CHAPTER XLVII

H.M.S. _RAMILLIES_

When the men who had gone out to South Africa to take part in the

Jameson Raid were passing through the Suez Canal on their way back

again, I saw and heard the people in the British ships cheering them as

they went by; a popular effusion which (in my view) boded trouble in

the future. Soon after my return from the United States in 1899, an

instalment of the trouble arrived. The burghers of the Transvaal and

of the Orange Free State crossed the British frontiers on the 12th

October.

This country began as usual by underrating the strength of the enemy.

Many of us remember the talk about rolling them up, and all the rest of

it; all very bright in its way; but not the way to begin a war, much

less to end it. Those of us who understood war, were by no means so

confident; and I expressed their opinion, when, as I may perhaps here

venture to recall, speaking at the Cutlers' Feast at Sheffield on the

2nd November, and again at Sunderland on the 6th November, 1899, I most

emphatically advocated the dispatch of a much larger force than the

Government had allocated for the purpose; on the principle that "in the

fire brigade, if an officer thought a fire needed four engines to put

it out, he would send eight."

Matters have changed so little since the South African war that,

although our Army and Navy are relatively inferior to what they were in

1899, the politicians are still alternately boasting of what will be

done in an emergency, and declaring that war is no longer possible.

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In December, 1899, I was appointed second in command of the

Mediterranean Fleet under the command of Vice-Admiral Sir J. A. Fisher,

K.C.B. (now Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fisher of Kilverstone, G.C.B.,

O.M., G.C.V.O.), flying his flag in H.M.S. _Renown_, and thereupon

resigned my seat at York. The London Chamber of Commerce were so good

as to invite me to a banquet prior to my departure. Speaking upon that

occasion, I pointed out that under our existing system of

administration, while the Cabinet must always bear the ultimate

responsibility, there was not yet in existence a department whose duty

it was to represent what were the requirements, present and future, of

Imperial defence. So far as the Navy was concerned, the duty was

charged upon the First Sea Lord; but it involved a task so vast and

complex, that no one man could possibly fulfil it; nor had the

Intelligence Department been developed, according to its original

purpose, into a War Staff.

In the event of a disaster in war, resulting from lack of organisation

and preparation, the Government, being rightly held responsible, are

perhaps turned out of office; when the nation may derive what

consolation may accrue from losing both its Government and the Empire

upon the same day.

My first command as rear-admiral coincided with the final disappearance

from the Navy of the old masts and sails training which was the delight

and pride of the sailors of my generation. Before the decision of the

Admiralty had been finally made, I suggested (in _The Times_, 9th

December, 1899) that, as there were then only four training ships, so

that no more than a proportion of boys could be passed through them,

either the system should be abolished, or two squadrons of six ships

should be provided, and all boys trained in them. The Admiralty,

however, considered that it would be inadvisable to send away so many

young seamen; and they were right.

I hoisted my flag in H.M.S. _Ramillies_ on 12th January 1900. She was

a first-class battleship of the _Royal Sovereign_ {463} class, of

14,150 tons. At that time she was six or seven years old; at the time

of writing, although she is no more than twenty, she has been sold for

old iron; and when they took her away to break her up, she got adrift

in a seaway off the Isle of Wight.

I saw the last of my old flagship as I was passing through the gut of

Gibraltar, on board the R.M.S. _Orvieto_, on 25th November, 1913. She

was being towed by a small tug to her last home, the yard of an Italian

ship-knacker. I thought of the old happy days on board her, and all

the sport, when she held the record in the Fleet for most of the drills

and all the boat-racing.

The flag-captain was Robert S. Lowry (now Vice-Admiral Sir R. S. Lowry,

K.C.B.), who had been with me in the _Undaunted_ as commander. The

commander was the Hon. Horace L. A. Hood (now Rear-Admiral Hood, C.B.,

M.V.O., D.S.O.). The flag-lieutenant was Maurice J. G. Cay, and the

secretary, Paymaster John A. Keys (now Fleet Paymaster J. A. Keys), who

was with me afterwards in my flagships.

At that time, apart from being charged with the duty of carrying into

execution the orders of the commander-in-chief, an officer second in

command had no individual responsibility. In other words, he had

little opportunity of acquiring from his superior officer that

knowledge which, in the event of war, he would require in an emergency.

Upon the adequacy of the Mediterranean Fleet depends the safety of the

Empire in time of war; but although war was then waging in South

Africa, although the other European Powers regarded Great Britain with

open or covert hostility, and although a combination of France and

Russia against this country was by no means improbable, the

Mediterranean Fleet was barely sufficient to meet the French Fleet

alone with any reasonable certainty of success. In other words, so far

as numbers and composition were concerned, the Mediterranean Fleet was

incapable of carrying into execution the duties with which it must be

charged in {464} the event of war. Under the command of Sir John

Fisher, its efficiency was admirable.

The bare statement of the requirements sufficiently indicates their

necessity. An increase of the supply of reserve coal, then dangerously

deficient; the provision of fleet colliers, fully equipped, of

distilling ships, of telegraph ships, and of hospital ships, of which

until quite recently there was only one in the Navy, and that one a

present from the United States; of store ships, reserve ammunition

ships and parent ships for torpedo craft: thirty-four vessels in all,

representing those auxiliaries without which no Fleet is adequately

fitted to fulfil its duties in war. These deficiencies fall to be

recorded, because, although some of them have since been supplied, it

is still the habit of the authorities to neglect the provision of fleet

auxiliaries, and the public are taught to believe that a squadron of

battleships is self-sufficient.

The construction of submarines, which had long been the subject of

experiment in France, having been begun by the United States, induced

me to write to Lord Goschen, First Lord, observing that whether or not

the new arm might prove valuable in war, at least it ought to be

tested, and suggesting that two experimental boats should be ordered.

The Admiralty shortly afterwards purchased five submarines of the

Holland Torpedo Boat Company, U.S.A., of a similar design to the six

Hollands of the _Adder_ class ordered by the United States in June,

1900. The Hollands were followed by the construction in this country

of the "A" class; and as everyone knows, the type was rapidly developed

until Great Britain now possesses a large fleet of these vessels.

Having investigated when I was in the _Undaunted_ the French system of

nucleus crews, under which the older men and pensioners were employed

to form skeleton crews for the ships in Reserve, upon the understanding

that they were not to go to sea in full commission except in the event

of war, I sent home a report upon the subject, indicating the advantage

enjoyed by the French naval seaman, who, under {465} the nucleus crew

system, could look forward with certainty to spending the end of his

career comfortably in a home port, and suggesting that a modification

of the system might be introduced into our own Service. Under the

British system, the ships in the Steam Reserve were then kept in order

by working parties composed of men temporarily under training in the

depots attached to the dockyards, an arrangement which had the

disadvantage that the men who formed the crews in the event of war,

would not be the men who were familiar with the ships.

Some years later, the Admiralty introduced the nucleus crew system,

which differed entirely from the principle upon which was based the

French method, in that a proportion of active service ratings were

placed on board the ships of the Reserve, and that these crews were

being constantly shifted from ship to ship. After a series of

experiments, it was officially decided to man a number of ships in

active commission with nucleus crews, which are officially stated to be

as efficient as full crews; a state of things which is as dangerous to

the national security as it is unfair to officers and men.

The accident occurring on board the French man-of-war _Admiral

Duperré_, leading to the conclusion that if cordite were exposed to

heat above a certain temperature its ignition would cause an enormously

increased pressure upon the gun, induced me officially to represent the

necessity of keeping ammunition at an even temperature. Several years

afterwards, a large quantity of cordite distributed among the Fleet was

found to be in so dangerous a condition that it was destroyed, and the

ammunition chambers were equipped with cooling apparatus.

My interest in signalling inspired me to invent a new drill for the

signalmen, in which the men themselves represented ships. Linked

together with a tack-line, in order to keep them in station, the men

executed the evolutions of a fleet in obedience to signals. I also

advocated that all captains and commanders should pass the signal

school as {466} a qualification for flag-command. Every admiral ought

to be familiar with manoeuvre signals at least; for in default of that

knowledge, he does not know that a wrong signal has been hoisted in his

flagship until he sees the ships making a wrong manoeuvre. An admiral

who understands signals will seldom, if ever, be observed hoisting a

negative.

It was in the year 1900 that H.M.S. _Terrible_, commanded by Captain

Percy M. Scott (now Admiral Sir P. M. Scott, K.C.B., K.C.V.O.) on the

China station, distinguished herself by making a gunnery record of a

percentage of 76.92 hits, as compared with the mean percentage of all

ships in commission, of which the highest was 46.91 (10-inch gun), and

the lowest was 28.2 (16.25 inch and 13.5 inch). Comparing the

_Renown_, flagship of the Mediterranean, with the _Terrible_, both

really smart ships, it was clear that there must be something radically

wrong with our gunnery training, when the _Terrible_ made more than

twice the number of hits with her 6-inch guns in the same number of

rounds.

I wrote home, suggesting that, as Captain Percy Scott had solved the

difficulties with which we were all struggling it would be advisable to

send him to the various Fleets and Squadrons to teach us the right

methods. I also wrote to Captain Percy Scott, expressing my interest

in his achievement, and received from him a courteous reply, enclosing

much useful information: which enabled me to represent to the

commander-in-chief that consideration should be given to the new

arrangements for shooting instituted on the China station, owing to the

inventions and the industry of Captain Percy Scott. It was also urged

that a gunnery training ship should be attached to each Fleet.

Among the excellent practices introduced by the commander-in-chief, was

the writing of essays by officers upon a given subject--the interchange

of ideas being of much educational value; and perhaps of hardly less

utility, was the exercise in composition. Many naval officers evince

marked literary ability; but there is always a proportion who find

accurate expression a difficulty. Few, however, so {467} dismally

succumb to it as the author of the following signal, made in response

to a request from an admiral for the explanation of a mistake in

manoeuvring. The reply was:

"When signal A2 pendant was made ---- reduced to 30 revolutions and as

she gradually dropped astern to get astern of ---- observed her bearing

she suddenly seemed to stop and turn towards us and we stopped and went

astern on seeing flagship passing ahead of ---- altogether we had

turned 6 points by that time. My object was to get under her stern by

dropping and watching her thinking that she was dropping gradually to

get astern."

At this time, the Board of Admiralty effected many improvements. The

coal supply for the Mediterranean was increased, the Mediterranean

Fleet was strengthened, and provided with colliers and with a hospital

ship; better ships were allocated for gunnery training at the home

ports; the old coastguard ships were replaced with modern vessels;

submarines were added to the Fleet; the signalling was improved; the

regulations for training gunnery and torpedo ratings were revised;

obsolete ships were removed from the effective list; a naval tactical

school was established; and combined manoeuvres of the Channel and

Mediterranean Fleets were instituted.

While Vice-Admiral Sir John Fisher was commander-in-chief of the

Mediterranean Fleet, he greatly improved its fighting efficiency. As

the result of his representations, the stocks of coal at Malta and

Gibraltar were increased, the torpedo flotillas were strengthened, and

the new breakwaters at Malta were begun. Some of Sir John Fisher's

reforms are confidential; but among his achievements which became

common knowledge, the following are notable: From a 12-knot Fleet with

breakdowns, he made a 15-knot Fleet without breakdowns; introduced long

range target practice, and instituted the Challenge Cup for heavy gun

shooting; instituted various war practices for officers and men;

invited, with excellent results, officers to formulate their opinions

upon cruising and battle formation; drew up complete {468} instructions

for torpedo flotillas; exercised cruisers in towing destroyers and

battleships in towing one another, thereby proving the utility of the

device for saving coal in an emergency; and generally carried into

execution Fleet exercises based, not on tradition but, on the

probabilities of war.

The _Ramillies_ competing in rifle-shooting, hockey, pistol shooting

and the squadron athletic sports, took the Mediterranean Jewel and £1;

was first in the sweepstakes; tied first for the Pembroke Plate; won

the tug-of-war twice, and the greasy pig race twice; altogether, the

ship took six firsts, nine seconds, and five thirds, out of 19 events.

In the early days of motor-cars, a motor-car race between Captain

George Neville and myself was arranged, the course being from the

bottom to the top of the Rock of Gibraltar. My car broke down, and

Neville won the race. Another breakdown in the same car occurred 20

miles distant from Vigo. That night I was giving a dinner in Vigo to

the Municipality and all the notabilities. I had not recovered from a

bad fall I had had with the Pytchley a few weeks previously, when I

broke my pelvis. I was riding a first-class hireling hunter; a

bullfinch had been cut, and the hedging was in the field towards us; my

horse took off at the end of the hedging in the field, and (as they say

in Ireland) threw a magnificent lep, but failed to clear the top of the

wattles, and came over on top of me.

So, when the car broke down, I could not walk. There was no help near.

The two friends who accompanied me, Hedworth Lambton and Hwfa Williams,

volunteered to get assistance. Finding none, they had to walk

twenty-one miles into Vigo. Hwfa Williams was wearing pumps. For

several days previously, distrusting the car, he had equipped himself

with stout boots in case of accident; now, of course, he had left them

in the ship. When he had first arrived on board, he had declared that

he was so ill that he could not be long for this world; but the walk

into Vigo cheered him up wonderfully.

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I was eventually towed in the car into Vigo, arriving about two o'clock

in the morning. In the meantime, the Staff had entertained my guests.

When I had been some six months in the Mediterranean, I was approached

as to whether I would accept the command of the Australian squadron.

Considering that the appointment would not afford the opportunities I

desired of learning how to handle a fleet, I intimated my preference

for remaining in the Mediterranean; where I remained for my full time

accordingly.

On 5th February, 1902, a few days before I completed my fifty-sixth

year, I hauled down my flag; and, in pursuance of a stately old custom

often practised on such an occasion, I was rowed ashore by twelve

officers in the cutter. Landing at Naples, I went home, arriving in

London just in time to attend the debate upon the Navy Estimates in the

House of Commons.

In the following June, Admiral Sir John Fisher succeeded Vice-Admiral

Sir A. L. Douglas upon the Board of Admiralty as Second Sea Lord.

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