hicksford.

General Sherman moved from Chattanooga on the 6th of May, with the

Armies of the Cumberland, Tennessee, and Ohio, commanded, respectively,

by Generals Thomas McPherson, and Schofield, upon Johnston's army at

Dalton; but finding the enemy's position at Buzzard's Roost, covering

Dalton, too strong to be assaulted, General McPherson was sent through

Snake Gap to turn it, while Generals Thomas and Schofield threatened it

in front and on the north. This movement was successful. Johnston,

finding his retreat likely to be cut off, fell back to his fortified

position at Resaca, where he was attacked on the afternoon of May 15th.

A heavy battle ensued. During the night the enemy retreated south.

Late on the 17th, his rear-guard was overtaken near Adairsville, and

heavy skirmishing followed. The next morning, however, he had again

disappeared. He was vigorously pursued, and was overtaken at Cassville

on the 19th, but during the ensuing night retreated across the Etowah.

While these operations were going on, General Jefferson C. Davis's

division of Thomas's army was sent to Rome, capturing it with its forts

and artillery, and its valuable mills and foundries. General Sherman,

having give his army a few days' rest at this point, again put it in

motion on the 23d, for Dallas, with a view of turning the difficult pass

at Allatoona. On the afternoon of the 25th, the advance, under General

Hooker, had a severe battle with the enemy, driving him back to New Hope

Church, near Dallas. Several sharp encounters occurred at this point.

The most important was on the 28th, when the enemy assaulted General

McPherson at Dallas, but received a terrible and bloody repulse.

On the 4th of June, Johnston abandoned his intrenched position at New

Hope Church, and retreated to the strong positions of Kenesaw, Pine, and

Lost mountains. He was forced to yield the two last-named places, and

concentrate his army on Kenesaw, where, on the 27th, Generals Thomas and

McPherson made a determined but unsuccessful assault. On the night of

the 2d of July, Sherman commenced moving his army by the right flank,

and on the morning of the 3d, found that the enemy, in consequence of

this movement, had abandoned Kenesaw and retreated across the

Chattahoochee.

General Sherman remained on the Chattahoochee to give his men rest and

get up stores until the 17th of July, when he resumed his operations,

crossed the Chattahoochee, destroyed a large portion of the railroad to

Augusta, and drove the enemy back to Atlanta. At this place General Hood

succeeded General Johnston in command of the rebel army, and assuming

the offensive-defensive policy, made several severe attacks upon Sherman

in the vicinity of Atlanta, the most desperate and determined of which

was on the 22d of July. About one P.M. of this day the brave,

accomplished, and noble-hearted McPherson was killed. General Logan

succeeded him, and commanded the Army of the Tennessee through this

desperate battle, and until he was superseded by Major-General Howard,

on the 26th, with the same success and ability that had characterized

him in the command of a corps or division.

In all these attacks the enemy was repulsed with great loss. Finding it

impossible to entirely invest the place, General Sherman, after securing

his line of communications across the Chattahoochee, moved his main

force round by the enemy's left flank upon the Montgomery and Macon

roads, to draw the enemy from his fortifications. In this he succeeded,

and after defeating the enemy near Rough-and-Ready, Jonesboro, and

Lovejoy's, forcing him to retreat to the south, on the 2d of September

occupied Atlanta, the objective point of his campaign.

About the time of this move, the rebel cavalry, under Wheeler, attempted

to cut his communications in the rear, but was repulsed at Dalton, and

driven into East Tennessee, whence it proceeded west to McMinnville,

Murfreesboro, and Franklin, and was finally driven south of the

Tennessee. The damage done by this raid was repaired in a few days.

During the partial investment of Atlanta, General Rousseau joined

General Sherman with a force of cavalry from Decatur, having made a

successful raid upon the Atlanta and Montgomery Railroad, and its

branches near Opelika. Cavalry raids were also made by Generals McCook,

Garrard, and Stoneman, to cut the remaining Railroad communication with

Atlanta. The first two were successful the latter, disastrous.

General Sherman's movement from Chattanooga to Atlanta was prompt,

skilful, and brilliant. The history of his flank movements and battles

during that memorable campaign will ever be read with an interest

unsurpassed by anything in history.

His own report, and those of his subordinate commanders, accompanying

it, give the details of that most successful campaign.

He was dependent for the supply of his armies upon a single-track

railroad from Nashville to the point where he was operating. This

passed the entire distance through a hostile country, and every foot of

it had to be protected by troops. The cavalry force of the enemy under

Forrest, in Northern Mississippi, was evidently waiting for Sherman to

advance far enough into the mountains of Georgia, to make a retreat

disastrous, to get upon this line and destroy it beyond the possibility

of further use. To guard against this danger, Sherman left what he

supposed to be a sufficient force to operate against Forrest in West

Tennessee. He directed General Washburn, who commanded there, to send

Brigadier-General S. D. Sturgis in command of this force to attack him.

On the morning of the 10th of June, General Sturgis met the enemy near

Guntown, Mississippi, was badly beaten, and driven back in utter rout

and confusion to Memphis, a distance of about one hundred miles, hotly

pursued by the enemy. By this, however, the enemy was defeated in his

designs upon Sherman's line of communications. The persistency with

which he followed up this success exhausted him, and made a season for

rest and repairs necessary. In the meantime, Major-General A. J. Smith,

with the troops of the Army of the Tennessee that had been sent by

General Sherman to General Banks, arrived at Memphis on their return

from Red River, where they had done most excellent service. He was

directed by General Sherman to immediately take the offensive against

Forrest. This he did with the promptness and effect which has

characterized his whole military career. On the 14th of July, he met

the enemy at Tupelo, Mississippi, and whipped him badly. The fighting

continued through three days. Our loss was small compared with that of

the enemy. Having accomplished the object of his expedition, General

Smith returned to Memphis.

During the months of March and April this same force under Forrest

annoyed us considerably. On the 24th of March it captured Union City,

Kentucky, and its garrison, and on the 24th attacked Paducah, commanded

by Colonel S. G. Hicks, 40th Illinois Volunteers. Colonel H., having

but a small force, withdrew to the forts near the river, from where he

repulsed the enemy and drove him from the place.

On the 13th of April, part of this force, under the rebel General

Buford, summoned the garrison of Columbus, Kentucky, to surrender, but

received for reply from Colonel Lawrence, 34th New Jersey Volunteers,

that being placed there by his Government with adequate force to hold

his post and repel all enemies from it, surrender was out of the

question.

On the morning of the same day Forrest attacked Fort Pillow, Tennessee,

garrisoned by a detachment of Tennessee cavalry and the 1st Regiment

Alabama colored troops, commanded by Major Booth. The garrison fought

bravely until about three o'clock in the afternoon, when the enemy

carried the works by assault; and, after our men threw down their arms,

proceeded to an inhuman and merciless massacre of the garrison.

On the 14th, General Buford, having failed at Columbus, appeared before

Paducah, but was again driven off.

Guerillas and raiders, seemingly emboldened by Forrest's operations,

were also very active in Kentucky. The most noted of these was Morgan.

With a force of from two to three thousand cavalry, he entered the State

through Pound Gap in the latter part of May. On the 11th of June they

attacked and captured Cynthiana, with its entire garrison. On the 12th

he was overtaken by General Burbridge, and completely routed with heavy

loss, and was finally driven out of the State. This notorious guerilla

was afterwards surprised and killed near Greenville, Tennessee, and his

command captured and dispersed by General Gillem.

In the absence of official reports of the commencement of the Red River

expedition, except so far as relates to the movements of the troops sent

by General Sherman under General A. J. Smith, I am unable to give the

date of its starting. The troops under General Smith, comprising two

divisions of the 16th and a detachment of the 17th army corps, left

Vicksburg on the 10th of March, and reached the designated point on Red

River one day earlier than that appointed by General Banks. The rebel

forces at Fort de Russy, thinking to defeat him, left the fort on the

14th to give him battle in the open field; but, while occupying the

enemy with skirmishing and demonstrations, Smith pushed forward to Fort

de Russy, which had been left with a weak garrison, and captured it with

its garrison about three hundred and fifty men, eleven pieces of

artillery, and many small-arms. Our loss was but slight. On the 15th

he pushed forward to Alexandria, which place he reached on the 18th. On

the 21st he had an engagement with the enemy at Henderson's Hill, in

which he defeated him, capturing two hundred and ten prisoners and four

pieces of artillery.

On the 28th, he again attacked and defeated the enemy under the rebel

General Taylor, at Cane River. By the 26th, General Banks had assembled

his whole army at Alexandria, and pushed forward to Grand Ecore. On the

morning of April 6th he moved from Grand Ecore. On the afternoon of the

7th, he advanced and met the enemy near Pleasant Hill, and drove him

from the field. On the same afternoon the enemy made a stand eight

miles beyond Pleasant Hill, but was again compelled to retreat. On the

8th, at Sabine Cross Roads and Peach Hill, the enemy attacked and

defeated his advance, capturing nineteen pieces of artillery and an

immense amount of transportation and stores. During the night, General

Banks fell back to Pleasant Hill, where another battle was fought on the

9th, and the enemy repulsed with great loss. During the night, General

Banks continued his retrograde movement to Grand Ecore, and thence to

Alexandria, which he reached on the 27th of April. Here a serious

difficulty arose in getting Admiral Porter's fleet which accompanied the

expedition, over the rapids, the water having fallen so much since they

passed up as to prevent their return. At the suggestion of Colonel (now

Brigadier-General) Bailey, and under his superintendence, wing-dams were

constructed, by which the channel was contracted so that the fleet

passed down the rapids in safety.

The army evacuated Alexandria on the 14th of May, after considerable

skirmishing with the enemy's advance, and reached Morganzia and Point

Coupee near the end of the month. The disastrous termination of this

expedition, and the lateness of the season, rendered impracticable the

carrying out of my plans of a movement in force sufficient to insure the

capture of Mobile.

On the 23d of March, Major-General Steele left Little Rock with the 7th

army corps, to cooperate with General Banks's expedition on the Red

River, and reached Arkadelphia on the 28th. On the 16th of April, after

driving the enemy before him, he was joined, near Elkin's Ferry, in

Washita County, by General Thayer, who had marched from Fort Smith.

After several severe skirmishes, in which the enemy was defeated,

General Steele reached Camden, which he occupied about the middle of

April.

On learning the defeat and consequent retreat of General Banks on Red

River, and the loss of one of his own trains at Mark's Mill, in Dallas

County, General Steele determined to fall back to the Arkansas River.

He left Camden on the 26th of April, and reached Little Rock on the 2d

of May. On the 30th of April, the enemy attacked him while crossing

Saline River at Jenkins's Ferry, but was repulsed with considerable

loss. Our loss was about six hundred in killed, wounded and prisoners.

Major-General Canby, who had been assigned to the command of the

"Military Division of the West Mississippi," was therefore directed to

send the 19th army corps to join the armies operating against Richmond,

and to limit the remainder of his command to such operations as might be

necessary to hold the positions and lines of communications he then

occupied.

Before starting General A. J. Smith's troops back to Sherman, General

Canby sent a part of it to disperse a force of the enemy that was

collecting near the Mississippi River. General Smith met and defeated

this force near Lake Chicot on the 5th of June. Our loss was about

forty killed and seventy wounded.

In the latter part of July, General Canby sent Major-General Gordon

Granger, with such forces as he could collect, to co-operate with

Admiral Farragut against the defences of Mobile Bay. On the 8th of

August, Fort Gaines surrendered to the combined naval and land forces.

Fort Powell was blown up and abandoned.

On the 9th, Fort Morgan was invested, and, after a severe bombardment,

surrendered on the 23d. The total captures amounted to one thousand

four hundred and sixty-four prisoners, and one hundred and four pieces

of artillery.

About the last of August, it being reported that the rebel General

Price, with a force of about ten thousand men, had reached Jacksonport,

on his way to invade Missouri, General A. J. Smith's command, then en

route from Memphis to join Sherman, was ordered to Missouri. A cavalry

force was also, at the same time, sent from Memphis, under command of

Colonel Winslow. This made General Rosecrans's forces superior to those

of Price, and no doubt was entertained he would be able to check Price

and drive him back; while the forces under General Steele, in Arkansas,

would cut off his retreat. On the 26th day of September, Price attacked

Pilot Knob and forced the garrison to retreat, and thence moved north to

the Missouri River, and continued up that river towards Kansas. General

Curtis, commanding Department of Kansas, immediately collected such

forces as he could to repel the invasion of Kansas, while General

Rosecrans's cavalry was operating in his rear.

The enemy was brought to battle on the Big Blue and defeated, with the

loss of nearly all his artillery and trains and a large number of

prisoners. He made a precipitate retreat to Northern Arkansas. The

impunity with which Price was enabled to roam over the State of Missouri

for a long time, and the incalculable mischief done by him, show to how

little purpose a superior force may be used. There is no reason why

General Rosecrans should not have concentrated his forces, and beaten

and driven Price before the latter reached Pilot Knob.

September 20th, the enemy's cavalry, under Forrest, crossed the

Tennessee near Waterloo, Alabama, and on the 23d attacked the garrison

at Athens, consisting of six hundred men, which capitulated on the 24th.

Soon after the surrender two regiments of reinforcements arrived, and

after a severe fight were compelled to surrender. Forrest destroyed the

railroad westward, captured the garrison at Sulphur Branch trestle,

skirmished with the garrison at Pulaski on the 27th, and on the same day

cut the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad near Tullahoma and Dechard.

On the morning of the 30th, one column of Forrest's command, under

Buford, appeared before Huntsville, and summoned the surrender of the

garrison. Receiving an answer in the negative, he remained in the

vicinity of the place until next morning, when he again summoned its

surrender, and received the same reply as on the night before. He

withdrew in the direction of Athens which place had been regarrisoned,

and attacked it on the afternoon of the 1st of October, but without

success. On the morning of the 2d he renewed his attack, but was

handsomely repulsed.

Another column under Forrest appeared before Columbia on the morning of

the 1st, but did not make an attack. On the morning of the 3d he moved

towards Mount Pleasant. While these operations were going on, every

exertion was made by General Thomas to destroy the forces under Forrest

before he could recross the Tennessee, but was unable to prevent his

escape to Corinth, Mississippi.

In September, an expedition under General Burbridge was sent to destroy

the saltworks at Saltville, Virginia. He met the enemy on the 2d of

October, about three miles and a half from Saltville, and drove him into

his strongly intrenched position around the salt-works, from which he

was unable to dislodge him. During the night he withdrew his command

and returned to Kentucky.

General Sherman, immediately after the fall of Atlanta, put his armies

in camp in and about the place, and made all preparations for refitting

and supplying them for future service. The great length of road from

Atlanta to the Cumberland River, however, which had to be guarded,

allowed the troops but little rest.

During this time Jefferson Davis made a speech in Macon, Georgia, which

was reported in the papers of the South, and soon became known to the

whole country, disclosing the plans of the enemy, thus enabling General

Sherman to fully meet them. He exhibited the weakness of supposing that

an army that had been beaten and fearfully decimated in a vain attempt

at the defensive, could successfully undertake the offensive against the

army that had so often defeated it.

In execution of this plan, Hood, with this army, was soon reported to

the south-west of Atlanta. Moving far to Sherman's right, he succeeded

in reaching the railroad about Big Shanty, and moved north on it.

General Sherman, leaving a force to hold Atlanta, with the remainder of

his army fell upon him and drove him to Gadsden, Alabama. Seeing the

constant annoyance he would have with the roads to his rear if he

attempted to hold Atlanta, General Sherman proposed the abandonment and

destruction of that place, with all the railroads leading to it, and

telegraphed me as follows:

"CENTREVILLE, GEORGIA", October 10--noon.

"Dispatch about Wilson just received. Hood is now crossing Coosa River,

twelve miles below Rome, bound west. If he passes over the Mobile and

Ohio road, had I not better execute the plan of my letter sent by

Colonel Porter, and leave General Thomas with the troops now in

Tennessee to defend the State? He will have an ample force when the

reinforcements ordered reach Nashville.

"W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.

"LIEUTENANT-GENERAL GRANT."

For a full understanding of the plan referred to in this dispatch, I

quote from the letter sent by Colonel Porter:

"I will therefore give my opinion, that your army and Canby's should be

reinforced to the maximum; that after you get Wilmington, you strike for

Savannah and the river; that Canby be instructed to hold the Mississippi

River, and send a force to get Columbus, Georgia, either by the way of

the Alabama or the Appalachicola, and that I keep Hood employed and put

my army in final order for a march on Augusta, Columbia, and Charleston,

to be ready as soon as Wilmington is sealed as to commerce and the city

of Savannah is in our possession." This was in reply to a letter of

mine of date September 12th, in answer to a dispatch of his containing

substantially the same proposition, and in which I informed him of a

proposed movement against Wilmington, and of the situation in Virginia,

etc.

"CITY POINT, VIRGINIA,

"October 11, 1864--11 A.M.

"Your dispatch of October 10th received. Does it not look as if Hood

was going to attempt the invasion of Middle Tennessee, using the Mobile

and Ohio and Memphis and Charleston roads to supply his base on the

Tennessee River, about Florence or Decatur? If he does this, he ought

to be met and prevented from getting north of the Tennessee River. If

you were to cut loose, I do not believe you would meet Hood's army, but

would be bushwhacked by all the old men and little boys, and such

railroad guards as are still left at home. Hood would probably strike

for Nashville, thinking that by going north he could inflict greater

damage upon us than we could upon the rebels by going south. If there

is any way of getting at Hood's army, I would prefer that, but I must

trust to your own judgment. I find I shall not be able to send a force

from here to act with you on Savannah. Your movements, therefore, will

be independent of mine; at least until the fall of Richmond takes place.

I am afraid Thomas, with such lines of road as he has to protect, could

not prevent Hood from going north. With Wilson turned loose, with all

your cavalry, you will find the rebels put much more on the defensive

than heretofore.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

"MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN."

"KINGSTON, GEORGIA, "October 11--11 A.M.

"Hood moved his army from Palmetto Station across by Dallas and

Cedartown, and is now on the Coosa River, south of Rome. He threw one

corps on my road at Acworth, and I was forced to follow. I hold Atlanta

with the 20th corps, and have strong detachments along my line. This

reduces my active force to a comparatively small army. We cannot remain

here on the defensive. With the twenty-five thousand men, and the bold

cavalry he has, he can constantly break my roads. I would infinitely

prefer to make a wreck of the road, and of the country from Chattanooga

to Atlanta including the latter city send back all my wounded and

worthless, and with my effective army, move through Georgia, smashing

things, to the sea. Hood may turn into Tennessee and Kentucky, but I

believe he will be forced to follow me. Instead of my being on the

defensive, I would be on the offensive; instead of guessing at what he

means to do, he would have to guess at my plans. The difference in war

is full twenty-five per cent. I can make Savannah, Charleston, or the

mouth of the Chattahoochee.

"Answer quick, as I know we will not have the telegraph long.

"W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.

"LIEUTENANT-GENERAL GRANT."

"CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, "October 11,1864--11.30 P.M.

"Your dispatch of to-day received. If you are satisfied the trip to the

sea-coast can be made, holding the line of the Tennessee River firmly,

you may make it, destroying all the railroad south of Dalton or

Chattanooga, as you think best.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

"MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN."

It was the original design to hold Atlanta, and by getting through to

the coast, with a garrison left on the southern railroads, leading east

and west, through Georgia, to effectually sever the east from the west.

In other words, cut the would-be Confederacy in two again, as it had

been cut once by our gaining possession of the Mississippi River.

General Sherman's plan virtually effected this object.

General Sherman commenced at once his preparations for his proposed

movement, keeping his army in position in the meantime to watch Hood.

Becoming satisfied that Hood had moved westward from Gadsden across Sand

Mountain, General Sherman sent the 4th corps, Major-General Stanley

commanding, and the 23d corps, Major-General Schofield commanding, back

to Chattanooga to report to Major-General Thomas, at Nashville, whom he

had placed in command of all the troops of his military division, save

the four army corps and cavalry division he designed to move with

through Georgia. With the troops thus left at his disposal, there was

little doubt that General Thomas could hold the line of the Tennessee,

or, in the event Hood should force it, would be able to concentrate and

beat him in battle. It was therefore readily consented to that Sherman

should start for the sea-coast.

Having concentrated his troops at Atlanta by the 14th of November, he

commenced his march, threatening both Augusta and Macon. His coming-out

point could not be definitely fixed. Having to gather his subsistence as

he marched through the country, it was not impossible that a force

inferior to his own might compel him to head for such point as he could

reach, instead of such as he might prefer. The blindness of the enemy,

however, in ignoring his movement, and sending Hood's army, the only

considerable force he had west of Richmond and east of the Mississippi

River, northward on an offensive campaign, left the whole country open,

and Sherman's route to his own choice.

How that campaign was conducted, how little opposition was met with, the

condition of the country through which the armies passed, the capture of

Fort McAllister, on the Savannah River, and the occupation of Savannah

on the 21st of December, are all clearly set forth in General Sherman's

admirable report.

Soon after General Sherman commenced his march from Atlanta, two

expeditions, one from Baton Rouge, Louisiana, and one from Vicksburg,

Mississippi, were started by General Canby to cut the enemy's lines of

communication with Mobile and detain troops in that field. General

Foster, commanding Department of the South, also sent an expedition, via

Broad River, to destroy the railroad between Charleston and Savannah.

The expedition from Vicksburg, under command of Brevet Brigadier-General

E. D. Osband (colonel 3d United States colored cavalry), captured, on

the 27th of November, and destroyed the Mississippi Central Railroad

bridge and trestle-work over Big Black River, near Canton, thirty miles

of the road, and two locomotives, besides large amounts of stores. The

expedition from Baton Rouge was without favorable results. The

expedition from the Department of the South, under the immediate command

of Brigadier-General John P. Hatch, consisting of about five thousand

men of all arms, including a brigade from the navy, proceeded up Broad

River and debarked at Boyd's Neck on the 29th of November, from where it

moved to strike the railroad at Grahamsville. At Honey Hill, about

three miles from Grahamsville, the enemy was found and attacked in a

strongly fortified position, which resulted, after severe fighting, in

our repulse with a loss of seven hundred and forty-six in killed,

wounded, and missing. During the night General Hatch withdrew. On the

6th of December General Foster obtained a position covering the

Charleston and Savannah Railroad, between the Coosawhatchie and

Tulifinny rivers.

Hood, instead of following Sherman, continued his move northward, which

seemed to me to be leading to his certain doom. At all events, had I

had the power to command both armies, I should not have changed the

orders under which he seemed to be acting. On the 26th of October, the

advance of Hood's army attacked the garrison at Decatur, Alabama, but

failing to carry the place, withdrew towards Courtland, and succeeded,

in the face of our cavalry, in effecting a lodgment on the north side of

the Tennessee River, near Florence. On the 28th, Forrest reached the

Tennessee, at Fort Heiman, and captured a gunboat and three transports.

On the 2d of November he planted batteries above and below Johnsonville,

on the opposite side of the river, isolating three gunboats and eight

transports. On the 4th the enemy opened his batteries upon the place,

and was replied to from the gunboats and the garrison. The gunboats

becoming disabled were set on fire, as also were the transports, to

prevent their falling into the hands of the enemy. About a million and

a half dollars' worth of store and property on the levee and in

storehouses was consumed by fire. On the 5th the enemy disappeared and

crossed to the north side of the Tennessee River, above Johnsonville,

moving towards Clifton, and subsequently joined Hood. On the night of

the 5th, General Schofield, with the advance of the 23d corps, reached

Johnsonville, but finding the enemy gone, was ordered to Pulaski, and

was put in command of all the troopers there, with instruction to watch

the movements of Hood and retard his advance, but not to risk a general

engagement until the arrival of General A. J. Smith's command from

Missouri, and until General Wilson could get his cavalry remounted.

On the 19th, General Hood continued his advance. General Thomas,

retarding him as much as possible, fell back towards Nashville for the

purpose of concentrating his command and gaining time for the arrival of

reinforcements. The enemy coming up with our main force, commanded by

General Schofield, at Franklin, on the 30th, assaulted our works

repeatedly during the afternoon until late at night, but were in every

instance repulsed. His loss in this battle was one thousand seven

hundred and fifty killed, seven hundred and two prisoners, and three

thousand eight hundred wounded. Among his losses were six general

officers killed, six wounded, and one captured. Our entire loss was two

thousand three hundred. This was the first serious opposition the enemy

met with, and I am satisfied was the fatal blow to all his expectations.

During the night, General Schofield fell back towards Nashville. This

left the field to the enemy--not lost by battle, but voluntarily

abandoned--so that General Thomas's whole force might be brought

together. The enemy followed up and commenced the establishment of his

line in front of Nashville on the 2d of December.

As soon as it was ascertained that Hood was crossing the Tennessee

River, and that Price was going out of Missouri, General Rosecrans was

ordered to send to General Thomas the troops of General A. J. Smith's

command, and such other troops as he could spare. The advance of this

reinforcement reached Nashville on the 30th of November.

On the morning of the 15th December, General Thomas attacked Hood in

position, and, in a battle lasting two days, defeated and drove him from

the field in the utmost confusion, leaving in our hand most of his

artillery and many thousand prisoners, including four general officers.

Before the battle of Nashville I grew very impatient over, as it

appeared to me, the unnecessary delay. This impatience was increased

upon learning that the enemy had sent a force of cavalry across the

Cumberland into Kentucky. I feared Hood would cross his whole army and

give us great trouble there. After urging upon General Thomas the

necessity of immediately assuming the offensive, I started West to

superintend matters there in person. Reaching Washington City, I

received General Thomas's dispatch announcing his attack upon the enemy,

and the result as far as the battle had progressed. I was delighted.

All fears and apprehensions were dispelled. I am not yet satisfied but

that General Thomas, immediately upon the appearance of Hood before

Nashville, and before he had time to fortify, should have moved out with

his whole force and given him battle, instead of waiting to remount his

cavalry, which delayed him until the inclemency of the weather made it

impracticable to attack earlier than he did. But his final defeat of

Hood was so complete, that it will be accepted as a vindication of that

distinguished officer's judgment.

After Hood's defeat at Nashville he retreated, closely pursued by

cavalry and infantry, to the Tennessee River, being forced to abandon

many pieces of artillery and most of his transportation. On the 28th of

December our advanced forces ascertained that he had made good his

escape to the south side of the river.

About this time, the rains having set in heavily in Tennessee and North

Alabama, making it difficult to move army transportation and artillery,

General Thomas stopped the pursuit by his main force at the Tennessee

River. A small force of cavalry, under Colonel W. J. Palmer, 15th

Pennsylvania Volunteers, continued to follow Hood for some distance,

capturing considerable transportation and all the enemy's

pontoon-bridge. The details of these operations will be found

clearly set forth in General Thomas's report.

A cavalry expedition, under Brevet Major-General Grierson, started from

Memphis on the 21st of December. On the 25th he surprised and captured

Forrest's dismounted camp at Verona, Mississippi, on the Mobile and Ohio

Railroad, destroyed the railroad, sixteen cars loaded with wagons and

pontoons for Hood's army, four thousand new English carbines, and large

amounts of public stores. On the morning of the 28th he attacked and

captured a force of the enemy at Egypt, and destroyed a train of

fourteen cars; thence turning to the south-west, he struck the

Mississippi Central Railroad at Winona, destroyed the factories and

large amounts of stores at Bankston, and the machine-shops and public

property at Grenada, arriving at Vicksburg January 5th.

During the operations in Middle Tennessee, the enemy, with a force under

General Breckinridge, entered East Tennessee. On the 13th of November

he attacked General Gillem, near Morristown, capturing his artillery and

several hundred prisoners. Gillem, with what was left of his command,

retreated to Knoxville. Following up his success, Breckinridge moved to

near Knoxville, but withdrew on the 18th, followed by General Ammen.

Under the directions of General Thomas, General Stoneman concentrated

the commands of Generals Burbridge and Gillem near Bean's Station to

operate against Breckinridge, and destroy or drive him into Virginia

--destroy the salt-works at Saltville, and the railroad into Virginia

as far as he could go without endangering his command. On the 12th of

December he commenced his movement, capturing and dispersing the enemy's

forces wherever he met them. On the 16th he struck the enemy, under

Vaughn, at Marion, completely routing and pursuing him to Wytheville,

capturing all his artillery, trains, and one hundred and ninety-eight

prisoners; and destroyed Wytheville, with its stores and supplies, and

the extensive lead-works near there. Returning to Marion, he met a force

under Breckinridge, consisting, among other troops, of the garrison of

Saltville, that had started in pursuit. He at once made arrangements to

attack it the next morning; but morning found Breckinridge gone. He

then moved directly to Saltville, and destroyed the extensive salt-works

at that place, a large amount of stores, and captured eight pieces of

artillery. Having thus successfully executed his instructions, he

returned General Burbridge to Lexington and General Gillem to Knoxville.

Wilmington, North Carolina, was the most important sea-coast port left

to the enemy through which to get supplies from abroad, and send cotton

and other products out by blockade-runners, besides being a place of

great strategic value. The navy had been making strenuous exertions to

seal the harbor of Wilmington, but with only partial effect. The nature

of the outlet of Cape Fear River was such, that it required watching for

so great a distance that, without possession of the land north of New

Inlet, or Fort Fisher, it was impossible for the navy to entirely close

the harbor against the entrance of blockade-runners.

To secure the possession of this land required the co-operation of a

land force, which I agreed to furnish. Immediately commenced the

assemblage in Hampton Roads, under Admiral D. D. Porter, of the most

formidable armada ever collected for concentration upon one given point.

This necessarily attracted the attention of the enemy, as well as that

of the loyal North; and through the imprudence of the public press, and

very likely of officers of both branches of service, the exact object of

the expedition became a subject of common discussion in the newspapers

both North and South. The enemy, thus warned, prepared to meet it.

This caused a postponement of the expedition until the later part of

November, when, being again called upon by Hon. G. V. Fox, Assistant

Secretary of the Navy, I agreed to furnish the men required at once, and

went myself, in company with Major-General Butler, to Hampton Roads,

where we had a conference with Admiral Porter as to the force required

and the time of starting. A force of six thousand five hundred men was

regarded as sufficient. The time of starting was not definitely

arranged, but it was thought all would be ready by the 6th of December,

if not before. Learning, on the 30th of November, that Bragg had gone

to Georgia, taking with him most of the forces about Wilmington, I

deemed it of the utmost importance that the expedition should reach its

destination before the return of Bragg, and directed General Butler to

make all arrangements for the departure of Major-General Weitzel, who

had been designated to command the land forces, so that the navy might

not be detained one moment.

On the 6th of December, the following instructions were given:

"CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, December 6, 1864.

"GENERAL: The first object of the expedition under General Weitzel is

to close to the enemy the port of Wilmington. If successful in this,

the second will be to capture Wilmington itself. There are reasonable

grounds to hope for success, if advantage can be taken of the absence of

the greater part of the enemy's forces now looking after Sherman in

Georgia. The directions you have given for the numbers and equipment of

the expedition are all right, except in the unimportant matter of where

they embark and the amount of intrenching tools to be taken. The object

of the expedition will be gained by effecting a landing on the main land

between Cape Fear River and the Atlantic, north of the north entrance to

the river. Should such landing be effected while the enemy still holds

Fort Fisher and the batteries guarding the entrance to the river, then

the troops should intrench themselves, and, by co-operating with the

navy, effect the reduction and capture of those places. These in our

hands, the navy could enter the harbor, and the port of Wilmington would

be sealed. Should Fort Fisher and the point of land on which it is

built fall into the hands of our troops immediately on landing, then it

will be worth the attempt to capture Wilmington by a forced march and

surprise. If time is consumed in gaining the first object of the

expedition, the second will become a matter of after consideration.

"The details for execution are intrusted to you and the officer

immediately in command of the troops.

"Should the troops under General Weitzel fail to effect a landing at or

near Fort Fisher, they will be returned to the armies operating against

Richmond without delay.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

"MAJOR-GENERAL B. F. BUTLER."

General Butler commanding the army from which the troops were taken for

this enterprise, and the territory within which they were to operate,

military courtesy required that all orders and instructions should go

through him. They were so sent, but General Weitzel has since

officially informed me that he never received the foregoing

instructions, nor was he aware of their existence, until he read General

Butler's published official report of the Fort Fisher failure, with my

indorsement and papers accompanying it. I had no idea of General

Butler's accompanying the expedition until the evening before it got off

from Bermuda Hundred, and then did not dream but that General Weitzel

had received all the instructions, and would be in command. I rather

formed the idea that General Butler was actuated by a desire to witness

the effect of the explosion of the powder-boat. The expedition was

detained several days at Hampton Roads, awaiting the loading of the

powder-boat.

The importance of getting the Wilmington expedition off without any

delay, with or without the powder-boat, had been urged upon General

Butler, and he advised to so notify Admiral Porter.

The expedition finally got off on the 13th of December, and arrived at

the place of rendezvous, off New Inlet, near Fort Fisher, on the evening

of the 15th. Admiral Porter arrived on the evening of the 18th, having

put in at Beaufort to get ammunition for the monitors. The sea becoming

rough, making it difficult to land troops, and the supply of water and

coal being about exhausted, the transport fleet put back to Beaufort to

replenish; this, with the state of the weather, delayed the return to

the place of rendezvous until the 24th. The powder-boat was exploded on

the morning of the 24th, before the return of General Butler from

Beaufort; but it would seem, from the notice taken of it in the Southern

newspapers, that the enemy were never enlightened as to the object of

the explosion until they were informed by the Northern press.

On the 25th a landing was effected without opposition, and a

reconnoissance, under Brevet Brigadier-General Curtis, pushed up towards

the fort. But before receiving a full report of the result of this

reconnoissance, General Butler, in direct violation of the instructions

given, ordered the re-embarkation of the troops and the return of the

expedition. The re-embarkation was accomplished by the morning of the

27th.

On the return of the expedition officers and men among them Brevet

Major-General (then Brevet Brigadier-General) N. M. Curtis,

First-Lieutenant G. W. Ross, 117th Regiment New York Volunteers,

First-Lieutenant William H. Walling, and Second-Lieutenant George

Simpson, 142d New York Volunteers voluntarily reported to me that when

recalled they were nearly into the fort, and, in their opinion, it could

have been taken without much loss.

Soon after the return of the expedition, I received a dispatch from the

Secretary of the Navy, and a letter from Admiral Porter, informing me

that the fleet was still off Fort Fisher, and expressing the conviction

that, under a proper leader, the place could be taken. The natural

supposition with me was, that when the troops abandoned the expedition,

the navy would do so also. Finding it had not, however, I answered on

the 30th of December, advising Admiral Porter to hold on, and that I

would send a force and make another attempt to take the place. This

time I selected Brevet Major-General (now Major-General) A. H. Terry to

command the expedition. The troops composing it consisted of the same

that composed the former, with the addition of a small brigade,

numbering about one thousand five hundred, and a small siege train. The

latter it was never found necessary to land. I communicated direct to

the commander of the expedition the following instructions:

"CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, January 3, 1865.

"GENERAL: The expedition intrusted to your command has been fitted out

to renew the attempt to capture Fort Fisher, N. C., and Wilmington

ultimately, if the fort falls. You will then proceed with as little

delay as possible to the naval fleet lying off Cape Fear River, and

report the arrival of yourself and command to Admiral D. D. Porter,

commanding North Atlantic Blockading Squadron.

"It is exceedingly desirable that the most complete understanding should

exist between yourself and the naval commander. I suggest, therefore,

that you consult with Admiral Porter freely, and get from him the part

to be performed by each branch of the public service, so that there may

be unity of action. It would be well to have the whole programme laid

down in writing. I have served with Admiral Porter, and know that you

can rely on his judgment and his nerve to undertake what he proposes. I

would, therefore, defer to him as much as is consistent with your own

responsibilities. The first object to be attained is to get a firm

position on the spit of land on which Fort Fisher is built, from which

you can operate against that fort. You want to look to the

practicability of receiving your supplies, and to defending yourself

against superior forces sent against you by any of the avenues left open

to the enemy. If such a position can be obtained, the siege of Fort

Fisher will not be abandoned until its reduction is accomplished, or

another plan of campaign is ordered from these headquarters.

"My own views are, that if you effect a landing, the navy ought to run a

portion of their fleet into Cape Fear River, while the balance of it

operates on the outside. Land forces cannot invest Fort Fisher, or cut

it off from supplies or reinforcements, while the river is in possession

of the enemy.

"A siege-train will be loaded on vessels and sent to Fort Monroe, in

readiness to be sent to you if required. All other supplies can be

drawn from Beaufort as you need them.

"Keep the fleet of vessels with you until your position is assured.

When you find they can be spared, order them back, or such of them as

you can spare, to Fort Monroe, to report for orders.

"In case of failure to effect a landing, bring your command back to

Beaufort, and report to these headquarters for further instructions.

You will not debark at Beaufort until so directed.

"General Sheridan has been ordered to send a division of troops to

Baltimore and place them on sea-going vessels. These troops will be

brought to Fort Monroe and kept there on the vessels until you are heard

from. Should you require them, they will be sent to you.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

"BREVET MAJOR-GENERAL A. H. TERRY."

Lieutenant-Colonel C. B. Comstock, aide-de-camp (now brevet

brigadier-general), who accompanied the former expedition,

was assigned, in orders, as chief-engineer to this.

It will be seen that these instructions did not differ materially from

those given for the first expedition, and that in neither instance was

there an order to assault Fort Fisher. This was a matter left entirely

to the discretion of the commanding officer.

The expedition sailed from Fort Monroe on the morning of the 6th,

arriving at the rendezvous, off Beaufort, on the 8th, where, owing to

the difficulties of the weather, it lay until the morning of the 12th,

when it got under way and reached its destination that evening. Under

cover of the fleet, the disembarkation of the troops commenced on the

morning of the 13th, and by three o'clock P.M. was completed without

loss. On the 14th a reconnoissance was pushed to within five hundred

yards of Fort Fisher, and a small advance work taken possession of and

turned into a defensive line against any attempt that might be made from

the fort. This reconnoissance disclosed the fact that the front of the

work had been seriously injured by the navy fire. In the afternoon of

the 15th the fort was assaulted, and after most desperate fighting was

captured, with its entire garrison and armament. Thus was secured, by

the combined efforts of the navy and army, one of the most important

successes of the war. Our loss was: killed, one hundred and ten;

wounded, five hundred and thirty-six. On the 16th and the 17th the

enemy abandoned and blew up Fort Caswell and the works on Smith's

Island, which were immediately occupied by us. This gave us entire

control of the mouth of the Cape Fear River.

At my request, Mayor-General B. F. Butler was relieved, and

Major-General E. O. C. Ord assigned to the Department of Virginia and

North Carolina.

The defence of the line of the Tennessee no longer requiring the force

which had beaten and nearly destroyed the only army now threatening it,

I determined to find other fields of operation for General Thomas's

surplus troops--fields from which they would co-operate with other

movements. General Thomas was therefore directed to collect all troops,

not essential to hold his communications at Eastport, in readiness for

orders. On the 7th of January, General Thomas was directed, if he was

assured of the departure of Hood south from Corinth, to send General

Schofield with his corps east with as little delay as possible. This

direction was promptly complied with, and the advance of the corps

reached Washington on the 23d of the same month, whence it was sent to

Fort Fisher and New Bern. On the 26th he was directed to send General

A. J. Smith's command and a division of cavalry to report to General

Canby. By the 7th of February the whole force was en route for its

destination.

The State of North Carolina was constituted into a military department,

and General Schofield assigned to command, and placed under the orders

of Major-General Sherman. The following instructions were given him:

"CITY POINT, VA., January 31, 1865.

"GENERAL:-- * * * Your movements are intended as co-operative

with Sherman's through the States of South and North Carolina. The

first point to be attained is to secure Wilmington. Goldsboro' will

then be your objective point, moving either from Wilmington or New Bern,

or both, as you deem best. Should you not be able to reach Goldsboro',

you will advance on the line or lines of railway connecting that place

with the sea-coast--as near to it as you can, building the road behind

you. The enterprise under you has two objects: the first is to give

General Sherman material aid, if needed, in his march north; the second,

to open a base of supplies for him on his line of march. As soon,

therefore, as you can determine which of the two points, Wilmington or

New Bern, you can best use for throwing supplies from, to the interior,

you will commence the accumulation of twenty days' rations and forage

for sixty thousand men and twenty thousand animals. You will get of

these as many as you can house and protect to such point in the interior

as you may be able to occupy. I believe General Palmer has received

some instructions direct from General Sherman on the subject of securing

supplies for his army. You will learn what steps he has taken, and be

governed in your requisitions accordingly. A supply of ordnance stores

will also be necessary.

"Make all requisitions upon the chiefs of their respective departments

in the field with me at City Point. Communicate with me by every

opportunity, and should you deem it necessary at any time, send a

special boat to Fortress Monroe, from which point you can communicate by

telegraph.

"The supplies referred to in these instructions are exclusive of those

required for your own command.

"The movements of the enemy may justify, or even make it your imperative

duty, to cut loose from your base, and strike for the interior to aid

Sherman. In such case you will act on your own judgment without waiting

for instructions. You will report, however, what you purpose doing.

The details for carrying out these instructions are necessarily left to

you. I would urge, however, if I did not know that you are already

fully alive to the importance of it, prompt action. Sherman may be

looked for in the neighborhood of Goldsboro' any time from the 22d to

the 28th of February; this limits your time very materially.

"If rolling-stock is not secured in the capture of Wilmington, it can be

supplied from Washington. A large force of railroad men have already

been sent to Beaufort, and other mechanics will go to Fort Fisher in a

day or two. On this point I have informed you by telegraph.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

"MAJOR-GENERAL J. M. SCHOFIELD."

Previous to giving these instructions I had visited Fort Fisher,

accompanied by General Schofield, for the purpose of seeing for myself

the condition of things, and personally conferring with General Terry

and Admiral Porter as to what was best to be done.

Anticipating the arrival of General Sherman at Savannah his army

entirely foot-loose, Hood being then before Nashville, Tennessee, the

Southern railroads destroyed, so that it would take several months to

re-establish a through line from west to east, and regarding the capture

of Lee's army as the most important operation towards closing the

rebellion--I sent orders to General Sherman on the 6th of December, that

after establishing a base on the sea-coast, with necessary garrison, to

include all his artillery and cavalry, to come by water to City Point

with the balance of his command.

On the 18th of December, having received information of the defeat and

utter rout of Hood's army by General Thomas, and that, owing to the

great difficulty of procuring ocean transportation, it would take over

two months to transport Sherman's army, and doubting whether he might

not contribute as much towards the desired result by operating from

where he was, I wrote to him to that effect, and asked him for his views

as to what would be best to do. A few days after this I received a

communication from General Sherman, of date 16th December, acknowledging

the receipt of my order of the 6th, and informing me of his preparations

to carry it into effect as soon as he could get transportation. Also

that he had expected, upon reducing Savannah, instantly to march to

Columbia, South Carolina, thence to Raleigh, and thence to report to me;

but that this would consume about six weeks' time after the fall of

Savannah, whereas by sea he could probably reach me by the middle of

January. The confidence he manifested in this letter of being able to

march up and join me pleased me, and, without waiting for a reply to my

letter of the 18th, I directed him, on the 28th of December, to make

preparations to start as he proposed, without delay, to break up the

railroads in North and South Carolina, and join the armies operating

against Richmond as soon as he could.

On the 21st of January I informed General Sherman that I had ordered the

23d corps, Major-General Schofield commanding, east; that it numbered

about twenty-one thousand men; that we had at Fort Fisher, about eight

thousand men; at New Bern, about four thousand; that if Wilmington was

captured, General Schofield would go there; if not, he would be sent to

New Bern; that, in either event, all the surplus force at both points

would move to the interior towards Goldsboro', in co-operation with his

movement; that from either point railroad communication could be run

out; and that all these troops would be subject to his orders as he came

into communication with them.

In obedience to his instructions, General Schofield proceeded to reduce

Wilmington, North Carolina, in co-operation with the navy under Admiral

Porter, moving his forces up both sides of the Cape Fear River. Fort

Anderson, the enemy's main defence on the west bank of the river, was

occupied on the morning of the 19th, the enemy having evacuated it after

our appearance before it.

After fighting on 20th and 21st, our troops entered Wilmington on the

morning of the 22d, the enemy having retreated towards Goldsboro' during

the night. Preparations were at once made for a movement on Goldsboro'

in two columns--one from Wilmington, and the other from New Bern--and to

repair the railroad leading there from each place, as well as to supply

General Sherman by Cape Fear River, towards Fayetteville, if it became

necessary. The column from New Bern was attacked on the 8th of March,

at Wise's Forks, and driven back with the loss of several hundred

prisoners. On the 11th the enemy renewed his attack upon our intrenched

position, but was repulsed with severe loss, and fell back during the

night. On the 14th the Neuse River was crossed and Kinston occupied,

and on the 21st Goldsboro' was entered. The column from Wilmington

reached Cox's Bridge, on the Neuse River, ten miles above Goldsboro', on

the 22d.

By the 1st of February, General Sherman's whole army was in motion from

Savannah. He captured Columbia, South Carolina, on the 17th; thence

moved on Goldsboro', North Carolina, via Fayetteville, reaching the

latter place on the 12th of March, opening up communication with General

Schofield by way of Cape Fear River. On the 15th he resumed his march

on Goldsboro'. He met a force of the enemy at Averysboro', and after a

severe fight defeated and compelled it to retreat. Our loss in this

engagement was about six hundred. The enemy's loss was much greater.

On the 18th the combined forces of the enemy, under Joe Johnston,

attacked his advance at Bentonville, capturing three guns and driving it

back upon the main body. General Slocum, who was in the advance

ascertaining that the whole of Johnston's army was in the front,

arranged his troops on the defensive, intrenched himself and awaited

reinforcements, which were pushed forward. On the night of the 21st the

enemy retreated to Smithfield, leaving his dead and wounded in our

hands. From there Sherman continued to Goldsboro', which place had been

occupied by General Schofield on the 21st (crossing the Neuse River ten

miles above there, at Cox's Bridge, where General Terry had got

possession and thrown a pontoon-bridge on the 22d), thus forming a

junction with the columns from New Bern and Wilmington.

Among the important fruits of this campaign was the fall of Charleston,

South Carolina. It was evacuated by the enemy on the night of the 17th

of February, and occupied by our forces on the 18th.

On the morning of the 31st of January, General Thomas was directed to

send a cavalry expedition, under General Stoneman, from East Tennessee,

to penetrate South Carolina well down towards Columbia, to destroy the

railroads and military resources of the country, and return, if he was

able, to East Tennessee by way of Salisbury, North Carolina, releasing

our prisoners there, if possible. Of the feasibility of this latter,

however, General Stoneman was to judge. Sherman's movements, I had no

doubt, would attract the attention of all the force the enemy could

collect, and facilitate the execution of this. General Stoneman was so

late in making his start on this expedition (and Sherman having passed

out of the State of South Carolina), on the 27th of February I directed

General Thomas to change his course, and order him to repeat his raid of

last fall, destroying the railroad towards Lynchburg as far as he could.

This would keep him between our garrisons in East Tennessee and the

enemy. I regarded it not impossible that in the event of the enemy

being driven from Richmond, he might fall back to Lynchburg and attempt

a raid north through East Tennessee. On the 14th of February the

following communication was sent to General Thomas:

"CITY POINT, VA., February 14, 1865.

"General Canby is preparing a movement from Mobile Bay against Mobile

and the interior of Alabama. His force will consist of about twenty

thousand men, besides A. J. Smith's command. The cavalry you have sent

to Canby will be debarked at Vicksburg. It, with the available cavalry

already in that section, will move from there eastward, in co-operation.

Hood's army has been terribly reduced by the severe punishment you gave

it in Tennessee, by desertion consequent upon their defeat, and now by

the withdrawal of many of them to oppose Sherman. (I take it a large

portion of the infantry has been so withdrawn. It is so asserted in the

Richmond papers, and a member of the rebel Congress said a few days

since in a speech, that one-half of it had been brought to South

Carolina to oppose Sherman.) This being true, or even if it is not

true, Canby's movement will attract all the attention of the enemy, and

leave the advance from your standpoint easy. I think it advisable,

therefore, that you prepare as much of a cavalry force as you can spare,

and hold it in readiness to go south. The object would be threefold:

first, to attract as much of the enemy's force as possible, to insure

success to Canby; second, to destroy the enemy's line of communications

and military resources; third, to destroy or capture their forces

brought into the field. Tuscaloosa and Selma would probably be the

points to direct the expedition against. This, however, would not be so

important as the mere fact of penetrating deep into Alabama. Discretion

should be left to the officer commanding the expedition to go where,

according to the information he may receive, he will best secure the

objects named above.

"Now that your force has been so much depleted, I do not know what

number of men you can put into the field. If not more than five

thousand men, however, all cavalry, I think it will be sufficient. It

is not desirable that you should start this expedition until the one

leaving Vicksburg has been three or four days out, or even a week. I do

not know when it will start, but will inform you by telegraph as soon as

I learn. If you should hear through other sources before hearing from

me, you can act on the information received.

"To insure success your cavalry should go with as little wagon-train as

possible, relying upon the country for supplies. I would also reduce

the number of guns to a battery, or the number of batteries, and put the

extra teams to the guns taken. No guns or caissons should be taken with

less than eight horses.

"Please inform me by telegraph, on receipt of this, what force you think

you will be able to send under these directions.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

"MAJOR-GENERAL G. H. THOMAS."

On the 15th, he was directed to start the expedition as soon after the

20th as he could get it off.

I deemed it of the utmost importance, before a general movement of the

armies operating against Richmond, that all communications with the

city, north of James River, should be cut off. The enemy having

withdrawn the bulk of his force from the Shenandoah Valley and sent it

south, or replaced troops sent from Richmond, and desiring to reinforce

Sherman, if practicable, whose cavalry was greatly inferior in numbers

to that of the enemy, I determined to make a move from the Shenandoah,

which, if successful, would accomplish the first at least, and possibly

the latter of the objects. I therefore telegraphed General Sheridan as

follows:

"CITY POINT, VA., February 20, 1865--1 P.M.

"GENERAL:--As soon as it is possible to travel, I think you will have no

difficulty about reaching Lynchburg with a cavalry force alone. From

there you could destroy the railroad and canal in every direction, so as

to be of no further use to the rebellion. Sufficient cavalry should be

left behind to look after Mosby's gang. From Lynchburg, if information

you might get there would justify it, you will strike south, heading the

streams in Virgina to the westward of Danville, and push on and join

General Sherman. This additional raid, with one now about starting from

East Tennessee under Stoneman, numbering four or give thousand cavalry,

one from Vicksburg, numbering seven or eight thousand cavalry, one from

Eastport, Mississippi, then thousand cavalry, Canby from Mobile Bay,

with about thirty-eight thousand mixed troops, these three latter

pushing for Tuscaloosa, Selma, and Montgomery, and Sherman with a large

army eating out the vitals of South Carolina, is all that will be wanted

to leave nothing for the rebellion to stand upon. I would advise you to

overcome great obstacles to accomplish this. Charleston was evacuated

on Tuesday 1st.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

"MAJOR-GENERAL P. H. SHERIDAN."

On the 25th I received a dispatch from General Sheridan, inquiring where

Sherman was aiming for, and if I could give him definite information as

to the points he might be expected to move on, this side of Charlotte,

North Carolina. In answer, the following telegram was sent him:

"CITY POINT, VA., February 25, 1865.

"GENERAL:--Sherman's movements will depend on the amount of opposition

he meets with from the enemy. If strongly opposed, he may possibly have

to fall back to Georgetown, S. C., and fit out for a new start. I

think, however, all danger for the necessity of going to that point has

passed. I believe he has passed Charlotte. He may take Fayetteville on

his way to Goldsboro'. If you reach Lynchburg, you will have to be

guided in your after movements by the information you obtain. Before

you could possibly reach Sherman, I think you would find him moving from

Goldsboro' towards Raleigh, or engaging the enemy strongly posted at one

or the other of these places, with railroad communications opened from

his army to Wilmington or New Bern.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

"MAJOR-GENERAL P. H. SHERIDAN."

General Sheridan moved from Winchester on the 27th of February, with two

divisions of cavalry, numbering about five thousand each. On the 1st of

March he secured the bridge, which the enemy attempted to destroy,

across the middle fork of the Shenandoah, at Mount Crawford, and entered

Staunton on the 2d, the enemy having retreated to Waynesboro'. Thence

he pushed on to Waynesboro', where he found the enemy in force in an

intrenched position, under General Early. Without stopping to make a

reconnoissance, an immediate attack was made, the position was carried,

and sixteen hundred prisoners, eleven pieces of artillery, with horses

and caissons complete, two hundred wagons and teams loaded with

subsistence, and seventeen battle-flags, were captured. The prisoners,

under an escort of fifteen hundred men, were sent back to Winchester.

Thence he marched on Charlottesville, destroying effectually the

railroad and bridges as he went, which place he reached on the 3d. Here

he remained two days, destroying the railroad towards Richmond and

Lynchburg, including the large iron bridges over the north and south

forks of the Rivanna River and awaited the arrival of his trains. This

necessary delay caused him to abandon the idea of capturing Lynchburg.

On the morning of the 6th, dividing his force into two columns, he sent

one to Scottsville, whence it marched up the James River Canal to New

Market, destroying every lock, and in many places the bank of the canal.

From here a force was pushed out from this column to Duiguidsville, to

obtain possession of the bridge across the James River at that place,

but failed. The enemy burned it on our approach. The enemy also burned

the bridge across the river at Hardwicksville. The other column moved

down the railroad towards Lynchburg, destroying it as far as Amherst

Court House, sixteen miles from Lynchburg; thence across the country,

uniting with the column at New Market. The river being very high, his

pontoons would not reach across it; and the enemy having destroyed the

bridges by which he had hoped to cross the river and get on the South

Side Railroad about Farmville, and destroy it to Appomattox Court House,

the only thing left for him was to return to Winchester or strike a base

at the White House. Fortunately, he chose the latter. From New Market

he took up his line of march, following the canal towards Richmond,

destroying every lock upon it and cutting the banks wherever

practicable, to a point eight miles east of Goochland, concentrating the

whole force at Columbia on the 10th. Here he rested one day, and sent

through by scouts information of his whereabouts and purposes, and a

request for supplies to meet him at White House, which reached me on the

night of the 12th. An infantry force was immediately sent to get

possession of White House, and supplies were forwarded. Moving from

Columbia in a direction to threaten Richmond, to near Ashland Station,

he crossed the Annas, and after having destroyed all the bridges and

many miles of the railroad, proceeded down the north bank of the

Pamunkey to White House, which place he reached on the 19th.

Previous to this the following communication was sent to General Thomas:

"CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, March 7, 1865--9.30 A.M.

"GENERAL:--I think it will be advisable now for you to repair the

railroad in East Tennessee, and throw a good force up to Bull's Gap and

fortify there. Supplies at Knoxville could always be got forward as

required. With Bull's Gap fortified, you can occupy as outposts about

all of East Tennessee, and be prepared, if it should be required of you

in the spring, to make a campaign towards Lynchburg, or into North

Carolina. I do not think Stoneman should break the road until he gets

into Virginia, unless it should be to cut off rolling-stock that may be

caught west of that.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

"MAJOR-GENERAL G. H. THOMAS."

Thus it will be seen that in March, 1865, General Canby was moving an

adequate force against Mobile and the army defending it under General

Dick Taylor; Thomas was pushing out two large and well-appointed cavalry

expeditions--one from Middle Tennessee under Brevet Major-General Wilson

against the enemy's vital points in Alabama, the other from East

Tennessee, under Major-General Stoneman, towards Lynchburg--and

assembling the remainder of his available forces, preparatory to

commence offensive operations from East Tennessee; General Sheridan's

cavalry was at White House; the armies of the Potomac and James were

confronting the enemy, under Lee, in his defences of Richmond and

Petersburg; General Sherman with his armies, reinforced by that of

General Schofield, was at Goldsboro'; General Pope was making

preparations for a spring campaign against the enemy under Kirby Smith

and Price, west of the Mississippi; and General Hancock was

concentrating a force in the vicinity of Winchester, Virginia, to guard

against invasion or to operate offensively, as might prove necessary.

After the long march by General Sheridan's cavalry over winter roads, it

was necessary to rest and refit at White House. At this time the

greatest source of uneasiness to me was the fear that the enemy would

leave his strong lines about Petersburg and Richmond for the purpose of

uniting with Johnston, and before he was driven from them by battle, or

I was prepared to make an effectual pursuit. On the 24th of March,

General Sheridan moved from White House, crossed the James River at

Jones's Landing, and formed a junction with the Army of the Potomac in

front of Petersburg on the 27th. During this move, General Ord sent

forces to cover the crossings of the Chickahominy.

On the 24th of March the following instructions for a general movement

of the armies operating against Richmond were issued:

"CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, March 24, 1865.

"GENERAL: On the 29th instant the armies operating against Richmond

will be moved by our left, for the double purpose of turning the enemy

out of his present position around Petersburg, and to insure the success

of the cavalry under General Sheridan, which will start at the same

time, in its efforts to reach and destroy the South Side and Danville

railroads. Two corps of the Army of the Potomac will be moved at first

in two columns, taking the two roads crossing Hatcher's Run, nearest

where the present line held by us strikes that stream, both moving

towards Dinwiddie Court House.

"The cavalry under General Sheridan, joined by the division now under

General Davies, will move at the same time by the Weldon Road and the

Jerusalem Plank Road, turning west from the latter before crossing the

Nottoway, and west with the whole column before reaching Stony Creek.

General Sheridan will then move independently, under other instructions

which will be given him. All dismounted cavalry belonging to the Army

of the Potomac, and the dismounted cavalry from the Middle Military

Division not required for guarding property belonging to their arm of

service, will report to Brigadier-General Benham, to be added to the

defences of City Point. Major-General Parke will be left in command of

all the army left for holding the lines about Petersburg and City Point,

subject of course to orders from the commander of the Army of the

Potomac. The 9th army corps will be left intact, to hold the present

line of works so long as the whole line now occupied by us is held. If,

however, the troops to the left of the 9th corps are withdrawn, then the

left of the corps may be thrown back so as to occupy the position held

by the army prior to the capture of the Weldon Road. All troops to the

left of the 9th corps will be held in readiness to move at the shortest

notice by such route as may be designated when the order is given.

"General Ord will detach three divisions, two white and one colored, or

so much of them as he can, and hold his present lines, and march for the

present left of the Army of the Potomac. In the absence of further

orders, or until further orders are given, the white divisions will

follow the left column of the Army of the Potomac, and the colored

division the right column. During the movement Major-General Weitzel

will be left in command of all the forces remaining behind from the Army

of the James.

"The movement of troops from the Army of the James will commence on the

night of the 27th instant. General Ord will leave behind the minimum

number of cavalry necessary for picket duty, in the absence of the main

army. A cavalry expedition, from General Ord's command, will also be

started from Suffolk, to leave there on Saturday, the 1st of April,

under Colonel Sumner, for the purpose of cutting the railroad about

Hicksford. This, if accomplished, will have to be a surprise, and

therefore from three to five hundred men will be sufficient. They

should, however, be supported by all the infantry that can be spared

from Norfolk and Portsmouth, as far out as to where the cavalry crosses

the Blackwater. The crossing should probably be at Uniten. Should

Colonel Sumner succeed in reaching the Weldon Road, he will be

instructed to do all the damage possible to the triangle of roads

between Hicksford, Weldon, and Gaston. The railroad bridge at Weldon

being fitted up for the passage of carriages, it might be practicable to

destroy any accumulation of supplies the enemy may have collected south

of the Roanoke. All the troops will move with four days' rations in

haversacks and eight days' in wagons. To avoid as much hauling as

possible, and to give the Army of the James the same number of days'

supplies with the Army of the Potomac, General Ord will direct his

commissary and quartermaster to have sufficient supplies delivered at

the terminus of the road to fill up in passing. Sixty rounds of

ammunition per man will be taken in wagons, and as much grain as the

transportation on hand will carry, after taking the specified amount of

other supplies. The densely wooded country in which the army has to

operate making the use of much artillery impracticable, the amount taken

with the army will be reduced to six or eight guns to each division, at

the option of the army commanders.

"All necessary preparations for carrying these directions into operation

may be commenced at once. The reserves of the 9th corps should be

massed as much as possible. While I would not now order an

unconditional attack on the enemy's line by them, they should be ready

and should make the attack if the enemy weakens his line in their front,

without waiting for orders. In case they carry the line, then the whole

of the 9th corps could follow up so as to join or co-operate with the

balance of the army. To prepare for this, the 9th corps will have

rations issued to them, same as the balance of the army. General

Weitzel will keep vigilant watch upon his front, and if found at all

practicable to break through at any point, he will do so. A success

north of the James should be followed up with great promptness. An

attack will not be feasible unless it is found that the enemy has

detached largely. In that case it may be regarded as evident that the

enemy are relying upon their local reserves principally for the defence

of Richmond. Preparations may be made for abandoning all the line north

of the James, except inclosed works only to be abandoned, however, after

a break is made in the lines of the enemy.

"By these instructions a large part of the armies operating against

Richmond is left behind. The enemy, knowing this, may, as an only

chance, strip their lines to the merest skeleton, in the hope of

advantage not being taken of it, while they hurl everything against the

moving column, and return. It cannot be impressed too strongly upon

commanders of troops left in the trenches not to allow this to occur

without taking advantage of it. The very fact of the enemy coming out

to attack, if he does so, might be regarded as almost conclusive

evidence of such a weakening of his lines. I would have it particularly

enjoined upon corps commanders that, in case of an attack from the

enemy, those not attacked are not to wait for orders from the commanding

officer of the army to which they belong, but that they will move

promptly, and notify the commander of their action. I would also enjoin

the same action on the part of division commanders when other parts of

their corps are engaged. In like manner, I would urge the importance of

following up a repulse of the enemy.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

"MAJOR-GENERALS MEADE, ORD, AND SHERIDAN."

Early on the morning of the 25th the enemy assaulted our lines in front

of the 9th corps (which held from the Appomattox River towards our

left), and carried Fort Stedman, and a part of the line to the right and

left of it, established themselves and turned the guns of the fort

against us, but our troops on either flank held their ground until the

reserves were brought up, when the enemy was driven back with a heavy

loss in killed and wounded, and one thousand nine hundred prisoners.

Our loss was sixty-eight killed, three hundred and thirty-seven wounded,

and five hundred and six missing. General Meade at once ordered the

other corps to advance and feel the enemy in their respective fronts.

Pushing forward, they captured and held the enemy's strongly intrenched

picket-line in front of the 2d and 6th corps, and eight hundred and

thirty-four prisoners. The enemy made desperate attempts to retake this

line, but without success. Our loss in front of these was fifty-two

killed, eight hundred and sixty-four wounded, and two hundred and seven

missing. The enemy's loss in killed and wounded was far greater.

General Sherman having got his troops all quietly in camp about

Goldsboro', and his preparations for furnishing supplies to them

perfected, visited me at City Point on the 27th of March, and stated

that he would be ready to move, as he had previously written me, by the

10th of April, fully equipped and rationed for twenty days, if it should

become necessary to bring his command to bear against Lee's army, in

co-operation with our forces in front of Richmond and Petersburg.

General Sherman proposed in this movement to threaten Raleigh, and then,

by turning suddenly to the right, reach the Roanoke at Gaston or

thereabouts, whence he could move on to the Richmond and Danville

Railroad, striking it in the vicinity of Burkesville, or join the armies

operating against Richmond, as might be deemed best. This plan he was

directed to carry into execution, if he received no further directions

in the meantime. I explained to him the movement I had ordered to

commence on the 29th of March. That if it should not prove as entirely

successful as I hoped, I would cut the cavalry loose to destroy the

Danville and South Side railroads, and thus deprive the enemy of further

supplies, and also to prevent the rapid concentration of Lee's and

Johnston's armies.

I had spent days of anxiety lest each morning should bring the report

that the enemy had retreated the night before. I was firmly convinced

that Sherman's crossing the Roanoke would be the signal for Lee to

leave. With Johnston and him combined, a long, tedious, and expensive

campaign, consuming most of the summer, might become necessary. By

moving out I would put the army in better condition for pursuit, and

would at least, by the destruction of the Danville Road, retard the

concentration of the two armies of Lee and Johnston, and cause the enemy

to abandon much material that he might otherwise save. I therefore

determined not to delay the movement ordered.

On the night of the 27th, Major-General Ord, with two divisions of the

24th corps, Major-General Gibbon commanding, and one division of the

25th corps, Brigadier-General Birney commanding, and MacKenzie's

cavalry, took up his line of march in pursuance of the foregoing

instructions, and reached the position assigned him near Hatcher's Run

on the morning of the 29th. On the 28th the following instructions were

given to General Sheridan:

"CITY POINT, VA., March 28, 1865.

"GENERAL:--The 5th army corps will move by the Vaughn Road at three A.M.

to-morrow morning. The 2d moves at about nine A.M., having but about

three miles to march to reach the point designated for it to take on the

right of the 5th corps, after the latter reaching Dinwiddie Court House.

Move your cavalry at as early an hour as you can, and without being

confined to any particular road or roads. You may go out by the nearest

roads in rear of the 5th corps, pass by its left, and passing near to or

through Dinwiddie, reach the right and rear of the enemy as soon as you

can. It is not the intention to attack the enemy in his intrenched

position, but to force him out, if possible. Should he come out and

attack us, or get himself where he can be attacked, move in with your

entire force in your own way, and with the full reliance that the army

will engage or follow, as circumstances will dictate. I shall be on the

field, and will probably be able to communicate with you. Should I not

do so, and you find that the enemy keeps within his main intrenched

line, you may cut loose and push for the Danville Road. If you find it

practicable, I would like you to cross the South Side Road, between

Petersburg and Burkesville, and destroy it to some extent. I would not

advise much detention, however, until you reach the Danville Road, which

I would like you to strike as near to the Appomattox as possible. Make

your destruction on that road as complete as possible. You can then

pass on to the South Side Road, west of Burkesville, and destroy that in

like manner.

"After having accomplished the destruction of the two railroads, which

are now the only avenues of supply to Lee's army, you may return to this

army, selecting your road further south, or you may go on into North

Carolina and join General Sherman. Should you select the latter course,

get the information to me as early as possible, so that I may send

orders to meet you at Goldsboro'.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

"MAJOR-GENERAL P. H. SHERIDAN."

On the morning of the 29th the movement commenced. At night the cavalry

was at Dinwiddie Court House, and the left of our infantry line extended

to the Quaker Road, near its intersection with the Boydton Plank Road.

The position of the troops from left to right was as follows: Sheridan,

Warren, Humphreys, Ord, Wright, Parke.

Everything looked favorable to the defeat of the enemy and the capture

of Petersburg and Richmond, if the proper effort was made. I therefore

addressed the following communication to General Sheridan, having

previously informed him verbally not to cut loose for the raid

contemplated in his orders until he received notice from me to do so:

"GRAVELLY CREEK, March 29, 1865.

"GENERAL:--Our line is now unbroken from the Appomattox to Dinwiddie.

We are all ready, however, to give up all, from the Jerusalem Plank Road

to Hatcher's Run, whenever the forces can be used advantageously. After

getting into line south of Hatcher's, we pushed forward to find the

enemy's position. General Griffin was attacked near where the Quaker

Road intersects the Boydton Road, but repulsed it easily, capturing

about one hundred men. Humphreys reached Dabney's Mill, and was pushing

on when last heard from.

"I now feel like ending the matter, if it is possible to do so, before

going back. I do not want you, therefore, to cut loose and go after the

enemy's roads at present. In the morning push around the enemy, if you

can, and get on to his right rear. The movements of the enemy's cavalry

may, of course, modify your action. We will act all together as one

army here, until it is seen what can be done with the enemy. The

signal-officer at Cobb's Hill reported, at half-past eleven A.M., that a

cavalry column had passed that point from Richmond towards Petersburg,

taking forty minutes to pass.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

"MAJOR-GENERAL P. H. SHERIDAN."

From the night of the 29th to the morning of the 31st the rain fell in

such torrents as to make it impossible to move a wheeled vehicle, except

as corduroy roads were laid in front of them. During the 30th, Sheridan

advanced from Dinwiddie Court House towards Five Forks, where he found

the enemy in full force. General Warren advanced and extended his line

across the Boydton Plank Road to near the White Oak Road, with a view of

getting across the latter; but, finding the enemy strong in his front

and extending beyond his left, was directed to hold on where he was, and

fortify. General Humphreys drove the enemy from his front into his main

line on the Hatcher, near Burgess's Mills. Generals Ord, Wright, and

Parke made examinations in their fronts to determine the feasibility of

an assault on the enemy's lines. The two latter reported favorably.

The enemy confronting us as he did, at every point from Richmond to our

extreme left, I conceived his lines must be weakly held, and could be

penetrated if my estimate of his forces was correct. I determined,

therefore, to extend our line no farther, but to reinforce General

Sheridan with a corps of infantry, and thus enable him to cut loose and

turn the enemy's right flank, and with the other corps assault the

enemy's lines. The result of the offensive effort of the enemy the week

before, when he assaulted Fort Stedman, particularly favored this. The

enemy's intrenched picket-line captured by us at that time threw the

lines occupied by the belligerents so close together at some points that

it was but a moment's run from one to the other. Preparations were at

once made to relieve General Humphreys's corps, to report to General

Sheridan; but the condition of the roads prevented immediate movement.

On the morning of the 31st, General Warren reported favorably to getting

possession of the White Oak Road, and was directed to do so. To

accomplish this, he moved with one division, instead of his whole corps,

which was attacked by the enemy in superior force and driven back on the

2d division before it had time to form, and it, in turn, forced back

upon the 3d division, when the enemy was checked. A division of the 2d

corps was immediately sent to his support, the enemy driven back with

heavy loss, and possession of the White Oak Road gained. Sheridan

advanced, and with a portion of his cavalry got possession of the Five

Forks; but the enemy, after the affair with the 5th corps, reinforced

the rebel cavalry, defending that point with infantry, and forced him

back towards Dinwiddie Court House. Here General Sheridan displayed

great generalship. Instead of retreating with his whole command on the

main army, to tell the story of superior forces encountered, he deployed

his cavalry on foot, leaving only mounted men enough to take charge of

the horses. This compelled the enemy to deploy over a vast extent of

wooded and broken country, and made his progress slow. At this juncture

he dispatched to me what had taken place, and that he was dropping back

slowly on Dinwiddie Court House. General Mackenzie's cavalry and one

division of the 5th corps were immediately ordered to his assistance.

Soon after receiving a report from General Meade that Humphreys could

hold our position on the Boydton Road, and that the other two divisions

of the 5th corps could go to Sheridan, they were so ordered at once.

Thus the operations of the day necessitated the sending of Warren,

because of his accessibility, instead of Humphreys, as was intended, and

precipitated intended movements. On the morning of the 1st of April,

General Sheridan, reinforced by General Warren, drove the enemy back on

Five Forks, where, late in the evening, he assaulted and carried his

strongly fortified position, capturing all his artillery and between

five and six thousand prisoners.

About the close of this battle, Brevet Major-General Charles Griffin

relieved Major-General Warren in command of the 5th corps. The report

of this reached me after nightfall. Some apprehensions filled my mind

lest the enemy might desert his lines during the night, and by falling

upon General Sheridan before assistance could reach him, drive him from

his position and open the way for retreat. To guard against this,

General Miles's division of Humphreys's corps was sent to reinforce him,

and a bombardment was commenced and kept up until four o'clock in the

morning (April 2), when an assault was ordered on the enemy's lines.

General Wright penetrated the lines with his whole corps, sweeping

everything before him, and to his left towards Hatcher's Run, capturing

many guns and several thousand prisoners. He was closely followed by

two divisions of General Ord's command, until he met the other division

of General Ord's that had succeeded in forcing the enemy's lines near

Hatcher's Run. Generals Wright and Ord immediately swung to the right,

and closed all of the enemy on that side of them in Petersburg, while

General Humphreys pushed forward with two divisions and joined General

Wright on the left. General Parke succeeded in carrying the enemy's

main line, capturing guns and prisoners, but was unable to carry his

inner line. General Sheridan being advised of the condition of affairs,

returned General Miles to his proper command. On reaching the enemy's

lines immediately surrounding Petersburg, a portion of General Gibbon's

corps, by a most gallant charge, captured two strong inclosed works--the

most salient and commanding south of Petersburg--thus materially

shortening the line of investment necessary for taking in the city. The

enemy south of Hatcher's Run retreated westward to Sutherland's Station,

where they were overtaken by Miles's division. A severe engagement

ensued, and lasted until both his right and left flanks were threatened

by the approach of General Sheridan, who was moving from Ford's Station

towards Petersburg, and a division sent by General Meade from the front

of Petersburg, when he broke in the utmost confusion, leaving in our

hands his guns and many prisoners. This force retreated by the main

road along the Appomattox River. During the night of the 2d the enemy

evacuated Petersburg and Richmond, and retreated towards Danville. On

the morning of the 3d pursuit was commenced. General Sheridan pushed

for the Danville Road, keeping near the Appomattox, followed by General

Meade with the 2d and 6th corps, while General Ord moved for

Burkesville, along the South Side Road; the 9th corps stretched along

that road behind him. On the 4th, General Sheridan struck the Danville

Road near Jetersville, where he learned that Lee was at Amelia Court

House. He immediately intrenched himself and awaited the arrival of

General Meade, who reached there the next day. General Ord reached

Burkesville on the evening of the 5th.

On the morning of the 5th, I addressed Major-General Sherman the

following communication:

"WILSON'S STATION, April 5, 1865.

"GENERAL: All indications now are that Lee will attempt to reach

Danville with the remnant of his force. Sheridan, who was up with him

last night, reports all that is left, horse, foot, and dragoons, at

twenty thousand, much demoralized. We hope to reduce this number

one-half. I shall push on to Burkesville, and if a stand is made at

Danville, will in a very few days go there. If you can possibly do so,

push on from where you are, and let us see if we cannot finish the job

with Lee's and Johnston's armies. Whether it will be better for you to

strike for Greensboro', or nearer to Danville, you will be better able

to judge when you receive this. Rebel armies now are the only strategic

points to strike at.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

"MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN."

On the morning of the 6th, it was found that General Lee was moving west

of Jetersville, towards Danville. General Sheridan moved with his

cavalry (the 5th corps having been returned to General Meade on his

reaching Jetersville) to strike his flank, followed by the 6th corps,

while the 2d and 5th corps pressed hard after, forcing him to abandon

several hundred wagons and several pieces of artillery. General Ord

advanced from Burkesville towards Farmville, sending two regiments of

infantry and a squadron of cavalry, under Brevet Brigadier-General

Theodore Read, to reach and destroy the bridges. This advance met the

head of Lee's column near Farmville, which it heroically attacked and

detained until General Read was killed and his small force overpowered.

This caused a delay in the enemy's movements, and enabled General Ord to

get well up with the remainder of his force, on meeting which, the enemy

immediately intrenched himself. In the afternoon, General Sheridan

struck the enemy south of Sailors' Creek, captured sixteen pieces of

artillery and about four hundred wagons, and detained him until the 6th

corps got up, when a general attack of infantry and cavalry was made,

which resulted in the capture of six or seven thousand prisoners, among

whom were many general officers. The movements of the 2d corps and

General Ord's command contributed greatly to the day's success.

On the morning of the 7th the pursuit was renewed, the cavalry, except

one division, and the 5th corps moving by Prince Edward's Court House;

the 6th corps, General Ord's command, and one division of cavalry, on

Farmville; and the 2d corps by the High Bridge Road. It was soon found

that the enemy had crossed to the north side of the Appomattox; but so

close was the pursuit, that the 2d corps got possession of the common

bridge at High Bridge before the enemy could destroy it, and immediately

crossed over. The 6th corps and a division of cavalry crossed at

Farmville to its support.

Feeling now that General Lee's chance of escape was utterly hopeless, I

addressed him the following communication from Farmville:

"April 7, 1865.

"GENERAL--The result of the last week must convince you of the

hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the Army of Northern

Virginia in this struggle. I feel that it is so, and regard it as my

duty to shift from myself the responsibility of any further effusion of

blood, by asking of you the surrender of that portion of the Confederate

States army known as the Army of Northern Virginia.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

"GENERAL R. E. LEE."

Early on the morning of the 8th, before leaving, I received at Farmville

the following:

"April 7, 1865.

"GENERAL: I have received your note of this date. Though not

entertaining the opinion you express on the hopelessness of further

resistance on the part of the Army of Northern Virginia, I reciprocate

your desire to avoid useless effusion of blood, and therefore, before

considering your proposition, ask the terms you will offer on condition

of its surrender.

"R. E. LEE, General.

"LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT."

To this I immediately replied:

"April 8, 1865.

"GENERAL:--Your note of last evening, in reply to mine of same date,

asking the condition on which I will accept the surrender of the Army of

Northern Virginia, is just received. In reply, I would say, that peace

being my great desire, there is but one condition I would insist upon

--namely, That the men and officers surrendered shall be disqualified for

taking up arms again against the Government of the United States until

properly exchanged. I will meet you, or will designate officers to meet

any officers you may name for the same purpose, at any point agreeable

to you, for the purpose of arranging definitely the terms upon which the

surrender of the Army of the Northern Virginia will be received.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

"GENERAL R. E. LEE."

Early on the morning of the 8th the pursuit was resumed. General Meade

followed north of the Appomattox, and General Sheridan, with all the

cavalry, pushed straight ahead for Appomattox Station, followed by

General Ord's command and the 5th corps. During the day General Meade's

advance had considerable fighting with the enemy's rear-guard, but was

unable to bring on a general engagement. Late in the evening General

Sheridan struck the railroad at Appomattox Station, drove the enemy from

there, and captured twenty-five pieces of artillery, a hospital train,

and four trains of cars loaded with supplies for Lee's army. During

this day I accompanied General Meade's column, and about midnight

received the following communication from General Lee:

April 8, 1865.

"GENERAL:--I received, at a late hour, your note of to-day. In mine of

yesterday I did not intend to propose the surrender of the Army of

Northern Virginia, but to ask the terms of your proposition. To be

frank, I do not think the emergency has arisen to call for the surrender

of this army; but as the restoration of peace should be the sole object

of all, I desired to know whether your proposals would lead to that end.

I cannot, therefore, meet you with a view to the surrender of the Army

of Northern Virginia; but as far as your proposal may affect the

Confederate States forces under my command, and tend to the restoration

of peace, I should be pleased to meet you at ten A.M. to-morrow on the

old stage-road to Richmond, between the picket-lines of the two armies.

"R. E. LEE, General.

"LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT."

Early on the morning of the 9th I returned him an answer as follows, and

immediately started to join the column south of the Appomattox:

"April 9, 1865.

"GENERAL:--Your note of yesterday is received. I have no authority to

treat on the subject of peace; the meeting proposed for ten A.M. to-day

could lead to no good. I will state, however, general, that I am

equally anxious for peace with yourself, and the whole North entertains

the same feeling. The terms upon which peace can be had are well

understood. By the South laying down their arms they will hasten that

most desirable event, save thousands of human lives, and hundreds of

millions of property not yet destroyed. Seriously hoping that all our

difficulties may be settled without the loss of another life, I

subscribe myself, etc.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

"GENERAL R. E. LEE."

On this morning of the 9th, General Ord's command and the 5th corps

reached Appomattox Station just as the enemy was making a desperate

effort to break through our cavalry. The infantry was at once thrown

in. Soon after a white flag was received, requesting a suspension of

hostilities pending negotiations for a surrender.

Before reaching General Sheridan's headquarters, I received the

following from General Lee:

"April 9, 1865.

"GENERAL:--I received your note of this morning on the picket-line,

whither I had come to meet you, and ascertain definitely what terms were

embraced in your proposal of yesterday with reference to the surrender

of this army. I now ask an interview, in accordance with the offer

contained in your letter of yesterday, for that purpose.

"R. E. LEE, General.

"LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT."

The interview was held at Appomattox Court-House, the result of which is

set forth in the following correspondence:

APPOMATTOX COURT-HOUSE, Virginia, April 9, 1865.

"GENERAL: In accordance with the substance of my letter to you of the

8th instant, I propose to receive the surrender of the Army of Northern

Virginia on the following terms, to wit: Rolls of all the officers and

men to be made in duplicate, one copy to be given to an officer to be

designated by me, the other to be retained by such officer or officers

as you may designate. The officers to give their individual paroles not

to take up arms against the Government of the United States until

properly exchanged; and each company or regimental commander sign a like

parole for the men of their commands. The arms, artillery, and public

property to be parked and stacked, and turned over to the officers

appointed by me to receive them. This will not embrace the side-arms of

the officers, nor their private horses or baggage. This done, each

officer and man will be allowed to return to his home, not to be

disturbed by United States authority so long as they observe their

paroles and the laws in force where they may reside.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

"GENERAL R. E. LEE."

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, April 9, 1865.

"GENERAL: I have received your letter of this date containing the terms

of surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia as proposed by you. As

they are substantially the same as those expressed in your letter of the

8th instant, they are accepted. I will proceed to designate the proper

officers to carry the stipulations into effect.

"R. E. LEE, General.

"LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT."

The command of Major-General Gibbon, the 5th army corps under Griffin,

and Mackenzie's cavalry, were designated to remain at Appomattox

Court-House until the paroling of the surrendered army was completed,

and to take charge of the public property. The remainder of the army

immediately returned to the vicinity of Burkesville.

General Lee's great influence throughout the whole South caused his

example to be followed, and to-day the result is that the armies lately

under his leadership are at their homes, desiring peace and quiet, and

their arms are in the hands of our ordnance officers.

On the receipt of my letter of the 5th, General Sherman moved directly

against Joe Johnston, who retreated rapidly on and through Raleigh,

which place General Sherman occupied on the morning of the 13th. The

day preceding, news of the surrender of General Lee reached him at

Smithfield.

On the 14th a correspondence was opened between General Sherman and

General Johnston, which resulted on the 18th in an agreement for a

suspension of hostilities, and a memorandum or basis for peace, subject

to the approval of the President. This agreement was disapproved by the

President on the 21st, which disapproval, together with your

instructions, was communicated to General Sherman by me in person on the

morning of the 24th, at Raleigh, North Carolina, in obedience to your

orders. Notice was at once given by him to General Johnston for the

termination of the truce that had been entered into. On the 25th

another meeting between them was agreed upon, to take place on the 26th,

which terminated in the surrender and disbandment of Johnston's army

upon substantially the same terms as were given to General Lee.

The expedition under General Stoneman from East Tennessee got off on the

20th of March, moving by way of Boone, North Carolina, and struck the

railroad at Wytheville, Chambersburg, and Big Lick. The force striking

it at Big Lick pushed on to within a few miles of Lynchburg, destroying

the important bridges, while with the main force he effectually

destroyed it between New River and Big Lick, and then turned for

Greensboro', on the North Carolina Railroad; struck that road and

destroyed the bridges between Danville and Greensboro', and between

Greensboro' and the Yadkin, together with the depots of supplies along

it, and captured four hundred prisoners. At Salisbury he attacked and

defeated a force of the enemy under General Gardiner, capturing fourteen

pieces of artillery and one thousand three hundred and sixty-four

prisoners, and destroyed large amounts of army stores. At this place he

destroyed fifteen miles of railroad and the bridges towards Charlotte.

Thence he moved to Slatersville.

General Canby, who had been directed in January to make preparations for

a movement from Mobile Bay against Mobile and the interior of Alabama,

commenced his movement on the 20th of March. The 16th corps,

Major-General A. J. Smith commanding, moved from Fort Gaines by water to

Fish River; the 13th corps, under Major-General Gordon Granger, moved

from Fort Morgan and joined the 16th corps on Fish River, both moving

thence on Spanish Fort and investing it on the 27th; while Major-General

Steele's command moved from Pensacola, cut the railroad leading from

Tensas to Montgomery, effected a junction with them, and partially

invested Fort Blakely. After a severe bombardment of Spanish Fort, a

part of its line was carried on the 8th of April. During the night the

enemy evacuated the fort. Fort Blakely was carried by assault on the

9th, and many prisoners captured; our loss was considerable. These

successes practically opened to us the Alabama River, and enabled us to

approach Mobile from the north. On the night of the 11th the city was

evacuated, and was taken possession of by our forces on the morning of

the 12th.

The expedition under command of Brevet Major-General Wilson, consisting

of twelve thousand five hundred mounted men, was delayed by rains until

March 22d, when it moved from Chickasaw, Alabama. On the 1st of April,

General Wilson encountered the enemy in force under Forrest near

Ebenezer Church, drove him in confusion, captured three hundred

prisoners and three guns, and destroyed the central bridge over the

Cahawba River. On the 2d he attacked and captured the fortified city of

Selma, defended by Forrest, with seven thousand men and thirty-two guns,

destroyed the arsenal, armory, naval foundry, machine-shops, vast

quantities of stores, and captured three thousand prisoners. On the 4th

he captured and destroyed Tuscaloosa. On the 10th he crossed the

Alabama River, and after sending information of his operations to

General Canby, marched on Montgomery, which place he occupied on the

14th, the enemy having abandoned it. At this place many stores and five

steamboats fell into our hands. Thence a force marched direct on

Columbus, and another on West Point, both of which places were assaulted

and captured on the 16th. At the former place we got one thousand five

hundred prisoners and fifty-two field-guns, destroyed two gunboats, the

navy yard, foundries, arsenal, many factories, and much other public

property. At the latter place we got three hundred prisoners, four

guns, and destroyed nineteen locomotives and three hundred cars. On the

20th he took possession of Macon, Georgia, with sixty field-guns, one

thousand two hundred militia, and five generals, surrendered by General

Howell Cobb. General Wilson, hearing that Jeff. Davis was trying to

make his escape, sent forces in pursuit and succeeded in capturing him

on the morning of May 11th.

On the 4th day of May, General Dick Taylor surrendered to General Canby

all the remaining rebel forces east of the Mississippi.

A force sufficient to insure an easy triumph over the enemy under Kirby

Smith, west of the Mississippi, was immediately put in motion for Texas,

and Major-General Sheridan designated for its immediate command; but on

the 26th day of May, and before they reached their destination, General

Kirby Smith surrendered his entire command to Major-General Canby. This

surrender did not take place, however, until after the capture of the

rebel President and Vice-President; and the bad faith was exhibited of

first disbanding most of his army and permitting an indiscriminate

plunder of public property.

Owing to the report that many of those lately in arms against the

government had taken refuge upon the soil of Mexico, carrying with them

arms rightfully belonging to the United States, which had been

surrendered to us by agreement among them some of the leaders who had

surrendered in person and the disturbed condition of affairs on the Rio

Grande, the orders for troops to proceed to Texas were not changed.

There have been severe combats, raids, expeditions, and movements to

defeat the designs and purposes of the enemy, most of them reflecting

great credit on our arms, and which contributed greatly to our final

triumph, that I have not mentioned. Many of these will be found clearly

set forth in the reports herewith submitted; some in the telegrams and

brief dispatches announcing them, and others, I regret to say, have not

as yet been officially reported.

For information touching our Indian difficulties, I would respectfully

refer to the reports of the commanders of departments in which they have

occurred.

It has been my fortune to see the armies of both the West and the East

fight battles, and from what I have seen I know there is no difference

in their fighting qualities. All that it was possible for men to do in

battle they have done. The Western armies commenced their battles in

the Mississippi Valley, and received the final surrender of the remnant

of the principal army opposed to them in North Carolina. The armies of

the East commenced their battles on the river from which the Army of the

Potomac derived its name, and received the final surrender of their old

antagonists at Appomattox Court House, Virginia. The splendid

achievements of each have nationalized our victories removed all

sectional jealousies (of which we have unfortunately experienced too

much), and the cause of crimination and recrimination that might have

followed had either section failed in its duty. All have a proud

record, and all sections can well congratulate themselves and each other

for having done their full share in restoring the supremacy of law over

every foot of territory belonging to the United States. Let them hope

for perpetual peace and harmony with that enemy, whose manhood, however

mistaken the cause, drew forth such herculean deeds of valor.

I have the honor to be, Very respectfully, your obedient servant, U. S.

GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

THE END

__________

FOOTNOTES

(*1) Afterwards General Gardner, C.S.A.

(*2) General Garland expressed a wish to get a message back to

General Twiggs, his division commander, or General Taylor, to

the effect that he was nearly out of ammunition and must have

more sent to him, or otherwise be reinforced. Deeming the

return dangerous he did not like to order any one to carry it,

so he called for a volunteer. Lieutenant Grant offered his

services, which were accepted.--PUBLISHERS.

(*3) Mentioned in the reports of Major Lee, Colonel Garland and

General Worth.--PUBLISHERS.

(*4) NOTE.--It had been a favorite idea with General Scott for a

great many years before the Mexican war to have established in

the United States a soldiers' home, patterned after something of

the kind abroad, particularly, I believe, in France. He

recommended this uniformly, or at least frequently, in his

annual reports to the Secretary of War, but never got any

hearing. Now, as he had conquered the state, he made

assessments upon the different large towns and cities occupied

by our troops, in proportion to their capacity to pay, and

appointed officers to receive the money. In addition to the sum

thus realized he had derived, through capture at Cerro Gordo,

sales of captured government tobacco, etc., sums which swelled

the fund to a total of about $220,000. Portions of this fund

were distributed among the rank and file, given to the wounded

in hospital, or applied in other ways, leaving a balance of some

$118,000 remaining unapplied at the close of the war. After the

war was over and the troops all home, General Scott applied to

have this money, which had never been turned into the Treasury

of the United States, expended in establishing such homes as he

had previously recommended. This fund was the foundation of the

Soldiers' Home at Washington City, and also one at Harrodsburgh,

Kentucky.

The latter went into disuse many years ago. In fact it never

had many soldiers in it, and was, I believe, finally sold.

(*5) The Mexican war made three presidential candidates, Scott,

Taylor and Pierce--and any number of aspirants for that high

office. It made also governors of States, members of the

cabinet, foreign ministers and other officers of high rank both

in state and nation. The rebellion, which contained more war in

a single day, at some critical periods, than the whole Mexican

war in two years, has not been so fruitful of political results

to those engaged on the Union side. On the other side, the side

of the South, nearly every man who holds office of any sort

whatever, either in the state or in the nation, was a

Confederate soldier, but this is easily accounted for from the

fact that the South was a military camp, and there were very few

people of a suitable age to be in the army who were not in it.

(*6) C. B. Lagow, the others not yet having joined me.

(*7) NOTE.--Since writing this chapter I have received from Mrs.

W. H. L. Wallace, widow of the gallant general who was killed in

the first day's fight on the field of Shiloh, a letter from

General Lew. Wallace to him dated the morning of the 5th. At

the date of this letter it was well known that the Confederates

had troops out along the Mobile & Ohio railroad west of Crump's

landing and Pittsburg landing, and were also collecting near

Shiloh. This letter shows that at that time General Lew.

Wallace was making preparations for the emergency that might

happen for the passing of reinforcements between Shiloh and his

position, extending from Crump's landing westward, and he sends

it over the road running from Adamsville to the Pittsburg

landing and Purdy road. These two roads intersect nearly a mile

west of the crossing of the latter over Owl Creek, where our

right rested. In this letter General Lew. Wallace advises

General W. H. L. Wallace that he will send "to-morrow" (and his

letter also says "April 5th," which is the same day the letter

was dated and which, therefore, must have been written on the

4th) some cavalry to report to him at his headquarters, and

suggesting the propriety of General W. H. L. Wallace's sending a

company back with them for the purpose of having the cavalry at

the two landings familiarize themselves with the road so that

they could "act promptly in case of emergency as guides to and

from the different camps."

This modifies very materially what I have said, and what has

been said by others, of the conduct of General Lew. Wallace at

the battle of Shiloh. It shows that he naturally, with no more

experience than he had at the time in the profession of arms,

would take the particular road that he did start upon in the

absence of orders to move by a different road.

The mistake he made, and which probably caused his apparent

dilatoriness, was that of advancing some distance after he found

that the firing, which would be at first directly to his front

and then off to the left, had fallen back until it had got very

much in rear of the position of his advance. This falling back

had taken place before I sent General Wallace orders to move up

to Pittsburg landing and, naturally, my order was to follow the

road nearest the river. But my order was verbal, and to a staff

officer who was to deliver it to General Wallace, so that I am

not competent to say just what order the General actually

received.

General Wallace's division was stationed, the First brigade at

Crump's landing, the Second out two miles, and the Third two and

a half miles out. Hearing the sounds of battle General Wallace

early ordered his First and Third brigades to concentrate on the

Second. If the position of our front had not changed, the road

which Wallace took would have been somewhat shorter to our right

than the River road.

U. S. GRANT.

MOUNT MACGREGOR, NEW YORK, June 21, 1885.

(*8) NOTE: In an article on the battle of Shiloh which I wrote

for the Century Magazine, I stated that General A. McD. McCook,

who commanded a division of Buell's army, expressed some

unwillingness to pursue the enemy on Monday, April 7th, because

of the condition of his troops. General Badeau, in his history,

also makes the same statement, on my authority. Out of justice

to General McCook and his command, I must say that they left a

point twenty-two miles east of Savannah on the morning of the

6th. From the heavy rains of a few days previous and the

passage of trains and artillery, the roads were necessarily deep

in mud, which made marching slow. The division had not only

marched through this mud the day before, but it had been in the

rain all night without rest. It was engaged in the battle of

the second day and did as good service as its position

allowed. In fact an opportunity occurred for it to perform a

conspicuous act of gallantry which elicited the highest

commendation from division commanders in the Army of the

Tennessee. General Sherman both in his memoirs and report makes

mention of this fact. General McCook himself belongs to a family

which furnished many volunteers to the army. I refer to these

circumstances with minuteness because I did General McCook

injustice in my article in the Century, though not to the extent

one would suppose from the public press. I am not willing to do

any one an injustice, and if convinced that I have done one, I

am always willing to make the fullest admission.

(*9) NOTE.--For gallantry in the various engagements, from the

time I was left in command down to 26th of October and on my

recommendation, Generals McPherson and C. S. Hamilton were

promoted to be Major-Generals, and Colonels C. C. Marsh, 20th

Illinois, M. M. Crocker, 13th Iowa J. A. Mower, 11th Missouri,

M. D. Leggett, 78th Ohio, J. D. Stevenson, 7th Missouri, and

John E. Smith, 45th Illinois, to be Brigadiers.

(*10) Colonel Ellet reported having attacked a Confederate

battery on the Red River two days before with one of his boats,

the De Soto. Running aground, he was obliged to abandon his

vessel. However, he reported that he set fire to her and blew

her up. Twenty of his men fell into the hands of the enemy.

With the balance he escaped on the small captured steamer, the

New Era, and succeeded in passing the batteries at Grand Gulf

and reaching the vicinity of Vicksburg.

(*11) One of Colonel Ellet's vessels which had run the blockade

on February the 2d and been sunk in the Red River.

(*12) NOTE.--On this occasion Governor Richard Yates, of

Illinois, happened to be on a visit to the army and accompanied

me to Carthage. I furnished an ambulance for his use and that

of some of the State officers who accompanied him.

(*13) NOTE.--When General Sherman first learned of the move I

proposed to make, he called to see me about it. I recollect

that I had transferred my headquarters from a boat in the river

to a house a short distance back from the levee. I was seated

on the piazza engaged in conversation with my staff when Sherman

came up. After a few moments' conversation he said that he would

like to see me alone. We passed into the house together and shut

the door after us. Sherman then expressed his alarm at the move

I had ordered, saying that I was putting myself in a position

voluntarily which an enemy would be glad to manoeuvre a year--or

a long time--to get me in. I was going into the enemy's country,

with a large river behind me and the enemy holding points

strongly fortified above and below. He said that it was an

axiom in war that when any great body of troops moved against an

enemy they should do so from a base of supplies, which they would

guard as they would the apple of the eye, etc. He pointed out

all the difficulties that might be encountered in the campaign

proposed, and stated in turn what would be the true campaign to

make. This was, in substance, to go back until high ground

could be reached on the east bank of the river; fortify there

and establish a depot of supplies, and move from there, being

always prepared to fall back upon it in case of disaster. I

said this would take us back to Memphis. Sherman then said that

was the very place he would go to, and would move by railroad

from Memphis to Grenada, repairing the road as we advanced. To

this I replied, the country is already disheartened over the

lack of success on the part of our armies; the last election

went against the vigorous prosecution of the war, voluntary

enlistments had ceased throughout most of the North and

conscription was already resorted to, and if we went back so far

as Memphis it would discourage the people so much that bases of

supplies would be of no use: neither men to hold them nor

supplies to put in them would be furnished. The problem for us

was to move forward to a decisive victory, or our cause was

lost. No progress was being made in any other field, and we had

to go on.

Sherman wrote to my adjutant general, Colonel J. A. Rawlins,

embodying his views of the campaign that should be made, and

asking him to advise me to at least get the views of my generals

upon the subject. Colonel Rawlins showed me the letter, but I

did not see any reason for changing my plans. The letter was

not answered and the subject was not subsequently mentioned

between Sherman and myself to the end of the war, that I

remember of. I did not regard the letter as official, and

consequently did not preserve it. General Sherman furnished a

copy himself to General Badeau, who printed it in his history of

my campaigns. I did not regard either the conversation between

us or the letter to my adjutant-general as protests, but simply

friendly advice which the relations between us fully

justified. Sherman gave the same energy to make the campaign a

success that he would or could have done if it had been ordered

by himself. I make this statement here to correct an impression

which was circulated at the close of the war to Sherman's

prejudice, and for which there was no fair foundation.

(*14) Meant Edward's Station.

(*15) CHATTANOOGA, November 18, 1863.

MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN:

Enclosed herewith I send you copy of instructions to

Major-General Thomas. You having been over the ground in

person, and having heard the whole matter discussed, further

instructions will not be necessary for you. It is particularly

desirable that a force should be got through to the railroad

between Cleveland and Dalton, and Longstreet thus cut off from

communication with the South, but being confronted by a large

force here, strongly located, it is not easy to tell how this is

to be effected until the result of our first effort is known.

I will add, however, what is not shown in my instructions to

Thomas, that a brigade of cavalry has been ordered here which,

if it arrives in time, will be thrown across the Tennessee above

Chickamauga, and may be able to make the trip to Cleveland or

thereabouts.

U. S. GRANT

Maj.-Gen'l.

CHATTANOOGA, November 18, 1863.

MAJOR-GENERAL GEO. H. THOMAS,

Chattanooga:

All preparations should be made for attacking the enemy's

position on Missionary Ridge by Saturday at daylight. Not being

provided with a map giving names of roads, spurs of the

mountains, and other places, such definite instructions cannot

be given as might be desirable. However, the general plan, you

understand, is for Sherman, with the force brought with him

strengthened by a division from your command, to effect a

crossing of the Tennessee River just below the mouth of

Chickamauga; his crossing to be protected by artillery from the

heights on the north bank of the river (to be located by your

chief of artillery), and to secure the heights on the northern

extremity to about the railroad tunnel before the enemy can

concentrate against him. You will co-operate with Sherman. The

troops in Chattanooga Valley should be well concentrated on your

left flank, leaving only the necessary force to defend

fortifications on the right and centre, and a movable column of

one division in readiness to move wherever ordered. This

division should show itself as threateningly as possible on the

most practicable line for making an attack up the valley. Your

effort then will be to form a junction with Sherman, making your

advance well towards the northern end of Missionary Ridge, and

moving as near simultaneously with him as possible. The

junction once formed and the ridge carried, communications will

be at once established between the two armies by roads on the

south bank of the river. Further movements will then depend on

those of the enemy. Lookout Valley, I think, will be easily

held by Geary's division and what troops you may still have

there belonging to the old Army of the Cumberland. Howard's

corps can then be held in readiness to act either with you at

Chattanooga or with Sherman. It should be marched on Friday

night to a position on the north side of the river, not lower

down than the first pontoon-bridge, and there held in readiness

for such orders as may become necessary. All these troops will

be provided with two days' cooked rations in haversacks, and one

hundred rounds of ammunition on the person of each infantry

soldier. Special care should be taken by all officers to see

that ammunition is not wasted or unnecessarily fired away. You

will call on the engineer department for such preparations as

you may deem necessary for carrying your infantry and artillery

over the creek.

U. S. GRANT,

Major-General.

(*16) In this order authority was given for the troops to reform

after taking the first line of rifle-pits preparatory to carrying

the ridge.

(*17) CHATTANOOGA, November 24,1863.

MAJOR-GENERAL. CEO. H. THOMAS,

Chattanooga

General Sherman carried Missionary Ridge as far as the tunnel

with only slight skirmishing. His right now rests at the tunnel

and on top of the hill, his left at Chickamauga Creek. I have

instructed General Sherman to advance as soon as it is light in

the morning, and your attack, which will be simultaneous, will

be in cooperation. Your command will either carry the

rifle-pits and ridge directly in front of them, or move to the

left, as the presence of the enemy may require. If Hooker's

position on the mountain [cannot be maintained] with a small

force, and it is found impracticable to carry the top from where

he is, it would be advisable for him to move up the valley with

all the force he can spare, and ascend by the first practicable

road.

U. S. GRANT,

Major-General.

(*18) WASHINGTON, D. C.,

December 8, 1863, 10.2 A.M.

MAJ.-GENERAL U. S. GRANT:

Understanding that your lodgment at Knoxville and at Chattanooga

is now secure, I wish to tender you, and all under your command,

my more than thanks, my profoundest gratitude for the skill,

courage, and perseverance with which you and they, over so great

difficulties, have effected that important object. God bless you

all,

A. LINCOLN,

President U. S.

(*19) General John G. Foster.

(*20) During this winter the citizens of Jo Davies County, Ill.,

subscribed for and had a diamond-hilled sword made for General

Grant, which was always known as the Chattanooga sword. The

scabbard was of gold, and was ornamented with a scroll running

nearly its entire length, displaying in engraved letters the

names of the battles in which General Grant had participated.

Congress also gave him a vote of thanks for the victories at

Chattanooga, and voted him a gold medal for Vicksburg and

Chattanooga. All such things are now in the possession of the

government at Washington.

(*21) WASHINGTON, D. C.

December 29, 1863.

MAJ.-GENERAL U. S. GRANT:

General Foster has asked to be relieved from his command on

account of disability from old wounds. Should his request be

granted, who would you like as his successor? It is possible

that Schofield will be sent to your command.

H. W. HALLECK

General-in-Chief.

(OFFICIAL.)

(*22) See letter to Banks, in General Grant's report, Appendix.

(*23) [PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES, WASHINGTON, D. C.,

April 4, 1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN,

Commanding Military Division of the Mississippi.

GENERAL:--It is my design, if the enemy keep quiet and allow me

to take the initiative in the spring campaign, to work all parts

of the army together, and somewhat towards a common centre. For

your information I now write you my programme, as at present

determined upon.

I have sent orders to Banks, by private messenger, to finish up

his present expedition against Shreveport with all dispatch; to

turn over the defence of Red River to General Steele and the

navy and to return your troops to you and his own to New

Orleans; to abandon all of Texas, except the Rio Grande, and to

hold that with not to exceed four thousand men; to reduce the

number of troops on the Mississippi to the lowest number

necessary to hold it, and to collect from his command not less

than twenty-five thousand men. To this I will add five thousand

men from Missouri. With this force he is to commence operations

against Mobile as soon as he can. It will be impossible for him

to commence too early.

Gillmore joins Butler with ten thousand men, and the two operate

against Richmond from the south side of the James River. This

will give Butler thirty-three thousand men to operate with, W.

F. Smith commanding the right wing of his forces and Gillmore

the left wing. I will stay with the Army of the Potomac,

increased by Burnside's corps of not less than twenty-five

thousand effective men, and operate directly against Lee's army,

wherever it may be found.

Sigel collects all his available force in two columns, one,

under Ord and Averell, to start from Beverly, Virginia, and the

other, under Crook, to start from Charleston on the Kanawha, to

move against the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad.

Crook will have all cavalry, and will endeavor to get in about

Saltville, and move east from there to join Ord. His force will

be all cavalry, while Ord will have from ten to twelve thousand

men of all arms.

You I propose to move against Johnston's army, to break it up

and to get into the interior of the enemy's country as far as

you can, inflicting all the damage you can against their war

resources.

I do not propose to lay down for you a plan of campaign, but

simply lay down the work it is desirable to have done and leave

you free to execute it in your own way. Submit to me, however,

as early as you can, your plan of operations.

As stated, Banks is ordered to commence operations as soon as he

can. Gillmore is ordered to report at Fortress Monroe by the

18th inst., or as soon thereafter as practicable. Sigel is

concentrating now. None will move from their places of

rendezvous until I direct, except Banks. I want to be ready to

move by the 25th inst., if possible. But all I can now direct

is that you get ready as soon as possible. I know you will have

difficulties to encounter in getting through the mountains to

where supplies are abundant, but I believe you will accomplish

it.

From the expedition from the Department of West Virginia I do

not calculate on very great results; but it is the only way I

can take troops from there. With the long line of railroad

Sigel has to protect, he can spare no troops except to move

directly to his front. In this way he must get through to

inflict great damage on the enemy, or the enemy must detach from

one of his armies a large force to prevent it. In other words,

if Sigel can't skin himself he can hold a leg while some one

else skins.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

U. S. GRANT,

Lieutenant-General.

(*24) See instructions to Butler, in General Grant's report,

Appendix.

(*25) IN FIELD, CULPEPER C. H., VA.,

April 9, 1864.

MAJ.-GENERAL GEO. G. MEADE

Com'd'g Army of the Potomac.

For information and as instruction to govern your preparations

for the coming campaign, the following is communicated

confidentially for your own perusal alone.

So far as practicable all the armies are to move together, and

towards one common centre. Banks has been instructed to turn

over the guarding of the Red River to General Steele and the

navy, to abandon Texas with the exception of the Rio Grande, and

to concentrate all the force he can, not less than 25,000 men, to

move on Mobile. This he is to do without reference to other

movements. From the scattered condition of his command,

however, he cannot possibly get it together to leave New Orleans

before the 1st of May, if so soon. Sherman will move at the same

time you do, or two or three days in advance, Jo. Johnston's army

being his objective point, and the heart of Georgia his ultimate

aim. If successful he will secure the line from Chattanooga to

Mobile with the aid of Banks.

Sigel cannot spare troops from his army to reinforce either of

the great armies, but he can aid them by moving directly to his

front. This he has been directed to do, and is now making

preparations for it. Two columns of his command will make south

at the same time with the general move; one from Beverly, from

ten to twelve thousand strong, under Major-General Ord; the

other from Charleston, Va., principally cavalry, under

Brig.-General Crook. The former of these will endeavor to reach

the Tennessee and Virginia Railroad, about south of Covington,

and if found practicable will work eastward to Lynchburg and

return to its base by way of the Shenandoah Valley, or join

you. The other will strike at Saltville, Va., and come eastward

to join Ord. The cavalry from Ord's command will try tributaries which

would furnish us an easy line over which to bring all supplies to

within easy hauling distance of every position the army could

occupy from the Rapidan to the James River. But Lee could, if

he chose, detach or move his whole army north on a line rather

interior to the one I would have to take in following. A

movement by his left--our right--would obviate this; but all

that was done would have to be done with the supplies and

ammunition we started with. All idea of adopting this latter

plan was abandoned when the limited quantity of supplies

possible to take with us was considered. The country over which

we would have to pass was so exhausted of all food or forage that

we would be obliged to carry everything with us.

While these preparations were going on the enemy was not

entirely idle. In the West Forrest made a raid in West

Tennessee up to the northern border, capturing the garrison of

four or five hundred men at Union City, and followed it up by an

attack on Paducah, Kentucky, on the banks of the Ohio. While he

was able to enter the city he failed to capture the forts or any

part of the garrison. On the first intelligence of Forrest's

raid I telegraphed Sherman to send all his cavalry against him,

and not to let him get out of the trap he had put himself

into. Sherman had anticipated me by sending troops against him

before he got my order.

Forrest, however, fell back rapidly, and attacked the troops at

Fort Pillow, a station for the protection of the navigation of

the Mississippi River. The garrison to force a passage

southward, if they are successful in reaching the Virginia and

Tennessee Railroad, to cut the main lines of the road connecting

Richmond with all the South and South-west.

Gillmore will join Butler with about 10,000 men from South

Carolina. Butler can reduce his garrison so as to take 23,000

men into the field directly to his front. The force will be

commanded by Maj.-General W. F. Smith. With Smith and Gillmore,

Butler will seize City Point, and operate against Richmond from

the south side of the river. His movement will be simultaneous

with yours.

Lee's army will be your objective point. Wherever Lee goes,

there you will go also. The only point upon which I am now in

doubt is, whether it will be better to cross the Rapidan above

or below him. Each plan presents great advantages over the

other with corresponding objections. By crossing above, Lee is

cut off from all chance of ignoring Richmond and going north on

a raid. But if we take this route, all we do must be done

whilst the rations we start with hold out. We separate from

Butler so that he cannot be directed how to co-operate. By the

other route Brandy Station can be used as a base of supplies

until another is secured on the York or James rivers.

These advantages and objections I will talk over with you more

fully than I can write them.

Burnside with a force of probably 25,000 men will reinforce

you. Immediately upon his arrival, which will be shortly after

the 20th inst., I will give him the defence of the road from

Bull Run as far south as we wish to hold it. This will enable

you to collect all your strength about Brandy Station and to the

front.

There will be naval co-operation on the James River, and

transports and ferries will be provided so that should Lee fall

back into his intrenchments at Richmond, Butler's force and

yours will be a unit, or at least can be made to act as such.

What I would direct then, is that you commence at once reducing

baggage to the very lowest possible standard. Two wagons to a

regiment of five hundred men is the greatest number that should

be allowed, for all baggage, exclusive of subsistence stores and

ordnance stores. One wagon to brigade and one to division

headquarters is sufficient and about two to corps headquarters.

Should by Lee's right flank be our route, you will want to make

arrangements for having supplies of all sorts promptly forwarded

to White House on the Pamunkey. Your estimates for this

contingency should be made at once. If not wanted there, there

is every probability they will be wanted on the James River or

elsewhere.

If Lee's left is turned, large provision will have to be made

for ordnance stores. I would say not much short of five hundred

rounds of infantry ammunition would do. By the other, half the

amount would be sufficient.

U. S. GRANT,

Lieutenant-General.

(*26) General John A. Logan, upon whom devolved the command of

the Army of the Tennessee during this battle, in his report gave

our total loss in killed, wounded and missing at 3,521; and

estimated that of the enemy to be not less than 10,000: and

General G. M. Dodge, graphically describing to General Sherman

the enemy's attack, the full weight of which fell first upon and

was broken by his depleted command, remarks: "The disparity of

forces can be seen from the fact that in the charge made by my

two brigades under Fuller and Mersy they took 351 prisoners,

representing forty-nine different regiments, eight brigades and

three divisions; and brought back eight battle flags from the

enemy."

(*27)

UNION ARMY ON THE RAPIDAN, MAY 5, 1864.

[COMPILED.]

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT, Commander-in-Chief.

MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE G. MEADE, Commanding Army of the Potomac.

MAJ.-GEN. W. S. HANCOCK, commanding Second Army Corps.

First Division, Brig.-Gen. Francis C. Barlow.

First Brigade, Col. Nelson A. Miles.

Second Brigade, Col. Thomas A. Smyth.

Third Brigade, Col. Paul Frank.

Fourth Brigade, Col. John R. Brooke.

Second Division, Brig.-Gen. John Gibbon.

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Alex. S. Webb.

Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Joshua T. Owen.

Third Brigade, Col. Samuel S. Carroll.

Third Division, Maj.-Gen. David B. Birney.

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. J. H. H. Ward.

Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Alexander Hays.

Fourth Divisin, Brig.-Gen. Gershom Mott.

First Brigade, Col. Robert McAllister.

Second Brigade, Col. Wm. R. Brewster.

Artillery Brigade, Col. John C. Tidball.

MAJ.-GEN. G. K. WARREN, commanding Fifth Army Corps.

First Division, Brig.-Gen. Charles Griffin.

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Romeyn B. Ayres.

Second Brigade, Col. Jacob B. Sweitzer.

Third Brigade, Brig.-Gen. J. J. Bartlett.

Second Division, Brig.-Gen. John C. Robinson.

First Brigade, Col. Samuel H. Leonard.

Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Henry Baxter.

Third Brigade, Col. Andrew W. Denison.

Third Division, Brig.-Gen. Samuel W. Crawford.

First Brigade, Col. Wm McCandless.

Third Brigade, Col. Joseph W. Fisher.

Fourth Division, Brig.-Gen. James S. Wadsworth.

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Lysander Cutler.

Second Brigade Brig.-Gen. James C. Rice.

Third Brigade, Col. Roy Stone

Artillery Brigade, Col. S. S. Wainwright.

MAJ.-GEN. JOHN SEDGWICK, commanding Sixth Army Corps.

First Division, Brig.-Gen. H. G. Wright.

First Brigade, Col. Henry W. Brown.

Second Brigade, Col. Emory Upton.

Third Brigade, Brig.-Gen. D. A. Russell.

Fourth Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Alexander Shaler.

Second Division, Brig.-Gen. George W. Getty.

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Frank Wheaton.

Second Brigade, Col. Lewis A. Grant.

Third Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Thos. H. Neill.

Fourth Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Henry L. Eustis.

Third Division, Brig.-Gen. James Ricketts.

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Wm. H. Morris.

Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. T. Seymour.

Artillery Brigade, Col. C. H. Tompkins

MAJ.-GEN. P. H. SHERIDAN, commanding Cavalry Corps.

First Division, Brig.-Gen. A. T. A. Torbert.

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. G. A. Custer.

Second Brigade, Col. Thos. C. Devin.

Reserve Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Wesley Merritt

Second Division, Brig.-Gen. D. McM. Gregg.

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Henry E. Davies, Jr.

Second Brigade, Col. J. Irvin Gregg.

Third Division, Brig.-Gen. J. H. Wilson.

First Brigade, Col. T. M. Bryan, Jr.

Second Brigade, Col. Geo. H. Chapman.

MAJ.-GEN. A. E. BURNSIDE, commanding Ninth Army Corps.

First Division, Brig.-Gen. T. G. Stevenson.

First Brigade, Col. Sumner Carruth.

Second Brigade, Col. Daniel Leasure.

Second Division, Brig.-Gen. Robert B. Potter.

First Brigade, Col. Zenas R. Bliss.

Second Brigade, Col. Simon G. Griffin.

Third Division, Brig.-Gen. Orlando Willcox.

First Brigade, Col. John F. Hartranft.

Second Brigade, Col. Benj. C. Christ.

Fourth Division, Brig.-Gen. Edward Ferrero.

First Brigade, Col. Joshua K. Sigfried.

Second Brigade, Col. Henry G. Thomas.

Provisional Brigade, Col. Elisha G. Marshall.

BRIG.-GEN. HENRY J. HUNT, commanding Artillery.

Reserve, Col. H. S. Burton.

First Brigade, Col. J. H. Kitching.

Second Brigade, Maj. J. A. Tompkins.

First Brig. Horse Art., Capt. J. M. Robertson.

Second Brigade, Horse Art., Capt. D. R. Ransom.

Third Brigade, Maj. R. H. Fitzhugh.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS.......

Provost Guard, Brig.-Gen. M. R. Patrick.

Volunteer Engineers, Brig.-Gen. H. W. Benham.

CONFEDERATE ARMY.

Organization of the Army of Northern Virginia, Commanded by

GENERAL ROBERT E. LEE, August 31st, 1834.

First Army Corps: LIEUT.-GEN. R. H. ANDERSON, Commanding.

MAJ.-GEN. GEO. E. PICKETT'S Division.

Brig.-Gen. Seth M. Barton's Brigade. (a)

Brig.-Gen. M. D. Corse's "

" Eppa Hunton's "

" Wm. R. Terry's "

MAJ.-GEN. C. W. FIELD'S Division. (b)

Brig.-Gen. G. T. Anderson's Brigade

" E. M. Law's (c) "

" John Bratton's "

MAJ.-GEN. J. B. KERSHAW'S Division. (d)

Brig.-Gen. W. T. Wofford's Brigade

" B. G. Humphreys' "

" Goode Bryan's "

" Kershaw's (Old) "

Second Army Corps: MAJOR-GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY, Commanding

MAJ.-GEN. JOHN B. GORDON'S Division.

Brig.-Gen. H. T. Hays' Brigade. (e)

" John Pegram 's " (f)

" Gordon's " (g)

Brig.-Gen. R. F. Hoke's "

MAJ.-GEN. EDWARD JOHNSON'S Division.

Stonewall Brig. (Brig.-Gen. J. A. Walker). (h)

Brig.-Gen. J M Jones' Brigade. (h)

" Geo H. Stewart's " (h)

" L. A. Stafford's " (e)

MAJ.-GEN. R. E. RODES' Division.

Brig.-Gen. J. Daniel's Brigade. (i)

" Geo. Dole's " (k)

" S. D. Ramseur's Brigade.

" C. A. Battle's "

" R. D. Johnston's " (f)

Third Army Corps: LIEUT.-GEN. A. P. HILL, Commanding.

MAJ.-GEN. WM. MAHONE'S Division. (l)

Brig.-Gen. J. C. C. Sanders' Brigade.

Mahone's "

Brig.-Gen. N. H. Harris's " (m)

" A. R. Wright's "

" Joseph Finegan's "

MAJ.-GEN. C. M. WILCOX'S Division.

Brig.-Gen. E. L. Thomas's Brigade (n)

" James H. Lane's "

" Sam'l McCowan's "

" Alfred M. Scale's "

MAJ.-GEN. H. HETH'S Division. (o)

Brig.-Gen. J. R. Davis's Brigade.

" John R. Cooke's "

" D. McRae's "

" J. J. Archer's "

" H. H. Walker's "

_unattached_: 5th Alabama Battalion.

Cavalry Corps: LIEUTENANT-GENERAL WADE HAMPTON, Commanding.(p)

MAJ.-GEN. FITZHUGH LEE'S Division

Brig.-Gen. W. C. Wickham's Brigade

" L. L. Lomax's "

MAJ.-GEN. M. C. BUTLER'S Division.

Brig.-Gen. John Dunovant's Brigade.

" P. M. B. Young's "

" Thomas L. Rosser's "

MAJ.-GEN. W. H. F. LEE'S Division.

Brig.-Gen. Rufus Barringer's Brigade.

" J. R. Chambliss's "

Artillery Reserve: BRIG.-GEN. W. N. PENDLETON, Commanding.

BRIG.-GEN. E. P. ALEXANDER'S DIVISION.*

Cabell's Battalion.

Manly's Battery.

1st Co. Richmond Howitzers.

Carleton's Battery.

Calloway's Battery.

Haskell's Battalion.

Branch's Battery.

Nelson's "

Garden's "

Rowan "

Huger's Battalion.

Smith's Battery.

Moody "

Woolfolk "

Parker's "

Taylor's "

Fickling's "

Martin's "

Gibb's Battalion.

Davidson's Battery.

Dickenson's "

Otey's "

BRIG.-GEN. A. L. LONG'S DIVISION.

Braxton's Battalion.

Lee Battery.

1st Md. Artillery.

Stafford "

Alleghany "

Cutshaw's Battalion.

Charlotteville Artillery.

Staunton "

Courtney "

Carter's Battalion.

Morris Artillery.

Orange "

King William Artillery.

Jeff Davis "

Nelson's Battalion.

Amherst Artillery.

Milledge "

Fluvauna "

Brown's Battalion.

Powhatan Artillery.

2d Richmond Howitzers.

3d " "

Rockbridge Artillery.

Salem Flying Artillery.

COL R. L.WALKER'S DIVISION.

Cutt's Battalion.

Ross's Battery.

Patterson's Battery.

Irwin Artillery.

Richardson's Battalion.

Lewis Artillery.

Donaldsonville Artillery.

Norfolk Light "

Huger "

Mclntosh 's Battalion.

Johnson's Battery.

Hardaway Artillery.

Danville "

2d Rockbridge Artillery.

Pegram's Battalion.

Peedee Artillery.

Fredericksburg Artillery.

Letcher "

Purcell Battery.

Crenshaw's Battery.

Poague's Battalion.

Madison Artillery.

Albemarle "

Brooke "

Charlotte "

NOTE.

(a) COL. W. R. Aylett was in command Aug. 29th, and probably at

above date.

(b) Inspection report of this division shows that it also

contained Benning's and Gregg's Brigades. (c) Commanded by

Colonel P. D. Bowles.

(d) Only two brigadier-generals reported for duty; names not

indicated.

Organization of the Army of the Valley District.

(e) Constituting York's Brigade.

(f) In Ramseur's Division.

(g) Evan's Brigade, Colonel E. N. Atkinson commanding, and

containing 12th Georgia Battalion.

(h) The Virginia regiments constituted Terry's Brigade, Gordon's

Division.

(i) Grimes' Brigade.

(k) Cook's "

(l) Returns report but one general officer present for duty;

name not indicated.

(m) Colonel Joseph M. Jayne, commanding.

(n) Colonel Thomas J. Simmons, commanding. (o) Four

brigadier-generals reported present for duty; names not

indicated.

(p) On face of returns appears to have consisted of Hampton's,

Fitz-Lee's, and W. H. F. Lee's Division, and Dearing's Brigade.

*But one general officer reported present for duty in the

artillery, and Alexander's name not on the original.

(*28) HEADQUARTERS ARMIES U. S.,

May II, 1864.--3 P.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE,

Commanding Army of the Potomac.

Move three divisions of the 2d corps by the rear of the 5th and

6th corps, under cover of night, so as to join the 9th corps in

a vigorous assault on the enemy at four o'clock A.M. to-morrow.

will send one or two staff officers over to-night to stay with

Burnside, and impress him with the importance of a prompt and

vigorous attack. Warren and Wright should hold their corps as

close to the enemy as possible, to take advantage of any

diversion caused by this attack, and to push in if any

opportunity presents itself. There is but little doubt in my

mind that the assault last evening would have proved entirely

successful if it had commenced one hour earlier and had been

heartily entered into by Mott's division and the 9th corps.

U. S. GRANT,

Lieut.-General.

(*29) HEADQUARTERS, ARMIES U. S.,

May 11, 1864.-4 P.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL A. E. BURNSIDE,

Commanding 9th Army Corps.

Major-General Hancock has been ordered to move his corps under

cover of night to join you in a vigorous attack against the

enemy at 4 o'clock A.M. to-morrow. You will move against the

enemy with your entire force promptly and with all possible

vigor at precisely 4 o'clock A.M. to-morrow the 12th inst. Let

your preparations for this attack be conducted with the utmost

secrecy and veiled entirely from the enemy.

I send two of my staff officers, Colonels Comstock and Babcock,

in whom I have great confidence and who are acquainted with the

direction the attack is to be made from here, to remain with you

and General Hancock with instructions to render you every

assistance in their power. Generals Warren and Wright will hold

their corps as close to the enemy as possible, to take advantage

of any diversion caused by yours and Hancock's attack, and will

push in their whole force if any opportunity presents itself.

U. S. GRANT,

Lieut.-General.

(*30) HEADQUARTERS ARMIES U. S.,

May 12, 1864, 6.30 P.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK,

Washington, D. C.

The eighth day of the battle closes, leaving between three and

four thousand prisoners in our hands for the day's work,

including two general officers, and over thirty pieces of

artillery. The enemy are obstinate, and seem to have found the

last ditch. We have lost no organizations, not even that of a

company, whilst we have destroyed and captured one division

(Johnson's), one brigade (Doles'), and one regiment entire from

the enemy.

U. S. GRANT,

Lieut.-General.

(*31) SPOTTSYLVANIA C. H., May 13, 1864.

HON E. M. STANTON, SECRETARY OF WAR,

Washington, D. C.

I beg leave to recommend the following promotions be made for

gallant and distinguished services in the last eight days'

battles, to wit: Brigadier-General H. G. Wright and

Brigadier-General John Gibbon to be Major-Generals; Colonel S.

S. Carroll, 8th Ohio Volunteers Colonel E. Upton, 121st New York

Volunteers; Colonel William McCandless, 2d Pennsylvania Reserves,

to be Brigadier-Generals. I would also recommend Major-General W.

S. Hancock for Brigadier-General in the regular army. His

services and qualifications are eminently deserving of this

recognition. In making these recommendations I do not wish the

claims of General G. M. Dodge for promotion forgotten, but

recommend his name to be sent in at the same time. I would also

ask to have General Wright assigned to the command of the Sixth

Army Corps. I would further ask the confirmation of General

Humphreys to the rank of Major-General.

General Meade has more than met my most sanguine expectations.

He and Sherman are the fittest officers for large commands I

have come in contact with. If their services can be rewarded by

promotion to the rank of Major-Generals in the regular army the

honor would be worthily bestowed, and I would feel personally

gratified. I would not like to see one of these promotions at

this time without seeing both.

U. S. GRANT,

Lieut.-General.

(*32) QUARLES' MILLS, VA., May 26, 1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK,

Washington, D. C.

The relative position of the two armies is now as follows: Lee's

right rests on a swamp east of the Richmond and Fredericksburg

road and south of the North Anna, his centre on the river at Ox

Ford, and his left at Little River with the crossings of Little

River guarded as far up as we have gone. Hancock with his corps

and one division of the 9th corps crossed at Chesterfield Ford

and covers the right wing of Lee's army. One division of the 9th

corps is on the north bank of the Anna at Ox Ford, with bridges

above and below at points nearest to it where both banks are

held by us, so that it could reinforce either wing of our army

with equal facility. The 5th and 6th corps with one division of

the 9th corps run from the south bank of the Anna from a short

distance above Ox Ford to Little River, and parallel with and

near to the enemy.

To make a direct attack from either wing would cause a slaughter

of our men that even success would not justify. To turn the

enemy by his right, between the two Annas is impossible on

account of the swamp upon which his right rests. To turn him by

the left leaves Little River, New Found River and South Anna

River, all of them streams presenting considerable obstacles to

the movement of our army, to be crossed. I have determined

therefore to turn the enemy's right by crossing at or near

Hanover Town. This crosses all three streams at once, and

leaves us still where we can draw supplies.

During the last night the teams and artillery not in position,

belonging to the right wing of our army, and one division of

that wing were quietly withdrawn to the north bank of the river

and moved down to the rear of the left. As soon as it is dark

this division with most of the cavalry will commence a forced

march for Hanover Town to seize and hold the crossings. The

balance of the right wing will withdraw at the same hour, and

follow as rapidly as possible. The left wing will also withdraw

from the south bank of the river to-night and follow in rear of

the right wing. Lee's army is really whipped. The prisoners we

now take show it, and the action of his army shows it

unmistakably. A battle with them outside of intrenchments

cannot be had. Our men feel that they have gained the MORALE

over the enemy, and attack him with confidence. I may be

mistaken, but I feel that our success over Lee's army is already

assured. The promptness and rapidity with which you have

forwarded reinforcements has contributed largely to the feeling

of confidence inspired in our men, and to break down that of the

enemy.

We are destroying all the rails we can on the Central and

Fredericksburg roads. I want to leave a gap on the roads north

of Richmond so big that to get a single track they will have to

import rail from elsewhere. Even if a crossing is not effected

at Hanover Town it will probably be necessary for us to move on

down the Pamunkey until a crossing is effected. I think it

advisable therefore to change our base of supplies from Port

Royal to the White House. I wish you would direct this change

at once, and also direct Smith to put the railroad bridge there

in condition for crossing troops and artillery and leave men to

hold it.

U. S. GRANT,

Lieut.-General.

(*33) NEAR COLD HARBOR, June 3, 1864, 7 A.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE,

Commanding A. P.

The moment it becomes certain that an assault cannot succeed,

suspend the offensive; but when one does succeed, push it

vigorously and if necessary pile in troops at the successful

point from wherever they can be taken. I shall go to where you

are in the course of an hour.

U. S. GRANT,

Lieut.-General.

(*34) COLD HARBOR, June 5,1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK, Chief of Staff of the Army, Washington,

D. C.

A full survey of all the ground satisfies me that it would be

impracticable to hold a line north-east of Richmond that would

protect the Fredericksburg Railroad to enable us to use that

road for supplying the army. To do so would give us a long

vulnerable line of road to protect, exhausting much of our

strength to guard it, and would leave open to the enemy all of

his lines of communication on the south side of the James. My

idea from the start has been to beat Lee's army if possible

north of Richmond; then after destroying his lines of

communication on the north side of the James River to transfer

the army to the south side and besiege Lee in Richmond, or

follow him south if he should retreat.

I now find, after over thirty days of trial, the enemy deems it

of the first importance to run no risks with the armies they now

have. They act purely on the defensive behind breastworks, or

feebly on the offensive immediately in front of them, and where

in case of repulse they can instantly retire behind them.

Without a greater sacrifice of human life than I am willing to

make all cannot be accomplished that I had designed outside of

the city. I have therefore resolved upon the following plan:

I will continue to hold substantially the ground now occupied by

the Army of the Potomac, taking advantage of any favorable

circumstance that may present itself until the cavalry can be

sent west to destroy the Virginia Central Railroad from about

Beaver Dam for some twenty-five or thirty miles west. When this

is effected I will move the army to the south side of the James

River, either by crossing the Chickahominy and marching near to

City Point, or by going to the mouth of the Chickahominy on

north side and crossing there. To provide for this last and

most possible contingency, several ferry-boats of the largest

class ought to be immediately provided.

Once on the south side of the James River, I can cut off all

sources of supply to the enemy except what is furnished by the

canal. If Hunter succeeds in reaching Lynchburg, that will be

lost to him also. Should Hunter not succeed, I will still make

the effort to destroy the canal by sending cavalry up the south

side of the river with a pontoon train to cross wherever they

can.

The feeling of the two armies now seems to be that the rebels

can protect themselves only by strong intrenchments, whilst our

army is not only confident of protecting itself without

intrenchments, but that it can beat and drive the enemy wherever

and whenever he can be found without this protection.

U. S. GRANT,

Lieutenant-General.

(*35) COLD HARBOR, VA., June 6, 1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL D. HUNTER

Commanding Dept. W. Va.

General Sheridan leaves here to-morrow morning, with

instructions to proceed to Charlottesville, Va., and to commence

there the destruction of the Va. Cen. R. R., destroying this way

as much as possible. The complete destruction of this road and

of the canal on James River is of great importance to us.

According to the instructions I sent to General Halleck for your

guidance, you were to proceed to Lynchburg and commence there. It

would be of great value to us to get possession of Lynchburg for

a single day. But that point is of so much importance to the

enemy, that in attempting to get it such resistance may be met

as to defeat your getting onto the road or canal at all. I see,

in looking over the letter to General Halleck on the subject of

your instructions, that it rather indicates that your route

should be from Staunton via Charlottesville. If you have so

understood it, you will be doing just what I want. The

direction I would now give is, that if this letter reaches you

in the valley between Staunton and Lynchburg, you immediately

turn east by the most practicable road. From thence move

eastward along the line of the road, destroying it completely

and thoroughly, until you join General Sheridan. After the work

laid out for General Sheridan and yourself is thoroughly done,

proceed to join the Army of the Potomac by the route laid out in

General Sheridan's instructions.

If any portion of your force, especially your cavalry, is needed

back in your Department, you are authorized to send it back.

If on receipt of this you should be near to Lynchburg and deem

it practicable to detach a cavalry force to destroy the canal.

Lose no opportunity to destroy the canal.

U. S. GRANT,

Lieut.-General.

(*36) FROM A STATEMENT OF LOSSES COMPILED IN THE

ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE.

FIELD OF ACTION AND DATE. | KILLED. | WOUNDED. | MISSING. |

AGGREGATE. |

Wilderness, May 5th to 7th | 2,261 | 8,785 | 2,902 |13,948 |

Spottsylvania, May 8th to 21st | 2,271 | 9,360 | 1,970 | 13,601|

North Anna, May 23d to 27th | 186 | 792 | 165 | 1,143 |

Totopotomoy, May 27th to 31st | 99 | 358 | 52 | 509 | Cold

Harbor, May 31st to June 12th | 1,769 | 6,752 | 1,537 |10,058 |

Total ................ | 6,586 | 26,047 | 6,626 | 39,259 |

(*37) CITY POINT, VA., June 17, 1864. 11 A.M.

MAJOR-GEN. HALLECK,

Washington, D. C.

* * * * * * *

The enemy in their endeavor to reinforce Petersburg abandoned

their intrenchments in front of Bermuda Hundred. They no doubt

expected troops from north of the James River to take their

place before we discovered it. General Butler took advantage of

this and moved a force at once upon the railroad and plank road

between Richmond and Petersburg, which I hope to retain

possession of.

Too much credit cannot be given to the troops and their

commanders for the energy and fortitude displayed during the

last five days. Day and night has been all the same, no delays

being allowed on any account.

U. S. GRANT,

Lieut.-General.

(*38) CITY POINT, VA., July 24, 1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE,

Commanding, etc.

The engineer officers who made a survey of the front from

Bermuda Hundred report against the probability of success from

an attack there. The chances they think will be better on

Burnside's front. If this is attempted it will be necessary to

concentrate all the force possible at the point in the enemy's

line we expect to penetrate. All officers should be fully

impressed with the absolute necessity of pushing entirely beyond

the enemy's present line, if they should succeed in penetrating

it, and of getting back to their present line promptly if they

should not succeed in breaking through.

To the right and left of the point of assault all the artillery

possible should be brought to play upon the enemy in front

during the assault. Their lines would be sufficient for the

support of the artillery, and all the reserves could be brought

on the flanks of their commands nearest to the point of assault,

ready to follow in if successful. The field artillery and

infantry held in the lines during the first assault should be in

readiness to move at a moment's notice either to their front or

to follow the main assault, as they should receive orders. One

thing, however, should be impressed on corps commanders. If

they see the enemy giving away on their front or moving from it

to reinforce a heavily assaulted portion of their line, they

should take advantage of such knowledge and act promptly without

waiting for orders from army commanders. General Ord can

co-operate with his corps in this movement, and about five

thousand troops from Bermuda Hundred can be sent to reinforce

you or can be used to threaten an assault between the Appomattox

and James rivers, as may be deemed best.

This should be done by Tuesday morning, if done at all. If not

attempted, we will then start at the date indicated to destroy

the railroad as far as Hicksford at least, and to Weldon if

possible.

* * * * * * *

Whether we send an expedition on the road or assault at

Petersburg, Burnside's mine will be blown up....

U. S. GRANT,

Lieutenant-General.

(*39) See letter, August 5th, Appendix.

(*40) See Appendix, letters of Oct. 11th.

(*41) CITY POINT, VA., December 2,1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS,

Nashville Tenn.

If Hood is permitted to remain quietly about Nashville, you will

lose all the road back to Chattanooga and possibly have to

abandon the line of the Tennessee. Should he attack you it is

all well, but if he does not you should attack him before he

fortifies. Arm and put in the trenches your quartermaster

employees, citizens, etc.

U. S. GRANT,

Lieutenant-General.

CITY POINT, VA., December 2, 1864.--1.30 P.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS,

Nashville, Tenn.

With your citizen employees armed, you can move out of Nashville

with all your army and force the enemy to retire or fight upon

ground of your own choosing. After the repulse of Hood at

Franklin, it looks to me that instead of falling back to

Nashville we should have taken the offensive against the enemy

where he was. At this distance, however, I may err as to the

best method of dealing with the enemy. You will now suffer

incalculable injury upon your railroads if Hood is not speedily

disposed of. Put forth therefore every possible exertion to

attain this end. Should you get him to retreating give him no

peace.

U. S. GRANT,

Lieutenant-General.

CITY POINT, VA., December 5, 1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS,

Nashville, Tenn.

Is there not danger of Forrest moving down the Cumberland to

where he can cross it? It seems to me whilst you should be

getting up your cavalry as rapidly as possible to look after

Forrest, Hood should be attacked where he is. Time strengthens

him in all possibility as much as it does you.

U. S. GRANT,

Lieutenant-General.

CITY POINT, VA., December 6, 1864--4 P.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS,

Nashville, Tenn.

Attack Hood at once and wait no longer for a remnant of your

cavalry. There is great danger of delay resulting in a campaign

back to the Ohio River.

U. S. GRANT,

Lieutenant-General.

CITY POINT, VA., December 8, 1864.--8.30 P.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS,

Nashville, Tenn.

Your dispatch of yesterday received. It looks to me evident the

enemy are trying to cross the Cumberland River, and are

scattered. Why not attack at once? By all means avoid the

contingency of a foot race to see which, you or Hood, can beat

to the Ohio. If you think necessary call on the governors of

States to send a force into Louisville to meet the enemy if he

should cross the river. You clearly never should cross except

in rear of the enemy. Now is one of the finest opportunities

ever presented of destroying one of the three armies of the

enemy. If destroyed he never can replace it. Use the means at

your command, and you can do this and cause a rejoicing that

will resound from one end of the land to the other.

U. S. GRANT,

Lieutenant-General.

CITY POINT, VA., December 11, 1864.--4 P.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS,

Nashville, Tenn.

If you delay attack longer the mortifying spectacle will be

witnessed of a rebel army moving for the Ohio River, and you

will be forced to act, accepting such weather as you find. Let

there be no further delay. Hood cannot even stand a drawn

battle so far from his supplies of ordnance stores. If he

retreats and you follow, he must lose his material and much of

his army. I am in hopes of receiving a dispatch from you to-day

announcing that you have moved. Delay no longer for weather or

reinforcements.

U. S. GRANT,

Lieutenant-General.

WASHINGTON, D. C., December 15, 1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS,

Nashville, Tenn.

I was just on my way to Nashville, but receiving a dispatch from

Van Duzer detailing your splendid success of to-day, I shall go

no further. Push the enemy now and give him no rest until he is

entirely destroyed. Your army will cheerfully suffer many

privations to break up Hood's army and render it useless for

future operations. Do not stop for trains or supplies, but take

them from the country as the enemy have done. Much is now

expected.

U. S. GRANT,

Lieutenant-General.

(*42) See orders to Major-General Meade, Ord, and Sheridan,

March 24th, Appendix.

(*43) See Appendix.

(*44) NOTE.--The fac-simile of the terms of Lee's surrender

inserted at this place, was copied from the original document

furnished the publishers through the courtesy of General Ely S.

Parker, Military Secretary on General Grant's staff at the time

of the surrender.

Three pages of paper were prepared in General Grant's manifold

order book on which he wrote the terms, and the interlineations

and erasures were added by General Parker at the suggestion of

General Grant. After such alteration it was handed to General

Lee, who put on his glasses, read it, and handed it back to

General Grant. The original was then transcribed by General

Parker upon official headed paper and a copy furnished General

Lee.

The fac-simile herewith shows the color of the paper of the

original document and all interlineations and erasures.

There is a popular error to the effect that Generals Grant and

Lee each signed the articles of surrender. The document in the

form of a letter was signed only by General Grant, in the parlor

of McLean's house while General Lee was sitting in the room, and

General Lee immediately wrote a letter accepting the terms and

handed it to General Grant.