CHAPTER XI.

ADVANCE ON THE CITY OF MEXICO--BATTLE OF CONTRERAS--ASSAULT AT

CHURUBUSCO--NEGOTIATIONS FOR PEACE--BATTLE OF MOLINO DEL REY--STORMING

OF CHAPULTEPEC--SAN COSME--EVACUATION OF THE CITY--HALLS OF THE

MONTEZUMAS.

The route followed by the army from Puebla to the City of Mexico was

over Rio Frio mountain, the road leading over which, at the highest

point, is about eleven thousand feet above tide water. The pass through

this mountain might have been easily defended, but it was not; and the

advanced division reached the summit in three days after leaving Puebla.

The City of Mexico lies west of Rio Frio mountain, on a plain backed by

another mountain six miles farther west, with others still nearer on the

north and south. Between the western base of Rio Frio and the City of

Mexico there are three lakes, Chalco and Xochimilco on the left and

Texcoco on the right, extending to the east end of the City of Mexico.

Chalco and Texcoco are divided by a narrow strip of land over which the

direct road to the city runs. Xochimilco is also to the left of the

road, but at a considerable distance south of it, and is connected with

Lake Chalco by a narrow channel. There is a high rocky mound, called El

Penon, on the right of the road, springing up from the low flat ground

dividing the lakes. This mound was strengthened by intrenchments at its

base and summit, and rendered a direct attack impracticable.

Scott's army was rapidly concentrated about Ayotla and other points near

the eastern end of Lake Chalco. Reconnoissances were made up to within

gun-shot of El Penon, while engineers were seeking a route by the south

side of Lake Chalco to flank the city, and come upon it from the south

and south-west. A way was found around the lake, and by the 18th of

August troops were in St. Augustin Tlalpam, a town about eleven miles

due south from the plaza of the capital. Between St. Augustin Tlalpam

and the city lie the hacienda of San Antonio and the village of

Churubusco, and south-west of them is Contreras. All these points,

except St. Augustin Tlalpam, were intrenched and strongly garrisoned.

Contreras is situated on the side of a mountain, near its base, where

volcanic rocks are piled in great confusion, reaching nearly to San

Antonio. This made the approach to the city from the south very

difficult.

The brigade to which I was attached--Garland's, of Worth's division--was

sent to confront San Antonio, two or three miles from St. Augustin

Tlalpam, on the road to Churubusco and the City of Mexico. The ground

on which San Antonio stands is completely in the valley, and the surface

of the land is only a little above the level of the lakes, and, except

to the south-west, it was cut up by deep ditches filled with water. To

the south-west is the Pedregal--the volcanic rock before spoken of--over

which cavalry or artillery could not be passed, and infantry would make

but poor progress if confronted by an enemy. From the position occupied

by Garland's brigade, therefore, no movement could be made against the

defences of San Antonio except to the front, and by a narrow causeway,

over perfectly level ground, every inch of which was commanded by the

enemy's artillery and infantry. If Contreras, some three miles west and

south, should fall into our hands, troops from there could move to the

right flank of all the positions held by the enemy between us and the

city. Under these circumstances General Scott directed the holding of

the front of the enemy without making an attack until further orders.

On the 18th of August, the day of reaching San Augustin Tlalpam,

Garland's brigade secured a position within easy range of the advanced

intrenchments of San Antonio, but where his troops were protected by an

artificial embankment that had been thrown up for some other purpose

than defense. General Scott at once set his engineers reconnoitring the

works about Contreras, and on the 19th movements were commenced to get

troops into positions from which an assault could be made upon the force

occupying that place. The Pedregal on the north and north-east, and the

mountain on the south, made the passage by either flank of the enemy's

defences difficult, for their work stood exactly between those natural

bulwarks; but a road was completed during the day and night of the 19th,

and troops were got to the north and west of the enemy.

This affair, like that of Cerro Gordo, was an engagement in which the

officers of the engineer corps won special distinction. In fact, in

both cases, tasks which seemed difficult at first sight were made easier

for the troops that had to execute them than they would have been on an

ordinary field. The very strength of each of these positions was, by

the skill of the engineers, converted into a defence for the assaulting

parties while securing their positions for final attack. All the troops

with General Scott in the valley of Mexico, except a part of the

division of General Quitman at San Augustin Tlalpam and the brigade of

Garland (Worth's division) at San Antonio, were engaged at the battle of

Contreras, or were on their way, in obedience to the orders of their

chief, to reinforce those who were engaged. The assault was made on the

morning of the 20th, and in less than half an hour from the sound of the

advance the position was in our hands, with many prisoners and large

quantities of ordnance and other stores. The brigade commanded by

General Riley was from its position the most conspicuous in the final

assault, but all did well, volunteers and regulars.

From the point occupied by Garland's brigade we could see the progress

made at Contreras and the movement of troops toward the flank and rear

of the enemy opposing us. The Mexicans all the way back to the city

could see the same thing, and their conduct showed plainly that they did

not enjoy the sight. We moved out at once, and found them gone from our

immediate front. Clarke's brigade of Worth's division now moved west

over the point of the Pedregal, and after having passed to the north

sufficiently to clear San Antonio, turned east and got on the causeway

leading to Churubusco and the City of Mexico. When he approached

Churubusco his left, under Colonel Hoffman, attacked a tete-de-pont at

that place and brought on an engagement. About an hour after, Garland

was ordered to advance directly along the causeway, and got up in time

to take part in the engagement. San Antonio was found evacuated, the

evacuation having probably taken place immediately upon the enemy seeing

the stars and stripes waving over Contreras.

The troops that had been engaged at Contreras, and even then on their

way to that battle-field, were moved by a causeway west of, and parallel

to the one by way of San Antonio and Churubusco. It was expected by the

commanding general that these troops would move north sufficiently far

to flank the enemy out of his position at Churubusco, before turning

east to reach the San Antonio road, but they did not succeed in this,

and Churubusco proved to be about the severest battle fought in the

valley of Mexico. General Scott coming upon the battle-field about this

juncture, ordered two brigades, under Shields, to move north and turn

the right of the enemy. This Shields did, but not without hard fighting

and heavy loss. The enemy finally gave way, leaving in our hands

prisoners, artillery and small arms. The balance of the causeway held

by the enemy, up to the very gates of the city, fell in like manner. I

recollect at this place that some of the gunners who had stood their

ground, were deserters from General Taylor's army on the Rio Grande.

Both the strategy and tactics displayed by General Scott in these

various engagements of the 20th of August, 1847, were faultless as I

look upon them now, after the lapse of so many years. As before stated,

the work of the engineer officers who made the reconnoissances and led

the different commands to their destinations, was so perfect that the

chief was able to give his orders to his various subordinates with all

the precision he could use on an ordinary march. I mean, up to the

points from which the attack was to commence. After that point is

reached the enemy often induces a change of orders not before

contemplated. The enemy outside the city outnumbered our soldiery quite

three to one, but they had become so demoralized by the succession of

defeats this day, that the City of Mexico could have been entered

without much further bloodshed. In fact, Captain Philip Kearney

--afterwards a general in the war of the rebellion--rode with a squadron

of cavalry to the very gates of the city, and would no doubt have

entered with his little force, only at that point he was badly wounded,

as were several of his officers. He had not heard the call for a halt.

General Franklin Pierce had joined the army in Mexico, at Puebla, a

short time before the advance upon the capital commenced. He had

consequently not been in any of the engagements of the war up to the

battle of Contreras. By an unfortunate fall of his horse on the

afternoon of the 19th he was painfully injured. The next day, when his

brigade, with the other troops engaged on the same field, was ordered

against the flank and rear of the enemy guarding the different points of

the road from San Augustin Tlalpam to the city, General Pierce attempted

to accompany them. He was not sufficiently recovered to do so, and

fainted. This circumstance gave rise to exceedingly unfair and unjust

criticisms of him when he became a candidate for the Presidency.

Whatever General Pierce's qualifications may have been for the

Presidency, he was a gentleman and a man of courage. I was not a

supporter of him politically, but I knew him more intimately than I did

any other of the volunteer generals.

General Scott abstained from entering the city at this time, because Mr.

Nicholas P. Trist, the commissioner on the part of the United States to

negotiate a treaty of peace with Mexico, was with the army, and either

he or General Scott thought--probably both of them--that a treaty would

be more possible while the Mexican government was in possession of the

capital than if it was scattered and the capital in the hands of an

invader. Be this as it may, we did not enter at that time. The army

took up positions along the slopes of the mountains south of the city,

as far west as Tacubaya. Negotiations were at once entered into with

Santa Anna, who was then practically THE GOVERNMENT and the immediate

commander of all the troops engaged in defence of the country. A truce

was signed which denied to either party the right to strengthen its

position, or to receive reinforcements during the continuance of the

armistices, but authorized General Scott to draw supplies for his army

from the city in the meantime.

Negotiations were commenced at once and were kept up vigorously between

Mr. Trist and the commissioners appointed on the part of Mexico, until

the 2d of September. At that time Mr. Trist handed in his ultimatum.

Texas was to be given up absolutely by Mexico, and New Mexico and

California ceded to the United States for a stipulated sum to be

afterwards determined. I do not suppose Mr. Trist had any discretion

whatever in regard to boundaries. The war was one of conquest, in the

interest of an institution, and the probabilities are that private

instructions were for the acquisition of territory out of which new

States might be carved. At all events the Mexicans felt so outraged at

the terms proposed that they commenced preparations for defence, without

giving notice of the termination of the armistice. The terms of the

truce had been violated before, when teams had been sent into the city

to bring out supplies for the army. The first train entering the city

was very severely threatened by a mob. This, however, was apologized for

by the authorities and all responsibility for it denied; and thereafter,

to avoid exciting the Mexican people and soldiery, our teams with their

escorts were sent in at night, when the troops were in barracks and the

citizens in bed. The circumstance was overlooked and negotiations

continued. As soon as the news reached General Scott of the second

violation of the armistice, about the 4th of September, he wrote a

vigorous note to President Santa Anna, calling his attention to it, and,

receiving an unsatisfactory reply, declared the armistice at an end.

General Scott, with Worth's division, was now occupying Tacubaya, a

village some four miles south-west of the City of Mexico, and extending

from the base up the mountain-side for the distance of half a mile.

More than a mile west, and also a little above the plain, stands Molino

del Rey. The mill is a long stone structure, one story high and several

hundred feet in length. At the period of which I speak General Scott

supposed a portion of the mill to be used as a foundry for the casting

of guns. This, however, proved to be a mistake. It was valuable to the

Mexicans because of the quantity of grain it contained. The building is

flat roofed, and a line of sand-bags over the outer walls rendered the

top quite a formidable defence for infantry. Chapultepec is a mound

springing up from the plain to the height of probably three hundred

feet, and almost in a direct line between Molino del Rey and the western

part of the city. It was fortified both on the top and on the rocky and

precipitous sides.

The City of Mexico is supplied with water by two aqueducts, resting on

strong stone arches. One of these aqueducts draws its supply of water

from a mountain stream coming into it at or near Molino del Rey, and

runs north close to the west base of Chapultepec; thence along the

centre of a wide road, until it reaches the road running east into the

city by the Garita San Cosme; from which point the aqueduct and road

both run east to the city. The second aqueduct starts from the east

base of Chapultepec, where it is fed by a spring, and runs north-east to

the city. This aqueduct, like the other, runs in the middle of a broad

road-way, thus leaving a space on each side. The arches supporting the

aqueduct afforded protection for advancing troops as well as to those

engaged defensively. At points on the San Cosme road parapets were

thrown across, with an embrasure for a single piece of artillery in

each. At the point where both road and aqueduct turn at right angles

from north to east, there was not only one of these parapets supplied by

one gun and infantry supports, but the houses to the north of the San

Cosme road, facing south and commanding a view of the road back to

Chapultepec, were covered with infantry, protected by parapets made of

sandbags. The roads leading to garitas (the gates) San Cosme and Belen,

by which these aqueducts enter the city, were strongly intrenched.

Deep, wide ditches, filled with water, lined the sides of both roads.

Such were the defences of the City of Mexico in September, 1847, on the

routes over which General Scott entered.

Prior to the Mexican war General Scott had been very partial to General

Worth--indeed he continued so up to the close of hostilities--but, for

some reason, Worth had become estranged from his chief. Scott evidently

took this coldness somewhat to heart. He did not retaliate, however,

but on the contrary showed every disposition to appease his subordinate.

It was understood at the time that he gave Worth authority to plan and

execute the battle of Molino del Rey without dictation or interference

from any one, for the very purpose of restoring their former relations.

The effort failed, and the two generals remained ever after cold and

indifferent towards each other, if not actually hostile.

The battle of Molino del Rey was fought on the 8th of September. The

night of the 7th, Worth sent for his brigade and regimental commanders,

with their staffs, to come to his quarters to receive instructions for

the morrow. These orders contemplated a movement up to within striking

distance of the Mills before daylight. The engineers had reconnoitred

the ground as well as possible, and had acquired all the information

necessary to base proper orders both for approach and attack.

By daylight on the morning of the 8th, the troops to be engaged at

Molino were all at the places designated. The ground in front of the

Mills, to the south, was commanded by the artillery from the summit of

Chapultepec as well as by the lighter batteries at hand; but a charge

was made, and soon all was over. Worth's troops entered the Mills by

every door, and the enemy beat a hasty retreat back to Chapultepec. Had

this victory been followed up promptly, no doubt Americans and Mexicans

would have gone over the defences of Chapultepec so near together that

the place would have fallen into our hands without further loss. The

defenders of the works could not have fired upon us without endangering

their own men. This was not done, and five days later more valuable

lives were sacrificed to carry works which had been so nearly in our

possession on the 8th. I do not criticise the failure to capture

Chapultepec at this time. The result that followed the first assault

could not possibly have been foreseen, and to profit by the unexpected

advantage, the commanding general must have been on the spot and given

the necessary instructions at the moment, or the troops must have kept

on without orders. It is always, however, in order to follow a

retreating foe, unless stopped or otherwise directed. The loss on our

side at Molino del Rey was severe for the numbers engaged. It was

especially so among commissioned officers.

I was with the earliest of the troops to enter the Mills. In passing

through to the north side, looking towards Chapultepec, I happened to

notice that there were armed Mexicans still on top of the building, only

a few feet from many of our men. Not seeing any stairway or ladder

reaching to the top of the building, I took a few soldiers, and had a

cart that happened to be standing near brought up, and, placing the

shafts against the wall and chocking the wheels so that the cart could

not back, used the shafts as a sort of ladder extending to within three

or four feet of the top. By this I climbed to the roof of the building,

followed by a few men, but found a private soldier had preceded me by

some other way. There were still quite a number of Mexicans on the

roof, among them a major and five or six officers of lower grades, who

had not succeeded in getting away before our troops occupied the

building. They still had their arms, while the soldier before mentioned

was walking as sentry, guarding the prisoners he had SURROUNDED, all by

himself. I halted the sentinel, received the swords from the

commissioned officers, and proceeded, with the assistance of the

soldiers now with me, to disable the muskets by striking them against

the edge of the wall, and throw them to the ground below.

Molino del Rey was now captured, and the troops engaged, with the

exception of an appropriate guard over the captured position and

property, were marched back to their quarters in Tacubaya. The

engagement did not last many minutes, but the killed and wounded were

numerous for the number of troops engaged.

During the night of the 11th batteries were established which could play

upon the fortifications of Chapultepec. The bombardment commenced early

on the morning of the 12th, but there was no further engagement during

this day than that of the artillery. General Scott assigned the capture

of Chapultepec to General Pillow, but did not leave the details to his

judgment. Two assaulting columns, two hundred and fifty men each,

composed of volunteers for the occasion, were formed. They were

commanded by Captains McKinzie and Casey respectively. The assault was

successful, but bloody.

In later years, if not at the time, the battles of Molino del Rey and

Chapultepec have seemed to me to have been wholly unnecessary. When the

assaults upon the garitas of San Cosme and Belen were determined upon,

the road running east to the former gate could have been reached easily,

without an engagement, by moving along south of the Mills until west of

them sufficiently far to be out of range, thence north to the road above

mentioned; or, if desirable to keep the two attacking columns nearer

together, the troops could have been turned east so as to come on the

aqueduct road out of range of the guns from Chapultepec. In like

manner, the troops designated to act against Belen could have kept east

of Chapultepec, out of range, and come on to the aqueduct, also out of

range of Chapultepec. Molino del Rey and Chapultepec would both have

been necessarily evacuated if this course had been pursued, for they

would have been turned.

General Quitman, a volunteer from the State of Mississippi, who stood

well with the army both as a soldier and as a man, commanded the column

acting against Belen. General Worth commanded the column against San

Cosme. When Chapultepec fell the advance commenced along the two

aqueduct roads. I was on the road to San Cosme, and witnessed most that

took place on that route. When opposition was encountered our troops

sheltered themselves by keeping under the arches supporting the

aqueduct, advancing an arch at a time. We encountered no serious

obstruction until within gun-shot of the point where the road we were on

intersects that running east to the city, the point where the aqueduct

turns at a right angle. I have described the defences of this position

before. There were but three commissioned officers besides myself, that

I can now call to mind, with the advance when the above position was

reached. One of these officers was a Lieutenant Semmes, of the Marine

Corps. I think Captain Gore, and Lieutenant Judah, of the 4th infantry,

were the others. Our progress was stopped for the time by the single

piece of artillery at the angle of the roads and the infantry occupying

the house-tops back from it.

West of the road from where we were, stood a house occupying the

south-west angle made by the San Cosme road and the road we were moving

upon. A stone wall ran from the house along each of these roads for a

considerable distance and thence back until it joined, enclosing quite a

yard about the house. I watched my opportunity and skipped across the

road and behind the south wall. Proceeding cautiously to the west

corner of the enclosure, I peeped around and seeing nobody, continued,

still cautiously, until the road running east and west was reached. I

then returned to the troops, and called for volunteers. All that were

close to me, or that heard me, about a dozen, offered their services.

Commanding them to carry their arms at a trail, I watched our

opportunity and got them across the road and under cover of the wall

beyond, before the enemy had a shot at us. Our men under cover of the

arches kept a close watch on the intrenchments that crossed our path and

the house-tops beyond, and whenever a head showed itself above the

parapets they would fire at it. Our crossing was thus made practicable

without loss.

When we reached a safe position I instructed my little command again to

carry their arms at a trail, not to fire at the enemy until they were

ordered, and to move very cautiously following me until the San Cosme

road was reached; we would then be on the flank of the men serving the

gun on the road, and with no obstruction between us and them. When we

reached the south-west corner of the enclosure before described, I saw

some United States troops pushing north through a shallow ditch near by,

who had come up since my reconnaissance. This was the company of

Captain Horace Brooks, of the artillery, acting as infantry. I

explained to Brooks briefly what I had discovered and what I was about

to do. He said, as I knew the ground and he did not, I might go on and

he would follow. As soon as we got on the road leading to the city the

troops serving the gun on the parapet retreated, and those on the

house-tops near by followed; our men went after them in such close

pursuit--the troops we had left under the arches joining--that a second

line across the road, about half-way between the first and the garita,

was carried. No reinforcements had yet come up except Brooks's company,

and the position we had taken was too advanced to be held by so small a

force. It was given up, but retaken later in the day, with some loss.

Worth's command gradually advanced to the front now open to it. Later

in the day in reconnoitring I found a church off to the south of the

road, which looked to me as if the belfry would command the ground back

of the garita San Cosme. I got an officer of the voltigeurs, with a

mountain howitzer and men to work it, to go with me. The road being in

possession of the enemy, we had to take the field to the south to reach

the church. This took us over several ditches breast deep in water and

grown up with water plants. These ditches, however, were not over eight

or ten feet in width. The howitzer was taken to pieces and carried by

the men to its destination. When I knocked for admission a priest came

to the door who, while extremely polite, declined to admit us. With the

little Spanish then at my command, I explained to him that he might save

property by opening the door, and he certainly would save himself from

becoming a prisoner, for a time at least; and besides, I intended to go

in whether he consented or not. He began to see his duty in the same

light that I did, and opened the door, though he did not look as if it

gave him special pleasure to do so. The gun was carried to the belfry

and put together. We were not more than two or three hundred yards from

San Cosme. The shots from our little gun dropped in upon the enemy and

created great confusion. Why they did not send out a small party and

capture us, I do not know. We had no infantry or other defences besides

our one gun.

The effect of this gun upon the troops about the gate of the city was so

marked that General Worth saw it from his position. (*3) He was so

pleased that he sent a staff officer, Lieutenant Pemberton--later

Lieutenant-General commanding the defences of Vicksburg--to bring me to

him. He expressed his gratification at the services the howitzer in the

church steeple was doing, saying that every shot was effective, and

ordered a captain of voltigeurs to report to me with another howitzer to

be placed along with the one already rendering so much service. I could

not tell the General that there was not room enough in the steeple for

another gun, because he probably would have looked upon such a statement

as a contradiction from a second lieutenant. I took the captain with

me, but did not use his gun.

The night of the 13th of September was spent by the troops under General

Worth in the houses near San Cosme, and in line confronting the general

line of the enemy across to Belen. The troops that I was with were in

the houses north of the road leading into the city, and were engaged

during the night in cutting passage-ways from one house to another

towards the town. During the night Santa Anna, with his army--except

the deserters--left the city. He liberated all the convicts confined in

the town, hoping, no doubt, that they would inflict upon us some injury

before daylight; but several hours after Santa Anna was out of the way,

the city authorities sent a delegation to General Scott to ask--if not

demand--an armistice, respecting church property, the rights of citizens

and the supremacy of the city government in the management of municipal

affairs. General Scott declined to trammel himself with conditions, but

gave assurances that those who chose to remain within our lines would be

protected so long as they behaved themselves properly.

General Quitman had advanced along his line very successfully on the

13th, so that at night his command occupied nearly the same position at

Belen that Worth's troops did about San Cosme. After the interview above

related between General Scott and the city council, orders were issued

for the cautious entry of both columns in the morning. The troops under

Worth were to stop at the Alameda, a park near the west end of the city.

Quitman was to go directly to the Plaza, and take possession of the

Palace--a mass of buildings on the east side in which Congress has its

sessions, the national courts are held, the public offices are all

located, the President resides, and much room is left for museums,

receptions, etc. This is the building generally designated as the

"Halls of the Montezumas."