CHAPTER XLIX

THE PARLIAMENTARY ANVIL

Shortly after the expiration of my appointment as second in command in

the Mediterranean, I was back again in the House of Commons, this time

as member for Woolwich, having been returned unopposed. Many

improvements in the Navy had been accomplished under Lord Salisbury's

administration; but the central defect in the system remained; and the

name of it was the want of a War Staff. There was no one in existence

whose duty it was to discover and to represent what were the present

and the future requirements of Imperial defence. The purpose with

which the Intelligence Department had been constituted at the

Admiralty, that it should be developed into a War Staff, had not been

fulfilled. The First Sea Lord was indeed charged with the duties of

organisation for war and the preparation of plans of campaign; but no

one man could by any possibility accomplish so vast and so complex a

task. How, then, was it done? The answer is that it was not done.

The extraordinary achievement of the late Sir Frederick Richards may of

course be cited to exemplify what one man can do; but Sir Frederick was

the man of a century, alike in knowledge, ability and character; and

that he was enabled, as First Sea Lord, temporarily to conquer the

difficulties inherent in the system, merely proves that the system was

so bad that a man of genius was required to overcome its defects, and

(in a word) to achieve his purpose in spite of it. The supply of such

men is extremely {479} limited. When such an one appears, which (with

luck) is once or twice in a generation, the system may be disregarded,

for he will make his own system.

But the need of a War Staff is sufficiently proved by the fact that,

ever since it was established in 1912, its members have been working

day and night. Two flag officers, four captains, five commanders, one

lieutenant; three majors, Royal Marines, six captains, Royal Marines;

one engineer-commander, three paymasters, and a staff of clerks: 25

officers and 19 civilians; now (1913) constitute the three divisions of

the Admiralty War Staff; more than double the number composing the

Intelligence Department when in 1912 it became one of the Divisions of

the War Staff. The balance of officers and clerks was added to the

Admiralty to discharge new duties. Who performed these duties before

the addition was made? No one. What was the result? The Government

were ignorant of all save obvious requirements, and often of those; and

in the result, occurred periodical revelations of deficiencies

(sometimes called panics), involving that excessive expenditure which

is the price of neglect.

I have wrought hard to reform the system all my life. My successive

sojourns in Parliament have been chiefly dedicated to that enterprise.

So in 1902 I began again to hammer on the Parliamentary anvil. In

March, I addressed the London Chamber of Commerce upon the lack of

administrative efficiency in national organisation for defence. In

June, I moved the reduction of the First Lord's salary in order to call

attention to defects in Admiralty administration. It was pointed out

that the time of commanders-in-chief upon most naval stations was

habitually expended in representing to the Admiralty deficiencies which

would never have occurred were there a Department at the Admiralty

charged with the duty of providing against them; and that, in the lack

of such a War Staff, the Budget for naval purposes was based upon

financial and political considerations, leaving naval requirements out

of the reckoning.

Mr. H. O. Arnold-Forster, Parliamentary Secretary to {480} the

Admiralty, admitted that "there was need for reinforcement in the

intellectual equipment which directed or ought to direct the enormous

forces of the Empire." That was one way of putting it; he was

perfectly right in affirming that (in similar language) a thinking

department was required in which the best sailors and soldiers should

combine to formulate the requirements of Imperial defence for the

information of the Cabinet.

The Government would then (at least) know what the requirements were.

In default of that knowledge, Ministers were open to the reproach

expressed bluntly enough by _The Saturday Review_ at the time (28th

June, 1902):

"That the one essential qualification for commanding a great service

such as our Navy should be an utter and entire ignorance of it and of

everything belonging to it, so that this commander may approach the

consideration of all questions relating to its well-being with absolute

impartiality and perfect freedom from prejudice, is surely one of the

most monstrous propositions ever put before men who were not candidates

for Government departments at Yarmouth" (lunatic asylum).

In the following month (July) I asked Mr. Balfour (who succeeded Lord

Salisbury as Prime Minister) in Parliament a question based upon Mr.

Arnold-Forster's statement aforesaid, as it was the considered

admission of a member of Government. The question was: "Whether the

attention of the Government had been given to the need for some

reinforcement of the intellectual equipment for directing the forces of

the Empire and for better preparation in advance with regard to the

defence of the Empire."

Mr. Balfour replied that he would be delighted to increase in any way

the intellectual equipment in connection with this or any other

subject. Upon being further asked what steps he proposed to take, Mr.

Balfour merely added that he would be glad to avail himself of such

talent as may be available.

The Press thereupon accused the Prime Minister of {481} frivolity. In

December (1902), however, Mr. Balfour, in reply to another question

asked by me in the House, said that the "whole subject is at this

moment engaging the very earnest attention of the Government." There

was already in existence a Committee of Defence constituted by Lord

Salisbury, as described in a previous chapter, but apparently it had

only met on one occasion, nor could anyone discover that it had ever

done anything. In 1902, nearly twelve years had elapsed since the

Hartington Commission had recommended the "formation of a Naval and

Military Council, which should probably be presided over by the Prime

Minister, and consist of the Parliamentary Heads of the two Services,

and their principal professional advisers.... It would be essential to

the usefulness of such a Council and to the interests of the country

that the proceedings and decisions should be duly recorded, instances

having occurred in which Cabinet decisions have been differently

understood by the two departments and have become practically a dead

letter."

It may be hoped, indeed, that records are kept of the meetings of the

Committee of Imperial Defence. They should contain some singularly

interesting information when the time comes for their publication,

which will be when the nation insists, as it does insist now and then,

upon finding a scapegoat.

To Mr. Balfour belongs the credit of having constituted the Committee

of Imperial Defence. After the experiences of the South African war it

could scarcely be argued that some such body was not needed. Here,

then, was a ripe opportunity, not only for co-ordinating the

administration of the two Services, not only for rightly estimating the

requirements of Imperial defence, but for lifting the Services above

party politics. That opportunity was lost. The Committee of Imperial

Defence immediately became, what it has remained, a sub-committee of

the Cabinet, wholly in subjection to party politics.

But in 1903, another and a highly important step was {482} taken

towards organisation for war, in the formation of the Commercial Branch

of the Intelligence Department at the Admiralty, charged with the duty

of dealing with the relations of the Navy and the mercantile marine in

time of war and with the protection of commerce and food supply.

A few years later, the Department was abolished during a period of

confusion; but it was restored as part of the War Staff soon after the

constitution of that body.

It will be observed that the utility of the Committee of Imperial

Defence depended primarily upon the work of a War Staff; for its naval

and military members could only be placed in possession of the

information with regard to requirements which it was (theoretically)

their duty to impart to the political members, by means of a War Staff.

But for several years after the formation of the committee, there was

no War Staff in existence at the Admiralty.

In December, 1902, occurred an opportunity for introducing physical and

military instruction into the elementary schools. The Education Bill

was then before Parliament; in the elementary school system, the

machinery required to provide physical and military training already

existed and in my view, it should be utilised, "in order that our

manhood should have had some previous training if called upon to fight

in defence of the Empire." With regard to physical education, its

necessity was exemplified in the large number of recruits rejected for

disabilities during the South African war; and as to military

instruction, the proposal was based upon the necessity of teaching

discipline and the rudiments of manly accomplishments to the young, by

means of education in marching, giving orders, swimming, and shooting

with a small-bore rifle. These considerations were placed by me before

the Duke of Devonshire, who had charge of the Education Bill in the

House of Lords, at the same time asking him to exert his influence to

obtain the insertion of a clause embodying the proposals.

The Duke replied that Lord Londonderry, who was then Minister of

Education, was considering how far it was {483} possible for the Board

of Education to effect the objects desired. But he added the

surprising information that "a considerable portion" of my suggestions

"referred to matters which can only be dealt with by the War Office."

In the House of Commons, I moved that "physical and military

instruction shall be compulsory in all schools supported by public

funds." Then it was stated that the question of physical education

could not be debated with reference to the Bill, but that there would

be no objection to such a clause being inserted in the Education Code.

When I proposed accordingly that such a clause should be inserted in

the Code of Education, Lord Londonderry said that he agreed with the

Duke of Devonshire that such suggestions could only be dealt with by

the War Office. I had no idea then, nor have I any conception now,

what that cryptic statement meant. I pointed out at the time that it

was wholly incomprehensible, the War Office having nothing whatever to

do with elementary schools, but to no avail. The proposal was largely

supported in the Press, but without effect upon the Government. The

War Office phantom, which was about as relevant to the discussion as

the ghost of Cæsar, proved irresistible. Nothing was done; except that

the Government laid another brick in their favourite pathway of lost

opportunities.

The use of oil fuel in battleships began in February, 1903; when the

_Mars_ and _Hannibal_ went to sea, each fitted to burn oil in two

boilers out of eight. One ship emitted white smoke, the other yellow;

and both gave forth a smell so dreadful that, when I was in command of

the Fleet, I told the captains of those vessels that I should place

them to windward of the enemy as the two most formidable ships

available. Nothing is better than oil fuel, on one condition--that you

have got it.

The necessity of promoting officers to flag rank earlier, in order that

they might gain the requisite experience while still young, was again

urged by me, and to this end I advocated an increase of the

rear-admirals' list. An {484} improvement has since been made in this

respect. In 1902 there were 39 rear-admirals; in 1913, the number had

been increased to 55.

Early in 1903, I visited America (for the third time), being most

hospitably entertained by my old friend, Colonel Robert M. Thompson.

During my stay with Colonel Thompson, who has been connected with the

United States Navy, I saw much of the American Fleet, and had the

pleasure of becoming acquainted with many American naval officers.

Admiral Brownson I knew already; I had met Admiral Bob Evans in the

Mediterranean when he was a commander; and I had enjoyed a conversation

with Captain (now Admiral) Mahan upon his visit to England some years

previously.

Admiral Evans was kind enough to place a torpedo-boat at my disposal,

the _Worden_, in which I went from Pensacola to Pontagoorda. I

astonished the signalman by reading a semaphore signal made to me by

the flagship, before he did. The hospitality extended to me by the

officers of the United States Navy was almost embarrassing in its

profusion; and I shall always retain the pleasantest memories of that

Service.

At a dinner of the Pilgrims' Society held at the Waldorf Hotel, New

York, on 4th February, in the course of my address I observed that

"battleships are cheaper than battles"; accidentally inventing a maxim

of five words which does in fact contain the essence of naval policy,

and which, touching the practical American imagination, ran throughout

the United States.

In October, 1902, I was promoted to the rank of vice-admiral.

In February, 1903, having been offered the command the Channel Fleet, I

resigned my seat at Woolwich; where I was succeeded by Mr. Will Crooks,

who was elected on 11th March by a majority of 3229.

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