CHAPTER XXXIII

THE SOUDAN WAR (_Continued_)

XI. THE RETREAT

Upon the day after the rescue of Sir Charles Wilson's party, a court of

inquiry, under my presidency, was held to investigate the conduct of

the captains of the two wrecked steamers, and one of the Reises. The

captains were acquitted. The Reis was found guilty of treachery, but

his punishment was remitted in consideration of the fact that he had

brought Lieutenant Stuart-Wortley safely down the river after the wreck

of the _Bordein_.

The little _Safieh_ was riddled with bullet-holes; she leaked like a

sieve, so that even before the action of Wad Habeshi, the pumps must be

kept going continually; and her bows, under the incessant concussion of

the guns, had opened out like a flower. The sides came away from the

stem, and in order to stop the water coming in, the natives had stuffed

rags and mud into the openings, which of course widened them. Upon our

return to Gubat, I caused a dry dock to be excavated in the bank; ran

the bows of the steamer into it; closed it against the water with mud;

and kept two black men baling out the water as hard as they could go

for eight hours on end, while we cut and fitted a new stem and bolted

the sides to it; a very difficult job, because the sides of the steamer

were rotten. The other repairs having been effected, I took the

_Safieh_ (which was so decayed that the pumps must still be kept going)

out {315} daily for foraging expeditions, to get cattle, sheep and

vegetables, and also to show there was fight in us yet. There were no

fowls, because the Mahdi had declared them to be unclean.

Captain Gascoigne and Khashm-el-Mus used to accompany me upon these

expeditions, Gascoigne taking command of the raiding parties on shore:

Lieutenant Robert A. J. Montgomerie (afterwards Rear-Admiral

Montgomerie, C.B., C.M.G.) was of the greatest service. Montgomerie

was of extraordinary physical strength and prowess. He joined me on

11th February, with Lieutenant G. W. Tyler, at Gubat. While helping to

work the boats up the river, Montgomerie saved a gun which sank when

the boat in which it was capsized. The weight of muzzle or breach

(whichever it was) was well over 200 lb., and the water was

shoulder-deep. Montgomerie picked up the gun, hove it upon his

shoulder and waded ashore with it.

His exploits at Ismailia are still remembered. He was sitting in a

saloon, where three French natives determined to provoke the English

officer. They chose the wrong man. One of the trio upset

Montgomerie's glass of beer, and although he did not apologise,

Montgomerie, supposing him to have done it by accident, took no notice.

A second man did the same, with the same result. Then the third hero

deliberately threw down Montgomerie's glass with his hand. Montgomerie

then acted instantly and with great rapidity. He knocked one man

senseless, picked up another and threw him on the top of his friend,

took the third and flung him up on the roof of the balcony.

Surgeon-General A. W. May reminds me that he and Montgomerie

discovered, at some distance from the river, a garden wherein grew

onions and limes. Montgomerie pulled the onions, while May collected

the limes for the sick in hospital. But a lime-tree is armed with long

and sharp thorns; and May, desiring to preserve his one and only

uniform, stripped and climbed the tree in his birthday suit. Suddenly

Arabs appeared; and May had but the {316} time to descend, pick up his

clothes and fly with Montgomerie back to the steamer.

Surgeon-General May also reminds me that upon another foraging trip, we

landed a party of Gordon's Soudanese troops to capture a flock of

sheep. Before the blacks had time to get away with the sheep, the

Arabs came down, and began to fire at them and also at the steamer. I

sent a black sergeant-major and a bugler to hasten the retreat of the

Soudanese. Two of them, each of whom was carrying a sheep, lagged

somewhat; whereupon the sergeant-major lay down, took careful aim, and

fired at them. Neither he nor they seemed to consider the method

unusual. It was on one of these foraging parties that Quartermaster

Olden saved the entire raiding party. Captain Gascoigne, in command of

a wild lot of Bashi-Bazouks and the most of the men from the _Safieh_,

had gone some little distance inland to a village. I was left in the

_Safieh_ with six men to serve the Gardner gun. The steamer was lying

alongside the bank, but not close in; for it was necessary to keep a

certain depth of water under her keel in a falling river, and to be

able to shove off quickly. I had poles ready rigged for this purpose.

The Bashi-Bazouks, who began firing from the hip at random with loud

cries so soon as they came on shore, had vanished into the distance

with the rest of the party; when I perceived afar off a crowd of

Dervishes gathering at a place at right angles to the line upon which

the raiding party must return, and nearer to the _Safieh_ than the

village where was the raiding party. The Dervishes, therefore,

evidently intended to cut off the British force.

I sent for Olden, gave him his instructions, and sent him on shore with

two riflemen. The three ran like hares through the scrub towards the

enemy. They ran at full speed for about 600 yards to get within range.

Then they scattered, concealed themselves and fired; moved again

swiftly, and fired again; and kept on repeating the manoeuvre, until

the Dervishes, believing that the scrub was {317} swarming with English

riflemen, drew off; and the raiding party returned in safety. For this

service, Olden was recommended by me for the conspicuous gallantry

medal.

The black soldiers, going barefoot, used to come in with their feet

transfixed by long thorns; these I cut out with a horse-lancet fitted

to my knife; and the operation was like cutting leather. I had gained

experience in performing it while getting the boats through at Wady

Halfa. At Ismailia a more delicate operation fell to me. While

fishing, my hook caught in a man's eyelid. The French surgeon who was

summoned went to work with a lancet, and tried to pull the barb through

the wound, causing the patient acute agony. I sent the doctor aside,

and using one of a pair of breeches' bow-ties (for tying bows at the

knees) drew the hook through to the shank, and severed it, much to the

surgeon's indignation.

The expeditions up and down the river in the _Safieh_ were amusing

enough; but we were only making the best of the interval before the

next move. Sir Charles Wilson had left Gubat on 6th February for

Korti, where he arrived on the 9th bearing the news of the fall of

Khartoum, and a full account of the condition of the Desert Column.

Lord Wolseley telegraphed the information to Lord Hartington (Secretary

of State for War), who telegraphed in reply: "Express warm recognition

of Government of brilliant services of Sir C. Wilson and satisfaction

at gallant rescue of his party."

Lord Wolseley, upon receipt of Sir C. Wilson's dispatch containing the

account of the action at Abu Kru, fought on the 19th January, when Sir

Herbert Stewart was wounded, had appointed Major-General Sir Redvers

Buller to take command of the Desert Column, Sir Evelyn Wood being

appointed chief of staff in his place. Buller had left Korti on 29th

January, and had arrived at Jakdul on the 2nd February. Lord Wolseley

had also dispatched the Royal Irish Regiment to reinforce the Desert

Column. The Royal Irish marched on foot the whole way across the {318}

Bayuda Desert, each man carrying 70 rounds of ammunition, filled water

bottles and rolled greatcoats. The first detachment left Korti on the

28th January, the second on the 30th; both arriving at Jakdul on the

4th February. They left Jakdul on the 7th. Buller left on the

following day; and upon arriving at Abu Klea, he left there two

companies of the Royal Irish, the rest of which accompanied him to

Gubat, for which place he started on the 10th. I saw the Royal Irish

march in; a splendid body of fighting men, trained down to the last

ounce, lean as hounds, and spoiling for a fight.

It will be observed that Buller was at Jakdul, half-way across the

Desert, on the 4th February, on which date Lord Wolseley learned from

Sir Charles Wilson of the fall of Khartoum. Lord Wolseley dispatched

three sets of orders to Sir Redvers Buller in quick succession, the

last reaching him at Abu Klea on the 10th, before he had resumed his

march to Gubat.

Lord Wolseley's dispatch instructed Sir Redvers Buller to make every

preparation for the evacuation of Gubat and the withdrawal of the

Column. At the same time, its tenor left a certain discretion to

Buller; who, replying to it in a private letter carried by the

returning messenger to Lord Wolseley, "spoke," says Colonel Colville,

in his official _History of the Sudan Campaign_, "hopefully of the

situation." I think the presence of the Royal Irish, in magnificent

condition, suggested to Buller that he could fight anybody anywhere.

In fact, when Sir Redvers came in to Gubat on 11th February, he wanted

to remain and fight. At his request, I stated to him my view of the

situation; which was, briefly, that unless we departed swiftly, we

should be eaten up by the enemy, who were known to be advancing in

immense force. I also reported officially that until the Nile rose,

the two steamers remaining to us were practically useless: a

consideration which proved conclusive. Sir Redvers Buller's dispatch,

dated at Gubat 12th February, and addressed to {319} the chief of

staff, describes the conclusions to which he came after having

carefully reviewed the situation (_History of the Sudan Campaign_--Part

II. p. 56). The camels were greatly reduced in number and were nearly

worn out; but if the Column were to attempt any further enterprise, the

camels must be sent to Jakdul and back to bring supplies, a journey

which would take at least ten days. This circumstance was virtually

conclusive. Sir Redvers adds: "I regret to have to express now an

opinion different to that which I expressed to Lord Wolseley in a

letter dated the night of the 10th instant; but when I then wrote, I

was not aware of the condition of the steamers and of the fact that the

big one could not pass a sandbank 25 miles below this. Lord C.

Beresford considers it doubtful if the other one can either.... Since

writing this I am confirmed in my opinion by the news that Mohammed

Ahmed (the Mahdi) left Khartoum _en route_ here on the 9th instant."

[Illustration: FIELD-MARSHAL THE RT. HON. VISCOUNT WOLSELEY, K.P.,

P.C., G.C.B., G.C.M.G., D.C.L., LL.D., O.M. 1833-1913]

In the meantime, Lord Wolseley had ordered the River Column to halt on

its way. On the 10th, General Earle, in command of the River Column,

had been killed at the action of Kirbekan. Lord Wolseley, until he

received Sir Redvers Buller's account of the desperate condition of the

River Column--deprived of transport, encumbered with wounded, short of

stores (owing to bad packing), and without boots--retained his

intention of effecting a junction of the two columns at Berber. At the

end of the third week in February that scheme was necessarily

abandoned. The River Column was recalled; and Buller, then on his way

back with the Desert Column, was instructed to return direct to Korti.

On the morning of 13th February the sick and wounded were dispatched

with a convoy under the command of Colonel Talbot. Eight or nine miles

out, the convoy was attacked, surrounded on three sides, and exposed to

fire from the enemy concealed in the bush. Among the wounded were the

scalded engine-room artificers; one of whom, recalling the incident in

conversation with me {320} recently, said: "That was the first time my

heart sank--when the bearers put down my litter, and the firing began."

After about two hours' engagement, when the convoy had lost eight

killed and wounded, the Light Camel Regiment, under the command of

Colonel Clarke, marching from Jakdul, opportunely appeared, and the

enemy drew off.

Colonel Talbot (my cousin) very kindly sent me a copy of his diary,

kept at the time. His account of the affair gives little indication of

what was in fact a passage of very considerable danger. He was

encumbered with a large number of sick and wounded; his force was

small; the force of the enemy, though it was impossible to estimate the

exact numbers, was formidable; and in spite of Talbot's skilful and

prompt dispositions of defence, the issue must have been very doubtful

had not the Light Camel Regiment arrived.

Colonel Talbot's account runs as follows: "_February_ 13_th_.--Received

orders from Sir R. Buller to march for Jakdul at dawn with 75 sick and

wounded, Sir H. Stewart and the worst cases carried in litters borne by

Egyptian soldiers from Khartoum. Escort of 300 men joined from the 3

Camel Regiments and about 200 Gordon's Egyptians from Khartoum.

"_February_ 14.--Marched at dawn 8 miles, and halted for breakfast.

Outposts, just as we were about to resume march, sent in report of

approach of large force of Arabs--mounted men, riflemen, and spearmen.

The Column was formed up, the wounded in the centre surrounded by

camels lying down, and outside them the Egyptian soldiers. The Camel

Corps troops were formed in two squares, one of the Heavy and Guards'

Camel Regiments in front of the Column, and the other of the Mounted

Infantry in rear. Skirmishers were sent into the bush to feel for the

enemy. The enemy opened fire and worked all round our force,

apparently trying to ascertain our weakest point. It was impossible to

estimate the strength of the enemy owing to the thick bush, but a

considerable number of riflemen, supported by a large {321} force of

spearmen, were seen, and about 30 horsemen were counted. After the

affair had lasted about two hours, and we had lost 8 men killed and

wounded, the Light Camel Regiment on the march to Gubat appeared

unexpectedly, and narrowly escaped becoming engaged with us, owing to

both forces being unaware of the proximity of the other, and through

the bush it was difficult to distinguish the Arabs from ourselves. No

doubt the arrival of the Light Camel Regiment accounted for the sudden

disappearance of the enemy."

It was Colonel Brabazon (now Major-General Sir J. P. Brabazon, C.B.,

C.V.O.), second in command of the Light Camel Corps, who, when the

Column had marched nearly half-way from Abu Klea to Metemmeh, went to

his commanding officer, Colonel Stanley Clarke, and suggested that the

Column should be immediately diverted to the scene of action. Colonel

Brabazon led the Column in the direction of the firing, and his two or

three hundred camels made so great a dust that the Arabs thought a

whole army was advancing upon their flank, and instantly fled away.

The result was that, hidden in the bush, the Light Camel Corps occupied

the ground vacated by the enemy, unknown to the convoy, which continued

to fire at the place they supposed the Arabs to be. General Brabazon's

account of the affair, which he very kindly sent to me, is as follows:

"I halted the Column, and the bush being very thick, the trees stopped

most of the bullets; nevertheless, they were knocking up the dust at

the feet of our camels, and a bullet struck my mess-tin. I ordered our

regimental call to be sounded, 'The Camels (Campbells) are coming,'

'Lights Out,' and finally 'Dinners.' But it was not until two or three

of us pushed our way through the bush into the open, whence I saw the

convoy preparing to give us another volley, that they realised we were

friends and not foes, and precious glad they were to see us. They had

only a small escort and were of course hampered with the sick and

wounded, and I think everyone who was there will agree {322} that they

were in a bad way.... I dined at the Guards' mess afterwards, and

Douglas Dawson said that he had just given his men the range

preparatory to their firing another volley, when he put up his glasses

and made out the helmets and red morocco coverings of the camel

saddles, and shouted, 'Come down! They are our fellows.' Then, Dawson

said, his soldier servant, who was standing behind him, remarked: 'Why,

I could have told you they were our fellows ten minutes before!' I

suppose he had recognised the 'Dinners' call."

So ended a comedy which had come very near to being a tragedy.

Gordon's Egyptian soldiers, who were carrying the wounded, put the

litters down when the firing began. Among the wounded were poor Sir

Herbert Stewart, devotedly nursed by Major Frank Rhodes, Major Poe,

Royal Marines, Sub-Lieutenant E. L. Munro and Lieutenant Charles

Crutchley. Poe and Crutchley each had a leg amputated. All the

wounded were lying helpless on the sand, listening to the firing, and

moment by moment expecting the terrible Dervish rush. A violent death

was very close to them, when Brabazon and his men came in the nick of

time. The convoy had one of the narrowest escapes in the history of

the British Army. It remains to add that Colonel Brabazon received no

recognition of his action of any kind from the authorities.

Colonel Talbot had been continuously employed upon the difficult and

arduous convoy duty since the arrival of the Desert Column at Gubat on

the 21st. Two days later Talbot started to return to Jakdul to fetch

supplies. Not he nor his men nor his camels had a day's rest from the

8th January, when the Desert Column left Korti, till the 27th, when the

convoy was back again at Jakdul. The convoy reached Gubat on the 31st

January; next day came the news of the fall of Khartoum; and the same

evening the convoy marched again for Jakdul with sick and wounded.

From Jakdul it returned with Sir Redvers Buller; arrived at Gubat on

the 11th February; and started again on the 13th, {323} as already

related, with another party of sick and wounded. On the way back to

Korti, Colonel Talbot, without engineers or commissariat, constructed a

camp and built forts at Megaga Wells, where the main body, including

the Naval Brigade, joined his convoy on 2nd March.

After Colonel Talbot's convoy had left Gubat on 13th February, I

disposed of the poor old _Safieh_ and the _Tewfikiyeh_, lest upon our

departure they should be taken by the enemy. The six brass guns were

spiked and thrown overboard, the ammunition was destroyed, the

eccentric straps were removed from the machinery, and finally the

valves were opened and the vessels sunk.

Then came the sad destruction of the stores for which we had no

transport. The number of camels would only suffice to carry rations

for three days, by the end of which the Column would have arrived at

Abu Klea, where were more stores. When Colonel Talbot's convoy of

supplies reached Gubat two days previously, the garrison had for ten

days been living on short rations: nevertheless, more than half of what

he brought must be destroyed. Count Gleichen (_With the Camel Corps up

the Nile_) says that "19,000 lbs. of flour, 3000 lbs. of biscuit,

21,220 lbs. of beef, 900 lbs. of bacon, 1100 lbs. of tea, oatmeal,

preserved vegetables, coffee, and all sorts of stores were pierced and

thrown into the river"--an example of waste in war resulting from

deficient transport.

Some of the medical comforts, small bottles of champagne and port, were

distributed. One among us--I think his name was Snow--took a bottle of

wine and swore he would keep it till he drank it in Khartoum. _And he

did_. He went into Khartoum with Kitchener thirteen years afterwards,

and drank his libation in the conquered city.

That incident reminds me that, when I went with the party of members of

the House of Commons to Russia in 1912, a Russian farmer sent a note to

the British admiral, of whom he said he had heard, together with a

bottle containing mustard which he had grown, and which he sent {324}

as a token that the aforesaid British admiral would give his enemies

mustard when he met them; for, said the farmer, the enemies of England

would certainly be the enemies of Russia. I have that bottle of

mustard.

What went to my heart when the stores were destroyed, was the dreadful

waste of my drums of precious lubricating oil, carried so far with so

great labour. My tears mingled with the oil as it was poured out upon

the sand.

On the 14th February, at 5.30 a.m., the Desert Column quitted Gubat and

started on the long return march to Korti, officers and men alike on

foot, excepting the Hussars. There was hardly a pair of boots in the

whole column. Some of the men cut up old rifle-buckets and tied the

pieces with string to the soles of their feet. As for my sailors, they

marched barefoot, every man carrying his rifle, cutlass, and 70

cartridges, and many of them towing reluctant camels. One camel to

every four men was allotted to carry saddle-bags and blankets; and the

camels kept dropping and dying all the way. By the time he had been

three days out, Count Gleichen, in charge of the baggage, had lost 92

camels. At first the weather was cool with a northerly breeze, and all

started well. On the march, in default of water, I used to spread my

clothes in the sun while I rubbed myself all over with sand; a dry bath

that was highly cleansing and refreshing. On the 15th February we came

to Abu Klea, somewhat weary.

We were of course in constant expectation of attack. On the next day

(16th) the Naval Brigade occupied a sand redoubt, on which the two

Gardner guns were mounted.

Sir Redvers Buller, finding that the water supply was insufficient and

that there was not enough food for the camels, sent on the Soudanese

troops, baggage, stores and camp-followers under escort to Jakdul,

while he halted at Abu Klea to keep the enemy in check, until the

unloaded camels returned from Jakdul, and until further instructions

arrived from headquarters. The remainder of the Column, entrenched at

Abu Klea, thus became the rearguard, in the {325} air, as the phrase

is; isolated for the time being and deprived of transport and reserve

stores; a dangerous position forced upon the general by the lack of

camels.

In the evening began the customary desert performance, opened by the

Dervishes firing at long range from a hill-top commanding the camp, and

continued during the long, cold, sleepless night with intermittent

sniping to a tom-tom accompaniment. But our men were seasoned by this

time; and although one among them was hit now and again, the situation

no longer set a strain upon their nerves, but was accepted as part of

the routine. That night two men were killed and thirteen wounded. It

is true that the faithful José Salvatro, my Maltese servant, who had

done and suffered so much, lost patience on this occasion. He was

heating cocoa over the fire, when a bullet struck the tin and splashed

the hot cocoa all over him.

"Why they fire _me_, sare?" said José. "Always firing _me_. _I_ never

did them any harm."

In the morning (the 17th) the enemy opened fire with a gun; which,

after three or four rounds, was knocked out by the Naval Brigade with a

Gardner.

I had walked a little way from the redoubt, when I was knocked over by

a stunning blow striking me at the base of the spine, and lay helpless.

I thought I was done; and I thought what an unlucky dog I was to have

come through so much, to die on the way back from a wound in a place so

undignified. But it was only a ricochet; my men carried me in; and I

speedily recovered.

During the day Major F. M. Wardrop, D.A.A.G., and Lieutenant R. J.

Tudway of the Mounted Infantry, with three men, employed the tactics I

had used outside Alexandria two years previously. Riding swiftly from

one point to another, and concealing themselves in the intervals, they

impressed the Dervishes with the delusion that a large force threatened

them in rear, and so caused them to retreat. In the afternoon,

Lieutenant-Colonel H. McCalmont arrived with the news of the action of

the River Column at Kirbekan {326} on the 10th, and of the death of

General Earle. The mail from Korti contained a kind message of

congratulation addressed by the Khedive to myself, referring to the

engagement at Wad Habeshi, as well as congratulations from home. The

total number of killed and wounded during the 16th and 17th was three

men killed, and four officers and 23 men wounded. We heard on the 21st

of the death of our beloved General, Sir Herbert Stewart, who, in spite

of all our hopes, had succumbed to his wound on the 17th, during the

march of Colonel Talbot's convoy, seven miles north of Geb-el-Nus. He

was buried with full military honours on the following day near the

wells of Jakdul.

On the 22nd February a convoy under Colonel Brabazon arrived with 782

camels. These were only just sufficient to move the stores and

supplies.

It may here be noted that it was only a day or two previously that Lord

Wolseley had received at Korti Sir Redvers Buller's letters describing

the complete collapse of the transport of the Desert Column; and it was

this information, together with a minute from Sir Evelyn Wood, who was

at Jakdul, that finally decided Lord Wolseley to abandon his intention

of combining the Desert and River Columns to hold posts along the Nile

preparatory to an autumn campaign. At the same time, great anxiety

with regard to the Desert Column prevailed at home.

Upon the morning of the next day (the 23rd) our picquets reported that

the enemy had received a reinforcement of some 8000 men and six guns.

Perhaps the Column had never been in more imminent danger than it was

at that moment.

Sir Redvers Buller discussed the situation with me. I expressed the

opinion that the large force of the enemy would cut off our advance,

rush us, and then move upon Jakdul and so on to Korti itself; and

remarked that the Column was short of transport and of provisions, and

would be short of water.

{327}

"What would you do if you were in command?" said Buller.

I told him that in the evening I would light a larger number of

camp-fires than usual, and, leaving them burning in order to deceive

the enemy, I would then depart in silence and with speed.

"For a sailor ashore," said Buller, "you've a good head. I'll do it."

And he did.

At two o'clock the same afternoon, Sir Redvers Buller sent on his sick

and wounded--32 of all ranks--with a convoy of 300 men commanded by

Colonel Stanley Clarke; and that night, at 7.30, the rest of the Column

stole forth into the desert, leaving a ring of camp-fires flaming in

the dark behind us. We halted after four hours' march and bivouacked

in peace. Next day (the 24th) we were sniped by a few wandering

scouts: and save for these, saw no enemy. Then began the three days'

hard marching, on short rations, and very little water, in great heat,

to Jakdul. Many of the men fell out: but not one man of the Naval

Brigade.

We arrived at Jakdul on the 26th February. I did not keep a diary: but

Lieutenant Colin Keppel's journal defines the situation in three

eloquent words: "Water, mails, cigarettes!"

Next day I found time to write home, the first opportunity for so doing

during the past six weeks.

"Even now (I wrote), I am writing in a storm of sand and wind, my paper

blowing one way and my helmet another, among my camels, who smell most

poisonous. Poor things, they were eight days without water, and had

only what food they could get when foraging in the desert. And they

have so many and so large holes in their backs, that I am obliged to

put shot-plugs in, to keep the water in when they drink...."

It was true that I put shot-plugs in the camels. My official report

(and what can be truer than an official report?) {328} contains under

date 27th February the sole entry: "Employed repairing camels' sides by

plugging them with oakum!" Lord Wolseley laughed when he read it. But

although the surgery may appear empirical, it was wonderfully

successful. The admixture of tar acted as an antiseptic.

On the following day (28th February) we resumed the march to Korti; on

2nd March the Naval Brigade joined Colonel Talbot's convoy at Megaga

Wells, with the Heavy Camel Regiment and Royal Artillery. The Guards'

Camel Regiment had gone on to Abu Halfa. The remainder of the Column

under Sir Evelyn Wood left Jakdul on 3rd March.

At Megaga Wells Colonel Talbot took command and we left for Korti,

officers and men continuing to march on foot, very few having soles to

their boots. There was one camel allocated to carry the kits of five

men; 30 camels carried water; and 10 carried the sick. The thermometer

registered 112° in the shade, and a hot wind blew. And so we came to

Korti on the 8th March, two months after we had left it.

Lord Wolseley inspected the Naval Brigade on parade; and expressed his

extreme satisfaction at the work they had done, and the manner in which

it had been performed. The next day the Brigade was broken up, and

told off to different stations, under the command of Captain Boardman.

I was ordered to rejoin the staff of Lord Wolseley.

Colonel Talbot notes that the Heavy Camel Regiment, of which he was in

command, had marched about 850 miles; that the strength of the regiment

upon leaving Korti was 23 officers and 373 men; and that its strength

upon its return was 15 officers and 256 men.

Only four of his men arrived on camels. Not one of my sailors fell out

during the whole way from Gubat to Korti.

Here, perhaps, it is not inopportune to place on record how delighted I

was to work with the Army. We are really only one Service, for the

protection of one Empire.

Nor, perhaps, to relate how that Her Majesty Queen {329} Victoria, when

she pinned the C.B. to my coat, said low, "I am very glad to give you

this, Lord Charles. I am very pleased with you."

Her Majesty's words were my reward; for I will own that decorations as

such have never attracted me.

I desire to record the excellent service of Captain F. R. Boardman

(afterwards Admiral Frederick Ross Boardman, C.B.), who invariably did

his utmost at the base to keep the Naval Brigade supplied. It was not

Captain Boardman's fortune to be in the first fighting line, where is

all the fun and where is often all the renown; yet the success of the

fighting line depends entirely upon the energy, forethought and

unselfish loyalty of those at the base of supply.

I happened to be discussing this point with a certain highly

distinguished personage.

"We got all the credit," I said, "but not half enough was given to

those at the base who sent forward the bullets and the grub."

"Grub? What is grub?" inquired the highly distinguished personage.

"I beg your pardon, sir. It is a slang term for food and provisions."

"So grub is food, is it? How very interesting!" said the highly

distinguished personage.

The sequel to our expedition was of course Lord Kitchener's masterly

campaign. After the capture of Omdurman, and the blowing up of the

Mahdi's tomb, it was publicly stated that a certain officer was

bringing home the skull of the holy man, intending to make it into an

inkpot. The House of Commons (of which I was then a member) having

nothing better to do, discussed the matter on 5th June, 1899. Lord

Kitchener sat in the Distinguished Strangers' Gallery. Mr. John Morley

(now Lord Morley) protested against the desecration of the tomb of the

Mahdi. I replied to Mr. Morley, protesting against his assumption of

authority in the matter. I said:

"Now I wish to take, most respectfully, issue with the {330} right

honourable the Member for Montrose upon this point. I say this with

great respect and with great earnestness that so far as I can judge

from the right honourable gentleman's writings and by his teachings, he

is no judge of religious fanaticism whatever. I say this with respect

because, as I understand what he has written, he does not regard

religious fanaticism as anything that can ever be powerful, because he

says himself that he does not understand the question at all. That

being so, I cannot accept the right honourable gentleman as a guide as

to what should be done to check religious fanaticism.... The right

honourable the Member for Montrose does not believe in the power of

religious fanaticism...."

Mr. Morley: "The Noble Lord cannot have read my writings, or else he

would have seen that fanaticism was one of the things I have written

most about" (Hansard 5th June, 1899).

A member said to me in the lobby afterwards: "You really ought not to

say these things. Why do you make these assertions?"

"Because," I said, "I have read Mr. Morley's works."

"You know very well," said my friend, "that you have never read any of

his books."

"I beg your pardon," I replied. "I never go to sleep without reading

one of Mr. Morley's books, and I never read one of Mr. Morley's books

without going to sleep."

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