CHAPTER XXXIX
THE SECOND SHIPBUILDING PROGRAMME
It is easier to take the helm than to be on the con. I have always
been on the con. To drop the metaphor, I have looked ahead in matters
of naval defence and have pointed out what (in my view) ought to be
done. In 1889, I resigned my post at the Board of Admiralty in order
to fasten public attention upon the instant necessity of strengthening
the Fleet by the addition of 70 vessels at a cost of £20,000,000. In
the same year, the Naval Defence Act provided those vessels at a cost a
little in excess of my estimate. That was my first shipbuilding
programme. Many other forces were of course exerted to the same end:
the representations of distinguished brother officers; the many
excellent articles in the Press; and the steadily increasing pressure
of public opinion, then much less warped by party politics than it has
since become. Apart from these influences, which were fortified by the
irresistible logic of the truth, my own efforts must have availed
little. But above all (to resume my metaphor), it was the helmsman at
the Admiralty who put the wheel over. Captain W. H. Hall, Director of
the Intelligence Department, worked out the requirements of the case,
unknown to me, and arrived at the same conclusions as those at which I
had arrived, and the Board of Admiralty adopted his scheme. By the
irony of circumstance, the Intelligence Department had been instituted,
in consequence of my representations, before I left the Admiralty, for
the precise purpose of reporting upon the requirements of defence; and
the first report of its fearless {386} and enlightened chief completely
upset the comfortable theories both of the Board and of the Government.
I have briefly recalled these matters, fully related in a previous
chapter, because they present a curious parallel with the events of
1893-4.
In July, 1893, while still on half-pay, I addressed the London Chamber
of Commerce on the subject of "The Protection of the mercantile marine
in War." Since I had left the _Undaunted_, early in the year, I had
been occupied once more in drawing up a scheme of naval requirements,
specifying what was required, why it was required, and how much it
would cost, and giving a detailed list of the necessary vessels. The
protection of the mercantile marine was the first part of it; the whole
was not completed until just before I was appointed captain of the
Steam Reserve at Chatham; and it would have been improper for me to
have published the paper while on active service. It was intended that
I should read it before the London Chamber of Commerce, following upon
and amplifying my address dealing with the protection of the mercantile
marine in war. But as there was no time available for the purpose
before I went on active service, I gave the scheme to Mr. John Jackson,
for the London Chamber of Commerce. I may take this opportunity of
paying a tribute to the disinterested and untiring patriotic zeal of
the late Mr. Jackson, between whom and myself a warm friendship existed.
In my address upon the protection of the mercantile marine in war, the
abrogation of the Declaration of Paris of 1856 was urged as a primary
condition of British naval supremacy: a condition unequivocally laid
down in the Report of the Three Admirals in 1889. Subsequent events
have shown that successive British Governments, far from recognising
the essential elements of sea power, continued to yield point after
point, until at the Naval Conferences of 1907 and 1909, whose
recommendations were embodied in the Declaration of London, British
Ministers virtually conceded nearly every right gained by centuries of
hard fighting {387} in the past. Fortunately, public indignation has
hitherto prevented the ratification of that fatal instrument.
It was also shown in my address that, at the time, the naval protection
for the mercantile marine was in the ratio of one small cruiser to 71
sailing vessels and one small cruiser to 41 steamers; that there were
dangerous deficiencies in the supplies of reserve coal and ammunition;
that a reserve force of at least 20 battleships was required; and that
there was urgent need for the immediate construction of the mole and
other works at Gibraltar.
The shipbuilding programme was designed to show how these and other
requirements were to be met. Mr. John Jackson caused it to be
published on his own responsibility. The execution of the requirements
therein specified involved an expenditure of 25 millions spread over
three and a half years. Their necessity was supported by Vice-Admiral
P. H. Colomb, writing in _The United Service Magazine_; by many letters
in the Press written by my brother officers; by further excellent
articles in _The Times_ and other papers; and by Lord George Hamilton,
ex-First Lord of the Admiralty.
In November, Lord Salisbury publicly stated that "men of different
schools with respect to maritime and military defences, men of very
different services and experiences and ability," were united in urging
that steps should be at once taken to re-establish the maritime
supremacy of this country.
The fact was, of course, that the provision made by the Naval Defence
Act of 1889 was running out, and that in the revolution of the party
political machine, the periodic neglect of the Navy had occurred as
usual. As one party attains a lease of power, it is forced to increase
the strength of the Fleet; the effort expends itself; then the other
party comes in, and either reduces the Fleet, or neglects it, or both,
until public opinion is once more aroused by infinite shoutings and
untiring labour, and the Government are coerced into doing their plain
duty.
Such was the situation in 1888-9; such was it in 1893-4. {388} In
1888-9, a Conservative administration was in power; in 1893-4, Mr.
Gladstone was Prime Minister. The difficulty of the situation in
1893-4 was therefore more obstinate, inasmuch as Mr. Gladstone's
Ministry held that the reduction of expenditure upon defence was an act
of moral virtue; whereas Lord Salisbury's Government merely waited to
be convinced of the necessity of increase, before doing their duty.
Nevertheless, what happened? The Navy Estimates of March, 1894,
provided for an expenditure of no less than 30¼ millions upon new
construction spread over five years; as compared with my proposal of 25
millions spread over three and a half years. The Government actually
provided more than was contained in my programme.
The Spencer programme, as it is called, was a much bigger scheme than
the programme of 1888-9. It not only provided the ships required, but
included a scheme for manning them. It included a comprehensive
programme of naval works in which, for the first time in history, the
defence of the Empire was treated as a whole. Provision was made for
deepening and improving the harbours of Portsmouth, Chatham, Devonport,
Haulbowline, for the Keyham extension, for naval barracks at Chatham
and Walmer, for the new works at Gibraltar, for the construction of
harbours at Portland, Dover, and Simon's Bay, and for large extensions
of the dockyards at Malta, Hong Kong and Simon's Bay. The cost of the
works was to be met by monies raised under a Naval Loan Act. That Act
is still in force, but a later Government declined to utilise it; with
the inevitable result that the neglected and dismantled condition of
the coaling stations and naval bases abroad, constitute a present
danger to the Empire, and will in the future require a vast
expenditure, which need never have been incurred, to be devoted to
their restoration.
To what extraordinary influence, then, was the conversion of Mr.
Gladstone and his colleagues to be attributed? There was, in fact, no
conversion. It was a case of coercion; {389} or, as Mr. Gladstone
entertained a strong dislike to the word, let us call it moral suasion.
The explanation is simple and sufficient. In August, 1893, which was
the time when the representations concerning naval deficiencies were
becoming insistent, Admiral Sir Frederick Richards was appointed First
Sea Lord. Sir Frederick Richards, it will be remembered, was one of
the Three Admirals who drew up the historic "Report on The Naval
Manoeuvres of 1888," and it was chiefly due to his genius and
patriotism that from a technical disquisition the Report became a
masterly exposition of the true principles of British sea power.
Incidentally, it endorsed the whole of my representations set forth in
my shipbuilding programme, which were embodied in the Naval Defence Act
of 1889.
Sir Frederick Richards, too, had been a member of the Hartington
Commission on Naval and Military Administration, which reported in
1890; and which, although its recommendations were for many years
neglected by successive Governments, at least taught its members what
was the real condition of affairs, and what were the requirements of
organisation for war. Sir Frederick, therefore, came to his high
office furnished not only with the sea experience of a flag officer
afloat, but equipped with a detailed knowledge of administration and
organisation; and endowed, in addition, with so remarkable a genius,
that he was one of the greatest naval administrators known to the
history of the Royal Navy.
His devotion to duty was the master motive of his life; nor was there a
man living who could turn him by the breadth of a hair from what he
believed to be right. Having planned, as the proper adviser of Lord
Spencer, the First Lord, the great shipbuilding and naval works scheme
of 1894-5, he was confronted by the strong opposition of Mr. Gladstone
and his Cabinet.
Sir Frederick Richards and the whole of his naval colleagues on the
Board immediately informed the Government that, unless their proposals
for strengthening the {390} Fleet and for providing for the naval
defence of the Empire, were accepted, they would resign. It was
enough. The Government yielded.
The Naval Lords were: Admiral Sir Frederick Richards, K.C.B.;
Rear-Admiral the Lord Walter Talbot Kerr; Rear-Admiral Sir John
Arbuthnot Fisher, K.C.B.; and Captain Gerard Henry Uctred Noel.
It was in commemoration of the action of Sir Frederick Richards that
the Navy caused his portrait to be painted, and presented it to the
nation. Inscribed with the legend "From the Navy to the Nation," it
hangs in the Painted Hall at Greenwich, where it was placed during the
lifetime of the admiral, an unique distinction.
As in 1889, when many of my brother officers and myself were conning
the ship, it was the helmsman at the Admiralty who put the wheel over,
and again I was wholly ignorant of his intentions. But this time the
helmsman was none other than the First Sea Lord, and with him were his
naval colleagues. With him, too, was the great body of public opinion
in the country; and as in 1888, those of us who had been toiling to
educate it, may at least claim to have set in motion a force lacking
which it is almost impossible, under a pseudo-democratic government, to
accomplish any great reform whatever.
It is not too much to say that to the shipbuilding and naval works
programme initiated and planned by Sir Frederick Richards in 1894-5,
and carried by his courage and resolution, the Empire owes its
subsequent immunity from external attack, notably at the time of the
Fashoda incident and during the South African war.
Sir Frederick Richards was so great a man, that he could even nullify
the injurious effect of the legal supremacy of the civilian First Lord
over the Board, which technically deprives it of collective
administrative authority. He served, however, with two high-minded
gentlemen, Lord Spencer, and Mr. Goschen who succeeded Lord Spencer.
{391}
I have had to do with three great shipbuilding programmes. The first
was carried after the resignation of one member of the Board, myself;
the second, by the threatened resignation of all the Naval Lords! Of
the third anon.
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