CHAPTER XXXIII.
1805.
Treaty of alliance between England and Russia--Certainty of an
approaching war--M. Forshmann, the Russian Minister--Duroc's mission
to Berlin--New project of the King of Sweden--Secret mission to the
Baltic--Animosity against France--Fall of the exchange between
Hamburg and Paris--Destruction of the first Austrian army--Taking of
Ulm--The Emperor's displeasure at the remark of a soldier--Battle of
Trafalgar--Duroc's position at the Court of Prussia--Armaments in
Russia--Libel upon Napoleon in the Hamburg 'Corespondent'--
Embarrassment of the Syndic and Burgomaster of Hamburg--The conduct
of the Russian Minister censured by the Swedish and English
Ministers.
At the beginning of August 1805 a treaty of alliance between Russia and
England was spoken of. Some persons of consequence, who had the means
of knowing all that was going on in the political world, had read this
treaty, the principal points of which were communicated to me.
Article 1st stated that the object of the alliance was to restore the
balance of Europe. By art. 2d the Emperor of Russia was to place 36,000
men at the disposal of England. Art. 3d stipulated that neither of the
two powers would consent to treat with France, nor to lay down arms
until the King of Sardinia should either be restored to his dominions or
receive an equivalent indemnity in the northeast of Italy. By art. 4th
Malta was to be evacuated by the English, and occupied by the Russians.
By art. 5th the two powers were to guarantee the independence of the
Republic of the Ionian Isles, and England was to pledge herself to
assist Russia in her war against Persia. If this plan of a treaty, of
the existence of which I was informed on unquestionable authority, had
been brought to any result it is impossible to calculate what might have
been its consequences.
At that time an immediate Continental war was confidently expected by
every person in the north of Europe; and it is very certain that, had
not Napoleon taken the hint in time and renounced his absurd schemes at
Boulogne, France would have stood in a dangerous situation.
M. Forshmann, the Russian charge d'affaires, was intriguing to excite
the north of Europe against France. He repeatedly received orders to
obtain the insertion of irritating articles in the 'Correspondent'. He
was an active, intriguing, and spiteful little man, and a declared enemy
of France; but fortunately his stupidity and vanity rendered him less
dangerous than he wished to be. He was universally detested, and he
would have lost all credit but that the extensive trade carried on
between Russia and Hamburg forced the inhabitants and magistrates of
that city to bear with a man who might have done them, individually,
considerable injury.
The recollection of Duroc's successful mission to Berlin during the
Consulate induced Napoleon to believe that that general might appease
the King of Prussia, who complained seriously of the violation of the
territory of Anspach, which Bernadotte, in consequence of the orders he
received, had not been able to respect. Duroc remained about six weeks
in Berlin.
The following letter from Duroc will show that the facility of passing
through Hesse seemed to excuse the second violation of the Prussian
territory; but there was a great difference between a petty Prince of
Hesse and the King of Prussia.
I send you, my dear Bourrienne, two despatches, which I have
received for you. M. de Talleyrand, who sends them, desires me to
request that you will transmit General Victor's by a sure
conveyance.
I do not yet know whether I shall stay long in Berlin. By the last
accounts I received the Emperor is still in Paris, and numerous
forces are assembling on the Rhine. The hopes of peace are
vanishing every day, and Austria does everything to promote war.
I have received accounts from Marshal Bernadotte. He has effected
his passage through Hesse. Marshal Bernadotte was much pleased with
the courtesy he experienced from the Elector.
The junction of the corps commanded by Bernadotte with the army of the
Emperor was very important, and Napoleon therefore directed the Marshal
to come up with him as speedily as possible, and by the shortest road.
It was necessary he should arrive in time for the battle of Austerlitz.
Gustavus, King of Sweden, who was always engaged in some enterprise,
wished to raise an army composed of Swedes, Prussians, and English; and
certainly a vigorous attack in the north would have prevented Bernadotte
from quitting the banks of the Elbe and the Weser, and reinforcing
the Grand Army which was marching on Vienna. But the King of Sweden's
coalition produced no other result than the siege of the little fortress
of Hameln.
Prussia would not come to a rupture with France, the King of Sweden
was abandoned, and Bonaparte's resentment against him increased. This
abortive project of Gustavus contributed not a little to alienate the
affections of his subjects, who feared that they might be the victims
of the revenge excited by the extravagant plans of their King, and the
insults he had heaped upon Napoleon, particularly since the death of the
Duc d'Enghien.
On the 13th of September 1805 I received a letter from the Minister of
Police soliciting information about Swedish Pomerania.
Astonished at not obtaining from the commercial Consuls at Lübeck and
Stettin any accounts of the movements of the Russians, I had sent to
those ports, four days before the receipt of the Police Minister's
letter, a confidential agent, to observe the Baltic: though we were only
64 leagues from Stralsund the most uncertain and contradictory accounts
came to hand. It was, however, certain that a landing of the Russians
was expected at Stralsund, or at Travemtinde, the port of Lübeck, at the
mouth of the little river Trave. I was positively informed that Russia
had freighted a considerable number of vessels for those ports.
The hatred of the French continued to increase in the north of Europe.
About the end of September there appeared at Kiel, in Denmark, a
libellous pamphlet, which was bought and read with inconceivable
avidity. This pamphlet, which was very ably written, was the production
of some fanatic who openly preached a crusade against France. The author
regarded the blood of millions of men as a trifling sacrifice for the
great object of humiliating France and bringing her back to the limits
of the old monarchy. This pamphlet was circulated extensively in the
German departments united to France, in Holland, and in Switzerland. The
number of incendiary publications which everywhere abounded indicated
but too plainly that if the nations of the north should be driven
back towards the Arctic regions they would in their turn repulse their
conquerors towards the south; and no man of common sense could doubt
that if the French eagles were planted in foreign capitals, foreign
standards would one day wave over Paris.
On the 30th of September 1805 I received, by an 'estafette',
intelligence of the landing at Stralsund of 6000 Swedes, who had arrived
from Stockholm in two ships of war.
About the end of September the Hamburg exchange on Paris fell
alarmingly. The loss was twenty per cent. The fall stopped at seventeen
below par. The speculation for this fall of the exchange had been made
with equal imprudence and animosity by the house of Osy and Company.
The head of that house, a Dutch emigrant, who had been settled at
Hamburg about six years, seized every opportunity of manifesting his
hatred of France. An agent of that rich house at Rotterdam was also very
hostile to us, a circumstance which shows that if many persons sacrifice
their political opinions to their interests there are others who
endanger their interests for the triumph of their opinions.
On the 23d of October 1805 I received official intelligence of the
total destruction of the first Austrian army: General Barbou, who was
in Hanover, also informed me of that event in the following terms: "The
first Austrian army has ceased to exist." He alluded to the brilliant
affair of Ulm. I immediately despatched twelve estafettes to different
parts; among other places to Stralsund and Husum. I thought that these
prodigies, which must have been almost incredible to those who were
unacquainted with Napoleon's military genius, might arrest the progress
of the Russian troops, and produces some change in the movements of the
enemy's forces. A second edition of the 'Correspondent' was published
with this intelligence, and 6000 copies were sold at four times the
usual price.
I need not detain the reader with the details of the capitulation of
Ulm, which have already been published, but I may relate the following
anecdote, which is not generally known. A French general passing before
the ranks of his men said to them, "Well, comrades, we have prisoners
enough here."--"yes indeed," replied one of the soldiers, "we never saw
so many . . . collected together before." It was stated at the time,
and I believe it, that the Emperor was much displeased when he heard of
this, and remarked that it was "atrocious to insult brave men to whom
the fate of arms had proved unfavourable."
In reading the history of this period we find that in whatever place
Napoleon happened to be, there was the central point of action. The
affairs of Europe were arranged at his headquarters in the same manner
as if he had been in Paris. Everything depended on his good or bad
fortune. Espionage, seduction, false promises, exactions,--all were
put in force to promote the success of his projects; but his despotism,
which excited dissatisfaction in France, and his continual aggressions,
which threatened the independence of foreign States, rendered him more
and more unpopular everywhere.
The battle of Trafalgar took place while Napoleon was marching on
Vienna, and on the day after the capitulation of Ulm. The southern coast
of Spain then witnessed an engagement between thirty-one French and
about an equal number of English ships, and in spite of this equality of
force the French fleet was destroyed.--[The actual forces present were
27 English ships of the line and 38 Franco-Spanish ships of the line;
see James' Naval History, vol. iii. p. 459.]
This great battle afforded another proof of our naval inferiority.
Admires Calder first gave us the lesson which Nelson completed, but
which cost the latter his life. According to the reports which Duroc
transmitted to me, courage gave momentary hope to the French; but they
were at length forced to yield to the superior naval tactics of the
enemy. The battle of Trafalgar paralysed our naval force, and banished
all hope of any attempt against England.
The favour which the King, of Prussia had shown to Duroc was withdrawn
when his Majesty received intelligence of the march of Bernadotte's
troops through the Margravate of Anspach. All accounts concurred
respecting the just umbrage which that violation of territory
occasioned to the King of Prussia. The agents whom I had in that quarter
overwhelmed me with reports of the excesses committed by the French in
passing through the Margravate. A letter I received from Duroc contains
the following remarks on this subject:
The corps of Marshal Bernadotte has passed through Anapach and by
some misunderstanding this has been regarded at Berlin as an insult
to the King, a violence committed upon his neutrality. How can it
be supposed, especially under present circumstances, that the
Emperor could have any intention of insulting or committing violence
upon his friend? Besides, the reports have been exaggerated, and
have been made by persons who wish to favour our enemies rather than
us. However, I am perfectly aware that Marshal Bernadotte's 70,000
men are not 70,000 virgins. Be this as it may, the business might
have been fatal, and will, at all events, be very injurious to us.
Laforeat and I are treated very harshly, though we do not deserve
it. All the idle stories that have been got up here must have
reached you. Probably Prussia will not forget that France was, and
still may be, the only power interested in her glory and
aggrandisement.
At the end of October the King of Prussia, far from thinking of war,
but in case of its occurrence wishing to check its disasters as far as
possible, proposed to establish a line of neutrality. This was the first
idea of the Confederation of the North. Duroc, fearing lest the Russians
should enter Hamburg, advised me, as a friend, to adopt precautions. But
I was on the spot; I knew all the movement the little detached corps,
and I was under no apprehension.
The editor of the Hamburg 'Correspondent' sent me every evening a proof
of the number which was to appear next day,--a favour which was granted
only to the French Minister. On the 20th of November I received
the proof as usual, and saw nothing objectionable in it. How great,
therefore, was my astonishment when next morning I read in the same
journal an article personally insulting to the Emperor, and in which the
legitimate sovereigns of Europe were called upon to undertake a crusade
against the usurper etc. I immediately sent for M. Doormann, first
Syndic of the Senate of Hamburg. When he appeared his mortified look
sufficiently informed me that he knew what I had to say to him. I
reproached him sharply, and asked him how, after all I had told him of
the Emperor's susceptibility, he could permit the insertion of such an
article. I observed to him that this indecorous diatribe had no official
character, since it had no signature; and that, therefore, he had acted
in direct opposition to a decree of the Senate, which prohibited the
insertion in the journals of any articles which were not signed. I
told him plainly that his imprudence might be attended with serious
consequences. M. Doormann did not attempt to justify himaelt but merely
explained to me how the thing had happened.
On the 20th of November, in the evening, M. Forshmann, the Russian
charge d'affaires who had in the course of the day arrived from the
Russian headquarters presented to the editor of the Correspondent the
article in question. The editor, after reading the article, which he
thought exceedingly indecorous, observed to M. Forshmann that his paper
was already made up, which was the fact, for I had seen a proof. M.
Forshmann, however, insisted on the insertion of the article. The editor
then told him that he could not admit it without the approbation of the
Syndic Censor. M. Forshmann immediately waited upon M. Doormann, and
when the latter begged that he would not insist on the insertion of the
article, M. Forshmann produced a letter written in French, which,
among other things, contained the following: "You will get the enclosed
article inserted in the Correspondent without suffering a single word
to be altered. Should the censor refuse, you must apply to the directing
Burgomaster, and, in case of his refusal, to General Tolstoy, who will
devise some means of rendering the Senate more complying, and forcing it
to observe an impartial deference."
M. Doorman, thinking he could not take upon himself to allow the
insertion of the article, went, accompanied by M. Forshmann, to wait
upon M. Von Graffen, the directing Burgomaster. MM. Doorman and Von
Graffen earnestly pointed out the impropriety of inserting the article;
but M. Forshmann referred to his order, and added that the compliance of
the Senate on this point was the only means of avoiding great mischief.
The Burgomaster and the Syndic, finding themselves thus forced to admit
the article, entreated that the following passage at least might be
suppressed: "I know a certain chief, who, in defiance of all laws divine
and human,--in contempt of the hatred he inspires in Europe, as well as
among those whom he has reduced to be his subjects, keeps possession of
a usurped throne by violence and crime. His insatiable ambition would
subject all Europe to his rule. But the time is come for avenging the
rights of nations . . . ." M. Forshmann again referred to his orders,
and with some degree of violence insisted on the insertion of the
article in its complete form. The Burgomaster then authorised the editor
of the Correspondent to print the article that night, and M. Forshmann,
having obtained that authority, carried the article to the office at
half-past eleven o'clock.
Such was the account given me by M. Doormann. I observed that I did not
understand how the imaginary apprehension of any violence on the part of
Russia should have induced him to admit so insolent an attack upon the
most powerful sovereign in Europe, whose arms would soon dictate laws
to Germany. The Syndic did not dissemble his fear of the Emperor's
resentment, while at the same time he expressed a hope that the Emperor
would take into consideration the extreme difficulty of a small power
maintaining neutrality in the extraordinary circumstances in which
Hamburg was placed, and that the articles might be said to have been
presented almost at the point of the Cossacks' spears. M. Doormann added
that a refusal, which world have brought Russian troops to Hamburg,
might have been attended by very unpleasant consequences to me, and
might have committed the Senate in a very different way. I begged of
him, once for all, to set aside in these affairs all consideration of my
personal danger: and the Syndic, after a conversation of more than
two hours, departed more uneasy in his mind than when he arrived,
and conjuring me to give a faithful report of the facts as they had
happened.
M. Doormann was a very worthy man, and I gave a favourable
representation of his excuses and of the readiness which he had always
evinced to keep out of the Correspondent articles hostile to France;
as, for example, the commencement of a proclamation of the Emperor of
Germany to his subjects, and a complete proclamation of the King of
Sweden. As it happened, the good Syndic escaped with nothing worse than
a fright; I was myself astonished at the success of my intercession.
I learned from the Minister for Foreign Affairs that the Emperor was
furiously indignant on reading the article, in which the French army was
outraged as well as he. Indeed, he paid but little attention to insults
directed against himself personally. Their eternal repetition had inured
him to them; but at the idea of his army being insulted he was violently
enraged, and uttered the most terrible threats.
It is worthy of remark that the Swedish and English Ministers, as soon
as they read the article, waited upon the editor of the Correspondent,
and expressed their astonishment that such a libel should have been
published. "Victorious armies," said they, "should be answered by
cannonballs and not by insults as gross as they are ridiculous." This
opinion was shared by all the foreigners at that time in Hamburg.