Chapter 20

Friday, January 8

Washington, D.C.

The New Senate Office Building is a moderately impressive struc-

ture on the edge of one of the worst sections of Washington.

Visitors find it a perpetual paradox that the power seat of the

Western World is located within a virtual shooting gallery of

drugs and weapons. Scott arrived at the NSOB near the capitol,

just before lunchtime. His press identification got him instant

access to the hearing room and into the privileged locations

where the media congregated. The hearings were in progress and

as solemn as he remembered other hearings broadcast on late night

C-SPAN.

He caught the last words of wisdom from a government employee who

worked for NIST, the National Institute of Standards and Technol-

ogy. The agency was formerly known as NBS, National Bureau of

Standards, and no one could adequately explain the change.

The NIST employee droned on about how seriously the government,

and more specifically, his agency cared about privacy and infor-

mation security, and that ". . .the government was doing all it

could to provide the requisite amount of security commensurate

with the perceived risk of disclosure and sensitivity of the

information in question." Scott ran into a couple of fellow

reporters who told him he was lucky to show up late. All morn-

ing, the government paraded witnesses to read prepared statements

about how they were protecting the interests of the Government.

It was an intensive lobbying effort, they told Scott, to shore up

whatever attacks might be made on the government's inefficient

bungling in distinction to its efficient bungling. To a man, the

witnesses assured the Senate committee that they were committed

to guaranteeing privacy of information and unconvincingly assur-

ing them that only appropriate authorized people have access to

sensitive and classified data.

Seven sequential propagandized statements went unchallenged by

the three senior committee members throughout the morning, and

Senator Rickfield went out of his way to thank the speakers for

their time, adding that he was personally convinced the Govern-

ment was indeed doing more than necessary to obviate such con-

cerns.

The underadvertised Senate Select Sub Committee on Privacy and

Technology Protection convened in Hearing Room 3 on the second

floor of the NSOB. About 400 could be accommodated in the huge

light wood paneled room on both the main floor and in the balcony

that wrapped around half of the room. The starkness of the room

was emphasized by the glare of arc and fluorescent lighting.

Scott found an empty seat on a wooden bench directly behind the

tables from which the witnesses would speak to the raised wooden

dais. He noticed that the attendance was extraordinarily low; by

both the public and the press. Probably due to the total lack of

exposure.

As the session broke for lunch, Scott asked why the TV cameras?

He thought this hearing was a deep dark secret. A couple of

fellow journalists agreed, and the only reason they had found out

about the Rickfield hearings was because the CNN producer called

them asking if they knew anything about them. Apparently, Scott

was told, CNN received an anonymous call, urging them to be part

of a blockbuster announcement. When CNN called Rickfield's

office, his staffers told CNN that there was no big deal, and

that they shouldn't waste their time. In the news business, that

kind of statement from a Congressional power broker is a sure

sign that it is worth being there. Just in case. So CNN assigned

a novice producer and a small crew to the first day of the hear-

ings. As promised, the morning session was an exercise in termi-

nal boredom.

The afternoon session was to begin at 1:30, but Senator Rickfield

was nowhere to be found, so the Assistant Chairperson of the

committee, Junior Senator Nancy Deere assumed control. She was a

44 year old grandmother of two from New England who had never

considered entering politics. Nancy Deere was the consummate

wife, supporter and stalwart of her husband Morgan Deere, an up

and coming national politician who had the unique mixture of

honesty, appeal and potential. She had spent full time on the

campaign trail with Morgan as he attempted to make the transition

from state politics to Washington. Morgan Deere was heavily

favored to win after the three term incumbent was named a co-

conspirator in the rigging of a Defense contract. Despite the

pending indictments, the race continued with constant pleadings

by the incumbent that the trumped up charges would shortly be

dismissed. In the first week after the Grand Jury was convened,

the voter polls indicated that Deere led with a 70% support

factor.

Then came the accident. On his way home from a fund raising

dinner, Morgan Deere's limousine was run off an icy winter road

by a drunk driver. Deere's resulting injuries made it impossible

for him to continue the campaign or even be sure that he would

ever be able to regain enough strength to withstand the brutality

of Washington politics.

Within days of the accident, Deere's campaign manager announced

that Nancy Deere would replace her husband. Due to Morgan's

local popularity, and the fact that the state was so small that

everyone knew everyone else's business, and that the incumbent

was going to jail, and that the elections were less than two

weeks away, there was barely a spike in the projections. No one

seemed to care that Nancy Deere had no experience in politics;

they just liked her.

What remained of the campaign was run on her part with impeccable

style. Unlike her opponent who spent vast sums to besmirch her

on television, Nancy's campaign was largely waged on news and

national talk shows. Her husband was popular, as was she, and

the general interest in her as a woman outweighed the interest in

her politics. The state's constituency overwhelmingly endorsed

her with their votes and Senator Nancy Deere, one of the few

woman ever to reach that level as an elected official, was on her

way to Washington.

Nancy Deere found that many of the professional politicians

preferred to ignore her; they were convinced she was bound to be

a one termer once the GOP got someone to run against her. Others

found her to be a genuine pain in the butt. Not due to her

naivete, far from that, she adeptly acclimated to the culture and

the system. Rather, she was a woman and she broke the rules. She

said what she felt; she echoed the sentiments of her constituency

which were largely unpopular politically. Nancy Deere didn't

care what official Washington thought; her state was behind her

with an almost unanimous approval and it was her sworn duty to

represent them honestly and without compromise. She had nothing

to lose by being herself. After more than a year in Washington,

she learned how the massive Washington machinery functioned and

why it crawled with a hurry up and wait engine.

In Rickfield's absence, at 1:40 P.M., Senator Nancy Deere called

the session to order. Her administrative demeanor gave no one

pause to question her authority. Even the other sole Congres-

sional representative on the sub-committee fell into step.

While Senator Stanley Paglusi technically had seniority, he sat

on the committee at Rickfield's request and held no specific

interest in the subject matter they were investigating. He

accepted the seat to mollify Rickfield and to add to his own

political resume.

"Come to order, please," she announced over the ample sound

system. The voluminous hearing room reacted promptly to the

authoritative command that issued forth from the petite auburn

haired Nancy Deere who would have been just as comfortable auc-

tioning donated goods at her church. She noticed that unlike the

morning session, the afternoon session was packed. The press pool

was nearly full and several people were forced to stand. What

had changed, she asked herself.

After the procedural formalities were completed, she again

thanked those who had spoken to the committee in the morning, and

then promised an equally informative afternoon. Nancy, as she

liked to be called on all but the most formal of occasions intro-

duced the committee's first afternoon witness.

"Our next speaker is Ted Hammacher, a recognized expert on the

subject of computer and information security. During 17 years

with the Government, Mr. Hammacher worked with the Defense Inves-

tigatory Agency and the National Security Agency as a DoD liai-

son. He is currently a security consultant to industry and the

government and is the author of hundreds of articles on the

subject." As was required, Nancy Deere outlined Hammacher's

qualifications as an expert, and then invited him to give his

opening statement.

The television in Rickfield's office was tuned to C-SPAN which

was broadcasting the hearings as he spoke into the phone.

"Only a couple more and then I'm off to spend my days in the

company of luscious maidens on the island of my choice," he

bragged into the phone. The Senator listened intently to the

response. "Yes, I am aware of that, but it doesn't change the

fact that I'm calling it quits. I cannot, I will not, continue

this charade." He listened quietly for several minutes before

interjecting.

"Listen, General, we've both made enough money to keep us in

style for the rest of our lives, and I will not jeopardize that

for anything. Got it?" Again he listened. "I don't know about

you, but I do not relish the idea of doing ten to twenty regard-

less of how much of a country club the prison is. It is still a

prison." He listened further.

"That's it, I've had it! Don't make me use that file to impli-

cate you, the guys over at State and our Import . . .hey!" Rick-

field turned to Ken Boyers. "Who started the afternoon session?"

He pointed at the TV.

"It looks like Senator Deere," Ken said.

"Deere? Where does that goddamned bitch get off . . ?" He remem-

bered the phone. "General? I have to go, I've got a suffragette

usurping a little power, and I have to put her back in her place.

You understand. But, on that other matter, I'm out. Done. Fini-

to. Do what you want, but keep me the fuck out of it." Rick-

field hung up abruptly and stared at the broadcast. "Some house-

broken homemaker is not going to make me look bad. Goddamn it,

Ken," Rickfield said as he stood up quickly. "Let's get back out

there."

"Thank you, Senator Deere, and committee members. I am honored

to have a chance to speak to you here today. As a preface to my

remarks, I think that a brief history of security and privacy

from a government perspective may be in order. One of the reasons

we are here today is due to a succession of events that since the

introduction of the computer have shaped an ad hoc anarchism, a

laissez-faire attitude toward privacy and security. Rather than

a comprehensive national policy, despite the valiant efforts of a

few able Congressmen, the United States of America has allowed

itself to be lulled into technical complacency and indifference.

Therefore, I will, if the committee agrees, provide a brief

chronological record."

"I for one would be most interested," said Senator Deere. "It

appeared that this morning our speakers assumed we were more

knowledgeable that we are. Any clarifications will be most

welcome." The crowd agreed silently. Much of the history was

cloaked in secrecy.

The distinguished Ted Hammacher was an accomplished orator,

utilizing the best that Washington diplomatic-speak could muster.

At 50 years old, his short cropped white hair capped a proper

military bearing even though he had maintained a civilian status

throughout his Pentagon associations. "Thank you madam

chairman." He glanced down at the well organized folder and

turned a page.

"Concerns of privacy can be traced back thousands of years with

perhaps the Egyptian pyramids as the first classic example of a

brute force approach towards privacy. The first recorded at-

tempts at disguising the contents of a written message were in

Roman times when Julius Caesar encoded messages to his generals

in the field. The Romans used a simple substitution cipher where

one letter in the alphabet is used in place of another. The

cryptograms found in the Sunday paper use the same techniques.

Any method by which a the contents of a message is scrambled is

known as encryption."

The CNN producer maintained the sole camera shot and his atten-

tion on Ted Hammacher. He missed Senator Rickfield and his aid

reappear on the dais. Rickfield's eyes penetrated Nancy Deere

who imperceptibly acknowledged his return. "You should not over-

step your bounds," Rickfield leaned over and said to her. "You

have five years to go. Stunts like this will not make your time

any easier."

"Senator," she said to Rickfield as Hammacher spoke. "You are

obviously not familiar with the procedures of Senate panel proto-

col. I was merely trying to assist the progress of the hearings

in your absence, I assure you." Her coolness infuriated Rick-

field.

"Well, then, thank you," he sneered. "But, now, I am back. I

will appreciate no further procedural interference." He sat up

brusquely indicating that his was the last word on the subject.

Unaware of the political sidebar in progress, Hammacher contin-

ued.

"Ciphers were evolved over the centuries until they reached a

temporary plateau during World War II. The Germans used the most

sophisticated message encoding or encryption device ever devised.

Suitably called the Enigma, their encryption scheme was nearly

uncrackable until the Allies captured one of the devices, and

then under the leadership of Alan Turing, a method was found to

regularly decipher intercepted German High Command orders. Many

historians consider this effort as being instrumental in bringing

about an end to the war.

"In the years immediately following World War II, the only per-

ceived need for secrecy was by the military and the emerging

intelligence services, namely the OSS as it became the modern

CIA, the British MI-5 and MI-6 and of course our opponents on the

other side. In an effort to maintain a technological leadership

position, the National Security Agency funded various projects to

develop encryption schemes that would adequately protect govern-

ment information and communications for the foreseeable future.

"The first such requests were issued in 1972 but it wasn't until

1974 that the National Bureau of Standards accepted an IBM pro-

posal for an encryption process known as Lucifer. With the

assistance of the NSA who is responsible for cryptography, the

Data Encryption Standard was approved in November of 1976. There

was an accompanying furor over the DES, some saying that the NSA

intentionally weakened it to insure that they could still decrypt

any messages using the approved algorithm.

"In 1982 a financial group, FIMAS endorsed a DES based method to

authenticate Electronic Funds Transfer, or EFT. Banks move

upwards of a trillion dollars daily, and in an effort to insure

that all monies are moved accurately and to their intended desti-

nations, the technique of Message Authentication Coding was

introduced. For still unknown reasons it was decided that en-

crypting the contents of the messages, or transfers, was unneces-

sary. Thus, financial transactions are still carried out with

no protection from eavesdropping."

"Excuse me, Mr. Hammacher, I want to understand this," interrupt-

ed Senator Deere. "Are you saying that, since 1976, we have had

the ability to camouflage the nation's financial networks, yet as

of today, they are still unprotected?" Rickfield looked over at

Nancy in disgust but the single camera missed it.

"Yes, ma'am, that's exactly the case," replied Hammacher.

"What does that mean to us? The Government? Or the average citi-

zen?"

"In my opinion it borders on insanity. It means that for the

price of a bit of electronic equipment, anyone can tap into the

details of the financial dealings of banks, the government and

every citizen in this country."

Senator Deere visibly gulped. "Thank you, please continue."

"In 1984, President Reagan signed National Security Decision

Directive 145. NSDD-145 established that defense contractors and

other organizations that handle sensitive or classified informa-

tion must adhere to certain security and privacy guidelines. A

number of advisory groups were established, and to a minimal

extent, the recommendations have been implemented, but I must

emphasize, to a minimal extent."

"Can you be a little more specific, Mr. Hammacher?" Asked Senator

Deere.

"No ma'am, I can't. A great deal of these efforts are classified

and by divulging who is not currently in compliance would be a

security violation in itself. It would be fair to say, though,

that the majority of those organizations targeted for additional

security measures fall far short of the government's intentions

and desires. I am sorry I cannot be more specific."

"I understand completely. Once again," Nancy said to Hammacher,

"I am sorry to interrupt."

"Not at all, Senator." Hammacher sipped from his water glass.

"As you can see, the interest in security was primarily from the

government, and more specifically the defense community. In

1981, the Department of Defense chartered the DoD Computer Secu-

rity Center which has since become the National Computer Security

Center operating under the auspices of the National Security

Agency. In 1983 they published a series of guidelines to be used

in the creation or evaluation of computer security. Officially

titled the Trusted Computer Security Evaluation Criteria, it is

popularly known as the Orange Book. It has had some minor

updates since then, but by and large it is an outdated document

designed for older computer architectures.

"The point to be made here is that while the government had an

ostensible interest and concern about the security of computers,

especially those under their control, there was virtually no

overt significance placed upon the security of private industry's

computers. Worse yet, it was not until 1987 that any proposed

criteria were developed for networked computers. So, as the

world tied itself together with millions of computers and net-

works, the Government was not concerned enough to address the

issue. Even today, there are no secure network criteria that are

universally accepted."

"Mr. Hammacher." Senator Rickfield spoke up for the first time.

"You appear to have a most demeaning tone with respect to the

United States Government's ability to manage itself. I for one

remain unconvinced that we are as derelict as you suggest.

Therefore, I would ask that you stick to the subject at hand, the

facts, and leave your personal opinions at home."

Nancy Deere as well as much of the audience listened in awe as

Rickfield slashed out at Hammacher who was in the process of

building an argument. Common courtesy demanded that he be per-

mitted to finish his statement, even if his conclusions were

unpopular or erroneous.

Hammacher did not seem fazed. "Sir, I am recounting the facts,

and only the facts. My personal opinions would only be further

damning, so I agree, that I will refrain." He turned a page in

his notebook and continued.

"Several laws were passed, most notably Public Law 100-235, the

Computer Security Act of 1987. This weak law called for enhanced

cooperation between the NSA and NIST in the administration of

security for the sensitive but unclassified world of the Govern-

ment and the private sector. Interestingly enough, in mid 1990

it was announced, that after a protracted battle between the two

security agencies, the NCSC would shut down and merge its efforts

with its giant super secret parent, the NSA. President Bush

signed the Directive effectively replacing Reagan's NSDD-145.

Because the budgeting and appropriations for both NSA and the

former NCSC are classified, there is no way to accurately gauge

the effectiveness of this move. It may still be some time before

we understand the ramifications of the new Executive Order.

"To date every state has some kind of statute designed to punish

computer crime, but prosecutions that involve the crossing of

state lines in the commission of a crime are far and few between.

Only 1% of all computer criminals are prosecuted and less than 5%

of those result in convictions. In short, the United States has

done little or nothing to forge an appropriate defense against

computer crime, despite the political gerrymandering and agency

shuffling over the last decade. That concludes my opening re-

marks." Hammacher sat back in his chair and finished the water.

He turned to his lawyer and whispered something Scott couldn't

hear.

"Ah, Mr. Hammacher, before you continue, I would like ask a few

questions. Do you mind?" Senator Nancy Deere was being her

usual gracious self.

"Not at all, Senator."

"You said earlier that the NSA endorsed a cryptographic system

that they themselves could crack. Could you elaborate?" Senator

Nancy Deere's ability to grasp an issue at the roots was uncanny.

"I'd be pleased to. First of all, it is only one opinion that

the NSA can crack DES; it has never been proven or disproven.

When DES was first introduced some theoreticians felt that NSA

had compromised the original integrity of IBM's Lucifer encryp-

tion project. I am not qualified to comment either way, but the

reduction of the key length, and the functional feedback mecha-

nisms were less stringent than the original. If this is true,

then we have to ask ourselves, why? Why would the NSA want a

weaker system?"

A number of heads in the hearing room nodded in agreement with

the question; others merely acknowledged that it was NSA bashing

time again.

Hammacher continued. "There is one theory that suggests that the

NSA, as the largest eavesdropping operation in the world wanted

to make sure that they could still listen in on messages once

they have been encrypted. The NSA has neither confirmed or

denied these reports. If that is true, then we must ask our-

selves, if DES is so weak, why does the NSA have the ultimate say

on export control. The export of DES is restricted by the Muni-

tions Control, Department of State, and they rely upon DoD and

the NSA for approval.

"The export controls suggest that maybe NSA cannot decrypt DES,

and there is some evidence to support that. For example, in

1985, the Department of Treasury wanted to extend the validation

of DES for use throughout the Treasury, the Federal Reserve

System and member banks. The NSA put a lot of political muscle

behind an effort to have DES deaffirmed and replaced with newer

encryption algorithms. Treasury argued that they had already

adapted DES, their constituents had spent millions on DES equip-

ment for EFT and it would be entirely too cumbersome and expen-

sive to make a change now. Besides, they asked, what's wrong

with DES? They never got an answer to that question, and thus

they won the battle and DES is still the approved encryption

methodology for banks. It was never established whether DES was

too strong or too weak for NSA's taste.

"Later, in 1987, the NSA received an application for export of a

DES based device that employed a technique called infinite en-

cryption. In response to the frenzy over the strength or weakness

of DES, one company took DES and folded it over and over on

itself using multiple keys. The NSA had an internal hemorrhage.

They forbade this product from being exported from the United

States in any form whatsoever. Period. It was an extraordinary

move on their part, and one that had built-in contradictions. If

DES is weak, then why not export it? If it's too strong, why

argue with Treasury? In any case, the multiple DES issue died

down until recently, when NSA, beaten at their own game by too

much secrecy, developed a secret internal program to create a

Multiple-DES encryption standard with a minimum of three sequen-

tial iterations.

"Further embarrassment was caused when an Israeli mathematician

found the 'trap door' built into DES by the NSA and how to decode

messages in seconds. This quite clearly suggests that the gov-

ernment has been listening in on supposedly secret and private

communications.

"Then we have to look at another event that strongly suggests

that NSA has something to hide."

"Mr. Hammacher!" Shouted Senator Rickfield. "I warned you about

that."

"I see nothing wrong with his comments, Senator," Deere said,

careful to make sure that she was heard over the sound system.

"I am the chairman of this committee, Ms. Deere, and I find Mr.

Hammacher's characterization of the NSA as unfitting this forum.

I wish he would find other words or eliminate the thought alto-

gether. Mr. Hammacher, do you think you are capable of that?"

Hammacher seethed. "Senator, I mean no disrespect to you or this

committee. However, I was asked to testify, and at my own ex-

pense I am providing as accurate information as possible. If you

happen to find anything I say not to your liking, I do apologize,

but my only alternative is not to testify at all."

"We accept your withdrawal, Mr. Hammacher, thank you for your

time." A hushed silence covered the hearing room. This was not

the time to get into it with Rickfield, Nancy thought. He has

sufficiently embarrassed himself and the media will take care of

the rest. Why the hell is he acting this way? He is known as a

hard ass, a real case, but his public image was unblemished. Had

the job passed him by?

A stunned and incensed Hammacher gathered his belongings as his

lawyer placated him. Scott overheard bits and pieces as they

both agreed that Rickfield was a flaming asshole. A couple of

reporters hurriedly followed them out of the hearing room for a

one on one interview.

"Is Dr. Sternman ready?" Rickfield asked.

A bustle of activity and a man spoke to the dais without the

assistance of a microphone. "Yessir, I am."

Sternman was definitely the academic type, Scott noted. A crum-

pled ill fitting brown suit covering a small hunched body that

was no more than 45 years old. He held an old scratched brief-

case and an armful of folders and envelopes. Scott was reminded

of the studious high school student that jocks enjoy tripping

with their feet. Dr. Sternman busied himself to straighten the

papers that fell onto the desk and his performance received a

brief titter from the crowd.

"Ah, yes, Mr. Chairman," Sternman said. "I'm ready now." Rick-

field looked as bored as ever.

"Thank you, Dr. Sternman. You are, I understand, a computer

virus expert? Is that correct?"

"Yessir. My doctoral thesis was on the subject and I have spent

several years researching computer viruses, their proliferation

and propagation." Rickfield groaned to himself. Unintelligible

mumbo jumbo.

"I also understand that your comments will be brief as we have

someone else yet to hear from today." It was as much a command

as a question.

"Yessir, it will be brief."

"Then, please, enlighten us, what is a virus expert and what do

you do?" Rickfield grinned menacingly at Dr. Les Sternman, Pro-

fessor of Applied Theoretical Mathematics, Massachusetts Insti-

tute of Technology.

"I believe the committee has received an advance copy of some

notes I made on the nature of computer viruses and the danger

they represent?" Rickfield hadn't read anything, so he looked at

Boyers who also shrugged his shoulders.

"Yes, Dr. Sternman," Nancy Deere said, "and we thank you for

your consideration." Rickfield glared at her as she politely

upstaged him yet again. "May I ask, though, that you provide a

brief description of a computer virus for the benefit of those

who have not read your presentation?" She stuck it to Rickfield

again.

"I'd be happy to, madam Chairwoman," he said nonchalantly. Rick-

field's neck turned red at the inadvertent sudden rise in Senator

Deere's stature. For the next several minutes Sternman solemnly

described what a virus was, how it worked and a history of their

attacks. He told the committee about Worms, Trojan Horses, Time

Bombs, Logic Bombs, Stealth Viruses, Crystal Viruses and an

assorted family of similar surreptitious computer programs.

Despite Sternman's sermonly manner, his audience found the sub-

ject matter fascinating.

"The reason you are here, Dr. Sternman, is to bring us up to

speed on computer viruses, which you have done with alacrity, and

we appreciate that." Rickfield held seniority, but Nancy Deere

took charge due to her preparation. "Now that we have an under-

standing of the virus, can you give us an idea of the type of

problems that they cause?"

"Ah, yes, but I need to say something here," Sternman said.

"Please, proceed," Rickfield said politely.

"When I first heard about replicating software, viruses, and this

was over 15 years ago, I, as many of my graduate students did,

thought of them as a curious anomaly. A benign subset of comput-

er software that had no anticipated applications. We spent

months working with viruses, self cloning software and built

mathematical models of their behavior which fit quite neatly in

the domain of conventional set theory. Then an amazing discovery

befell us. We proved mathematically that there is absolutely no

effective way to protect against computer viruses in software."

Enough of the spectators had heard about viruses over the past

few years to comprehend the purport of that one compelling state-

ment. Even Senator Rickfield joined Nancy and the others in

their awe. No way to combat viruses? Dr. Sternman had dropped

a bombshell on them.

"Dr. Sternman," said Senator Deere, "could you repeat that?

"Yes, yes," Sternman replied, knowing the impact of his state-

ment. "That is correct. A virus is a piece of software and

software is designed to do specific tasks in a hardware environ-

ment. All software uses basically the same techniques to do its

job. Without all of the technicalities, if one piece of software

can do something, another piece of software can un-do it. It's

kind of a computer arms race.

"I build a virus, and you build a program to protect against that

one virus. It works. But then I make a small change in the

virus to attack or bypass your software, and Poof! I blow you

away. Then you build a new piece of software to defend against

both my first virus and my mutated virus and that works until I

build yet another. This process can go on forever, and frankly,

it's just not worth the effort."

"What is not worth the effort, Doctor?" Asked Nancy Deere. "You

paint a most bleak picture."

"I don't mean to at all, Senator." Dr. Sternman smiled soothing-

ly up at the committee and took off his round horn rim glasses.

"I wasn't attempting to be melodramatic, however these are not

opinions or guesses. They are facts. It is not worth the effort

to fight computer viruses with software. The virus builders will

win because the Virus Busters are the ones playing catch-up."

"Virus Busters?" Senator Rickfield mockingly said conspicuously

raising his eyebrows. His reaction elicited a wave of laughter

from the hall.

"Yessir," said Dr. Sternman to Rickfield. "Virus Busters.

That's a term to describe programmers who fight viruses. They

mistakenly believe they can fight viruses with defensive software

and some of them sell some incredibly poor programs. In many

cases you're better off not using anything at all.

"You see, there is no way to write a program that can predict the

potential behavior of other software in such a way that it will

not interfere with normal computer operations. So, the only way

to find a virus is to already know what it looks like, and go out

looking for it. There are several major problems with this

approach. First of all, the virus has already struck and done

some damage. Two it has already infected other software and will

continue to spread. Three, a program must be written to defeat

the specific virus usually using a unique signature for each

virus, and the vaccine for the virus must be distributed to the

computer users.

"This process can take from three to twelve months, and by the

time the virus vaccine has been deployed, the very same virus has

been changed, mutated, and the vaccine is useless against it. So

you see, the Virus Busters are really wasting their time, and

worst of all they are deceiving the public." Dr. Sternman com-

pleted what he had to say with surprising force.

"Doctor Sternman," Senator Rickfield said with disdain, "all of

your theories are well and good, and perhaps they work in the

laboratory. But isn't it true, sir, that computer viruses are an

overblown issue that the media has sensationalized and that they

are nothing more than a minor inconvenience?"

"Not really, Senator. The statistics don't support that conclu-

sion," Dr. Sternman said with conviction. "That is one of the

worst myths." Nancy Deere smiled to herself as the dorky college

professor handed it right to a United States Senator. "The

incidence of computer viruses has been on a logarithmic increase

for the past several years. If a human disease infected at the

same rate, we would declare a medical state of emergency."

"Doctor," implored Rickfield. "Aren't you exaggerating . . .?"

"No Senator, here are the facts. There are currently over 5000

known computer viruses and strains that have been positively

identified. Almost five thousand, Senator." The good Doctor

was a skilled debater, and Rickfield was being sucked in by his

attack on the witness. The figure three thousand impressed

everyone. A few low whistles echoed through the large chamber.

Stupid move Merrill, though Nancy.

"It is estimated, sir, that at the current rate, there will be

over 100,000 active viruses in five years," Dr. Sternman dryly

spoke to Rickfield, "that every single network in the United

States, Canada and the United Kingdom is infected with at least

one computer virus. That is the equivalent of having one member

of every family in the country being sick at all times. That is

an epidemic, and one that will not go away. No sir, it will not."

Sternman's voice rose. "It will not go away. It will only get

worse."

"That is a most apoplectic prophesy, Doctor. I think that many

of us would have trouble believing the doom and gloom you por-

tend." Rickfield was sloughing off the Doctor, but Sternman was

here to tell a story, and he would finish.

"There is more, Senator. Recent reports show that over 75% of

the computers in the People's Republic of China are infected with

deadly and destructive software. Why? The look on your face

asks the question. Because, almost every piece of software in

that country is bootleg, illegal copies of popular programs.

That invites viruses. Since vast quantities of computers come

from the Pacific Rim, many with prepackaged software, new comput-

er equipment is a source of computer viruses that was once con-

sidered safe. Modem manufacturers have accidentally had viruses

on their communications software; several major domestic software

manufacturers have had their shrink-wrapped software infected.

"If you recall in 1989, NASA brought Virus Busters to Cape Kenne-

dy and Houston to thwart a particular virus that threatened a

space launch. A year later as everyone remembers, NASA computers

were invaded forcing officials to abort a flight. The attacks go

on, and they inflict greater damage than is generally thought.

"Again, these are our best estimates, that over 90% of all viral

infections go unreported."

"Doctor, 90%? Isn't that awfully high?" Nancy asked.

"Definitely, yes, but imagine the price of speaking out. I have

talked to hundreds of companies, major corporations, that are

absolutely terrified of anyone knowing that their computers have

been infected. Or they have been the target of any computer

crime for that matter. They feel that the public, their custom-

ers, maybe even their stockholders, might lose faith in the

company's ability to protect itself. So? Most viral attacks go

unreported.

"It's akin to computer rape." Dr. Sternman had a way with words

to keep his audience attentive. Years of lecturing to sleeping

freshman had taught him a few tricks. "A computer virus is

uninvited, it invades the system, and then has its way with it.

If that's not rape, I don't know what is."

"Your parallels are most vivid," said a grimacing Nancy Deere.

"Let's leave that thought for now, and maybe you can explain the

type of damage that a virus can do. It sounds to me like there

are thousands of new diseases out there, and every one needs to

be isolated, diagnosed and then cured. That appears to me to a

formidable challenge."

"I could not have put it better, Senator. You grasp things

quickly." Sternman was genuinely complimenting Nancy. "The

similarities to the medical field cannot go unnoticed if we are

to deal with the problem rationally and effectively. And like a

disease, we need to predict the effects of the infection. What

we have found in that area is as frightening.

"The first generation of viruses were simple in their approach.

The designers correctly assumed that no one was looking for them,

and they could enter systems without any deterrence. They erase

files, scramble data, re-format hard drives . . .make the comput-

er data useless.

"Then the second generation of viruses came along with the

nom-de-guerre stealth. These viruses hid themselves more elabo-

rately to avoid detection and had a built in self-preservation

instinct. If the virus thinks it's being probed, it self de-

structs or hides itself even further.

"In addition, second generation viruses learned how to become

targeted. Some viruses have been designed to only attack a

competitor's product and nothing else."

"Is that possible?" Asked Nancy Deere.

"It's been done many times. Some software bugs in popular soft-

ware are the result of viral infections, others may be genuine

bugs. Imagine a virus who sole purpose is to attack Lotus 123

spreadsheets. The virus is designed to create computational

errors in the program's spreadsheets. The user then thinks that

Lotus is to blame and so he buys another product. Yes, ma'am, it

is possible, and occurs every day of the week. Keeping up with

it is the trick.

"Other viruses attack on Friday the 13th. only, some attack only

at a specified time . . .the damage to be done is only limited by

imagination of the programmers. Third generation viruses were

even more sophisticated. They were designed to do damage not

only to the data, but to the computer hardware itself. Some were

designed to overload communications ports with tight logical

loops. Others were designed to destroy the hard disk by directly

overdriving the disk or would cause amonitor to self-destruct.

There is no limit to the possibilities.

"You sound as though you hold their skills in high regard, Doc-

tor." Rickfield continued to make snide remarks whenever possi-

ble.

"Yessir, I do. Many of them have extraordinary skills, that are

unfortunately misguided. They are a new breed of bored

criminal."

"You mentioned earlier Doctor, that there were over 5000 known

viruses. How fast is the epidemic, as you put it, spreading?"

Senator Nancy Deere asked while making prolific notes throughout.

"For all intents and purposes Senator, they spread unchecked.

There is a certain amount of awareness of the problem, but it is

only superficial. The current viral defenses include signature

identification, cyclic redundancy checks and intercept verifica-

tion, but the new viruses can combat those as a matter of rule.

If the current rate of viral infection continues, it will be a

safe bet that nearly every computer in the country will be in-

fected ten times over within three years."

Dr. Arnold Sternman spent the next half hour answering insightful

questions from Nancy Deere, and even Puglasi became concerned

enough to ask a few. Rickfield continued with his visceral

comments to the constant amazement of the gallery and spectators.

Scott could only imagine the raking Rickfield would receive in

the press, but being Friday, the effects will be lessened.

Besides, it seemed as if Rickfield just didn't give a damn.

Rickfield dismissed and perfunctorily thanked Dr. Sternman. He

prepared for the next speaker, but Senator Deere leaned over and

asked him for a five minute conclave. He was openly reluctant,

but as she raised her voice, he conceded. In a private office

off to the side, Nancy Deere came unglued.

"What kind of stunt are you pulling out there, Senator?" She

demanded as she paced the room. "I thought this was a hearing,

not a lynching."

Rickfield slouched in a plush leather chair and appeared uncon-

cerned. "I am indeed sorry," he said with the pronounced drawl

of a Southern country gentleman, "that the young Senatoress finds

cross examination unpleasant. Perhaps if we treated this like a

neighborhood gossip session, it might be easier."

"Now one damned minute," she yelled while pointing a finger right

at Rickfield. "That was not cross-examination; it was harassment

and I for one am embarrassed for you. And two, do not, I repeat,

do not, ever patronize me. I am not one of your cheap call

girls." She could not have knocked Rickfield over any harder

with a sledgehammer.

"You bitch!" Rickfield rose to confront her standing nine inches

taller. "You stupid bitch. You have no idea what's at stake.

None. It's bigger than you. At this rate I can assure you, you

will never have an ear in Washington. Never. You will be deaf,

dumb and blind in this town. I have been on this Hill for thirty

years and paid my dues and I will not have a middle aged June

Cleaver undermine a lifetime of work just because she smells her

first cause."

Undaunted, Nancy stood her ground. "I don't know what you're up

to Senator, but I do know that you're sand bagging these hear-

ings. I've raised four kids and half a neighborhood, plus my

husband talked in his sleep. I learned a lot about politicians,

and I know sand bagging when I see it. Now, if you got stuck

with these hearings and think they're a crock, that's fine. I

hear it happens to everyone. But, I see them as important and I

don't want you to interfere."

"You are in no position to ask for anything."

"I'm not asking. I'm telling." Where did she get the gumption,

she asked herself. Then it occurred to her;<MI> I'm not a

politician, I want to see things get fixed.<D> "I will take

issue with you, take you on publicly, if necessary. I was Presi-

dent of the PTA for 8 years. I am fluent in dealing with bitches

of every size and shape. You're just a bastard."

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