part in the common action. It only seemed to Napoleon that it all took

place by his will. And so the question whether he had or had not a

cold has no more historic interest than the cold of the least of the

transport soldiers.

Moreover, the assertion made by various writers that his cold was

the cause of his dispositions not being as well-planned as on former

occasions, and of his orders during the battle not being as good as

previously, is quite baseless, which again shows that Napoleon’s cold on

the twenty-sixth of August was unimportant.

The dispositions cited above are not at all worse, but are even

better, than previous dispositions by which he had won victories. His

pseudo-orders during the battle were also no worse than formerly, but

much the same as usual. These dispositions and orders only seem worse

than previous ones because the battle of Borodinó was the first Napoleon

did not win. The profoundest and most excellent dispositions and orders

seem very bad, and every learned militarist criticizes them with looks

of importance, when they relate to a battle that has been lost, and the

very worst dispositions and orders seem very good, and serious people

fill whole volumes to demonstrate their merits, when they relate to a

battle that has been won.

The dispositions drawn up by Weyrother for the battle of Austerlitz were

a model of perfection for that kind of composition, but still they were

criticized—criticized for their very perfection, for their excessive

minuteness.

Napoleon at the battle of Borodinó fulfilled his office as

representative of authority as well as, and even better than, at other

battles. He did nothing harmful to the progress of the battle; he

inclined to the most reasonable opinions, he made no confusion, did not

contradict himself, did not get frightened or run away from the field of

battle, but with his great tact and military experience carried out his

role of appearing to command, calmly and with dignity.