BOOK IX.

LIFE OF HERACLITUS.

I. Heraclitus was the son of Blyson, or, as some say, of Heracion, and a

citizen of Ephesus. He flourished about the sixty-ninth olympiad.

II. He was above all men of a lofty and arrogant spirit, as is plain from

his writings, in which he says, “Abundant learning does not form the

mind; for if it did, it would have instructed Hesiod, and Pythagoras,

and likewise Xenophanes, and Hecatæus. For the only piece of real wisdom

is to know that idea, which by itself will govern everything on every

occasion.” He used to say, too, that Homer deserved to be expelled from

the games and beaten, and Archilochus likewise. He used also to say,

“It is more necessary to extinguish insolence, than to put out a fire.”

Another of his sayings was, “The people ought to fight for the law, as

for their city.” He also attacks the Ephesians for having banished his

companion Hermodorus, when he says, “The Ephesians deserve to have all

their youth put to death, and all those who are younger still banished

from their city, inasmuch as they have banished Hermodorus, the best man

among them, saying, ‘Let no one of us be pre-eminently good; and if there

be any such person, let him go to another city and another people.’”

And when he was requested to make laws for them, he refused, because the

city was already immersed in a thoroughly bad constitution. And having

retired to the temple of Diana with his children, he began to play

at dice; and when all the Ephesians flocked round him, he said, “You

wretches, what are you wondering at? is it not better to do this, than to

meddle with public affairs in your company?”

III. And at last, becoming a complete misanthrope, he used to live,

spending his time in walking about the mountains; feeding on grasses

and plants, and in consequence of these habits, he was attacked by the

dropsy, and so then he returned to the city, and asked the physicians, in

a riddle, whether they were able to produce a drought after wet weather.

And as they did not understand him, he shut himself up in a stable for

oxen, and covered himself with cow-dung, hoping to cause the wet to

evaporate from him, by the warmth that this produced. And as he did

himself no good in this way, he died, having lived seventy years; and

we have written an epigram upon him which runs thus:—

I’ve often wondered much at Heraclitus,

That he should chose to live so miserably,

And die by such a miserable fate.

For fell disease did master all his body,

With water quenching all the light of his eyes,

And bringing darkness o’er his mind and body.

But Hermippus states, that what he asked the physicians was this, whether

any one could draw off the water by depressing his intestines? and

when they answered that they could not, he placed himself in the sun,

and ordered his servants to plaster him over with cow-dung; and being

stretched out in that way, on the second day he died, and was buried

in the market-place. But Neanthes, of Cyzicus says, that as he could

not tear off the cow-dung, he remained there, and on account of the

alteration in his appearance, he was not discovered, and so was devoured

by the dogs.

IV. And he was a wonderful person, from his boyhood, since, while he was

young, he used to say that he knew nothing but when he had grown up, he

then used to affirm that he knew everything. And he was no one’s pupil,

but he used to say, that he himself had investigated every thing, and

had learned everything of himself. But Sotion relates, that some people

affirmed that he had been a pupil of Xenophanes. And that Ariston, stated

in his account of Heraclitus, that he was cured of the dropsy, and died

of some other disease. And Hippobotus gives the same account.

V. There is a book of his extant, which is about nature generally, and it

is divided into three discourses; one on the Universe; one on Politics;

and one on Theology. And he deposited this book in the temple of Diana,

as some authors report, having written it intentionally in an obscure

style, in order that only those who were able men might comprehend it,

and that it might not be exposed to ridicule at the hands of the common

people. Timon attacks this man also, saying:—

Among them came that cuckoo Heraclitus

The enigmatical obscure reviler

Of all the common people.

Theophrastus asserts, that it was out of melancholy that he left some

of his works half finished, and wrote several, in completely different

styles; and Antisthenes, in his Successions, adduces as a proof of his

lofty spirit, the fact, that he yielded to his brother the title and

privileges of royalty.[121] And his book had so high a reputation, that

a sect arose in consequence of it, who were called after his own name,

Heracliteans.

VI. The following may be set down in a general manner as his main

principles: that everything is created from fire, and is dissolved into

fire; that everything happens according to destiny, and that all existing

things are harmonized, and made to agree together by opposite tendencies;

and that all things are full of souls and dæmones. He also discussed all

the passions which exist in the world, and used also to contend that the

sun was of that precise magnitude of which he appears to be. One of his

sayings too was, that no one, by whatever road he might travel, could

ever possibly find out the boundaries of the soul, so deeply hidden are

the principles which regulate it. He used also to call opinion the sacred

disease; and to say that eye-sight was often deceived. Sometimes, in his

writings, he expresses himself with great brilliancy and clearness; so

that even the most stupid man may easily understand him, and receive an

elevation of soul from him. And his conciseness, and the dignity of his

style, are incomparable.

In particulars, his doctrines are of this kind. That fire is an

element, and that it is by the changes of fire that all things exist;

being engendered sometimes by rarity, some times by density. But he

explains nothing clearly. He also says, that everything is produced by

contrariety, and that everything flows on like a river; that the universe

is finite, and that there is one world, and that that is produced from

fire, and that the whole world is in its turn again consumed by fire at

certain periods, and that all this happens according to fate. That of the

contraries, that which leads to production is called war and contest, and

that which leads to the conflagration is called harmony and peace; that

change is the road leading upward, and the road leading downward; and

that the whole world exists according to it.

For that fire, when densified becomes liquid, and becoming concrete,

becomes also water; again, that the water when concrete is turned to

earth, and that this is the road down; again, that the earth itself

becomes fused, from which water is produced, and from that everything

else is produced; and then he refers almost everything to the evaporation

which takes place from the sea; and this is the road which leads upwards.

Also, that there are evaporations, both from earth and sea, some of which

are bright and clear, and some are dark; and that the fire is increased

by the dark ones, and the moisture by the others. But what the space

which surrounds us is, he does not explain. He states, however, that

there are vessels in it, turned with their hollow part towards us; in

which all the bright evaporations are collected, and form flames, which

are the stars; and that the brightest of these flames, and the hottest,

is the light of the sun; for that all the other stars are farther off

from the earth; and that on this account, they give less light and

warmth; and that the moon is nearer the earth, but does not move through

a pure space; the sun, on the other hand, is situated in a transparent

space, and one free from all admixture, preserving a well proportioned

distance from us, on which account it gives us more light and more heat.

And that the sun and moon are eclipsed, when the before-mentioned vessels

are turned upwards. And that the different phases of the moon take place

every month, as its vessel keeps gradually turning round. Moreover, that

day and night, and months and years, and rains and winds, and things

of that kind, all exist according to, and are caused by, the different

evaporations.

For that the bright evaporation catching fire in the circle of the sun

causes day, and the predominance of the opposite one causes night; and

again, from the bright one the heat is increased so as to produce summer,

and from the dark one the cold gains strength and produces winter; and

he also explains the causes of the other phenomena in a corresponding

manner.

But with respect to the earth, he does not explain at all of what

character it is, nor does he do so in the case of the vessels; and these

were his main doctrines.

VII. Now, what his opinion about Socrates was, and what expressions he

used when he met with a treatise of his which Euripides brought him,

according to the story told by Ariston, we have detailed in our account

of Socrates. Seleucus, the grammarian, however, says that a man of the

name of Croton, in his Diver, relates that it was a person of the name

of Crates who first brought this book into Greece; and that he said that

he wanted some Delian diver who would not be drowned in it. And the book

is described under several titles; some calling it the Muses, some a

treatise on Nature; but Diodotus calls it—

A well compacted helm to lead a man

Straight through the path of life.

Some call it a science of morals, the arrangement of the changes[122] of

unity and of everything.

VIII. They say that when he was asked why he preserved silence, he said,

“That you may talk.”

IX. Darius was very desirous to enjoy his conversation; and wrote thus to

him:—

KING DARIUS, THE SON OF HYSTASPES, ADDRESSES HERACLITUS OF EPHESUS, THE

WISE MAN, GREETING HIM.

“You have written a book on Natural Philosophy, difficult to understand

and difficult to explain. Accordingly, if in some parts it is explained

literally, it seems to disclose a very important theory concerning the

universal world, and all that is contained in it, as they are placed in a

state of most divine motion. But commonly, the mind is kept in suspense,

so that those who have studied your work the most, are not able precisely

to disentangle the exact meaning of your expressions. Therefore, king

Darius, the son of Hystaspes wishes to enjoy the benefit of hearing you

discourse, and of receiving some Grecian instruction. Come, therefore,

quickly to my sight, and to my royal palace; for the Greeks, in

general, do not accord to wise men the distinction which they deserve,

and disregard the admirable expositions delivered by them, which are,

however, worthy of being seriously listened to and studied; but with me

you shall have every kind of distinction and honour, and you shall enjoy

every day honourable and worthy conversation, and your pupils’ life shall

become virtuous, in accordance with your precepts.”

HERACLITUS, OF EPHESUS, TO KING DARIUS, THE SON OF HYSTASPES, GREETING.

“All the men that exist in the world, are far removed from truth and

just dealings; but they are full of evil foolishness, which leads them

to insatiable covetousness and vain-glorious ambition. I, however,

forgetting all their worthlessness, and shunning satiety, and who wish

to avoid all envy on the part of my countrymen, and all appearance of

arrogance, will never come to Persia, since I am quite contented with a

little, and live as best suits my own inclination.”

X. This was the way in which the man behaved even to the king. And

Demetrius, in his treatise on People of the same Name, says that he also

despised the Athenians, among whom he had a very high reputation. And

that though he was himself despised by the Ephesians, he nevertheless

preferred his own home. Demetrius Phalereus also mentions him in his

Defence of Socrates.

XI. There were many people who undertook to interpret his book. For

Antisthenes and Heraclides, Ponticus, and Cleanthes, and Sphærus the

Stoic; and besides them Pausanias, who was surnamed Heraclitistes, and

Nicomedes, and Dionysius, all did so. And of the grammarians, Diodotus

undertook the same task; and he says that the subject of the book is not

natural philosophy, but politics; and that all that is said in it about

natural philosophy, is only by way of illustration. And Hieronymus tells

us, that a man of the name of Scythinus, an iambic poet, attempted to

render the book into verse.

XII. There are many epigrams extant which were written upon him, and this

is one of them:—

I who lie here am Heraclitus, spare me

Ye rude unlettered men: ’Twas not for you

That I did labour, but for wiser people.

One man may be to me a countless host,

And an unnumbered multitude be no one;

And this I still say in the shades below.

And there is another expressed thus:—

Be not too hasty, skimming o’er the book

Of Heraclitus; ’tis a difficult road,

For mist is there, and darkness hard to pierce.

But if you have a guide who knows his system,

Then everything is clearer than the sun.

XIII. There were five people of the name of Heraclitus. The first

was this philosopher of ours. The second a lyric poet, who wrote a

panegyrical hymn on the Twelve Gods. The third was an Elegiac poet, of

Halicarnassus; on whom Callimachus wrote the following epigram:—

I heard, O Heraclitus, of your death,

And the news filled my eyes with mournful tears,

When I remembered all the happy hours

When we with talk beguiled the setting sun.

You now are dust; but still the honeyed voice

Of your sweet converse doth and will survive;

Nor can fell death, which all things else destroys,

Lay upon that his ruthless conquering grasp.

The fourth was a Lesbian, who wrote a history of Macedonia. The fifth was

a man who blended jest with earnest; and who, having been a harp-player,

abandoned that profession for a serio-comic style of writing.

LIFE OF XENOPHANES.

I. Xenophanes was the son of Dexius, or, as Apollodorus says, of

Orthomenes. He was a citizen of Colophon; and is praised by Timon.

Accordingly, he says:—

Xenophanes, not much a slave to vanity,

The wise reprover of the tricks of Homer.

He, having been banished from his own country, lived at Zancle, in Sicily,

and at Catana.

II. And, according to the statements made by some people, he was a pupil

of no one; but, as others say, he was a pupil of Boton the Athenian; or,

as another account again affirms, of Archelaus. He was, if we may believe

Sotion, a contemporary of Anaximander.

III. He wrote poems in hexameter and in elegiac verse; and also he wrote

iambics against Hesiod and Homer, attacking the things said in their

poems about the Gods. He also used to recite his own poems. It is said

likewise, that he argued against the opinions of Thales and Pythagoras,

and that he also attacked Epimenides. He lived to an extreme old age; as

he says somewhere himself:—

Threescore and seven long years are fully passed,

Since first my doctrines spread abroad through Greece:

And ’twixt that time and my first view of light

Six lustres more must added be to them:

If I am right at all about my age,

Lacking but eight years of a century.

His doctrine was, that there were four elements of existing things; and

an infinite number of worlds, which were all unchangeable. He thought

that the clouds were produced by the vapour which was borne upwards from

the sun, and which lifted them up into the circumambient space. That the

essence of God was of a spherical form, in no respect resembling man;

that the universe could see, and that the universe could hear, but could

not breathe; and that it was in all its parts intellect, and wisdom, and

eternity. He was the first person who asserted that everything which is

produced is perishable, and that the soul is a spirit. He used also to

say that the many was inferior to unity. Also, that we ought to associate

with tyrants either as little as possible, or else as pleasantly as

possible.

When Empedocles said to him that the wise man was undiscoverable, he

replied, “Very likely; for it takes a wise man to discover a wise

man.” And Sotion says, that he was the first person who asserted that

everything is incomprehensible. But he is mistaken in this.

Xenophanes wrote a poem on the Founding of Colophon; and also, on the

Colonisation of Elea, in Italy, consisting of two thousand verses. And he

flourished about the sixtieth olympiad.

IV. Demetrius Phalereus, in his treatise on Old Age, and Phenætius the

Stoic, in his essay on Cheerfulness, relate that he buried his sons

with his own hands, as Anaxagoras had also done. And he seems to have

been detested[123] by the Pythagoreans, Parmeniscus, and Orestades, as

Phavorinus relates in the first book of his Commentaries.

V. There was also another Xenophanes, a native of Lesbos, and an iambic

poet.

These are the Promiscuous or unattached philosophers.

LIFE OF PARMENIDES.

I. Parmenides, the son of Pyres, and a citizen of Velia, was a pupil of

Xenophanes. And Theophrastus, in his Abridgment, says that he was also a

pupil of Anaximander. However, though he was a pupil of Xenophanes, he

was not afterwards a follower of his; but he attached himself to Aminias,

and Diochaetes the Pythagorean, as Sotion relates, which last was a poor

but honourable and virtuous man. And he it was whose follower he became,

and after he was dead he erected a shrine, or ἡρῷον, in his honour. And

so Parmenides, who was of a noble family and possessed of considerable

wealth, was induced, not by Xenophanes but by Aminias, to embrace the

tranquil life of a philosopher.

II. He was the first person who asserted that the earth was of a

spherical form; and that it was situated in the centre of the universe.

He also taught that there were two elements, fire and earth; and that one

of them occupies the place of the maker, the other that of the matter.

He also used to teach that man was originally made out of clay; and that

they were composed of two parts, the hot and the cold; of which, in fact,

everything consists. Another of his doctrines was, that the mind and the

soul were the same thing, as we are informed by Theophrastus, in his

Natural Philosophy, when he enumerates the theories of nearly all the

different philosophers.

He also used to say that philosophy was of a twofold character; one kind

resting on certain truth, the other on opinion. On which account he says

some where:

And ’twill be needful for you well to know,

The fearless heart of all-convincing truth:

Also the opinions, though less sure, of men,

Which rest upon no certain evidence.

III. Parmenides too philosophizes in his poems; as Hesiod and Xenophanes,

and Empedocles used to. And he used to say that argument was the test

of truth; and that the sensations were not trustworthy witnesses.

Accordingly, he says:—

Let not the common usages of men

Persuade your better taught experience,

To trust to men’s unsafe deceitful sight,

Or treacherous ears, or random speaking tongue:

Reason alone will prove the truth of facts.

On which account Timon says of him:—

The vigorous mind of wise Parmenides,

Who classes all the errors of the thoughts

Under vain phantasies.

Plato inscribed one of his dialogues with his name—Parmenides, or an

essay on Ideas. He flourished about the sixty-ninth Olympiad. He appears

to have been the first person who discovered that Hesperus and Lucifer

were the same star, as Phavorinus records, in the fifth book of his

Commentaries. Some, however, attribute this discovery to Pythagoras. And

Callimachus asserts that the poem in which this doctrine is promulgated

is not his work.

IV. He is said also to have given laws to his fellow-citizens, as

Speusippus records, in his account of the Philosophers. He was also the

first employer of the question called the Achilles,[124] as Phavorinus

assures us in his Universal History.

V. There was also another Parmenides, an orator, who wrote a treatise on

the art of Oratory.

LIFE OF MELISSUS.

I. Melissus was a Samian, and the son of Ithagenes. He was a pupil

of Parmenides; but he also had conversed with Heraclitus, when he

recommended him to the Ephesians, who were unacquainted with him, as

Hippocrates recommended Democritus to the people of Abdera.

II. He was a man greatly occupied in political affairs, and held in

great esteem among his fellow citizens; on which account he was elected

admiral. And he was admired still more on account of his private virtues.

III. His doctrine was, that the Universe was infinite, unsusceptible of

change, immoveable, and one, being always like to itself, and complete;

and that there was no such thing as real motion, but that there only

appeared to be such. As respecting the Gods, too, he denied that there

was any occasion to give a definition of them, for that there was no

certain knowledge of them.

IV. Apollodorus states that he flourished about the eighty-fourth

olympiad.

LIFE OF ZENO, THE ELEATIC.

I. Zeno was a native of Velia. Apollodorus, in his Chronicles, says that

he was by nature the son of Teleutagoras, but by adoption the son of

Parmenides.

II. Timon speaks thus of him and Melissus:—

Great is the strength, invincible the might

Of Zeno, skilled to argue on both sides

Of any question, th’ universal critic;

And of Melissus too. They rose superior

To prejudice in general; only yielding

To very few.

And Zeno had been a pupil of Parmenides, and had been on other accounts

greatly attached to him.

III. He was a tall man, as Plato tells us in his Parmenides, and the

same writer, in his Phædrus, calls him also the Eleatic Palamedes.

IV. Aristotle, in his Sophist, says that he was the inventor of

dialectics, as Empedocles was of rhetoric. And he was a man of the

greatest nobleness of spirit, both in philosophy and in politics. There

are also many books extant, which are attributed to him, full of great

learning and wisdom.

V. He, wishing to put an end to the power of Nearches, the tyrant (some,

however, call the tyrant Diomedon), was arrested, as we are informed by

Heraclides, in his abridgment of Satyrus. And when he was examined, as

to his accomplices, and as to the arms which he was taking to Lipara, he

named all the friends of the tyrant as his accomplices, wishing to make

him feel himself alone. And then, after he had mentioned some names,

he said that he wished to whisper something privately to the tyrant;

and when he came near him he bit him, and would not leave his hold till

he was stabbed. And the same thing happened to Aristogiton, the tyrant

slayer. But Demetrius, in his treatise on People of the same Name, says

that it was his nose that he bit off.

Moreover, Antisthenes, in his Successions, says that after he had given

him information against his friends, he was asked by the tyrant if

there was any one else. And he replied, “Yes, you, the destruction of

the city.” And that he also said to the bystanders, “I marvel at your

cowardice, if you submit to be slaves to the tyrant out of fear of such

pains as I am now enduring.” And at last he bit off his tongue and spit

it at him; and the citizens immediately rushed forward, and slew the

tyrant with stones. And this is the account that is given by almost every

one.

But Hermippus says, that he was put into a mortar, and pounded to death.

And we ourselves have written the following epigram on him:—

Your noble wish, O Zeno, was to slay

A cruel tyrant, freeing Elea

From the harsh bonds of shameful slavery,

But you were disappointed; for the tyrant

Pounded you in a mortar. I say wrong,

He only crushed your body, and not you.

VI. And Zeno was an excellent man in other respects, and he was also

a despiser of great men in an equal degree with Heraclitus; for he,

too, preferred the town which was formerly called Hyele, and afterwards

Elea, being a colony of the Phocæans, and his own native place, a poor

city possessed of no other importance than the knowledge of how to raise

virtuous citizens, to the pride of the Athenians; so that he did not

often visit them, but spent his life at home.

VII. He, too, was the first man who asked the question called

Achilles,[125] though Phavorinus attributes its first use to Parmenides,

and several others.

VIII. His chief doctrines were, that there were several worlds, and that

there was no vacuum; that the nature of all things consisted of hot and

cold, and dry and moist, these elements interchanging their substances

with one another; that man was made out of the earth, and that his soul

was a mixture of the before-named elements in such a way that no one of

them predominated.

IX. They say that when he was reproached, he was indignant; and that

when some one blamed him, he replied, “If when I am reproached, I am not

angered, then I shall not be pleased when I am praised.”

X. We have already said in our account of the Cittiæan, that there were

eight Zenos; but this one flourished about the seventy-ninth olympiad.

LIFE OF LEUCIPPUS.

I. Leucippus was a native of Velia, but, as some say, of Abdera; and, as

others report, of Melos.

II. He was a pupil of Zeno. And his principal doctrines were, that all

things were infinite, and were interchanged with one another; and that

the universe was a vacuum, and full of bodies; also that the worlds were

produced by bodies falling into the vacuum, and becoming entangled with

one another; and that the nature of the stars originated in motion,

according to their increase; also, that the sun is borne round in a

greater circle around the moon; that the earth is carried on revolving

round the centre; and that its figure resembles a drum; he was the first

philosopher who spoke of atoms as principles.

III. These are his doctrines in general; in particular detail, they are

as follow: he says that the universe is infinite, as I have already

mentioned; that of it, one part is a plenum, and the other a vacuum. He

also says that the elements, and the worlds which are derived from them,

are infinite, and are dissolved again into them; and that the worlds are

produced in this manner: That many bodies, of various kinds and shapes,

are borne by amputation from the infinite, into a vast vacuum; and then,

they being collected together, produce one vortex; according to which

they, dashing against one another, and whirling about in every direction,

are separated in such a way that like attaches itself to like.

But as they are all of equal weight, when by reason of their number they

are no longer able to whirl about, the thin ones depart into the outer

vacuum, as if they bounded through, and the others remain behind, and

becoming entangled with one another, run together, and produce a sort of

spherical shaped figure.

This subsists as a kind of membrane; containing within itself bodies of

every kind; and as these are whirled about so as to revolve according to

the resistance of the centre, the circumambient membrane becomes thin,

since bodies are without ceasing, uniting according to the impulse given

by the vortex; and in this way the earth is produced, since these bodies

which have once been brought to the centre remain there.

On the other side, there is produced another enveloping membrane, which

increases incessantly by the accretion of exterior bodies; and which, as

it is itself animated by a circular movement, drags with it, and adds to

itself, everything it meets with; some of these bodies thus enveloped

re-unite again and form compounds, which are at first moist and clayey,

but soon becoming dry, and being drawn on in the universal movement of

the circular vortex, they catch fire, and constitute the substance of the

stars. The orbit of the sun is the most distant one; that of the moon is

the nearest to the earth; and between the two are the orbits of the other

stars.

All the stars are set on fire by the rapidity of their own motion; and

the sun is set on fire by the stars; the moon has only a slight quantity

of fire; the sun and the moon are eclipsed in …[126] in consequence of

the inclination of the earth towards the south. In the north it always

snows, and those districts are cold, and are often frozen.

The sun is eclipsed but seldom; but the moon frequently, because her

orbits are unequal.

Leucippus admits also, that the production of worlds, their increase,

their diminution, and their destruction, depend on a certain necessity,

the character of which he does not precisely explain.

LIFE OF DEMOCRITUS.

I. Democritus was the son of Hegesistratus, but as some say, of

Athenocrites, and, according to other accounts, of Damasippus. He was

a native of Abdera, or, as it is stated by some authors, a citizen of

Miletus.

II. He was a pupil of some of the Magi and Chaldæans, whom Xerxes had

left with his father as teachers, when he had been hospitably received

by him, as Herodotus informs us;[127] and from these men he, while still

a boy, learned the principles of astronomy and theology. Afterwards, his

father entrusted him to Leucippus, and to Anaxagoras, as some authors

assert, who was forty years older than he. And Phavorinus, in his

Universal History, says that Democritus said of Anaxagoras, that his

opinions about the sun and moon were not his own, but were old theories,

and that he had stolen them. And that he used also to pull to pieces his

assertions about the composition of the world, and about mind, as he was

hostile to him, because he had declined to admit him as a pupil. How then

can he have been a pupil of his, as some assert? And Demetrius in his

treatise on People of the same Name, and Antisthenes in his Successions,

both affirm that he travelled to Egypt to see the priests there, and

to learn mathematics of them; and that he proceeded further to the

Chaldæans, and penetrated into Persia, and went as far as the Persian

Gulf. Some also say that he made acquaintance with the Gymnosophists in

India, and that he went to Æthiopia.

III. He was one of three brothers who divided their patrimony among them;

and the most common story is, that he took the smaller portion, as it was

in money, because he required money for the purpose of travelling; though

his brothers suspected him of entertaining some treacherous design. And

Demetrius says, that his share amounted to more than a hundred talents,

and that he spent the whole of it.

IV. He also says, that he was so industrious a man, that he cut off for

himself a small portion of the garden which surrounded his house, in

which there was a small cottage, and shut himself up in it. And on one

occasion, when his father brought him an ox to sacrifice, and fastened it

there, he for a long time did not discover it, until his father having

roused him, on the pretext of the sacrifice, told him what he had done

with the ox.

V. He further asserts, that it is well known that he went to Athens, and

as he despised glory, he did not desire to be known; and that he became

acquainted with Socrates, without Socrates knowing who he was. “For I

came,” says he, “to Athens, and no one knew me.” “If,” says Thrasylus,

“the Rivals is really the work of Plato, then Democritus must be the

anonymous interlocutor, who is introduced in that dialogue, besides

Œnopides and Anaxagoras, the one I mean who, in the conversation with

Socrates, is arguing about philosophy, and whom the philosopher tells,

that a philosopher resembles a conqueror in the Pentathlum.” And he was

veritably a master of five branches of philosophy. For he was thoroughly

acquainted with physics, and ethics, and mathematics, and the whole

encyclic system, and indeed he was thoroughly experienced and skilful in

every kind of art. He it was who was the author of the saying, “Speech

is the shadow of action.” But Demetrius Phalereus, in his Defence of

Socrates, affirms that he never came to Athens at all. And that is a

still stranger circumstance than any, if he despised so important a

city, not wishing to derive glory from the place in which he was, but

preferring rather himself to invest the place with glory.

VI. And it is evident from his writings, what sort of man he was.

“He seems,” says Thrasylus, “to have been also an admirer of the

Pythagoreans.” And he mentions Pythagoras himself, speaking of him with

admiration, in the treatise which is inscribed with his name. And he

appears to have derived all his doctrines from him to such a degree, that

one would have thought that he had been his pupil, if the difference

of time did not prevent it. At all events, Glaucus, of Rhegium, who

was a contemporary of his, affirms that he was a pupil of some of the

Pythagorean school.

And Apollodorus, of Cyzicus, says that he was intimate with Philolaus;

“He used to practise himself,” says Antisthenes, “in testing perceptions

in various manners; sometimes retiring into solitary places, and spending

his time even among tombs.”

VII. And he further adds, that when he returned from his travels, he

lived in a most humble manner; like a man who had spent all his property,

and that on account of his poverty, he was supported by his brother

Damasus. But when he had foretold some future event, which happened

as he had predicted, and had in consequence become famous, he was for

all the rest of his life thought worthy of almost divine honours by

the generality of people. And as there was a law, that a man who had

squandered the whole of his patrimony, should not be allowed funeral

rites in his country, Antisthenes says, that he, being aware of this

law, and not wishing to be exposed to the calumnies of those who envied

him, and would be glad to accuse him, recited to the people his work

called the Great World, which is far superior to all his other writings,

and that as a reward for it he was presented with five hundred talents;

and not only that, but he also had some brazen statues erected in his

honour. And when he died, he was buried at the public expense; after

having attained the age of more than a hundred years. But Demetrius says,

that it was his relations who read the Great World, and that they were

presented with a hundred talents only; and Hippobotus coincides in this

statement.

VIII. And Aristoxenus, in his Historic Commentaries, says that Plato

wished to burn all the writings of Democritus that he was able to

collect; but that Amyclas and Cleinias, the Pythagoreans, prevented him,

as it would do no good; for that copies of his books were already in many

hands. And it is plain that that was the case; for Plato, who mentions

nearly all the ancient philosophers, nowhere speaks of Democritus; not

even in those passages where he has occasion to contradict his theories,

evidently, because he said that if he did, he would be showing his

disagreement with the best of all philosophers; a man whom even Timon

praises in the following terms:—

Like that Democritus, wisest of men,

Sage ruler of his speech; profound converser,

Whose works I love to read among the first.

IX. But he was, according to the statement made by himself in the Little

World, a youth when Anaxagoras was an old man, being forty years younger

than he was. And he says, that he composed the Little World seven hundred

and thirty years after the capture of Troy. And he must have been born,

according to the account given by Apollodorus in his Chronicles, in the

eightieth olympiad; but, as Thrasylus says, in his work entitled the

Events, which took place before the reading of the books of Democritus,

in the third year of the seventy-seventh olympiad, being, as it is there

stated, one year older than Socrates. He must therefore have been a

contemporary of Archelaus, the pupil of Anaxagoras, and of Œnopides,

for he makes mention of this letter. He also speaks of the theories of

Parmenides and Zeno, on the subject of the One, as they were the men of

the highest reputation in histories, and he also speaks of Protagoras of

Abdera, who confessedly lived at the same time as Socrates.

X. Athenodorus tells us, in the eighth book of his Conversations, that

once, when Hippocrates came to see him, he ordered some milk to be

brought; and that, when he saw the milk, he said that it was the milk

of a black goat, with her first kid; on which Hippocrates marvelled at

his accurate knowledge. Also, as a young girl came with Hippocrates, on

the first day, he saluted her thus, “Good morning, my maid;” but on the

next day, “Good morning, woman;” for, indeed, she had ceased to be a maid

during the night.

XI. And Hermippus relates, that Democritus died in the following manner:

he was exceedingly old, and appeared at the point of death; and his

sister was lamenting that he would die during the festival of the

Thesmophoria,[128] and so prevent her from discharging her duties to the

Goddess; and so he bade her be of good cheer, and desired her to bring

him hot loaves every day. And, by applying these to his nostrils, he kept

himself alive even over the festival. But when the days of the festival

were passed (and it lasted three days), then he expired, without any

pain, as Hipparchus assures us, having lived a hundred and nine years.

And we have written an epigram upon him in our collection of poems in

every metre, which runs thus:—

What man was e’er so wise, who ever did

So great a deed as this Democritus?

Who kept off death, though present for three days,

And entertained him with hot steam of bread.

Such was the life of this man.

XII. Now his principal doctrines were these. That atoms and the vacuum

were the beginning of the universe; and that everything else existed

only in opinion. That the worlds were infinite, created, and perishable.

But that nothing was created out of nothing, and that nothing was

destroyed so as to become nothing. That the atoms were infinite both

in magnitude and number, and were borne about through the universe in

endless revolutions. And that thus they produced all the combinations

that exist; fire, water, air, and earth; for that all these things are

only combinations of certain atoms; which combinations are incapable of

being affected by external circumstances, and are unchangeable by reason

of their solidity. Also, that the sun and the moon are formed by such

revolutions and round bodies; and in like manner the soul is produced;

and that the soul and the mind are identical: that we see by the falling

of visions across our sight; and that everything that happens, happens of

necessity. Motion, being the cause of the production of everything, which

he calls necessity. The chief good he asserts to be cheerfulness; which,

however, he does not consider the same as pleasure; as some people, who

have misunderstood him, have fancied that he meant; but he understands by

cheerfulness, a condition according to which the soul lives calmly and

steadily, being disturbed by no fear, or superstition, or other passion.

He calls this state εὐθυμία, and εὐεστὼ, and several other names.

Everything which is made he looks upon as depending for its existence on

opinion; but atoms and the vacuum he believes exist by nature. These were

his principal opinions.

XIII. Of his books, Thrasylus has given a regular catalogue, in the same

way that he has arranged the works of Plato, dividing them into four

classes.

Now these are his ethical works. The Pythagoras; a treatise on the

Disposition of the Wise Man; an essay on those in the Shades Below; the

Tritogeneia (this is so called because from Minerva three things are

derived which hold together all human affairs); a treatise on Manly

Courage or Valour; the Horn of Amalthea; an essay on Cheerfulness; a

volume of Ethical Commentaries. A treatise entitled, For Cheerfulness,

(εὐεστὼ) is not found.

These are his writings on natural philosophy. The Great World (which

Theophrastus asserts to be the work of Leucippus); the Little World; the

Cosmography; a treatise on the Planets; the first book on Nature; two

books on the Nature of Man, or on Flesh; an essay on the Mind; one on the

Senses (some people join these two together in one volume, which they

entitle, on the Soul); a treatise on Juices; one on Colours; one on the

Different Figures; one on the Changes of Figures; the Cratynteria (that

is to say, an essay, approving of what has been said in preceding ones);

a treatise on Phænomenon, or on Providence; three books on Pestilences,

or Pestilential Evils; a book of Difficulties. These are his books on

natural philosophy.

His miscellaneous works are these. Heavenly Causes; Aërial Causes; Causes

affecting Plane Surfaces; Causes referring to Fire, and to what is in

Fire; Causes affecting Voices; Causes affecting Seeds, and Plants, and

Fruits; three books of Causes affecting Animals; Miscellaneous Causes; a

treatise on the Magnet. These are his miscellaneous works.

His mathematical writings are the following. A treatise on the Difference

of Opinion, or on the Contact of the Circle and the Sphere; one on

Geometry; one on Numbers; one on Incommensurable Lines, and Solids,

in two books; a volume called Explanations; the Great Year, or the

Astronomical Calendar; a discussion on the Clepsydra; the Map of the

Heavens; Geography; Polography; Actinography, or a discussion on Rays of

Light. These are his mathematical works.

His works on music are the following. A treatise on Rhythm and Harmony;

one on Poetry; one on the beauty of Epic Poems; one on Euphonious and

Discordant Letters; one on Homer, or on Propriety of Diction[129] and

Dialects; one on Song, one on Words; the Onomasticon. These are his

musical works.

The following are his works on art. Prognostics; a treatise on the Way

of Living, called also Diætetics, or the Opinions of a Physician; Causes

relating to Unfavourable and Favourable Opportunities; a treatise on

Agriculture, called also the Georgic; one on Painting; Tactics, and

Fighting in heavy Armour. These are his works on such subjects.

Some authors also give a list of some separate treatises which they

collect from his Commentaries. A treatise on the Sacred Letters seen at

Babylon; another on the Sacred Letters seen at Meroe; the Voyage round

the Ocean; a treatise on History; a Chaldaic Discourse; a Phrygian

Discourse; a treatise on Fever; an essay on those who are attacked with

Cough after illness; the Principles of Laws; Things made by Hand, or

Problems.

As to the other books which some writers ascribed to him, some are merely

extracts from his other writings, and some are confessedly the work of

others. And this is a sufficient account of his writings.

XIV. There were six people of the name of Democritus. The first was this

man of whom we are speaking; the second was a musician of Chios, who

lived about the same time; the third was a sculptor who is mentioned by

Antigonus; the fourth is a man who wrote a treatise on the Temple at

Ephesus, and on the city of Samothrace; the fifth was an epigrammatic

poet, of great perspicuity and elegance; the sixth was a citizen of

Pergamus, who wrote a treatise on Oratory.

LIFE OF PROTAGORAS.

I. Protagoras was the son of Artemon, or, as Apollodorus says (which

account is corroborated by Deinon, in his History of Persia), of Mæander.

He was a native of Abdera, as Heraclides Ponticus tell us, in his

treatise on Laws; and the same authority informs us that he made laws

for the Thurians. But, according to the statement of Eupolis, in his

Flatterers, he was a native of Teos; for he says:—

Within you’ll find Protagoras, of Teos.

He, and Prodicus of Ceos, used to levy contributions for giving their

lectures; and Plato, in his Protagoras, says that Prodicus had a very

powerful voice.

II. Protagoras was a pupil of Democritus. And he was surnamed Wisdom, as

Phavorinus informs us in his Universal History.

III. He was the first person who asserted that in every question there

were two sides to the argument exactly opposite to one another. And he

used to employ them in his arguments, being the first person who did so.

But he began something in this manner: “Man is the measure of all things:

of those things which exist as he is; and of those things which do not

exist as he is not.” And he used to say that nothing else was soul except

the senses, as Plato says, in the Theætetus; and that everything was

true. And another of his treatises he begins in this way: “Concerning the

Gods, I am not able to know to a certainty whether they exist or whether

they do not. For there are many things which prevent one from knowing,

especially the obscurity of the subject, and the shortness of the life of

man.” And on account of this beginning of his treatise, he was banished

by the Athenians. And they burnt his books in the market-place, calling

them in by the public crier, and compelling all who possessed them to

surrender them.

He was the first person who demanded payment of his pupils; fixing

his charge at a hundred minæ. He was also the first person who gave a

precise definition of the parts of time; and who explained the value of

opportunity, and who instituted contests of argument, and who armed the

disputants with the weapon of sophism. He it was too who first left facts

out of consideration, and fastened his arguments on words; and who was

the parent of the present superficial and futile kinds of discussion. On

which account Timon says of him:—

Protagoras, that slippery arguer,

In disputatious contests fully skilled.

He too, it was, who first invented that sort of argument which is called

the Socratic, and who first employed the reasonings of Antisthenes, which

attempt to establish the point that they cannot be contradicted; as Plato

tells us in his Euthydemus. He was also the first person who practised

regular discussions on set subjects, as Artemidorus, the dialectician,

tells us in his treatise against Chrysippus. He was also the original

inventor of the porter’s pad for men to carry their burdens on, as we

are assured by Aristotle, in his book on Education; for he himself was a

porter, as Epicurus says somewhere or other. And it was in this way that

he became highly thought of by Democritus, who saw him as he was tying up

some sticks.

He was also the first person who divided discourse into four parts;

entreaty, interrogation, answer, and injunction: though some writers

make the parts seven; narration, interrogation, answer, injunction,

promise, entreaty, and invocation; and these he called the foundations of

discourse: but Alcidamas says that there are four divisions of discourse;

affirmation, denial, interrogation, and invocation.

V. The first of his works that he ever read in public was the treatise

on the Gods, the beginning of which we have quoted above, and he read

this at Athens in the house of Euripides, or, as some say, in that

of Megaclides; others say that he read it in the Lyceum; his pupil,

Archagoras, the son of Theodotus, giving him the aid of his voice. His

accuser was Pythodorus, the son of Polyzelus, one of the four hundred;

but Aristotle calls him Evathlus.

VI. The writings of his which are still extant are these: a treatise on

the Art of Contention; one on Wrestling; one on Mathematics; one on a

Republic; one on Ambition; one on Virtues; one on the Original Condition

of Man; one on those in the Shades Below; one on the Things which are not

done properly by Men; one volume of Precepts; one essay entitled Justice

in Pleading for Hire; two books of Contradictions.

These are his books.

Plato also addressed a dialogue to him.

VII. Philochorus relates that, as he was sailing to Sicily his ship was

wrecked, and that this circumstance is alluded to by Euripides in his

Ixion; and some say that he died on his journey, being about ninety years

old. But Apollodorus states his age at seventy years, and says that he

was a sophist forty years, and that he flourished about the eighty-fourth

Olympiad. There is an epigram upon him written by myself, in the

following terms:—

I hear accounts of you, Protagoras,

That, travelling far from Athens, on the road,

You, an old man, and quite infirm, did die.

For Cecrops’ city drove you forth to exile;

But you, though ’scaping dread Minerva’s might,

Could not escape the outspread arms of Pluto.

VIII. It is said that once, when he demanded of Evathlus his pupil

payment for his lessons, Evathlus said to him, “But I have never been

victorious in an argument;” and he rejoined, “But if I gain my cause,

then I should naturally receive the fruits of my victory, and so would

you obtain the fruits of yours.”

IX. There was also another Protagoras, an astronomer, on whom Euphorion

wrote an elegy; and a third also, who was a philosopher of the Stoic

sect.

LIFE OF DIOGENES, OF APOLLONIA.

I. Diogenes was a native of Apollonia, and the son of Apollothemis,

a natural philosopher of high reputation; and he was, as Antisthenes

reports, a pupil of Anaximenes. He was also a contemporary of Anaxagoras,

and Demetrius Phalereus says, in his Defence of Socrates, that he was

very unpopular at Athens, and even in some danger of his life.

II. The following were his principal doctrines; that the air was an

element; that the worlds were infinite, and that the vacuum also was

infinite; that the air, as it was condensed, and as it was rarified,

was the productive cause of the worlds; that nothing can be produced

out of nothing;[130] and that nothing can be destroyed so as to become

nothing; that the earth is round, firmly planted in the middle of the

universe, having acquired its situation from the circumvolutions of the

hot principle around it, and its consistency from the cold.

The first words of his treatise are:—

“It appears to me that he who begins any treatise ought to lay down

principles about which there can be no dispute, and that his exposition

of them ought to be simple and dignified.”

LIFE OF ANAXARCHUS.

I. Anaxarchus was a native of Abdera. He was a pupil of Diogenes, of

Smyrna; but, as some say, of Metrodorus, of Chios; who said that he was

not even sure that he knew nothing; and Metrodorus was a pupil of Nessus,

of Chios; though others assert that he was a disciple of Democritus.

II. Anaxarchus too enjoyed the intimacy of Alexander, and flourished

about the hundred and tenth olympiad. He had for an enemy Nicocreon, the

tyrant of Cyprus. And on one occasion, when Alexander, at a banquet,

asked him what he thought of the entertainment, he is said to have

replied, “O king, everything is provided very sumptuously; and the only

thing wanting is to have the head of some satrap served up;” hinting

at Nicocreon. And Nicocreon did not forget his grudge against him for

this; but after the death of the king, when Anaxarchus, who was making a

voyage, was driven against his will into Cyprus, he took him and put him

in a mortar, and commanded him to be pounded to death with iron pestles.

And then they say that he, disregarding this punishment, uttered that

celebrated saying, “Beat the bag of Anaxarchus, but you will not beat

Anaxarchus himself.” And then, when Nicocreon commanded that his tongue

should be cut out, it is said that he bit it off, and spit it at him. And

we have written an epigram upon him in the following terms:—

Beat more and more; you’re beating but a bag;

Beat, Anaxarchus is in heav’n with Jove.

Hereafter Proserpine will rack your bones,

And say, Thus perish, you accursed beater.

III. Anaxarchus, on account of the evenness of his temper and the

tranquillity of his life, was called the Happy. And he was a man to

whom it was very easy to reprove men and bring them to temperance.

Accordingly, he produced an alteration in Alexander who thought himself

a God, for when he saw the blood flowing from some wound that he had

received, he pointed to him with his finger, and said, “This is blood,

and not:—

“Such stream as issues from a wounded God;

Pure emanation, uncorrupted flood,

Unlike our gross, diseas’d, terrestrial blood.”[131]

But Plutarch says that it was Alexander himself who quoted these lines to

his friends.

They also tell a story that Anaxarchus once drank to him, and then showed

the goblet, and said:—

Shall any mortal hand dare wound a God?

LIFE OF PYRRHO.

I. Pyrrho was a citizen of Elis, and the son of Pleistarchus, as Diocles

informs us, and, as Apollodorus in his Chronicles asserts, he was

originally a painter.

II. And he was a pupil of Bryson, the son of Stilpon, as we are told

by Alexander in his Chronicles. After that he attached himself to

Anaxarchus, and attended him everywhere; so that he even went as far as

the Gymnosophists, in India, and the Magi.

III. Owing to which circumstance, he seems to have taken a noble line in

philosophy, introducing the doctrine of incomprehensibility, and of the

necessity of suspending one’s judgment, as we learn from Ascanius, of

Abdera. For he used to say that nothing was honourable, or disgraceful,

or just, or unjust. And on the same principle he asserted that there

was no such thing as downright truth; but that men did everything in

consequence of custom and law. For that nothing was any more this than

that. And his life corresponded to his principles; for he never shunned

anything, and never guarded against anything; encountering everything,

even waggons for instance, and precipices, and dogs, and everything of

that sort; committing nothing whatever to his senses. So that he used

to be saved, as Antigonus the Carystian tells us, by his friends who

accompanied him. And Ænesidemus says that he studied philosophy on the

principle of suspending his judgment on all points, without however, on

any occasion acting in an imprudent manner, or doing anything without due

consideration. And he lived to nearly ninety years of age.

IV. And Antigonus, of Carystus, in his account of Pyrrho, mentions the

following circumstances respecting him; that he was originally a person

of no reputation, but a poor man, and a painter; and that a picture of

some camp-bearers, of very moderate execution, was preserved in the

Gymnasium at Elis, which was his work; and that he used to walk out into

the fields and seek solitary places, very rarely appearing to his family

at home; and that he did this in consequence of having heard some Indian

reproaching Anaxarchus for never teaching any one else any good, but for

devoting all his time to paying court to princes in palaces. He relates

of him too, that he always maintained the same demeanour, so that if any

one left him in the middle of his delivery of a discourse, he remained

and continued what he was saying; although, when a young man, he was of a

very excitable temperament. Often too, says Antigonus, he would go away

for a time, without telling any one beforehand, and taking any chance

persons whom he chose for his companions. And once, when Anaxarchus had

fallen into a pond, he passed by without assisting him; and when some

one blamed him for this, Anaxarchus himself praised his indifference and

absence of all emotion.

On one occasion he was detected talking to himself, and when he was

asked the reason, he said that he was studying how to be good. In his

investigations he was never despised by any one, because he always spoke

explicitly and straight to the question that had been put to him. On

which account Nausiphanes was charmed by him even when he was quite

young. And he used to say that he should like to be endowed with the

disposition of Pyrrho, without losing his own power of eloquence. And

he said too, that Epicurus, who admired the conversation and manners of

Pyrrho, was frequently asking him about him.

V. He was so greatly honoured by his country, that he was appointed

a priest; and on his account all the philosophers were exempted from

taxation. He had a great many imitators of his impassiveness; in

reference to which Timon speaks thus of him in his Python, and in his

Silli:—

Now, you old man, you Pyrrho, how could you

Find an escape from all the slavish doctrines

And vain imaginations of the Sophists?

How did you free yourself from all the bonds

Of sly chicane, and artful deep persuasion?

How came you to neglect what sort of breeze

Blows round your Greece, and what’s the origin

And end of everything?

And again, in his Images, he says:—

These things, my heart, O Pyrrho, longs to hear,

How you enjoy such ease of life and quiet,

The only man as happy as a God.

And the Athenians presented him with the freedom of their city, as

Diocles tells us, because he had slain Cotys, the Thracian.

VI. He also lived in a most blameless manner with his sister, who was a

midwife, as Eratosthenes relates, in his treatise on Riches and Poverty;

so that he himself used to carry poultry, and pigs too if he could get

any, into the market-place and sell them. And he used to clean all the

furniture of the house without expressing any annoyance. And it is said

that he carried his indifference so far that he even washed a pig. And

once, when he was very angry about something connected with his sister

(and her name was Philista), and some one took him up, he said, “The

display of my indifference does not depend on a woman.” On another

occasion, when he was driven back by a dog which was attacking him, he

said to some one who blamed him for being discomposed, “That it was a

difficult thing entirely to put off humanity; but that a man ought to

strive with all his power to counteract circumstances with his actions if

possible, and at all events with his reason.” They also tell a story that

once, when some medicines of a consuming tendency, and some cutting and

cautery was applied to him for some wound, that he never even contracted

his brow. And Timon intimates his disposition plainly enough in the

letters which he wrote to Python. Moreover, Philo, the Athenian, who was

a friend of his, said that he was especially fond of Democritus; and next

to him of Homer; whom he admired greatly, and was continually saying:—

But as the race of falling leaves decay,

Such is the fate of man.[132]

He used also, as it is said, to compare men to wasps, and flies, and

birds, and to quote the following lines:—

Die then, my friend, what boots it to deplore?

The great, the good Patroclus is no more.

He, far thy better, was foredoom’d to die;

And thou, doest thou bewail mortality?[133]

And so he would quote anything that bore on the uncertainty and emptiness

and fickleness of the affairs of man. Posidonius tells the following

anecdote about him: that when some people who were sailing with him

were looking gloomy because of a storm, he kept a calm countenance,

and comforted their minds, exhibiting himself on deck eating a pig, and

saying that it became a wise man to preserve an untroubled spirit in that

manner. Numenius is the only writer who asserts that he used to deliver

positive dogmas.

VII. He had many eminent disciples, and among them Eurylochus, of whom

the following defective characteristic is related; for, they say, that he

was once worked up to such a pitch of rage that he took up a spit with

the meat on it, and chased the cook as far as the market-place. And once

in Elis he was so harassed by some people who put questions to him in the

middle of his discourses, that he threw down his cloak and swam across

the Alpheus. He was the greatest possible enemy to the Sophists, as Timon

tells us. But Philo, on the contrary, was very fond of arguing; on which

account Timon speaks of him thus:—

Avoiding men to study all devoted,

He ponders with himself, and never heeds

The glory or disputes which harass Philo.

Besides these disciples, Pyrrho also had Hecateus of Abdera, and Timon

the Phliasian, who wrote the Silli, and whom we shall speak of hereafter;

and also Nausiphanes, of Teos, who, as some say, was the master of

Epicurus.

VIII. All these men were called Pyrrhoneans from their master; and also

doubters, and sceptics, and ephectics, or suspenders of their judgment,

and investigators, from their principles. And their philosophy was called

investigatory, from their investigating or seeking the truth on all

sides; and sceptical from their being always doubting (σκέπτομαι), and

never finding; and ephectic, from the disposition which they encouraged

after investigation, I mean the suspending of their judgment (ἐποχὴ);

and doubting, because they asserted that the dogmatic philosophers only

doubted, and that they did the same. [And they were called Pyrrhoneans

from Pyrrho himself.]

But Theodosius, in his Chapters on Scepticism, contends, that we ought

not to call the Pyrrhonean school sceptical; for since, says he, the

motion and agitation of the mind in each individual is incomprehensible

to others, we are unable to know what was the disposition of Pyrrho; and

if we do not know it we ought not to be called Pyrrhoneans. He also

adds that Pyrrho was not the original inventor of Scepticism, and that

he had no particular dogma of any kind; and that, consequently, it can

only be called Pyrrhonism from some similarity. Some say that Homer was

the original founder of this school; since he at different times gives

different accounts of the same circumstance, as much as any one else ever

did; and since he never dogmatizes definitively respecting affirmation;

they also say that the maxims of the seven wise men were sceptical;

such as that, “Seek nothing in excess,” and that, “Suretyship is near

calamity;” which shows that calamity follows a man who has given positive

and certain surety; they also argue that Archilochus and Euripides were

Sceptics; and Archilochus speaks thus:—

And now, O Glaucus, son of Leptines,

Such is the mind of mortal man, which changes

With every day that Jupiter doth send.

And Euripides says:—

Why then do men assert that wretched mortals

Are with true wisdom gifted; for on you

We all depend; and we do everything

Which pleases you.

Moreover, Xenophanes, and Zeno the Eleatic, and Democritus were also

Sceptics; of whom Xenophanes speaks thus:—

And no man knows distinctly anything,

And no man ever will.

And Zeno endeavours to put an end to the doctrine of motion by saying:

“The object moved does not move either in the place in which it is, or

in that in which it is not.” Democritus, too, discards the qualities,

where he says: what is cold is cold in opinion, and what is hot is hot

in opinion; but atoms and the vacuum exist in reality. And again he

says: “But we know nothing really; for truth lies in the bottom.” Plato,

too, following them, attributes the knowledge of the truth to the Gods

and to the sons of the Gods, and leaves men only the investigation of

probability. And Euripides says:—

Who now can tell whether to live may not

Be properly to die. And whether that

Which men do call to die, may not in truth

Be but the entrance into real life?

And Empedocles speaks thus:—

These things are not perceptible to sight,

Nor to the ears, nor comprehensible

To human intellect.

And in a preceding passage he says:—

Believing nothing, but such circumstances

As have befallen each.

Heraclitus, too, says, “Let us not form conjectures at random, about

things of the greatest importance.” And Hippocrates delivers his opinion

in a very doubtful manner, such as becomes a man; and before them all

Homer has said:—

Long in the field of words we may contend,

Reproach is infinite and knows no end.

And immediately after:—

Armed, or with truth or falsehood, right or wrong.

(So voluble a weapon is the tongue),

Wounded we wound, and neither side can fail,

For every man has equal strength to rail:[134]

Intimating the equal vigour and antithetical force of words. And the

Sceptics persevered in overthrowing all the dogmas of every sect, while

they themselves asserted nothing dogmatically; and contented themselves

with expressing the opinions of others, without affirming anything

themselves, not even that they did affirm nothing; so that even discarded

all positive denial; for to say, “We affirm nothing,” was to affirm

something. “But we,” said they, “enunciate the doctrines of others, to

prove our own perfect indifference; it is just as if we were to express

the same thing by a simple sign.” So these words, “We affirm nothing,”

indicate the absence of all affirmation, just as other propositions,

such as, “Not more one thing than another,” or, “Every reason has a

corresponding reason opposed to it,” and all such maxims indicate a

similar idea. But the phrase, “Not more one thing,” &c., has sometimes

an affirmative sense, indicating the equality of certain things, as for

instance, in this sentence, “A pirate is not worse than a liar.” But

by the sceptics this is said not positively, but negatively, as for

instance, where the speaker contests a point and says, “It was not

Scylla, any more than it was Chimæra.” And the word “more,” itself, is

sometimes used to indicate a comparison, as when we say, “That honey is

more sweet than grapes.” And at other times it is used positively, and at

the same time negatively, as when we say, “Virtue profits us more than

hurts us;” for in this phrase we intimate that virtue does profit, and

does not hurt us. But the Sceptics abolish the whole expression, “Not

more than it;” saying, that “Prudence has not existence, any more than it

has no existence.” Accordingly, then, expression, as Timon says in his

Python, indicates nothing more than an absence of all affirmation, or of

all assent of the judgment.

Also the expression, “Every reason has a corresponding reason,” &c., does

in the same manner indicate the suspension of the judgment; for if, while

the facts are different, the expressions are equipollent, it follows that

a man must be quite ignorant of the real truth.

Besides this, to this assertion there is a contrary assertion opposed,

which, after having destroyed all others, turns itself against itself,

and destroys itself, resembling, as it were, those cathartic medicines

which, after they have cleansed the stomach, then discharge themselves,

and are got rid of. And so the dogmatic philosophers say, that all these

reasonings are so far from overturning the authority of reason that they

confirm it. To this the Sceptics reply, that they only employ reason as

an instrument, because it is impossible to overturn the authority of

reason, without employing reason; just as if we assert that there is

no such thing as space, we must employ the word “space,” but that not

dogmatically, but demonstratively; and if we assert that nothing exists

according to necessity, it is unavoidable that we must use the word

“necessity.” The same principle of interpretation did they adopt; for

they affirmed that facts are not by nature such as they appear to be, but

that they only seem such; and they said, that what they doubt is not what

they think, for their thoughts are evident to themselves, but the reality

of the things which are only made known to them by their sensations.

The Pyrrhonean system, then, is a simple explanation of appearances, or

of notions of every kind, by means of which, comparing one thing with

another one arrives at the conclusion, that there is nothing in all

these notions, but contradiction and confusion; as Ænesidemus says in

his Introduction to Pyrrhonism. As to the contradictions which are found

in those speculations, when they have pointed out in what way each fact

is convincing, they then, by the same means, take away all belief from

it; for they say that we regard as certain, those things which always

produce similar impressions on the senses, those which are the offspring

of habit, or which are established by the laws, and those too which give

pleasure or excite wonder. And they prove that the reasons opposite to

those on which our assent is founded are entitled to equal belief.

IX. The difficulties which they suggest, relating to the agreement

subsisting between what appears to the senses, and what is comprehended

by the intellect, divide themselves into ten modes of argument, according

to which the subject and object of our knowledge is incessantly changing.

And these ten modes Pyrrho lays down in the following manner.

The first relates to the difference which one remarks between the

sentiments of animals in respect of pleasure, and pain, and what is

injurious, and what is advantageous; and from this we conclude, that

the same objects do not always produce the same impressions; and that

the fact of this difference ought to be a reason with us for suspending

our judgment. For there are some animals which are produced without

any sexual connexion, as those which live in the fire, and the Arabian

Phœnix, and worms. Others again are engendered by copulation, as men

and others of that kind; and some are composed in one way, and others

in another; on which account they also differ in their senses, as for

instance, hawks are very keen-sighted; dogs have a most acute scent. It

is plain, therefore, that the things seen produce different impressions

on those animals which differ in their power of sight. So, too, young

branches are eagerly eaten by the goat, but are bitter to mankind; and

hemlock is nutritious for the quail, but deadly to man; and pigs eat

their own dung, but a horse does not.

The second mode refers to the nature and idiosyncracies of men. According

to Demophon, the steward of Alexander used to feel warm in the shade,

and to shiver in the sun. And Andron, the Argive, as Aristotle tells us,

travelled through the dry parts of Libya, without once drinking. Again,

one man is fond of medicine, another of farming, another of commerce;

and the same pursuits are good for one man, and injurious to another; on

which account, we ought to suspend our opinions.

The third mode, is that which has for its object the difference of the

organs of sense. Accordingly, an apple presents itself to the sight as

yellow, to the taste as sweet, to the smell as fragrant; and the same

form is seen, in very different lights, according to the differences of

mirrors. It follows, therefore, that what is seen is just as likely to be

something else as the reality.

The fourth refers to the dispositions of the subject, and the changes in

general to which it is liable. Such as health, sickness, sleep, waking,

joy, grief, youth, old age, courage, fear, want, abundance, hatred,

friendship, warmth, cold, easiness of breathing, oppression of the

respiratory organs, and so on. The objects, therefore, appear different

to us according to the disposition of the moment; for, even madmen are

not in a state contrary to nature. For, why are we to say that of them

more than of ourselves? For we too look at the sun as if it stood still.

Theon, of Tithora, the Stoic, used to walk about in his sleep; and a

slave of Pericles’ used, when in the same state, to walk on the top of

the house.

The fifth mode is conversant with laws, and established customs, and

belief in mythical traditions, and the conventions of art, and dogmatical

opinions. This mode embraces all that relates to vice, and to honesty; to

the true, and to the false; to the good, and to the bad; to the Gods, and

to the production, and destruction of all visible objects. Accordingly,

the same action is just in the case of some people, and unjust in that

of others. And good in the case of some, and bad in that of others. On

this principle we see that the Persians do not think it unnatural for a

man to marry his daughter; but among the Greeks it is unlawful. Again,

the Massagetæ, as Eudoxus tells us in the first book of his Travels over

the World, have their women in common; but the Greeks do not. And the

Cilicians delight in piracy, but the Greeks avoid it. So again, different

nations worship different Gods; and some believe in the providence of

God, and others do not. The Egyptians embalm their dead, and then bury

them; the Romans burn them; the Pæonians throw them into the lakes. All

these considerations show that we ought to suspend our judgment.

The sixth mode has reference to the promiscuousness and confusion of

objects; according to which nothing is seen by us simply and by itself;

but in combination either with air, or with light, or with moisture, or

with solidity, or heat, or cold, or motion, or evaporation or some other

power. Accordingly, purple exhibits a different hue in the sun, and in

the moon, and in a lamp. And our own complexions appear different when

seen at noonday and at sunset. And a stone which one cannot lift in the

air, is easily displaced in the water, either because it is heavy itself

and is made light by the water, or because it is light in itself and is

made heavy by the air. So that we cannot positively know the peculiar

qualities of anything, just as we cannot discover oil in ointment.

The seventh mode has reference to distances, and position, and space, and

to the objects which are in space. In this mode one establishes the fact

that objects which we believe to be large, sometimes appear small; that

those which we believe to be square, sometimes appear round; that those

which we fancy even, appear full of projections; those which we think

straight, seem bent; and those which we believe to be colourless, appear

of quite a different complexion. Accordingly, the sun, on account of its

distance from us, appears small. The mountains too, at a distance,[135]

appear airy masses and smooth, but when beheld close, they are rough.

Again, the sun has one appearance at his rise, and quite a different one

at midday. And the same body looks very different in a wood from what

it does on plain ground. So too, the appearance of an object changes

according to its position as regards us; for instance, the neck of a dove

varies as it turns. Since then, it is impossible to view these things

irrespectively of place and position, it is clear that their real nature

is not known.

The eighth mode has respect to the magnitudes or quantities of things; or

to the heat or coldness, or to the speed or slowness, or to the paleness

or variety of colour of the subject. For instance, a moderate quantity of

wine when taken invigorates, but an excessive quantity weakens. And the

same is the case with food, and other similar things.

The ninth depends upon the frequency, or rarity, or strangeness of the

thing under consideration. For instance, earthquakes excite no wonder

among those nations with whom they are of frequent occurrence; nor does

the sun, because he is seen every day.

The ninth mode is called by Phavorinus, the eighth, and by Sextus and

Ænesidemus, the tenth; and Sextus calls the tenth the eighth, which

Phavorinus reckons the tenth as the ninth in order.

The tenth mode refers to the comparison between one thing and another;

as, for instance, between what is light and what is heavy; between

what is strong and what is weak; between what is greater and what is

less; what is above and what is below. For instance, that which is on

the right, is not on the right intrinsically and by nature, but it is

looked upon as such in consequence of its relation to something else;

and if that other thing be transposed, then it will no longer be on the

right. In the same way, a man is spoken of as a father, or brother, or

relation to some one else; and day is called so in relation to the sun:

and everything has its distinctive name in relation to human thought:

therefore, those things which are known in relation to others, are

unknown of themselves.

And these are the ten modes.

X. But Agrippa adds five other modes to them. One derived from the

disagreement of opinions; another from the necessity of proceeding _ad

infinitum_ from one reasoning to another; a third from relation; a fourth

from hypothesis; and the last from the reciprocal nature of proofs.

That which refers to the disagreement of opinions, shows that all the

questions which philosophers propose to themselves, or which people in

general discuss, are full of uncertainty and contradiction.

That which is derived from the necessity of proceeding incessantly from

one reasoning to another, demonstrates that it is impossible for a man

ever, in his researches, to arrive at undeniable truth; since one truth

is only to be established by another truth; and so on, _ad infinitum_.

The mode which is derived from relation rests on the doctrine that no

object is ever perceived independently and entirely by itself, but always

in its relation to something else; so that it is impossible to know its

nature correctly.

That which depends on hypothesis is directed against those arguers who

pretend that it is necessary to accept the principles of things taken

absolutely, and that one must place one’s faith in them without any

examination, which is an absurdity, for one may just as well lay down the

opposite principles.

The fifth mode, that one namely which arises from the reciprocal nature

of proofs, is capable of application whenever the proof of the truth

which we are looking for supposes, as a necessary preliminary, our belief

in that truth; for instance, if, after we have proved the porosity of

bodies by their evaporations, we return and prove the evaporations by the

porosity.

XI. These Sceptics then deny the existence of any demonstration, of

any test of truth, of any signs, or causes, or motion, or learning,

and of anything as intrinsically or naturally good or bad. For every

demonstration, say they, depends either on things which demonstrate

themselves, or on principles which are indemonstrable. If on things

which demonstrate themselves, then these things themselves require

demonstration; and so on _ad infinitum_. If on principles which are

indemonstrable, then, the very moment that either the sum total of these

principles, or even one single one of them, is incorrectly urged, the

whole demonstration falls instantly to pieces. But if any one supposes,

they add, that there are principles which require no demonstration, that

man deceives himself strangely, not seeing that it is necessary for him

in the first place to establish this point, that they contain their proof

in themselves. For a man cannot prove that there are four elements,

because there are four elements.

Besides, if particular proofs are denied in a complex demonstration, it

must follow that the whole demonstration is also incorrect. Again, if we

are to know that an argument is really a demonstrative proof, we must

have a test of truth; and in order to establish a test, we require a

demonstrative proof; and these two things must be devoid of every kind of

certainty, since they bear reciprocally the one on the other.

How then is any one to arrive at certainty about obscure matters, if one

is ignorant even how one ought to attempt to prove them? For what one is

desirous to understand is not what the appearance of things is, but what

their nature and essence is.

They show, too, that the dogmatic philosophers act with great simplicity;

for that the conclusions which they draw from their hypothetical

principles, are not scientific truths but mere suppositions; and

that, in the same manner, one might establish the most improbable

propositions. They also say that those who pretend that one ought not to

judge of things by the circumstances which surround them, or by their

accessories, but that one ought to take their nature itself as one’s

guide, do not perceive that, while they pretend to give the precise

measure and definition of everything, if the objects present such and

such an appearance, that depends solely on their position and relative

arrangement. They conclude from thence, that it is necessary to say that

everything is true, or that everything is false. For if certain things

only are true, how is one to recognize them. Evidently it will not be

the senses which judge in that case of the objects of sensation, for

all appearances are equal to the senses; nor will it be the intellect,

for the same reason. But besides these two faculties, there does not

appear to be any other test or criterion at all. So, say they, if we

desire to arrive at any certainty with respect to any object which comes

under either sense or intellect, we must first establish those opinions

which are laid down previously as bearing on those objects. For some

people have denied this doctrine, and others have overturned that; it

is therefore indispensable that they should be judged of either by the

senses or by the intellect. And the authority of each of these faculties

is contested; it is therefore impossible to form a positive judgment of

the operations of the senses and of the intellect; and if the contest

between the different opinions, compels us to a neutrality, then the

measure which appeared proper to apply to the appreciation of all those

objects is at the same time put an end to, and one must fix a similar

valuation on everything.

Perhaps our opponent will say, “Are then appearances trustworthy or

deceitful?”[136] We answer that, if they are trustworthy, the other side

has nothing to object to those to whom the contrary appearance presents

itself. For, as he who says that such and such a thing appears to him is

trustworthy, so also is he who says that the contrary appears to him. And

if appearances are deceitful, then they do not deserve any confidence

when they assert what appears to them to be true. We are not bound then

to believe that a thing is true, merely because it obtains assent. For

all men do not yield to the same reasons; and even the same individual

does not always see things in the same light. Persuasion often depends on

external circumstances, on the authority of the speaker, on his ability,

on the elegance of his language, on habit, or even on pleasure.

They also, by this train of reasoning, suppress the criterion of truth.

Either the criterion has been decided on, or it has not. And if it has

not, it does not deserve any confidence, and it cannot be of any use at

all in aiding us to discern truth from falsehood. If, on the other hand,

it has been decided on, it then enters into the class of particular

things which require a criterion, and in that case to judge and to be

judged amount to the same thing; the criterion which judges is itself

judged of by something else, that again by a third criterion, and so on

_ad infinitum_. Add to this, say they, the fact that people are not even

agreed as to the nature of the criterion of truth; some say that man is

the criterion, others that it is the senses which are so: one set places

reason in the van, another class rely upon cataleptic perception.

As to man himself, he disagrees both with himself and with others, as

the diversity of laws and customs proves. The senses are deceivers, and

reason disagrees with itself. Cataleptic perception is judged of by the

intellect, and the intellect changes in various manners; accordingly, we

can never find any positive criterion, and in consequence, truth itself

wholly eludes our search.

They also affirm that there are no such things as signs; for if there

are signs, they argue they must be such as are apprehended either by the

senses or by the intellect. Now, there are none which are apprehended by

the senses, for everything which is apprehended by the senses is general,

while a sign is something particular. Moreover, any object which is

apprehended by the senses has an existence of its own, while signs are

only relative. Again, signs are not apprehended by the intellect, for

in that case they would be either the visible manifestation of a visible

thing, or the invisible manifestation of an invisible thing, or the

invisible sign of a visible thing; or the visible sign of an invisible

thing. But none of all these cases are possible; there are therefore no

such things as signs at all.

There is therefore no such thing as a visible sign of a visible thing;

for that which is visible has no need of a sign. Nor, again, is there any

invisible sign of an invisible thing; for when anything is manifested by

means of another thing, it must become visible. On the same principle

there is no invisible sign of a visible object; for that which aids in

the perception of something else must be visible. Lastly, there is no

visible manifestation of an invisible thing; for as a sign is something

wholly relative, it must be perceived in that of which it is the sign;

and that is not the case. It follows, therefore, that none of those

things which are not visible in themselves admit of being perceived; for

one considers signs as things which aid in the perception of that which

is not evident by itself.

They also wholly discard, and, as far as depends on them, overturn the

idea of any cause, by means of this same train of reasoning. Cause is

something relative. It is relative to that of which it is the cause. But

that which is relative is only conceived, and has no real existence.

The idea of a cause then is a pure conception; for, inasmuch as it is a

cause, it must be a cause of something; otherwise it would be no cause

at all. In the same way as a father cannot be a father, unless there

exists some being in respect of whom one gives him the title of father;

so too a cause stands on the same ground. For, supposing that nothing

exists relatively to which a cause can be spoken of; then, as there is no

production, or destruction, or anything of that sort, there can likewise

be no cause. However, let us admit that there are such things as causes.

In that case then, either a body must be the cause of a body, or that

which is incorporeal must be the cause of that which is incorporeal. Now,

neither of these cases is possible, therefore, there is no such thing

as cause. In fact, one body cannot be the cause of another body, since

both bodies must have the same nature; and if it be said that one is the

cause, inasmuch as it is a body, then the other must be a cause for the

same reason. And in that case one would have two reciprocal causes; two

agents without any passive subject.

Again, one incorporeal thing cannot be the cause of another incorporeal

thing for the same reason. Also, an incorporeal thing cannot be the

cause of a body, because nothing that is incorporeal can produce a body.

Nor, on the other hand, can a body be the cause of anything incorporeal,

because in every production there must be some passive subject matter;

but, as what is incorporeal is by its own nature protected from being

a passive subject, it cannot be the object of any productive power.

There is, therefore, no such thing as any cause at all. From all which

it follows, that the first principles of all things have no reality;

for such a principle, if it did exist, must be both the agent and the

efficient cause.

Again, there is no such thing as motion. For whatever is moved, is moved

either in the place in which it is, or in that in which it is not. It

certainly is not moved in the place in which it is, and it is impossible

that it should be moved in the place in which it is not; therefore, there

is no such thing as motion at all.

They also denied the existence of all learning. If, said they, anything

is taught, then either that which does exist is taught in its existence

or that which does not exist is taught in its non-existence; but that

which does exist is not taught in its existence (for the nature of all

existent things is visible to all men, and is known by all men); nor is

that which does not exist taught in its non-existence, for nothing can

happen to that which does not exist, so that to be taught cannot happen

to it.

Nor again, say they, is there any such thing as production. For that

which is, is not produced, for it exists already; nor that which is not,

for that does not exist at all. And that which has no being nor existence

at all, cannot be produced.

Another of their doctrines is, that there is no such thing as any natural

good, or natural evil. For if there be any natural good, or natural evil,

then it must be good to everyone, or evil to everyone; just as snow is

cold to everyone. But there is no such thing as one general good or evil

which is common to all beings; therefore, there is no such thing as any

natural good, or natural evil. For either one must pronounce everything

good which is thought so by anyone whatever, or one must say that it does

not follow that everything which is thought good is good. Now, we cannot

say that everything which is thought good is good, since the same thing

is thought good by one person (as, for instance, pleasure is thought good

by Epicurus) and evil by another (as it is thought evil by Antisthenes);

and on this principle the same thing will be both good and evil. If,

again, we assert that it does not follow that everything which is thought

good is good, then we must distinguish between the different opinions;

which it is not possible to do by reason of the equality of the reasons

adduced in support of them. It follows that we cannot recognize anything

as good by nature.

And we may also take a view of the whole of their system by the

writings which some of them have left behind them. Pyrrho himself has

left nothing; but his friends Timon, and Ænesidemus, and Numenius, and

Nausiphanes, and others of that class have left books. And the dogmatical

philosophers arguing against them, say that they also adopt spurious and

pronounce positive dogmas. For where they think that they are refuting

others they are convicted, for in the very act of refutation, they assert

positively and dogmatize. For when they say that they define nothing,

and that every argument has an opposite argument; they do here give a

positive definition, and assert a positive dogma. But they reply to these

objectors; as to the things which happen to us as men, we admit the truth

of what you say; for we certainly do know that it is day, and that we are

alive; and we admit that we know many other of the phænomena of life.

But with respect to those things as to which the dogmatic philosophers

make positive assertions, saying that they are comprehended, we suspend

our judgment on the ground of their being uncertain; and we know nothing

but the passions; for we confess that we see, and we are aware that we

comprehend that such a thing is the fact; but we do not know how we see,

or how we comprehend. Also, we state in the way of narrative, that this

appears white, without asserting positively that it really is so. And

with respect to the assertion, “We define nothing,” and other sentences

of that sort, we do not pronounce them as dogmas. For to say that is a

different kind of statement from saying that the world is spherical;

for the one fact is not evident, while the other statements are mere

admissions.

While, therefore, we say that we define nothing, we do not even say that

as a definition.

Again, the dogmatic philosophers say that the Sceptics overthrow all

life, when they deny everything of which life consists. But the Sceptics

say that they are mistaken; for they do not deny that they see, but that

they do not know how it is that they see. For, say they, we assert what

is actually the fact, but we do not describe its character. Again, we

feel that fire burns, but we suspend our judgment as to whether it has

a burning nature. Also, we see whether a person moves, and that a man

dies; but how these things happen we know not. Therefore, say they, we

only resist the uncertain deductions which are put by the side of evident

facts. For when we say that an image has projections, we only state

plainly what is evident; but when we say that it has not projections, we

no longer say what appears evident, but something else. On which account

Timon, in his Python, says that Pyrrho does not destroy the authority of

custom. And in his Images he speaks thus:—

But what is evidently seen prevails,

Wherever it may be.

And in his treatise on the Senses, he says, “The reason why a thing

is sweet I do not declare, but I confess that the fact of sweetness

is evident.” So too, Ænesidemus, in the first book of his Pyrrhonean

Discourses, says that Pyrrho defines nothing dogmatically, on account

of the possibility of contradiction, but that he is guided by what is

evident. And he says the same thing in his book against Wisdom, and in

his treatise on Investigation.

In like manner, Zeuxis, a friend of Ænesidemus, in his treatise on

Twofold Arguments, and Antiochus, of Laodicea, and Apellas, in his

Agrippa, all declare nothing beyond what is evident. The criterion

therefore, among the Sceptics, is that which is evident; as Ænesidemus

also says; and Epicurus says the same thing.

But Democritus says, that there is no test whatever of appearances,

and also that they are not criteria of truth. Moreover, the dogmatic

philosophers attack the criterion derived from appearances, and say that

the same objects present at times different appearances; so that a town

presents at one time a square, and at another a round appearance; and

that consequently, if the Sceptic does not discriminate between different

appearances, he does nothing at all. If, on the contrary, he determines

in favour of either, then, say they, he no longer attaches equal value

to all appearances. The Sceptics reply to this, that in the presence of

different appearances, they content themselves with saying that there

are many appearances, and that it is precisely because things present

themselves under different characters, that they affirm the existence of

appearances.

Lastly, the Sceptics say, that the chief good is the suspension of the

judgment which tranquillity of mind follows, like its shadow, as Timon

and Ænesidemus say; for that we need not choose these things, or avoid

those, which all depend on ourselves: but as to those things which do not

depend upon us, but upon necessity, such as hunger, thirst, and pain,

those we cannot avoid; for it is not possible to put an end to them by

reason.

But when the dogmatic philosophers object that the Sceptic, on his

principles, will not refuse to kill his own father, if he is ordered

to do so; so that they answer, that they can live very well without

disquieting themselves about the speculations of the dogmatic

philosophers; but, suspending their judgment in all matters which do not

refer to living and the preservation of life. Accordingly, say they, we

avoid some things, and we seek others, following custom in that; and we

obey the laws.

Some authors have asserted, that the chief good of the Stoics is

impassibility; others say that it is mildness and tranquillity.

LIFE OF TIMON.

I. Apollonides, of Nicæa, a philosopher of our school, in the first

book of his Commentaries on the Silli, which he dedicated to Tiberius

Cæsar, says that Timon was the son of Timarchus, and a Phliasian by

birth. And then, when he was young, he studied dancing, and afterwards

he renounced that study, and went to Megara to Stilpo. And having spent

some time there, he returned home again and married. Then he came

with his wife to Elis, to see Pyrrho, and there he remained while his

children were born; the elder of whom, he called Xanthus, and taught him

medicine, and left him his successor in his sect of philosophy. And he

was a man of considerable eminence, as Sotion tells us in his eleventh

book. Afterwards, being in difficulty as to his means, he departed to

the Hellespont and the Propontis; and living at Chalcedon as a Sophist,

he earned a very high reputation and great popularity; from thence he

departed, after having made a considerable fortune, and went to Athens,

and remained there till his death, going across once for a short time

to Thebes. He was also acquainted with king Antigonus, and with Ptolemy

Philadelphus, as he himself testifies in his Iambics.

II. He was, says Antigonus, fond of drinking, and he at times occupied

himself with works quite inconsistent with philosophy; for he wrote lyric

and epic poems, and tragedies and satiric dramas, and thirty comedies,

and sixty tragedies and Silli, and amatory poems.

There are works of his also enumerated in a regular catalogue, extending

to twenty thousand verses, which are mentioned by Antigonus, of Carystos,

who also wrote his life. Of the Silli, there are three volumes; in which

he attacks every one as if he were a Sceptic, and especially he lampoons

the dogmatic philosophers under the form of parodies. The first volume

of these Silli contains a long uninterrupted narration; but the second

and third are in the form of dialogues. He is represented in them, as

interrogating Xenophanes, the Colophonian, about every thing, and he

utters a long continued discourse; in his second book he speaks of the

more ancient philosophers; and in his third of the more modern ones;

on which account some people have given the last book the name of the

epilogue.

But the first book contains the same subjects, with this difference, that

in that it is all confined to one single person and its first line begins

thus:—

Come hither, all you over-busy Sophists

III. He died when he was nearly ninety years old, as Antigonus tells us;

and Sotion, in his eleventh book, makes the same statement. I have heard

it said that he had only one eye, and, indeed, he used to call himself

Cyclops.

IV. There was also another Timon, the misanthrope.

V. Now this philosopher was very fond of a garden, and also of solitude,

as we are told by Antigonus. Accordingly it is reported, that Hieronymus,

the Peripatetic, said of him, as among the Scythians, both they who

fly, and they who pursue shoot with the bow, so in the case of the

philosophers, those who pursue and those who fly both hunt for pupils, as

Timon for instance.

VI. He was a man of very acute perceptions, and very quick at seeing

the ridiculous side of any question: he was also very fond of learning,

and a very clever man at devising plots for poets, and at composing

dramas. And he used to associate with himself, in the composition of his

tragedies, two other poets, named Alexander and Homer; and whenever he

was disturbed by his maid-servants or by the dogs, he paid no attention

to them, studying above all things to live in tranquillity. They tell a

story, that Aratus asked him how he could procure an entire and correct

copy of Homer’s poetry, and he answered, “If he could fall in with an old

manuscript which had never been corrected.” And all his works used to

lie about at random, and at times half eaten by mice; so that once when

he was reading them to Zopyrus, the orator, and unrolling a volume, he

read whatever passages came first, and when he got to the middle of the

book he found a great gap, which he had not previously perceived, so very

indifferent was he about such matters.

His constitution was so vigorous, that he could easily go without his

dinner. And they say, that once when he saw Arcesilaus passing through

the forum of the Cercopes, he said, “What are you doing here, where we

freemen are?” And he used constantly to quote to those who invoked the

testimony of their intellects to judge of the senses:—

Attagas and Numenius are met.[137]

And this jesting manner was habitual with him. Accordingly he once said

to a man, who was surprised at everything, “Why do you not wonder that

we three men have only four eyes between us?” for he himself had only

one eye, no more had Dioscorides, his pupil; but the man to whom he was

speaking had his sight unimpaired. On another occasion, he was asked by

Arcesilaus, why he had come from Thebes, and he said, “To laugh at you

all when I see you face to face.” But though he attacked Arcesilaus in

his Silli, he has praised him in the book entitled the Funeral Banquet of

Arcesilaus.

VII. He had no successor, as Menodotus tells us; but his school ceased,

till Ptolemy the Cyrenean re-established it. According to the account

given to us by Hippobotus and Sotion, he had as pupils, Dioscorides

of Cyprus, and Nicolochus of Rhodes, and Euphranor of Seleucia, and

Praylus of the Troas, who was a man of such constancy of mind that, as

Phylarchus relates in his History, he allowed himself to be punished

as a traitor wholly undeservedly, not uttering one word of complaint

against his fellow citizens; and Euphranor had for his pupil, Eubulus, of

Alexandria, who was the master of Ptolemy, who was the master of Sarpedon

and Heraclides. And Heraclides was the master of Ænesidemus, of Cnossus,

who wrote eight books of Pyrrhonean discourses; he was also the master

of Zeuxippus Polites, who was the master of Zeuxis Goniopus, who was the

master of Antiochus, of Laodicea, in Lycia. Antiochus again, was the

master of Menodotus, of Nicomedia, a skilful physician, and of Theodas,

of Laodicea; and Menodotus was the master of Herodotus, of Tarsus, the

son of Arieus; Herodotus was the master of Sextus Empiricus, who left ten

books of Sceptic Maxims, and other excellent works; and Sextus was the

master of Saturninus Cythenas, who was also an empiric.