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CHAPTER XXIII

THE SOUDAN WAR OF 1884-5

I. SUMMARY OF EVENTS

NOTE

A year before the British forces restored order in Egypt, trouble was

beginning in the Soudan. One Mahomet Ahmed, who was the son of a

boat-builder, and who had the peculiar conformation of the teeth which

betokened the fore-ordained of the Prophet, announced that he was the

Mahdi. In July, 1881, the holy man dwelt upon the island of Abba, on

the White Nile, above Khartoum. Thence he caused it to be made known

that he was the chosen instrument for the reformation of Islam, and

that all those who denied him would be abolished. Reouf Pasha, who was

then Governor-General of the Soudan, summoned the Mahdi to Khartoum,

there to give an account of himself. The Mahdi naturally refused; and

when Reouf sent soldiers to fetch him, the Mahdi slew most of them, and

departed into the hills, he and all his following. The Governor of

Fashoda took an expedition to Gheddeer, and was also slain, together

with most of his men. Then Giegler Pasha, a German, acting as

temporary Governor-General of the Soudan, succeeded in defeating the

forces of the Mahdi. But Abdel Kader, who, succeeding Reouf, took over

the command from Giegler, was defeated in his turn. On 7th June, 1882,

the Egyptian forces were cut to pieces near Fashoda. In July, the

Mahdi was besieging Obeid and {212} Bara. By October, 1882, both

places were in danger of falling, and Abdel Kader was demanding

reinforcements from Egypt.

The Soudan is a country as large as India; at that time it had no

railways, no canals, no roads, and, excepting the Nile during a part of

the year, no navigable rivers. In November, 1882, the British

Government informed the Khedive that they declined to be responsible

for the condition of the Soudan. Lord Granville's intimation to this

effect was the first step in the policy which progressed from blunder

to blunder to the desertion and death of General Gordon.

The Egyptian Government, left in the lurch, hastily enlisted some

10,000 men, the most part being brought in by force, and dispatched

them to Abdel Kader at Berber. At Abdel Kader's request, Colonel

Stewart and two other British officers were sent to Khartoum to help

him to deal with the raw and mutinous levies.

In December, a number of British officers were appointed to the

Egyptian Army in Egypt, in accordance with the recommendations of Lord

Dufferin, and Sir Evelyn Wood was appointed Sirdar. The British Army

of Occupation had now been reduced to 12,000 men, under the command of

General Sir Archibald Alison, who, in the following April (1883) was

succeeded by Lieutenant-General F. C. S. Stephenson.

In January, 1883, Colonel W. Hicks, afterwards Hicks Pasha, was

appointed by the Khedive chief of the staff of the Army of the Soudan.

Before he proceeded to the theatre of war, Abdel Kader had lost and won

various engagements, and had reoccupied the province of Sennar; while

the Mahdi had taken El Obeid and Bara and occupied the whole of

Kordofan.

In February, it was announced in the Queen's Speech that "the British

troops will be withdrawn as promptly as may be permitted by a prudent

examination of the country"; a declaration provoking intense alarm

among the European {213} inhabitants of Egypt. Their protests,

however, were totally disregarded. The Egyptians naturally concluded

that England owned no real interest in that reform of administration

which her influence alone could achieve.

On 7th February, 1883, Colonel Hicks left Cairo for Khartoum, with his

staff, consisting of Colonels Colborne and De Coetlogon, Majors

Farquhar and Martin, and Captains Warner, Massey and Forrestier-Walker.

Upon the night before their departure, Colonel Hicks and his staff

dined with Lord and Lady Charles Beresford in Cairo. Lord Charles

Beresford, who was then on half-pay, had expressed a wish to accompany

Colonel Hicks, but Lord Dufferin disapproving of his suggestion, Lord

Charles Beresford withdrew it.

Hicks and his men disappeared into the desert, which presently

swallowed them up.

On the 28th April, Hicks defeated a large force of the Mahdi's army on

the White Nile. The Egyptian Government then decided to reconquer the

province of Kordofan, and dispatched reinforcements to Khartoum. On

the 9th September, Hicks Pasha, at the head of 10,000 men, marched for

Duem. The last dispatch received from him was dated 3rd October, 1883.

Upon a day early in November, Hicks and his whole army were annihilated.

His defeat left Khartoum in great danger. On 9th November, before the

news of the disaster reached England, the British Government stated

that all British troops were to be withdrawn from Egypt. When the fact

was known, the decision of the Government was modified; but they still

declined to interfere in the Soudan; and advised the Egyptian

Government to evacuate at least a part of that territory. The Egyptian

Government protesting, the British Government, on 4th January, 1884,

sent a peremptory message insisting that the policy of evacuation

should be carried into execution. The inconsequence of Her Majesty's

Ministers is sufficiently apparent.

In the meantime, during August of the preceding year, {214} 1883,

trouble had arisen in the Eastern Soudan, where Osman Digna, a trader,

joined the Mahdi, and brought all the tribes of that country to his

standard. At the beginning of November, 1883, just at the time when

Hicks Pasha and his army had come to their end, an Egyptian force under

Mahmoud Talma Pasha was defeated by Osman Digna in the attempt to

relieve Tokar, besieged by the rebels, Captain Moncrieff, Royal Navy,

British Consul at Souakim, being killed in the action. A second

expeditionary force under Suleiman Pasha was cut to pieces on 2nd

December at Tamanieh.

The Egyptian Government then dispatched reinforcements under the

command of General Valentine Baker, among whose staff were Colonel

Sartorius, Lieutenant-Colonel Harrington, Lieutenant-Colonel Hay,

Majors Harvey, Giles, and Holroyd, Morice Bey and Dr. Leslie. On the

4th February, 1884, Baker was defeated at El-Teb, with the loss of

nearly two-thirds of his force. Morice Bey, Dr. Leslie, and nine other

European officers were killed. Souakim being threatened, Admiral

Hewett, on 10th December, was given the command of the town, having

under him some 3800 troops. Two days later came the news of the taking

of Sinkat by the rebels, and of the massacre of the garrison. During

the period in which these successive disasters occurred, the British

Army of Occupation was kept idle in Cairo by the orders of the British

Government.

The current of events now divides, one leading to Khartoum, the other

still flowing in the Eastern Soudan. The British Government,

hopelessly at fault, turned to General Charles Gordon, as the one man

in the world who could apparently perform miracles. Ten years

previously, "Chinese" Gordon, as Governor-General of the Soudan, and

again in 1877, as Governor-General of the Soudan, Darfur and the

Equatorial Provinces, had freed the country from Turkish rule, broken

the slave trade, established peace, opened trade routes, and laid the

foundations of civilisation. Since 1877 he had been engaged in setting

wrong things right in Egypt {215} in the Soudan again, in Abyssinia, in

China, in the Mauritius, at the Cape, in Palestine, and in the Congo.

On 18th January, 1884, Gordon was instructed by the British Government

to report upon the best method of evacuating the Soudan. When he

arrived at Cairo, these instructions were radically altered by Sir

Evelyn Baring (afterwards Lord Cromer), who, on the 25th January,

informed Gordon that he was required actually to direct the evacuation

of Khartoum and of the whole Soudan, and afterwards to establish an

organised government in that country. Gordon arrived at Khartoum on

the 18th February, where he was hailed as the father and saviour of the

people.

On the same day, Major-General Sir Gerald Graham left Suez to join at

Souakim the force which had been placed under his command. That force

was chiefly drawn from the British Army of Occupation in Egypt. The

object of the expedition was the relief of Tokar, or, if that place had

already fallen, the protection of Souakim, an alternative which

involved an attack upon Osman Digna's victorious army. Tokar was in

fact taken by the enemy before the expedition started.

The British Government, whose original intention had been to refrain

from any action in the Soudan whatsoever; which had been compelled by

force of circumstances, including the most frightful bloodshed, to

change a wholly negative policy to a definite scheme of evacuation; now

perceived, of course too late, that if the European population was to

be brought away, at least some measure of military force must be

employed. What Her Majesty's Ministers were unable to see, or what, if

they saw, they chose to ignore, was the plain fact that the same force

and the same measures and the same promptitude would be required for

the salvation of Europeans in face of the enemy, as for the reconquest

and reoccupation of the country. In this delusion, or dereliction,

resides the explanation of an affair which has left an indelible stain

upon British honour.

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On 28th February, 1884, Graham defeated the enemy, inflicting upon them

severe losses, at El-Teb, near the spot upon which Baker's disastrous

action had occurred some three weeks previously. On 13th March, after

a hard and at times a dubious fight, Graham won another victory at

Tamaai, and the power of Osman Digna was broken. Graham was then

ordered to return, and the expedition was over.

By withdrawing Graham's troops, the Government both threw away the

fruits of his success, and deliberately abandoned the control of the

Souakim-Berber route from Khartoum, by which alone Gordon could have

brought away the refugees. Berber was the key to the Soudan.

Thenceforth, the Souakim-Berber route was impracticable; and it was for

this reason that Lord Wolseley was obliged to take the much longer Nile

route.

On the very day after Graham's victory at El-Teb, and before Graham had

left Souakim, Gordon had telegraphed from Khartoum as follows:--

"There is not much chance of the situation improving, and every chance

of it getting worse; for we have nothing to rely on to make it better.

You must, therefore, decide whether you will or will not make an

attempt to save the two-thirds of the population who are well affected

before these two-thirds retreat. Should you wish to intervene, send

200 British troops to Wady Halfa, and adjutants to inspect Dongola, and

then open up Souakim-Berber road by Indian Moslem troops. This will

cause an immediate collapse of the revolt."

On 2nd March he telegraphed again to the same effect; but Lord

Granville declined to accede to General Gordon's suggestions. A few

days later, when the Eastern Soudan and the Souakim-Berber route had

been definitely abandoned, Sir Evelyn Baring strongly advised the

British Government to obtain command of the Souakim-Berber route. But

the {217} advice was refused by Lord Granville, and the most urgent

appeals continued to be addressed to him in vain.

Deserted by the Government, Gordon tried, and failed, to raise money

privately for the purpose of engaging Turkish troops. Early in April,

Khartoum was closely besieged. At this time, Lord Wolseley urged upon

the Government the necessity of relieving Gordon. In May, preparations

for war were begun. A part of the British Army of Occupation in Egypt

was sent up the Nile; and Commander Hammill and other naval officers

were employed to report upon the navigation of the river. These facts

did not prevent Lord Hartington from informing the House of Commons,

early in July, that the Government had no intention of sending an

expedition to relieve General Gordon, unless it were made clear that by

no other means could he be relieved, and adding that the Government had

"received no information making it desirable that we should depart from

that decision" (Royce, _The Egyptian Campaigns_). On 24th July, Lord

Wolseley made a spirited protest against the procrastination of the

Government. The pressure of public opinion could no longer be entirely

withstood. On 30th July, Gordon sent a message in which he declared

his retreat to be impossible.

On 5th August, Mr. Gladstone asked and obtained a vote of credit.

Then, and not until then, were the preparations for war begun in

England. Having decided, upon the advice of Lord Wolseley, to follow

the Nile route instead of the Souakim-Berber route, the Government

ordered 800 boats. These were 30 feet long, having six feet six inches

beam, two feet six inches draught, fitted with 12 oars, two masts and

lug sails; each designed to carry two boatmen and 10 soldiers with

provisions, arms and ammunition. Eight steam pinnaces and two

stern-wheel paddle-boats were also fitted out; the Nile steamers

belonging to the Egyptian Government were taken over; and 380

_voyageurs_ from Canada were engaged. The total force of troops

selected numbered 7000. Messrs. Thomas Cook & Son contracted to

transport the {218} whole expedition to above the Second Cataract.

Lord Wolseley was appointed commander-in-chief; General Sir Redvers

Buller was chief of staff; General Earle was given command of a

brigade; special service officers were: Colonels Sir Charles Wilson,

Brackenbury, Harrison, Henderson, Maurice, Lord Anson (Royce, _The

Egyptian Campaigns_). Lord Charles Beresford was attached to Lord

Wolseley's staff.

Even now, the Government failed to recognise the plain facts of the

case. Their instructions to Lord Wolseley were that the main object of

the expedition was to rescue General Gordon. Her Majesty's Ministers

considered that it might be practicable to achieve his release without

going to Khartoum, and that in any case it was desirable to avoid any

fighting so far as possible.

When Lord Wolseley started from Cairo on 27th September, 1884, the

advance was already going rapidly forward. Under the direction of Sir

Evelyn Wood and Commander Hammill, a number of the whaler boats had

been transported to Wady Halfa, which is nearly 900 miles from

Khartoum, the total length of the Nile route being 1650 miles. Along

the river, up to Wady Halfa and a little beyond to Sarras, bases of

supply had been established; an advance guard was already at New

Dongola, about 100 miles above Wady Halfa, under the command of General

Sir Herbert Stewart, he who afterwards led the Desert Column.

Arriving at Wady Halfa on 5th October, Lord Wolseley received news that

Colonel J. S. Stewart, Mr. Power, British Consul at Khartoum and

correspondent of _The Times_, M. Herbin, French Consul, and a party of

Greek and Egyptian refugees, who had left Khartoum in the steamer

Abbas, had all been slain. Stewart had with him Gordon's papers,

which, of course, were taken by the Mahdi's men.

On the 8th October a letter from M. Herbin was received at Cairo. It

was dated from Khartoum, 29th July, 1884, and stated that there were

then provisions for two months in the {219} place. The time had thus

expired--and M. Herbin had been murdered--ere the letter arrived.

A temporary base was formed at Wady Halfa; and bases of supplies were

established along the river up to New Dongola. By means of

extraordinary exertions, boats and steamers were hauled up to Dongola

through the rapids. Lord Wolseley formed a Camel Corps of 1500 men,

consisting of four regiments, Heavy Cavalry, Light Cavalry, Guards, and

Mounted Infantry, with a detachment of Royal Marines. Early in

November, a general advance was made from Wady Halfa. Wolseley arrived

at Dongola on 3rd November. Two days previously, on 1st November, Sir

Evelyn Baring had received a message from Gordon, dated 13th July,

saying that he could hold out for four months. The limit, therefore,

had nearly been reached by the time the expedition was leaving Wady

Halfa, 900 miles from Khartoum.

Lord Wolseley, early in November, considered that it would take to the

end of the year to concentrate his forces at Ambukol, just above Old

Dongola. He returned to Wady Halfa to expedite progress; and by the

middle of December headquarters were established at Korti, and by

Christmas the greater part of the force was concentrated there. During

the whole of this period, Wolseley's army must be figured as a river of

men flowing along the river Nile, the infantry struggling up in boats,

the mounted men toiling along the banks; the stream of men banking up

at headquarters, the military front, which is steadily pushed forward

from Wady Halfa to New Dongola, from New Dongola to Old Dongola 60 to

70 miles farther up, from Old Dongola to Korti.

On 17th November a letter was received from Gordon saying that he could

hold out for forty days from the date of the superscription, 4th

November, 1884, thus leaving Wolseley barely four weeks to accomplish a

task needing as many months. On 28th November another letter from

Gordon, dated 9th September, gave the relief expedition four months,

thus leaving Wolseley five weeks from the {220} date upon which the

letter was received. It was now clear that the expedition could not

reach Khartoum in time.

When Lord Wolseley, towards the end of December, had his forces

concentrated at Korti, he decided to divide them into two columns, the

Desert Column and the Nile Column. The reasons for his scheme can only

be clearly apprehended by a reference to the map. At Korti, the Nile

turns north-east, looping back again, and resuming its southward course

at Metemmeh. A straight line drawn across the Bayuda Desert from Korti

to Metemmeh is the short cut. This was the route given to the Desert

Column. The Nile Column was to proceed up the loop of the river to

Hamdab, there to avenge the murder of Colonel Stewart and his party, to

proceed higher up to Berti, and thence to secure the bend of the river

and to open up the desert route back to Korosko, below Wady Halfa, and

from Korosko it was intended to attack Berber, and thence to join

forces with the Desert Column at Metemmeh.

The Nile Column, numbering about 3000 men, under the command of

Major-General Earle, Brigadier-General Brackenbury being second in

command, left Korti on 28th December, 1884.

The Desert Column was placed under the command of General Sir Herbert

Stewart. With him was Colonel Sir Charles Wilson, who was instructed

to take a body of troops from Metemmeh to Khartoum. The Column

consisted of sections of the Camel Corps, a company of the Royal

Engineers, a detachment of the 19th Hussars, detachments of the

Commissariat and Medical Corps, and the Naval Brigade, which was placed

under the command of Lord Charles Beresford. The total force numbered

73 officers, 1032 non-commissioned officers and men, 2099 camels, and

40 horses. The Desert Column left Korti on 30th December, 1884. It

was, in fact, a forlorn hope.

(The writer desires to acknowledge the use he has made of the excellent

narrative of events contained in _The Egyptian Campaigns_, by the Hon.

Charles Royle.)

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