CHAPTER XIII.

CONCERNING AUXILIARIES, MIXED SOLDIERY, AND ONE’S OWN

Auxiliaries, which are the other useless arm, are employed when a

prince is called in with his forces to aid and defend, as was done by

Pope Julius in the most recent times; for he, having, in the enterprise

against Ferrara, had poor proof of his mercenaries, turned to

auxiliaries, and stipulated with Ferdinand, King of Spain,[1] for his

assistance with men and arms. These arms may be useful and good in

themselves, but for him who calls them in they are always

disadvantageous; for losing, one is undone, and winning, one is their

captive.

[1] Ferdinand V (F. II of Aragon and Sicily, F. III of Naples),

surnamed “The Catholic,” born 1452, died 1516.

And although ancient histories may be full of examples, I do not wish

to leave this recent one of Pope Julius the Second, the peril of which

cannot fail to be perceived; for he, wishing to get Ferrara, threw

himself entirely into the hands of the foreigner. But his good fortune

brought about a third event, so that he did not reap the fruit of his

rash choice; because, having his auxiliaries routed at Ravenna, and the

Switzers having risen and driven out the conquerors (against all

expectation, both his and others), it so came to pass that he did not

become prisoner to his enemies, they having fled, nor to his

auxiliaries, he having conquered by other arms than theirs.

The Florentines, being entirely without arms, sent ten thousand

Frenchmen to take Pisa, whereby they ran more danger than at any other

time of their troubles.

The Emperor of Constantinople,[2] to oppose his neighbours, sent ten

thousand Turks into Greece, who, on the war being finished, were not

willing to quit; this was the beginning of the servitude of Greece to

the infidels.

[2] Joannes Cantacuzenus, born 1300, died 1383.

Therefore, let him who has no desire to conquer make use of these arms,

for they are much more hazardous than mercenaries, because with them

the ruin is ready made; they are all united, all yield obedience to

others; but with mercenaries, when they have conquered, more time and

better opportunities are needed to injure you; they are not all of one

community, they are found and paid by you, and a third party, which you

have made their head, is not able all at once to assume enough

authority to injure you. In conclusion, in mercenaries dastardy is most

dangerous; in auxiliaries, valour. The wise prince, therefore, has

always avoided these arms and turned to his own; and has been willing

rather to lose with them than to conquer with the others, not deeming

that a real victory which is gained with the arms of others.

I shall never hesitate to cite Cesare Borgia and his actions. This duke

entered the Romagna with auxiliaries, taking there only French

soldiers, and with them he captured Imola and Forli; but afterwards,

such forces not appearing to him reliable, he turned to mercenaries,

discerning less danger in them, and enlisted the Orsini and Vitelli;

whom presently, on handling and finding them doubtful, unfaithful, and

dangerous, he destroyed and turned to his own men. And the difference

between one and the other of these forces can easily be seen when one

considers the difference there was in the reputation of the duke, when

he had the French, when he had the Orsini and Vitelli, and when he

relied on his own soldiers, on whose fidelity he could always count and

found it ever increasing; he was never esteemed more highly than when

every one saw that he was complete master of his own forces.

I was not intending to go beyond Italian and recent examples, but I am

unwilling to leave out Hiero, the Syracusan, he being one of those I

have named above. This man, as I have said, made head of the army by

the Syracusans, soon found out that a mercenary soldiery, constituted

like our Italian condottieri, was of no use; and it appearing to him

that he could neither keep them nor let them go, he had them all cut to

pieces, and afterwards made war with his own forces and not with

aliens.

I wish also to recall to memory an instance from the Old Testament

applicable to this subject. David offered himself to Saul to fight with

Goliath, the Philistine champion, and, to give him courage, Saul armed

him with his own weapons; which David rejected as soon as he had them

on his back, saying he could make no use of them, and that he wished to

meet the enemy with his sling and his knife. In conclusion, the arms of

others either fall from your back, or they weigh you down, or they bind

you fast.

Charles the Seventh,[3] the father of King Louis the Eleventh,[4]

having by good fortune and valour liberated France from the English,

recognized the necessity of being armed with forces of his own, and he

established in his kingdom ordinances concerning men-at-arms and

infantry. Afterwards his son, King Louis, abolished the infantry and

began to enlist the Switzers, which mistake, followed by others, is, as

is now seen, a source of peril to that kingdom; because, having raised

the reputation of the Switzers, he has entirely diminished the value of

his own arms, for he has destroyed the infantry altogether; and his

men-at-arms he has subordinated to others, for, being as they are so

accustomed to fight along with Switzers, it does not appear that they

can now conquer without them. Hence it arises that the French cannot

stand against the Switzers, and without the Switzers they do not come

off well against others. The armies of the French have thus become

mixed, partly mercenary and partly national, both of which arms

together are much better than mercenaries alone or auxiliaries alone,

but much inferior to one’s own forces. And this example proves it, for

the kingdom of France would be unconquerable if the ordinance of

Charles had been enlarged or maintained.

[3] Charles VII of France, surnamed “The Victorious,” born 1403, died

1461.

[4] Louis XI, son of the above, born 1423, died 1483.

But the scanty wisdom of man, on entering into an affair which looks

well at first, cannot discern the poison that is hidden in it, as I

have said above of hectic fevers. Therefore, if he who rules a

principality cannot recognize evils until they are upon him, he is not

truly wise; and this insight is given to few. And if the first disaster

to the Roman Empire[5] should be examined, it will be found to have

commenced only with the enlisting of the Goths; because from that time

the vigour of the Roman Empire began to decline, and all that valour

which had raised it passed away to others.

[5] “Many speakers to the House the other night in the debate on the

reduction of armaments seemed to show a most lamentable ignorance of

the conditions under which the British Empire maintains its existence.

When Mr Balfour replied to the allegations that the Roman Empire sank

under the weight of its military obligations, he said that this was

‘wholly unhistorical.’ He might well have added that the Roman power

was at its zenith when every citizen acknowledged his liability to

fight for the State, but that it began to decline as soon as this

obligation was no longer recognised.”—_Pall Mall Gazette_, 15th May

1906.

I conclude, therefore, that no principality is secure without having

its own forces; on the contrary, it is entirely dependent on good

fortune, not having the valour which in adversity would defend it. And

it has always been the opinion and judgment of wise men that nothing

can be so uncertain or unstable as fame or power not founded on its own

strength. And one’s own forces are those which are composed either of

subjects, citizens, or dependents; all others are mercenaries or

auxiliaries. And the way to make ready one’s own forces will be easily

found if the rules suggested by me shall be reflected upon, and if one

will consider how Philip, the father of Alexander the Great, and many

republics and princes have armed and organized themselves, to which

rules I entirely commit myself.