CHAPTER XIX.

THAT ONE SHOULD AVOID BEING DESPISED AND HATED

Now, concerning the characteristics of which mention is made above, I

have spoken of the more important ones, the others I wish to discuss

briefly under this generality, that the prince must consider, as has

been in part said before, how to avoid those things which will make him

hated or contemptible; and as often as he shall have succeeded he will

have fulfilled his part, and he need not fear any danger in other

reproaches.

It makes him hated above all things, as I have said, to be rapacious,

and to be a violator of the property and women of his subjects, from

both of which he must abstain. And when neither their property nor

their honor is touched, the majority of men live content, and he has

only to contend with the ambition of a few, whom he can curb with ease

in many ways.

It makes him contemptible to be considered fickle, frivolous,

effeminate, mean-spirited, irresolute, from all of which a prince

should guard himself as from a rock; and he should endeavour to show in

his actions greatness, courage, gravity, and fortitude; and in his

private dealings with his subjects let him show that his judgments are

irrevocable, and maintain himself in such reputation that no one can

hope either to deceive him or to get round him.

That prince is highly esteemed who conveys this impression of himself,

and he who is highly esteemed is not easily conspired against; for,

provided it is well known that he is an excellent man and revered by

his people, he can only be attacked with difficulty. For this reason a

prince ought to have two fears, one from within, on account of his

subjects, the other from without, on account of external powers. From

the latter he is defended by being well armed and having good allies,

and if he is well armed he will have good friends, and affairs will

always remain quiet within when they are quiet without, unless they

should have been already disturbed by conspiracy; and even should

affairs outside be disturbed, if he has carried out his preparations

and has lived as I have said, as long as he does not despair, he will

resist every attack, as I said Nabis the Spartan did.

But concerning his subjects, when affairs outside are disturbed he has

only to fear that they will conspire secretly, from which a prince can

easily secure himself by avoiding being hated and despised, and by

keeping the people satisfied with him, which it is most necessary for

him to accomplish, as I said above at length. And one of the most

efficacious remedies that a prince can have against conspiracies is not

to be hated and despised by the people, for he who conspires against a

prince always expects to please them by his removal; but when the

conspirator can only look forward to offending them, he will not have

the courage to take such a course, for the difficulties that confront a

conspirator are infinite. And as experience shows, many have been the

conspiracies, but few have been successful; because he who conspires

cannot act alone, nor can he take a companion except from those whom he

believes to be malcontents, and as soon as you have opened your mind to

a malcontent you have given him the material with which to content

himself, for by denouncing you he can look for every advantage; so

that, seeing the gain from this course to be assured, and seeing the

other to be doubtful and full of dangers, he must be a very rare

friend, or a thoroughly obstinate enemy of the prince, to keep faith

with you.

And, to reduce the matter into a small compass, I say that, on the side

of the conspirator, there is nothing but fear, jealousy, prospect of

punishment to terrify him; but on the side of the prince there is the

majesty of the principality, the laws, the protection of friends and

the state to defend him; so that, adding to all these things the

popular goodwill, it is impossible that any one should be so rash as to

conspire. For whereas in general the conspirator has to fear before the

execution of his plot, in this case he has also to fear the sequel to

the crime; because on account of it he has the people for an enemy, and

thus cannot hope for any escape.

Endless examples could be given on this subject, but I will be content

with one, brought to pass within the memory of our fathers. Messer

Annibale Bentivogli, who was prince in Bologna (grandfather of the

present Annibale), having been murdered by the Canneschi, who had

conspired against him, not one of his family survived but Messer

Giovanni,[1] who was in childhood: immediately after his assassination

the people rose and murdered all the Canneschi. This sprung from the

popular goodwill which the house of Bentivogli enjoyed in those days in

Bologna; which was so great that, although none remained there after

the death of Annibale who was able to rule the state, the Bolognese,

having information that there was one of the Bentivogli family in

Florence, who up to that time had been considered the son of a

blacksmith, sent to Florence for him and gave him the government of

their city, and it was ruled by him until Messer Giovanni came in due

course to the government.

[1] Giovanni Bentivogli, born in Bologna 1438, died at Milan 1508. He

ruled Bologna from 1462 to 1506. Machiavelli’s strong condemnation of

conspiracies may get its edge from his own very recent experience

(February 1513), when he had been arrested and tortured for his

alleged complicity in the Boscoli conspiracy.

For this reason I consider that a prince ought to reckon conspiracies

of little account when his people hold him in esteem; but when it is

hostile to him, and bears hatred towards him, he ought to fear

everything and everybody. And well-ordered states and wise princes have

taken every care not to drive the nobles to desperation, and to keep

the people satisfied and contented, for this is one of the most

important objects a prince can have.

Among the best ordered and governed kingdoms of our times is France,

and in it are found many good institutions on which depend the liberty

and security of the king; of these the first is the parliament and its

authority, because he who founded the kingdom, knowing the ambition of

the nobility and their boldness, considered that a bit to their mouths

would be necessary to hold them in; and, on the other side, knowing the

hatred of the people, founded in fear, against the nobles, he wished to

protect them, yet he was not anxious for this to be the particular care

of the king; therefore, to take away the reproach which he would be

liable to from the nobles for favouring the people, and from the people

for favouring the nobles, he set up an arbiter, who should be one who

could beat down the great and favour the lesser without reproach to the

king. Neither could you have a better or a more prudent arrangement, or

a greater source of security to the king and kingdom. From this one can

draw another important conclusion, that princes ought to leave affairs

of reproach to the management of others, and keep those of grace in

their own hands. And further, I consider that a prince ought to cherish

the nobles, but not so as to make himself hated by the people.

It may appear, perhaps, to some who have examined the lives and deaths

of the Roman emperors that many of them would be an example contrary to

my opinion, seeing that some of them lived nobly and showed great

qualities of soul, nevertheless they have lost their empire or have

been killed by subjects who have conspired against them. Wishing,

therefore, to answer these objections, I will recall the characters of

some of the emperors, and will show that the causes of their ruin were

not different to those alleged by me; at the same time I will only

submit for consideration those things that are noteworthy to him who

studies the affairs of those times.

It seems to me sufficient to take all those emperors who succeeded to

the empire from Marcus the philosopher down to Maximinus; they were

Marcus and his son Commodus, Pertinax, Julian, Severus and his son

Antoninus Caracalla, Macrinus, Heliogabalus, Alexander, and Maximinus.

There is first to note that, whereas in other principalities the

ambition of the nobles and the insolence of the people only have to be

contended with, the Roman emperors had a third difficulty in having to

put up with the cruelty and avarice of their soldiers, a matter so

beset with difficulties that it was the ruin of many; for it was a hard

thing to give satisfaction both to soldiers and people; because the

people loved peace, and for this reason they loved the unaspiring

prince, whilst the soldiers loved the warlike prince who was bold,

cruel, and rapacious, which qualities they were quite willing he should

exercise upon the people, so that they could get double pay and give

vent to their own greed and cruelty. Hence it arose that those emperors

were always overthrown who, either by birth or training, had no great

authority, and most of them, especially those who came new to the

principality, recognizing the difficulty of these two opposing humours,

were inclined to give satisfaction to the soldiers, caring little about

injuring the people. Which course was necessary, because, as princes

cannot help being hated by someone, they ought, in the first place, to

avoid being hated by every one, and when they cannot compass this, they

ought to endeavour with the utmost diligence to avoid the hatred of the

most powerful. Therefore, those emperors who through inexperience had

need of special favour adhered more readily to the soldiers than to the

people; a course which turned out advantageous to them or not,

accordingly as the prince knew how to maintain authority over them.

From these causes it arose that Marcus, Pertinax, and Alexander, being

all men of modest life, lovers of justice, enemies to cruelty, humane,

and benignant, came to a sad end except Marcus; he alone lived and died

honoured, because he had succeeded to the throne by hereditary title,

and owed nothing either to the soldiers or the people; and afterwards,

being possessed of many virtues which made him respected, he always

kept both orders in their places whilst he lived, and was neither hated

nor despised.

But Pertinax was created emperor against the wishes of the soldiers,

who, being accustomed to live licentiously under Commodus, could not

endure the honest life to which Pertinax wished to reduce them; thus,

having given cause for hatred, to which hatred there was added contempt

for his old age, he was overthrown at the very beginning of his

administration. And here it should be noted that hatred is acquired as

much by good works as by bad ones, therefore, as I said before, a

prince wishing to keep his state is very often forced to do evil; for

when that body is corrupt whom you think you have need of to maintain

yourself—it may be either the people or the soldiers or the nobles—you

have to submit to its humours and to gratify them, and then good works

will do you harm.

But let us come to Alexander, who was a man of such great goodness,

that among the other praises which are accorded him is this, that in

the fourteen years he held the empire no one was ever put to death by

him unjudged; nevertheless, being considered effeminate and a man who

allowed himself to be governed by his mother, he became despised, the

army conspired against him, and murdered him.

Turning now to the opposite characters of Commodus, Severus, Antoninus

Caracalla, and Maximinus, you will find them all cruel and

rapacious-men who, to satisfy their soldiers, did not hesitate to

commit every kind of iniquity against the people; and all, except

Severus, came to a bad end; but in Severus there was so much valour

that, keeping the soldiers friendly, although the people were oppressed

by him, he reigned successfully; for his valour made him so much

admired in the sight of the soldiers and people that the latter were

kept in a way astonished and awed and the former respectful and

satisfied. And because the actions of this man, as a new prince, were

great, I wish to show briefly that he knew well how to counterfeit the

fox and the lion, which natures, as I said above, it is necessary for a

prince to imitate.

Knowing the sloth of the Emperor Julian, he persuaded the army in

Sclavonia, of which he was captain, that it would be right to go to

Rome and avenge the death of Pertinax, who had been killed by the

praetorian soldiers; and under this pretext, without appearing to

aspire to the throne, he moved the army on Rome, and reached Italy

before it was known that he had started. On his arrival at Rome, the

Senate, through fear, elected him emperor and killed Julian. After this

there remained for Severus, who wished to make himself master of the

whole empire, two difficulties; one in Asia, where Niger, head of the

Asiatic army, had caused himself to be proclaimed emperor; the other in

the west where Albinus was, who also aspired to the throne. And as he

considered it dangerous to declare himself hostile to both, he decided

to attack Niger and to deceive Albinus. To the latter he wrote that,

being elected emperor by the Senate, he was willing to share that

dignity with him and sent him the title of Caesar; and, moreover, that

the Senate had made Albinus his colleague; which things were accepted

by Albinus as true. But after Severus had conquered and killed Niger,

and settled oriental affairs, he returned to Rome and complained to the

Senate that Albinus, little recognizing the benefits that he had

received from him, had by treachery sought to murder him, and for this

ingratitude he was compelled to punish him. Afterwards he sought him

out in France, and took from him his government and life. He who will,

therefore, carefully examine the actions of this man will find him a

most valiant lion and a most cunning fox; he will find him feared and

respected by every one, and not hated by the army; and it need not be

wondered at that he, a new man, was able to hold the empire so well,

because his supreme renown always protected him from that hatred which

the people might have conceived against him for his violence.

But his son Antoninus was a most eminent man, and had very excellent

qualities, which made him admirable in the sight of the people and

acceptable to the soldiers, for he was a warlike man, most enduring of

fatigue, a despiser of all delicate food and other luxuries, which

caused him to be beloved by the armies. Nevertheless, his ferocity and

cruelties were so great and so unheard of that, after endless single

murders, he killed a large number of the people of Rome and all those

of Alexandria. He became hated by the whole world, and also feared by

those he had around him, to such an extent that he was murdered in the

midst of his army by a centurion. And here it must be noted that

such-like deaths, which are deliberately inflicted with a resolved and

desperate courage, cannot be avoided by princes, because any one who

does not fear to die can inflict them; but a prince may fear them the

less because they are very rare; he has only to be careful not to do

any grave injury to those whom he employs or has around him in the

service of the state. Antoninus had not taken this care, but had

contumeliously killed a brother of that centurion, whom also he daily

threatened, yet retained in his bodyguard; which, as it turned out, was

a rash thing to do, and proved the emperor’s ruin.

But let us come to Commodus, to whom it should have been very easy to

hold the empire, for, being the son of Marcus, he had inherited it, and

he had only to follow in the footsteps of his father to please his

people and soldiers; but, being by nature cruel and brutal, he gave

himself up to amusing the soldiers and corrupting them, so that he

might indulge his rapacity upon the people; on the other hand, not

maintaining his dignity, often descending to the theatre to compete

with gladiators, and doing other vile things, little worthy of the

imperial majesty, he fell into contempt with the soldiers, and being

hated by one party and despised by the other, he was conspired against

and was killed.

It remains to discuss the character of Maximinus. He was a very warlike

man, and the armies, being disgusted with the effeminacy of Alexander,

of whom I have already spoken, killed him and elected Maximinus to the

throne. This he did not possess for long, for two things made him hated

and despised; the one, his having kept sheep in Thrace, which brought

him into contempt (it being well known to all, and considered a great

indignity by every one), and the other, his having at the accession to

his dominions deferred going to Rome and taking possession of the

imperial seat; he had also gained a reputation for the utmost ferocity

by having, through his prefects in Rome and elsewhere in the empire,

practised many cruelties, so that the whole world was moved to anger at

the meanness of his birth and to fear at his barbarity. First Africa

rebelled, then the Senate with all the people of Rome, and all Italy

conspired against him, to which may be added his own army; this latter,

besieging Aquileia and meeting with difficulties in taking it, were

disgusted with his cruelties, and fearing him less when they found so

many against him, murdered him.

I do not wish to discuss Heliogabalus, Macrinus, or Julian, who, being

thoroughly contemptible, were quickly wiped out; but I will bring this

discourse to a conclusion by saying that princes in our times have this

difficulty of giving inordinate satisfaction to their soldiers in a far

less degree, because, notwithstanding one has to give them some

indulgence, that is soon done; none of these princes have armies that

are veterans in the governance and administration of provinces, as were

the armies of the Roman Empire; and whereas it was then more necessary

to give satisfaction to the soldiers than to the people, it is now more

necessary to all princes, except the Turk and the Soldan, to satisfy

the people rather the soldiers, because the people are the more

powerful.

From the above I have excepted the Turk, who always keeps round him

twelve thousand infantry and fifteen thousand cavalry on which depend

the security and strength of the kingdom, and it is necessary that,

putting aside every consideration for the people, he should keep them

his friends. The kingdom of the Soldan is similar; being entirely in

the hands of soldiers, it follows again that, without regard to the

people, he must keep them his friends. But you must note that the state

of the Soldan is unlike all other principalities, for the reason that

it is like the Christian pontificate, which cannot be called either an

hereditary or a newly formed principality; because the sons of the old

prince are not the heirs, but he who is elected to that position by

those who have authority, and the sons remain only noblemen. And this

being an ancient custom, it cannot be called a new principality,

because there are none of those difficulties in it that are met with in

new ones; for although the prince is new, the constitution of the state

is old, and it is framed so as to receive him as if he were its

hereditary lord.

But returning to the subject of our discourse, I say that whoever will

consider it will acknowledge that either hatred or contempt has been

fatal to the above-named emperors, and it will be recognized also how

it happened that, a number of them acting in one way and a number in

another, only one in each way came to a happy end and the rest to

unhappy ones. Because it would have been useless and dangerous for

Pertinax and Alexander, being new princes, to imitate Marcus, who was

heir to the principality; and likewise it would have been utterly

destructive to Caracalla, Commodus, and Maximinus to have imitated

Severus, they not having sufficient valour to enable them to tread in

his footsteps. Therefore a prince, new to the principality, cannot

imitate the actions of Marcus, nor, again, is it necessary to follow

those of Severus, but he ought to take from Severus those parts which

are necessary to found his state, and from Marcus those which are

proper and glorious to keep a state that may already be stable and

firm.