CHAPTER XXXVII

SIEGE OF VICKSBURG.

I now determined upon a regular siege--to "out-camp the enemy," as it

were, and to incur no more losses. The experience of the 22d convinced

officers and men that this was best, and they went to work on the

defences and approaches with a will. With the navy holding the river,

the investment of Vicksburg was complete. As long as we could hold our

position the enemy was limited in supplies of food, men and munitions of

war to what they had on hand. These could not last always.

The crossing of troops at Bruinsburg commenced April 30th. On the 18th

of May the army was in rear of Vicksburg. On the 19th, just twenty days

after the crossing, the city was completely invested and an assault had

been made: five distinct battles (besides continuous skirmishing) had

been fought and won by the Union forces; the capital of the State had

fallen and its arsenals, military manufactories and everything useful

for military purposes had been destroyed; an average of about one

hundred and eighty miles had been marched by the troops engaged; but

five days' rations had been issued, and no forage; over six thousand

prisoners had been captured, and as many more of the enemy had been

killed or wounded; twenty-seven heavy cannon and sixty-one field-pieces

had fallen into our hands; and four hundred miles of the river, from

Vicksburg to Port Hudson, had become ours. The Union force that had

crossed the Mississippi River up to this time was less than forty-three

thousand men. One division of these, Blair's, only arrived in time to

take part in the battle of Champion's Hill, but was not engaged there;

and one brigade, Ransom's of McPherson's corps, reached the field after

the battle. The enemy had at Vicksburg, Grand Gulf, Jackson, and on the

roads between these places, over sixty thousand men. They were in their

own country, where no rear guards were necessary. The country is

admirable for defence, but difficult for the conduct of an offensive

campaign. All their troops had to be met. We were fortunate, to say

the least, in meeting them in detail: at Port Gibson seven or eight

thousand; at Raymond, five thousand; at Jackson, from eight to eleven

thousand; at Champion's Hill, twenty-five thousand; at the Big Black,

four thousand. A part of those met at Jackson were all that was left of

those encountered at Raymond. They were beaten in detail by a force

smaller than their own, upon their own ground. Our loss up to this time

was:

KILLED WOUNDED MISSING

Port Gibson..... 131 719 25

South Fork Bayou Pierre..... .. 1 ..

Skirmishes, May 3 ..... 1 9 ..

Fourteen Mile Creek..... 6 24 ..

Raymond............... 66 339 39

Jackson..... 42 251 7

Champion's Hill..... 410 1,844 187

Big Black..... 39 237 3

Bridgeport..... .. 1 ..

Total..... 695 3,425 259

Of the wounded many were but slightly so, and continued on duty. Not

half of them were disabled for any length of time.

After the unsuccessful assault of the 22d the work of the regular siege

began. Sherman occupied the right starting from the river above

Vicksburg, McPherson the centre (McArthur's division now with him) and

McClernand the left, holding the road south to Warrenton. Lauman's

division arrived at this time and was placed on the extreme left of the

line.

In the interval between the assaults of the 19th and 22d, roads had been

completed from the Yazoo River and Chickasaw Bayou, around the rear of

the army, to enable us to bring up supplies of food and ammunition;

ground had been selected and cleared on which the troops were to be

encamped, and tents and cooking utensils were brought up. The troops

had been without these from the time of crossing the Mississippi up to

this time. All was now ready for the pick and spade. Prentiss and

Hurlbut were ordered to send forward every man that could be spared.

Cavalry especially was wanted to watch the fords along the Big Black,

and to observe Johnston. I knew that Johnston was receiving

reinforcements from Bragg, who was confronting Rosecrans in Tennessee.

Vicksburg was so important to the enemy that I believed he would make

the most strenuous efforts to raise the siege, even at the risk of

losing ground elsewhere.

My line was more than fifteen miles long, extending from Haines' Bluff

to Vicksburg, thence to Warrenton. The line of the enemy was about

seven. In addition to this, having an enemy at Canton and Jackson, in

our rear, who was being constantly reinforced, we required a second line

of defence facing the other way. I had not troops enough under my

command to man these. General Halleck appreciated the situation and,

without being asked, forwarded reinforcements with all possible

dispatch.

The ground about Vicksburg is admirable for defence. On the north it is

about two hundred feet above the Mississippi River at the highest point

and very much cut up by the washing rains; the ravines were grown up

with cane and underbrush, while the sides and tops were covered with a

dense forest. Farther south the ground flattens out somewhat, and was

in cultivation. But here, too, it was cut up by ravines and small

streams. The enemy's line of defence followed the crest of a ridge from

the river north of the city eastward, then southerly around to the

Jackson road, full three miles back of the city; thence in a

southwesterly direction to the river. Deep ravines of the description

given lay in front of these defences. As there is a succession of

gullies, cut out by rains along the side of the ridge, the line was

necessarily very irregular. To follow each of these spurs with

intrenchments, so as to command the slopes on either side, would have

lengthened their line very much. Generally therefore, or in many places,

their line would run from near the head of one gully nearly straight to

the head of another, and an outer work triangular in shape, generally

open in the rear, was thrown up on the point; with a few men in this

outer work they commanded the approaches to the main line completely.

The work to be done, to make our position as strong against the enemy as

his was against us, was very great. The problem was also complicated by

our wanting our line as near that of the enemy as possible. We had but

four engineer officers with us. Captain Prime, of the Engineer Corps,

was the chief, and the work at the beginning was mainly directed by him.

His health soon gave out, when he was succeeded by Captain Comstock,

also of the Engineer Corps. To provide assistants on such a long line I

directed that all officers who had graduated at West Point, where they

had necessarily to study military engineering, should in addition to

their other duties assist in the work.

The chief quartermaster and the chief commissary were graduates. The

chief commissary, now the Commissary-General of the Army, begged off,

however, saying that there was nothing in engineering that he was good

for unless he would do for a sap-roller. As soldiers require rations

while working in the ditches as well as when marching and fighting, and

as we would be sure to lose him if he was used as a sap-roller, I let

him off. The general is a large man; weighs two hundred and twenty

pounds, and is not tall.

We had no siege guns except six thirty-two pounders, and there were none

at the West to draw from. Admiral Porter, however, supplied us with a

battery of navy-guns of large calibre, and with these, and the field

artillery used in the campaign, the siege began. The first thing to do

was to get the artillery in batteries where they would occupy commanding

positions; then establish the camps, under cover from the fire of the

enemy but as near up as possible; and then construct rifle-pits and

covered ways, to connect the entire command by the shortest route. The

enemy did not harass us much while we were constructing our batteries.

Probably their artillery ammunition was short; and their infantry was

kept down by our sharpshooters, who were always on the alert and ready

to fire at a head whenever it showed itself above the rebel works.

In no place were our lines more than six hundred yards from the enemy.

It was necessary, therefore, to cover our men by something more than

the ordinary parapet. To give additional protection sand bags,

bullet-proof, were placed along the tops of the parapets far enough

apart to make loop-holes for musketry. On top of these, logs were put.

By these means the men were enabled to walk about erect when off duty,

without fear of annoyance from sharpshooters. The enemy used in their

defence explosive musket-balls, no doubt thinking that, bursting over

our men in the trenches, they would do some execution; but I do not

remember a single case where a man was injured by a piece of one of

these shells. When they were hit and the ball exploded, the wound was

terrible. In these cases a solid ball would have hit as well. Their

use is barbarous, because they produce increased suffering without any

corresponding advantage to those using them.

The enemy could not resort to our method to protect their men, because

we had an inexhaustible supply of ammunition to draw upon and used it

freely. Splinters from the timber would have made havoc among the men

behind.

There were no mortars with the besiegers, except what the navy had in

front of the city; but wooden ones were made by taking logs of the

toughest wood that could be found, boring them out for six or twelve

pound shells and binding them with strong iron bands. These answered as

coehorns, and shells were successfully thrown from them into the

trenches of the enemy.

The labor of building the batteries and intrenching was largely done by

the pioneers, assisted by negroes who came within our lines and who were

paid for their work; but details from the troops had often to be made.

The work was pushed forward as rapidly as possible, and when an advanced

position was secured and covered from the fire of the enemy the

batteries were advanced. By the 30th of June there were two hundred and

twenty guns in position, mostly light field-pieces, besides a battery of

heavy guns belonging to, manned and commanded by the navy. We were now

as strong for defence against the garrison of Vicksburg as they were

against us; but I knew that Johnston was in our rear, and was receiving

constant reinforcements from the east. He had at this time a larger

force than I had had at any time prior to the battle of Champion's Hill.

As soon as the news of the arrival of the Union army behind Vicksburg

reached the North, floods of visitors began to pour in. Some came to

gratify curiosity; some to see sons or brothers who had passed through

the terrible ordeal; members of the Christian and Sanitary Associations

came to minister to the wants of the sick and the wounded. Often those

coming to see a son or brother would bring a dozen or two of poultry.

They did not know how little the gift would be appreciated. Many of the

soldiers had lived so much on chickens, ducks and turkeys without bread

during the march, that the sight of poultry, if they could get bacon,

almost took away their appetite. But the intention was good.

Among the earliest arrivals was the Governor of Illinois, with most of

the State officers. I naturally wanted to show them what there was of

most interest. In Sherman's front the ground was the most broken and

most wooded, and more was to be seen without exposure. I therefore took

them to Sherman's headquarters and presented them. Before starting out

to look at the lines--possibly while Sherman's horse was being saddled

--there were many questions asked about the late campaign, about which

the North had been so imperfectly informed. There was a little knot

around Sherman and another around me, and I heard Sherman repeating, in

the most animated manner, what he had said to me when we first looked

down from Walnut Hills upon the land below on the 18th of May, adding:

"Grant is entitled to every bit of the credit for the campaign; I

opposed it. I wrote him a letter about it." But for this speech it is

not likely that Sherman's opposition would have ever been heard of. His

untiring energy and great efficiency during the campaign entitle him to

a full share of all the credit due for its success. He could not have

done more if the plan had been his own. (*13)

On the 26th of May I sent Blair's division up the Yazoo to drive out a

force of the enemy supposed to be between the Big Black and the Yazoo.

The country was rich and full of supplies of both food and forage.

Blair was instructed to take all of it. The cattle were to be driven in

for the use of our army, and the food and forage to be consumed by our

troops or destroyed by fire; all bridges were to be destroyed, and the

roads rendered as nearly impassable as possible. Blair went forty-five

miles and was gone almost a week. His work was effectually done. I

requested Porter at this time to send the marine brigade, a floating

nondescript force which had been assigned to his command and which

proved very useful, up to Haines' Bluff to hold it until reinforcements

could be sent.

On the 26th I also received a letter from Banks, asking me to reinforce

him with ten thousand men at Port Hudson. Of course I could not comply

with his request, nor did I think he needed them. He was in no danger

of an attack by the garrison in his front, and there was no army

organizing in his rear to raise the siege.

On the 3d of June a brigade from Hurlbut's command arrived, General

Kimball commanding. It was sent to Mechanicsburg, some miles north-east

of Haines' Bluff and about midway between the Big Black and the Yazoo.

A brigade of Blair's division and twelve hundred cavalry had already, on

Blair's return from the Yazoo, been sent to the same place with

instructions to watch the crossings of the Big Black River, to destroy

the roads in his (Blair's) front, and to gather or destroy all supplies.

On the 7th of June our little force of colored and white troops across

the Mississippi, at Milliken's Bend, were attacked by about 3,000 men

from Richard Taylor's trans-Mississippi command. With the aid of the

gunboats they were speedily repelled. I sent Mower's brigade over with

instructions to drive the enemy beyond the Tensas Bayou; and we had no

further trouble in that quarter during the siege. This was the first

important engagement of the war in which colored troops were under fire.

These men were very raw, having all been enlisted since the beginning of

the siege, but they behaved well.

On the 8th of June a full division arrived from Hurlbut's command, under

General Sooy Smith. It was sent immediately to Haines' Bluff, and

General C. C. Washburn was assigned to the general command at that

point.

On the 11th a strong division arrived from the Department of the

Missouri under General Herron, which was placed on our left. This cut

off the last possible chance of communication between Pemberton and

Johnston, as it enabled Lauman to close up on McClernand's left while

Herron intrenched from Lauman to the water's edge. At this point the

water recedes a few hundred yards from the high land. Through this

opening no doubt the Confederate commanders had been able to get

messengers under cover of night.

On the 14th General Parke arrived with two divisions of Burnside's

corps, and was immediately dispatched to Haines' Bluff. These latter

troops--Herron's and Parke's--were the reinforcements already spoken of

sent by Halleck in anticipation of their being needed. They arrived

none too soon.

I now had about seventy-one thousand men. More than half were disposed

across the peninsula, between the Yazoo at Haines' Bluff and the Big

Black, with the division of Osterhaus watching the crossings of the

latter river farther south and west from the crossing of the Jackson

road to Baldwin's ferry and below.

There were eight roads leading into Vicksburg, along which and their

immediate sides, our work was specially pushed and batteries advanced;

but no commanding point within range of the enemy was neglected.

On the 17th I received a letter from General Sherman and one on the 18th

from General McPherson, saying that their respective commands had

complained to them of a fulsome, congratulatory order published by

General McClernand to the 13th corps, which did great injustice to the

other troops engaged in the campaign. This order had been sent North

and published, and now papers containing it had reached our camps. The

order had not been heard of by me, and certainly not by troops outside

of McClernand's command until brought in this way. I at once wrote to

McClernand, directing him to send me a copy of this order. He did so,

and I at once relieved him from the command of the 13th army corps and

ordered him back to Springfield, Illinois. The publication of his order

in the press was in violation of War Department orders and also of mine.