CHAPTER III.

CONCERNING MIXED PRINCIPALITIES

But the difficulties occur in a new principality. And firstly, if it be

not entirely new, but is, as it were, a member of a state which, taken

collectively, may be called composite, the changes arise chiefly from

an inherent difficulty which there is in all new principalities; for

men change their rulers willingly, hoping to better themselves, and

this hope induces them to take up arms against him who rules: wherein

they are deceived, because they afterwards find by experience they have

gone from bad to worse. This follows also on another natural and common

necessity, which always causes a new prince to burden those who have

submitted to him with his soldiery and with infinite other hardships

which he must put upon his new acquisition.

In this way you have enemies in all those whom you have injured in

seizing that principality, and you are not able to keep those friends

who put you there because of your not being able to satisfy them in the

way they expected, and you cannot take strong measures against them,

feeling bound to them. For, although one may be very strong in armed

forces, yet in entering a province one has always need of the goodwill

of the natives.

For these reasons Louis the Twelfth, King of France, quickly occupied

Milan, and as quickly lost it; and to turn him out the first time it

only needed Lodovico’s own forces; because those who had opened the

gates to him, finding themselves deceived in their hopes of future

benefit, would not endure the ill-treatment of the new prince. It is

very true that, after acquiring rebellious provinces a second time,

they are not so lightly lost afterwards, because the prince, with

little reluctance, takes the opportunity of the rebellion to punish the

delinquents, to clear out the suspects, and to strengthen himself in

the weakest places. Thus to cause France to lose Milan the first time

it was enough for the Duke Lodovico[1] to raise insurrections on the

borders; but to cause him to lose it a second time it was necessary to

bring the whole world against him, and that his armies should be

defeated and driven out of Italy; which followed from the causes above

mentioned.

[1] Duke Lodovico was Lodovico Moro, a son of Francesco Sforza, who

married Beatrice d’Este. He ruled over Milan from 1494 to 1500, and

died in 1510.

Nevertheless Milan was taken from France both the first and the second

time. The general reasons for the first have been discussed; it remains

to name those for the second, and to see what resources he had, and

what any one in his situation would have had for maintaining himself

more securely in his acquisition than did the King of France.

Now I say that those dominions which, when acquired, are added to an

ancient state by him who acquires them, are either of the same country

and language, or they are not. When they are, it is easier to hold

them, especially when they have not been accustomed to self-government;

and to hold them securely it is enough to have destroyed the family of

the prince who was ruling them; because the two peoples, preserving in

other things the old conditions, and not being unlike in customs, will

live quietly together, as one has seen in Brittany, Burgundy, Gascony,

and Normandy, which have been bound to France for so long a time: and,

although there may be some difference in language, nevertheless the

customs are alike, and the people will easily be able to get on amongst

themselves. He who has annexed them, if he wishes to hold them, has

only to bear in mind two considerations: the one, that the family of

their former lord is extinguished; the other, that neither their laws

nor their taxes are altered, so that in a very short time they will

become entirely one body with the old principality.

But when states are acquired in a country differing in language,

customs, or laws, there are difficulties, and good fortune and great

energy are needed to hold them, and one of the greatest and most real

helps would be that he who has acquired them should go and reside

there. This would make his position more secure and durable, as it has

made that of the Turk in Greece, who, notwithstanding all the other

measures taken by him for holding that state, if he had not settled

there, would not have been able to keep it. Because, if one is on the

spot, disorders are seen as they spring up, and one can quickly remedy

them; but if one is not at hand, they are heard of only when they are

great, and then one can no longer remedy them. Besides this, the

country is not pillaged by your officials; the subjects are satisfied

by prompt recourse to the prince; thus, wishing to be good, they have

more cause to love him, and wishing to be otherwise, to fear him. He

who would attack that state from the outside must have the utmost

caution; as long as the prince resides there it can only be wrested

from him with the greatest difficulty.

The other and better course is to send colonies to one or two places,

which may be as keys to that state, for it is necessary either to do

this or else to keep there a great number of cavalry and infantry. A

prince does not spend much on colonies, for with little or no expense

he can send them out and keep them there, and he offends a minority

only of the citizens from whom he takes lands and houses to give them

to the new inhabitants; and those whom he offends, remaining poor and

scattered, are never able to injure him; whilst the rest being

uninjured are easily kept quiet, and at the same time are anxious not

to err for fear it should happen to them as it has to those who have

been despoiled. In conclusion, I say that these colonies are not

costly, they are more faithful, they injure less, and the injured, as

has been said, being poor and scattered, cannot hurt. Upon this, one

has to remark that men ought either to be well treated or crushed,

because they can avenge themselves of lighter injuries, of more serious

ones they cannot; therefore the injury that is to be done to a man

ought to be of such a kind that one does not stand in fear of revenge.

But in maintaining armed men there in place of colonies one spends much

more, having to consume on the garrison all the income from the state,

so that the acquisition turns into a loss, and many more are

exasperated, because the whole state is injured; through the shifting

of the garrison up and down all become acquainted with hardship, and

all become hostile, and they are enemies who, whilst beaten on their

own ground, are yet able to do hurt. For every reason, therefore, such

guards are as useless as a colony is useful.

Again, the prince who holds a country differing in the above respects

ought to make himself the head and defender of his less powerful

neighbours, and to weaken the more powerful amongst them, taking care

that no foreigner as powerful as himself shall, by any accident, get a

footing there; for it will always happen that such a one will be

introduced by those who are discontented, either through excess of

ambition or through fear, as one has seen already. The Romans were

brought into Greece by the Ætolians; and in every other country where

they obtained a footing they were brought in by the inhabitants. And

the usual course of affairs is that, as soon as a powerful foreigner

enters a country, all the subject states are drawn to him, moved by the

hatred which they feel against the ruling power. So that in respect to

those subject states he has not to take any trouble to gain them over

to himself, for the whole of them quickly rally to the state which he

has acquired there. He has only to take care that they do not get hold

of too much power and too much authority, and then with his own forces,

and with their goodwill, he can easily keep down the more powerful of

them, so as to remain entirely master in the country. And he who does

not properly manage this business will soon lose what he has acquired,

and whilst he does hold it he will have endless difficulties and

troubles.

The Romans, in the countries which they annexed, observed closely these

measures; they sent colonies and maintained friendly relations with[2]

the minor powers, without increasing their strength; they kept down the

greater, and did not allow any strong foreign powers to gain authority.

Greece appears to me sufficient for an example. The Achaeans and

Ætolians were kept friendly by them, the kingdom of Macedonia was

humbled, Antiochus was driven out; yet the merits of the Achaeans and

Ætolians never secured for them permission to increase their power, nor

did the persuasions of Philip ever induce the Romans to be his friends

without first humbling him, nor did the influence of Antiochus make

them agree that he should retain any lordship over the country. Because

the Romans did in these instances what all prudent princes ought to do,

who have to regard not only present troubles, but also future ones, for

which they must prepare with every energy, because, when foreseen, it

is easy to remedy them; but if you wait until they approach, the

medicine is no longer in time because the malady has become incurable;

for it happens in this, as the physicians say it happens in hectic

fever, that in the beginning of the malady it is easy to cure but

difficult to detect, but in the course of time, not having been either

detected or treated in the beginning, it becomes easy to detect but

difficult to cure. Thus it happens in affairs of state, for when the

evils that arise have been foreseen (which it is only given to a wise

man to see), they can be quickly redressed, but when, through not

having been foreseen, they have been permitted to grow in a way that

every one can see them, there is no longer a remedy. Therefore, the

Romans, foreseeing troubles, dealt with them at once, and, even to

avoid a war, would not let them come to a head, for they knew that war

is not to be avoided, but is only to be put off to the advantage of

others; moreover they wished to fight with Philip and Antiochus in

Greece so as not to have to do it in Italy; they could have avoided

both, but this they did not wish; nor did that ever please them which

is forever in the mouths of the wise ones of our time:—Let us enjoy the

benefits of the time—but rather the benefits of their own valour and

prudence, for time drives everything before it, and is able to bring

with it good as well as evil, and evil as well as good.

[2] See remark in the introduction on the word “intrattenere.”

But let us turn to France and inquire whether she has done any of the

things mentioned. I will speak of Louis[3] (and not of Charles)[4] as

the one whose conduct is the better to be observed, he having held

possession of Italy for the longest period; and you will see that he

has done the opposite to those things which ought to be done to retain

a state composed of divers elements.

[3] Louis XII, King of France, “The Father of the People,” born 1462,

died 1515.

[4] Charles VIII, King of France, born 1470, died 1498.

King Louis was brought into Italy by the ambition of the Venetians, who

desired to obtain half the state of Lombardy by his intervention. I

will not blame the course taken by the king, because, wishing to get a

foothold in Italy, and having no friends there—seeing rather that every

door was shut to him owing to the conduct of Charles—he was forced to

accept those friendships which he could get, and he would have

succeeded very quickly in his design if in other matters he had not

made some mistakes. The king, however, having acquired Lombardy,

regained at once the authority which Charles had lost: Genoa yielded;

the Florentines became his friends; the Marquess of Mantua, the Duke of

Ferrara, the Bentivogli, my lady of Forli, the Lords of Faenza, of

Pesaro, of Rimini, of Camerino, of Piombino, the Lucchese, the Pisans,

the Sienese—everybody made advances to him to become his friend. Then

could the Venetians realize the rashness of the course taken by them,

which, in order that they might secure two towns in Lombardy, had made

the king master of two-thirds of Italy.

Let any one now consider with what little difficulty the king could

have maintained his position in Italy had he observed the rules above

laid down, and kept all his friends secure and protected; for although

they were numerous they were both weak and timid, some afraid of the

Church, some of the Venetians, and thus they would always have been

forced to stand in with him, and by their means he could easily have

made himself secure against those who remained powerful. But he was no

sooner in Milan than he did the contrary by assisting Pope Alexander to

occupy the Romagna. It never occurred to him that by this action he was

weakening himself, depriving himself of friends and of those who had

thrown themselves into his lap, whilst he aggrandized the Church by

adding much temporal power to the spiritual, thus giving it greater

authority. And having committed this prime error, he was obliged to

follow it up, so much so that, to put an end to the ambition of

Alexander, and to prevent his becoming the master of Tuscany, he was

himself forced to come into Italy.

And as if it were not enough to have aggrandized the Church, and

deprived himself of friends, he, wishing to have the kingdom of Naples,

divided it with the King of Spain, and where he was the prime arbiter

in Italy he takes an associate, so that the ambitious of that country

and the malcontents of his own should have somewhere to shelter; and

whereas he could have left in the kingdom his own pensioner as king, he

drove him out, to put one there who was able to drive him, Louis, out

in turn.

The wish to acquire is in truth very natural and common, and men always

do so when they can, and for this they will be praised not blamed; but

when they cannot do so, yet wish to do so by any means, then there is

folly and blame. Therefore, if France could have attacked Naples with

her own forces she ought to have done so; if she could not, then she

ought not to have divided it. And if the partition which she made with

the Venetians in Lombardy was justified by the excuse that by it she

got a foothold in Italy, this other partition merited blame, for it had

not the excuse of that necessity.

Therefore Louis made these five errors: he destroyed the minor powers,

he increased the strength of one of the greater powers in Italy, he

brought in a foreign power, he did not settle in the country, he did

not send colonies. Which errors, had he lived, were not enough to

injure him had he not made a sixth by taking away their dominions from

the Venetians; because, had he not aggrandized the Church, nor brought

Spain into Italy, it would have been very reasonable and necessary to

humble them; but having first taken these steps, he ought never to have

consented to their ruin, for they, being powerful, would always have

kept off others from designs on Lombardy, to which the Venetians would

never have consented except to become masters themselves there; also

because the others would not wish to take Lombardy from France in order

to give it to the Venetians, and to run counter to both they would not

have had the courage.

And if any one should say: “King Louis yielded the Romagna to Alexander

and the kingdom to Spain to avoid war,” I answer for the reasons given

above that a blunder ought never to be perpetrated to avoid war,

because it is not to be avoided, but is only deferred to your

disadvantage. And if another should allege the pledge which the king

had given to the Pope that he would assist him in the enterprise, in

exchange for the dissolution of his marriage[5] and for the cap to

Rouen,[6] to that I reply what I shall write later on concerning the

faith of princes, and how it ought to be kept.

[5] Louis XII divorced his wife, Jeanne, daughter of Louis XI, and

married in 1499 Anne of Brittany, widow of Charles VIII, in order to

retain the Duchy of Brittany for the crown.

[6] The Archbishop of Rouen. He was Georges d’Amboise, created a

cardinal by Alexander VI. Born 1460, died 1510.

Thus King Louis lost Lombardy by not having followed any of the

conditions observed by those who have taken possession of countries and

wished to retain them. Nor is there any miracle in this, but much that

is reasonable and quite natural. And on these matters I spoke at Nantes

with Rouen, when Valentino, as Cesare Borgia, the son of Pope

Alexander, was usually called, occupied the Romagna, and on Cardinal

Rouen observing to me that the Italians did not understand war, I

replied to him that the French did not understand statecraft, meaning

that otherwise they would not have allowed the Church to reach such

greatness. And in fact it has been seen that the greatness of the

Church and of Spain in Italy has been caused by France, and her ruin

may be attributed to them. From this a general rule is drawn which

never or rarely fails: that he who is the cause of another becoming

powerful is ruined; because that predominancy has been brought about

either by astuteness or else by force, and both are distrusted by him

who has been raised to power.