CHAPTER X.

MARCH TO JALAPA--BATTLE OF CERRO GORDO--PEROTE--PUEBLA--SCOTT AND

TAYLOR.

General Scott had less than twelve thousand men at Vera Cruz. He had

been promised by the administration a very much larger force, or claimed

that he had, and he was a man of veracity. Twelve thousand was a very

small army with which to penetrate two hundred and sixty miles into an

enemy's country, and to besiege the capital; a city, at that time, of

largely over one hundred thousand inhabitants. Then, too, any line of

march that could be selected led through mountain passes easily

defended. In fact, there were at that time but two roads from Vera Cruz

to the City of Mexico that could be taken by an army; one by Jalapa and

Perote, the other by Cordova and Orizaba, the two coming together on the

great plain which extends to the City of Mexico after the range of

mountains is passed.

It was very important to get the army away from Vera Cruz as soon as

possible, in order to avoid the yellow fever, or vomito, which usually

visits that city early in the year, and is very fatal to persons not

acclimated; but transportation, which was expected from the North, was

arriving very slowly. It was absolutely necessary to have enough to

supply the army to Jalapa, sixty-five miles in the interior and above

the fevers of the coast. At that point the country is fertile, and an

army of the size of General Scott's could subsist there for an

indefinite period. Not counting the sick, the weak and the garrisons

for the captured city and fort, the moving column was now less than ten

thousand strong. This force was composed of three divisions, under

Generals Twiggs, Patterson, and Worth. The importance of escaping the

vomito was so great that as soon as transportation enough could be got

together to move a division the advance was commenced. On the 8th of

April, Twiggs's division started for Jalapa. He was followed very soon

by Patterson, with his division. General Worth was to bring up the rear

with his command as soon as transportation enough was assembled to carry

six days' rations for his troops with the necessary ammunition and camp

and garrison equipage. It was the 13th of April before this division

left Vera Cruz.

The leading division ran against the enemy at Cerro Gordo, some fifty

miles west, on the road to Jalapa, and went into camp at Plan del Rio,

about three miles from the fortifications. General Patterson reached

Plan del Rio with his division soon after Twiggs arrived. The two were

then secure against an attack from Santa Anna, who commanded the Mexican

forces. At all events they confronted the enemy without reinforcements

and without molestation, until the 18th of April. General Scott had

remained at Vera Cruz to hasten preparations for the field; but on the

12th, learning the situation at the front, he hastened on to take

personal supervision. He at once commenced his preparations for the

capture of the position held by Santa Anna and of the troops holding it.

Cerro Gordo is one of the higher spurs of the mountains some twelve to

fifteen miles east of Jalapa, and Santa Anna had selected this point as

the easiest to defend against an invading army. The road, said to have

been built by Cortez, zigzags around the mountain-side and was defended

at every turn by artillery. On either side were deep chasms or mountain

walls. A direct attack along the road was an impossibility. A flank

movement seemed equally impossible. After the arrival of the

commanding-general upon the scene, reconnoissances were sent out to

find, or to make, a road by which the rear of the enemy's works might be

reached without a front attack. These reconnoissances were made under

the supervision of Captain Robert E. Lee, assisted by Lieutenants P. G.

T. Beauregard, Isaac I. Stevens, Z. B. Tower, G. W. Smith, George B.

McClellan, and J. G. Foster, of the corps of engineers, all officers who

attained rank and fame, on one side or the other, in the great conflict

for the preservation of the unity of the nation. The reconnoissance was

completed, and the labor of cutting out and making roads by the flank of

the enemy was effected by the 17th of the month. This was accomplished

without the knowledge of Santa Anna or his army, and over ground where

he supposed it impossible. On the same day General Scott issued his

order for the attack on the 18th.

The attack was made as ordered, and perhaps there was not a battle of

the Mexican war, or of any other, where orders issued before an

engagement were nearer being a correct report of what afterwards took

place. Under the supervision of the engineers, roadways had been opened

over chasms to the right where the walls were so steep that men could

barely climb them. Animals could not. These had been opened under

cover of night, without attracting the notice of the enemy. The

engineers, who had directed the opening, led the way and the troops

followed. Artillery was let down the steep slopes by hand, the men

engaged attaching a strong rope to the rear axle and letting the guns

down, a piece at a time, while the men at the ropes kept their ground on

top, paying out gradually, while a few at the front directed the course

of the piece. In like manner the guns were drawn by hand up the

opposite slopes. In this way Scott's troops reached their assigned

position in rear of most of the intrenchments of the enemy, unobserved.

The attack was made, the Mexican reserves behind the works beat a hasty

retreat, and those occupying them surrendered. On the left General

Pillow's command made a formidable demonstration, which doubtless held a

part of the enemy in his front and contributed to the victory. I am not

pretending to give full details of all the battles fought, but of the

portion that I saw. There were troops engaged on both sides at other

points in which both sustained losses; but the battle was won as here

narrated.

The surprise of the enemy was complete, the victory overwhelming; some

three thousand prisoners fell into Scott's hands, also a large amount of

ordnance and ordnance stores. The prisoners were paroled, the artillery

parked and the small arms and ammunition destroyed. The battle of Buena

Vista was probably very important to the success of General Scott at

Cerro Gordo and in his entire campaign from Vera Cruz to the great

plains reaching to the City of Mexico. The only army Santa Anna had to

protect his capital and the mountain passes west of Vera Cruz, was the

one he had with him confronting General Taylor. It is not likely that he

would have gone as far north as Monterey to attack the United States

troops when he knew his country was threatened with invasion further

south. When Taylor moved to Saltillo and then advanced on to Buena

Vista, Santa Anna crossed the desert confronting the invading army,

hoping no doubt to crush it and get back in time to meet General Scott

in the mountain passes west of Vera Cruz. His attack on Taylor was

disastrous to the Mexican army, but, notwithstanding this, he marched

his army to Cerro Gordo, a distance not much short of one thousand miles

by the line he had to travel, in time to intrench himself well before

Scott got there. If he had been successful at Buena Vista his troops

would no doubt have made a more stubborn resistance at Cerro Gordo. Had

the battle of Buena Vista not been fought Santa Anna would have had time

to move leisurely to meet the invader further south and with an army not

demoralized nor depleted by defeat.

After the battle the victorious army moved on to Jalapa, where it was in

a beautiful, productive and healthy country, far above the fevers of the

coast. Jalapa, however, is still in the mountains, and between there

and the great plain the whole line of the road is easy of defence. It

was important, therefore, to get possession of the great highway between

the sea-coast and the capital up to the point where it leaves the

mountains, before the enemy could have time to re-organize and fortify

in our front. Worth's division was selected to go forward to secure this

result. The division marched to Perote on the great plain, not far from

where the road debouches from the mountains. There is a low, strong

fort on the plain in front of the town, known as the Castle of Perote.

This, however, offered no resistance and fell into our hands, with its

armament.

General Scott having now only nine or ten thousand men west of Vera

Cruz, and the time of some four thousand of them being about to expire,

a long delay was the consequence. The troops were in a healthy climate,

and where they could subsist for an indefinite period even if their line

back to Vera Cruz should be cut off. It being ascertained that the men

whose time would expire before the City of Mexico could possibly fall

into the hands of the American army, would not remain beyond the term

for which they had volunteered, the commanding-general determined to

discharge them at once, for a delay until the expiration of their time

would have compelled them to pass through Vera Cruz during the season of

the vomito. This reduced Scott's force in the field to about five

thousand men.

Early in May, Worth, with his division, left Perote and marched on to

Puebla. The roads were wide and the country open except through one

pass in a spur of mountains coming up from the south, through which the

road runs. Notwithstanding this the small column was divided into two

bodies, moving a day apart. Nothing occurred on the march of special

note, except that while lying at the town of Amozoque--an easy day's

march east of Puebla--a body of the enemy's cavalry, two or three

thousand strong, was seen to our right, not more than a mile away. A

battery or two, with two or three infantry regiments, was sent against

them and they soon disappeared. On the 15th of May we entered the city

of Puebla.

General Worth was in command at Puebla until the latter end of May, when

General Scott arrived. Here, as well as on the march up, his

restlessness, particularly under responsibilities, showed itself.

During his brief command he had the enemy hovering around near the city,

in vastly superior numbers to his own. The brigade to which I was

attached changed quarters three different times in about a week,

occupying at first quarters near the plaza, in the heart of the city;

then at the western entrance; then at the extreme east. On one occasion

General Worth had the troops in line, under arms, all day, with three

days' cooked rations in their haversacks. He galloped from one command

to another proclaiming the near proximity of Santa Anna with an army

vastly superior to his own. General Scott arrived upon the scene the

latter part of the month, and nothing more was heard of Santa Anna and

his myriads. There were, of course, bodies of mounted Mexicans hovering

around to watch our movements and to pick up stragglers, or small bodies

of troops, if they ventured too far out. These always withdrew on the

approach of any considerable number of our soldiers. After the arrival

of General Scott I was sent, as quartermaster, with a large train of

wagons, back two days' march at least, to procure forage. We had less

than a thousand men as escort, and never thought of danger. We procured

full loads for our entire train at two plantations, which could easily

have furnished as much more.

There had been great delay in obtaining the authority of Congress for

the raising of the troops asked for by the administration. A bill was

before the National Legislature from early in the session of 1846-7,

authorizing the creation of ten additional regiments for the war to be

attached to the regular army, but it was the middle of February before

it became a law. Appointments of commissioned officers had then to be

made; men had to be enlisted, the regiments equipped and the whole

transported to Mexico. It was August before General Scott received

reinforcement sufficient to warrant an advance. His moving column, not

even now more than ten thousand strong, was in four divisions, commanded

by Generals Twiggs, Worth, Pillow and Quitman. There was also a cavalry

corps under General Harney, composed of detachments of the 1st, 2d, and

3d dragoons. The advance commenced on the 7th of August with Twiggs's

division in front. The remaining three divisions followed, with an

interval of a day between. The marches were short, to make

concentration easier in case of attack.

I had now been in battle with the two leading commanders conducting

armies in a foreign land. The contrast between the two was very marked.

General Taylor never wore uniform, but dressed himself entirely for

comfort. He moved about the field in which he was operating to see

through his own eyes the situation. Often he would be without staff

officers, and when he was accompanied by them there was no prescribed

order in which they followed. He was very much given to sit his horse

side-ways--with both feet on one side--particularly on the battlefield.

General Scott was the reverse in all these particulars. He always wore

all the uniform prescribed or allowed by law when he inspected his

lines; word would be sent to all division and brigade commanders in

advance, notifying them of the hour when the commanding general might be

expected. This was done so that all the army might be under arms to

salute their chief as he passed. On these occasions he wore his dress

uniform, cocked hat, aiguillettes, sabre and spurs. His staff proper,

besides all officers constructively on his staff--engineers, inspectors,

quartermasters, etc., that could be spared--followed, also in uniform

and in prescribed order. Orders were prepared with great care and

evidently with the view that they should be a history of what followed.

In their modes of expressing thought, these two generals contrasted

quite as strongly as in their other characteristics. General Scott was

precise in language, cultivated a style peculiarly his own; was proud of

his rhetoric; not averse to speaking of himself, often in the third

person, and he could bestow praise upon the person he was talking about

without the least embarrassment. Taylor was not a conversationalist,

but on paper he could put his meaning so plainly that there could be no

mistaking it. He knew how to express what he wanted to say in the

fewest well-chosen words, but would not sacrifice meaning to the

construction of high-sounding sentences. But with their opposite

characteristics both were great and successful soldiers; both were true,

patriotic and upright in all their dealings. Both were pleasant to

serve under--Taylor was pleasant to serve with. Scott saw more through

the eyes of his staff officers than through his own. His plans were

deliberately prepared, and fully expressed in orders. Taylor saw for

himself, and gave orders to meet the emergency without reference to how

they would read in history.