CHAPTER XXXVIII.

JOHNSTON'S MOVEMENTS--FORTIFICATIONS AT HAINES' BLUFF--EXPLOSION OF THE

MINE--EXPLOSION OF THE SECOND MINE--PREPARING FOR THE ASSAULT--THE FLAG

OF TRUCE--MEETING WITH PEMBERTON--NEGOTIATIONS FOR SURRENDER--ACCEPTING

THE TERMS--SURRENDER OF VICKSBURG.

On the 22d of June positive information was received that Johnston had

crossed the Big Black River for the purpose of attacking our rear, to

raise the siege and release Pemberton. The correspondence between

Johnston and Pemberton shows that all expectation of holding Vicksburg

had by this time passed from Johnston's mind. I immediately ordered

Sherman to the command of all the forces from Haines' Bluff to the Big

Black River. This amounted now to quite half the troops about Vicksburg.

Besides these, Herron and A. J. Smith's divisions were ordered to hold

themselves in readiness to reinforce Sherman. Haines' Bluff had been

strongly fortified on the land side, and on all commanding points from

there to the Big Black at the railroad crossing batteries had been

constructed. The work of connecting by rifle-pits where this was not

already done, was an easy task for the troops that were to defend them.

We were now looking west, besieging Pemberton, while we were also

looking east to defend ourselves against an expected siege by Johnston.

But as against the garrison of Vicksburg we were as substantially

protected as they were against us. Where we were looking east and north

we were strongly fortified, and on the defensive. Johnston evidently

took in the situation and wisely, I think, abstained from making an

assault on us because it would simply have inflicted loss on both sides

without accomplishing any result. We were strong enough to have taken

the offensive against him; but I did not feel disposed to take any risk

of losing our hold upon Pemberton's army, while I would have rejoiced at

the opportunity of defending ourselves against an attack by Johnston.

From the 23d of May the work of fortifying and pushing forward our

position nearer to the enemy had been steadily progressing. At three

points on the Jackson road, in front of Leggett's brigade, a sap was run

up to the enemy's parapet, and by the 25th of June we had it undermined

and the mine charged. The enemy had countermined, but did not succeed in

reaching our mine. At this particular point the hill on which the rebel

work stands rises abruptly. Our sap ran close up to the outside of the

enemy's parapet. In fact this parapet was also our protection. The

soldiers of the two sides occasionally conversed pleasantly across this

barrier; sometimes they exchanged the hard bread of the Union soldiers

for the tobacco of the Confederates; at other times the enemy threw over

hand-grenades, and often our men, catching them in their hands, returned

them.

Our mine had been started some distance back down the hill; consequently

when it had extended as far as the parapet it was many feet below it.

This caused the failure of the enemy in his search to find and destroy

it. On the 25th of June at three o'clock, all being ready, the mine was

exploded. A heavy artillery fire all along the line had been ordered to

open with the explosion. The effect was to blow the top of the hill off

and make a crater where it stood. The breach was not sufficient to

enable us to pass a column of attack through. In fact, the enemy having

failed to reach our mine had thrown up a line farther back, where most

of the men guarding that point were placed. There were a few men,

however, left at the advance line, and others working in the

countermine, which was still being pushed to find ours. All that were

there were thrown into the air, some of them coming down on our side,

still alive. I remember one colored man, who had been under ground at

work when the explosion took place, who was thrown to our side. He was

not much hurt, but terribly frightened. Some one asked him how high he

had gone up. "Dun no, massa, but t'ink 'bout t'ree mile," was his

reply. General Logan commanded at this point and took this colored man

to his quarters, where he did service to the end of the siege.

As soon as the explosion took place the crater was seized by two

regiments of our troops who were near by, under cover, where they had

been placed for the express purpose. The enemy made a desperate effort

to expel them, but failed, and soon retired behind the new line. From

here, however, they threw hand-grenades, which did some execution. The

compliment was returned by our men, but not with so much effect. The

enemy could lay their grenades on the parapet, which alone divided the

contestants, and roll them down upon us; while from our side they had to

be thrown over the parapet, which was at considerable elevation. During

the night we made efforts to secure our position in the crater against

the missiles of the enemy, so as to run trenches along the outer base of

their parapet, right and left; but the enemy continued throwing their

grenades, and brought boxes of field ammunition (shells), the fuses of

which they would light with portfires, and throw them by hand into our

ranks. We found it impossible to continue this work. Another mine was

consequently started which was exploded on the 1st of July, destroying

an entire rebel redan, killing and wounding a considerable number of its

occupants and leaving an immense chasm where it stood. No attempt to

charge was made this time, the experience of the 25th admonishing us.

Our loss in the first affair was about thirty killed and wounded. The

enemy must have lost more in the two explosions than we did in the

first. We lost none in the second.

From this time forward the work of mining and pushing our position

nearer to the enemy was prosecuted with vigor, and I determined to

explode no more mines until we were ready to explode a number at

different points and assault immediately after. We were up now at three

different points, one in front of each corps, to where only the parapet

of the enemy divided us.

At this time an intercepted dispatch from Johnston to Pemberton informed

me that Johnston intended to make a determined attack upon us in order

to relieve the garrison at Vicksburg. I knew the garrison would make no

formidable effort to relieve itself. The picket lines were so close to

each other--where there was space enough between the lines to post

pickets--that the men could converse. On the 21st of June I was

informed, through this means, that Pemberton was preparing to escape, by

crossing to the Louisiana side under cover of night; that he had

employed workmen in making boats for that purpose; that the men had been

canvassed to ascertain if they would make an assault on the "Yankees" to

cut their way out; that they had refused, and almost mutinied, because

their commander would not surrender and relieve their sufferings, and

had only been pacified by the assurance that boats enough would be

finished in a week to carry them all over. The rebel pickets also said

that houses in the city had been pulled down to get material to build

these boats with. Afterwards this story was verified: on entering the

city we found a large number of very rudely constructed boats.

All necessary steps were at once taken to render such an attempt

abortive. Our pickets were doubled; Admiral Porter was notified, so

that the river might be more closely watched; material was collected on

the west bank of the river to be set on fire and light up the river if

the attempt was made; and batteries were established along the levee

crossing the peninsula on the Louisiana side. Had the attempt been made

the garrison of Vicksburg would have been drowned, or made prisoners on

the Louisiana side. General Richard Taylor was expected on the west

bank to co-operate in this movement, I believe, but he did not come, nor

could he have done so with a force sufficient to be of service. The

Mississippi was now in our possession from its source to its mouth,

except in the immediate front of Vicksburg and of Port Hudson. We had

nearly exhausted the country, along a line drawn from Lake Providence to

opposite Bruinsburg. The roads west were not of a character to draw

supplies over for any considerable force.

By the 1st of July our approaches had reached the enemy's ditch at a

number of places. At ten points we could move under cover to within

from five to one hundred yards of the enemy. Orders were given to make

all preparations for assault on the 6th of July. The debouches were

ordered widened to afford easy egress, while the approaches were also to

be widened to admit the troops to pass through four abreast. Plank, and

bags filled with cotton packed in tightly, were ordered prepared, to

enable the troops to cross the ditches.

On the night of the 1st of July Johnston was between Brownsville and the

Big Black, and wrote Pemberton from there that about the 7th of the

month an attempt would be made to create a diversion to enable him to

cut his way out. Pemberton was a prisoner before this message reached

him.

On July 1st Pemberton, seeing no hope of outside relief, addressed the

following letter to each of his four division commanders:

"Unless the siege of Vicksburg is raised, or supplies are thrown in, it

will become necessary very shortly to evacuate the place. I see no

prospect of the former, and there are many great, if not insuperable

obstacles in the way of the latter. You are, therefore, requested to

inform me with as little delay as possible, as to the condition of your

troops and their ability to make the marches and undergo the fatigues

necessary to accomplish a successful evacuation."

Two of his generals suggested surrender, and the other two practically

did the same. They expressed the opinion that an attempt to evacuate

would fail. Pemberton had previously got a message to Johnston

suggesting that he should try to negotiate with me for a release of the

garrison with their arms. Johnston replied that it would be a

confession of weakness for him to do so; but he authorized Pemberton to

use his name in making such an arrangement.

On the 3d about ten o'clock A.M. white flags appeared on a portion of

the rebel works. Hostilities along that part of the line ceased at

once. Soon two persons were seen coming towards our lines bearing a

white flag. They proved to be General Bowen, a division commander, and

Colonel Montgomery, aide-de-camp to Pemberton, bearing the following

letter to me:

"I have the honor to propose an armistice for--hours, with the view to

arranging terms for the capitulation of Vicksburg. To this end, if

agreeable to you, I will appoint three commissioners, to meet a like

number to be named by yourself at such place and hour to-day as you may

find convenient. I make this proposition to save the further effusion

of blood, which must otherwise be shed to a frightful extent, feeling

myself fully able to maintain my position for a yet indefinite period.

This communication will be handed you under a flag of truce, by

Major-General John S. Bowen."

It was a glorious sight to officers and soldiers on the line where these

white flags were visible, and the news soon spread to all parts of the

command. The troops felt that their long and weary marches, hard

fighting, ceaseless watching by night and day, in a hot climate,

exposure to all sorts of weather, to diseases and, worst of all, to the

gibes of many Northern papers that came to them saying all their

suffering was in vain, that Vicksburg would never be taken, were at last

at an end and the Union sure to be saved.

Bowen was received by General A. J. Smith, and asked to see me. I had

been a neighbor of Bowen's in Missouri, and knew him well and favorably

before the war; but his request was refused. He then suggested that I

should meet Pemberton. To this I sent a verbal message saying that, if

Pemberton desired it, I would meet him in front of McPherson's corps at

three o'clock that afternoon. I also sent the following written reply

to Pemberton's letter:

"Your note of this date is just received, proposing an armistice for

several hours, for the purpose of arranging terms of capitulation

through commissioners, to be appointed, etc. The useless effusion of

blood you propose stopping by this course can be ended at any time you

may choose, by the unconditional surrender of the city and garrison.

Men who have shown so much endurance and courage as those now in

Vicksburg, will always challenge the respect of an adversary, and I can

assure you will be treated with all the respect due to prisoners of war.

I do not favor the proposition of appointing commissioners to arrange

the terms of capitulation, because I have no terms other than those

indicated above."

At three o'clock Pemberton appeared at the point suggested in my verbal

message, accompanied by the same officers who had borne his letter of

the morning. Generals Ord, McPherson, Logan and A. J. Smith, and

several officers of my staff, accompanied me. Our place of meeting was

on a hillside within a few hundred feet of the rebel lines. Near by

stood a stunted oak-tree, which was made historical by the event. It

was but a short time before the last vestige of its body, root and limb

had disappeared, the fragments taken as trophies. Since then the same

tree has furnished as many cords of wood, in the shape of trophies, as

"The True Cross."

Pemberton and I had served in the same division during part of the

Mexican War. I knew him very well therefore, and greeted him as an old

acquaintance. He soon asked what terms I proposed to give his army if

it surrendered. My answer was the same as proposed in my reply to his

letter. Pemberton then said, rather snappishly, "The conference might

as well end," and turned abruptly as if to leave. I said, "Very well."

General Bowen, I saw, was very anxious that the surrender should be

consummated. His manner and remarks while Pemberton and I were talking,

showed this. He now proposed that he and one of our generals should

have a conference. I had no objection to this, as nothing could be made

binding upon me that they might propose. Smith and Bowen accordingly had

a conference, during which Pemberton and I, moving a short distance away

towards the enemy's lines were in conversation. After a while Bowen

suggested that the Confederate army should be allowed to march out with

the honors of war, carrying their small arms and field artillery. This

was promptly and unceremoniously rejected. The interview here ended, I

agreeing, however, to send a letter giving final terms by ten o'clock

that night.

Word was sent to Admiral Porter soon after the correspondence with

Pemberton commenced, so that hostilities might be stopped on the part of

both army and navy. It was agreed on my paging with Pemberton that they

should not be renewed until our correspondence ceased.

When I returned to my headquarters I sent for all the corps and division

commanders with the army immediately confronting Vicksburg. Half the

army was from eight to twelve miles off, waiting for Johnston. I

informed them of the contents of Pemberton's letters, of my reply and

the substance of the interview, and that I was ready to hear any

suggestion; but would hold the power of deciding entirely in my own

hands. This was the nearest approach to a "council of war" I ever held.

Against the general, and almost unanimous judgment of the council I sent

the following letter:

"In conformity with agreement of this afternoon, I will submit the

following proposition for the surrender of the City of Vicksburg, public

stores, etc. On your accepting the terms proposed, I will march in one

division as a guard, and take possession at eight A.M. to-morrow. As

soon as rolls can be made out, and paroles be signed by officers and

men, you will be allowed to march out of our lines, the officers taking

with them their side-arms and clothing, and the field, staff and cavalry

officers one horse each. The rank and file will be allowed all their

clothing, but no other property. If these conditions are accepted, any

amount of rations you may deem necessary can be taken from the stores

you now have, and also the necessary cooking utensils for preparing

them. Thirty wagons also, counting two two-horse or mule teams as one,

will be allowed to transport such articles as cannot be carried along.

The same conditions will be allowed to all sick and wounded officers and

soldiers as fast as they become able to travel. The paroles for these

latter must be signed, however, whilst officers present are authorized

to sign the roll of prisoners."

By the terms of the cartel then in force, prisoners captured by either

army were required to be forwarded as soon as possible to either Aiken's

landing below Dutch Gap on the James River, or to Vicksburg, there to be

exchanged, or paroled until they could be exchanged. There was a

Confederate commissioner at Vicksburg, authorized to make the exchange.

I did not propose to take him a prisoner, but to leave him free to

perform the functions of his office. Had I insisted upon an

unconditional surrender there would have been over thirty thousand men

to transport to Cairo, very much to the inconvenience of the army on the

Mississippi. Thence the prisoners would have had to be transported by

rail to Washington or Baltimore; thence again by steamer to Aiken's--all

at very great expense. At Aiken's they would have had to be paroled,

because the Confederates did not have Union prisoners to give in

exchange. Then again Pemberton's army was largely composed of men whose

homes were in the South-west; I knew many of them were tired of the war

and would get home just as soon as they could. A large number of them

had voluntarily come into our lines during the siege, and requested to

be sent north where they could get employment until the war was over and

they could go to their homes.

Late at night I received the following reply to my last letter:

"I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of

this date, proposing terms of capitulation for this garrison and post.

In the main your terms are accepted; but, in justice both to the honor

and spirit of my troops manifested in the defence of Vicksburg, I have

to submit the following amendments, which, if acceded to by you, will

perfect the agreement between us. At ten o'clock A.M. to-morrow, I

propose to evacuate the works in and around Vicksburg, and to surrender

the city and garrison under my command, by marching out with my colors

and arms, stacking them in front of my present lines. After which you

will take possession. Officers to retain their side-arms and personal

property, and the rights and property of citizens to be respected."

This was received after midnight. My reply was as follows:

"I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of 3d

July. The amendment proposed by you cannot be acceded to in full. It

will be necessary to furnish every officer and man with a parole signed

by himself, which, with the completion of the roll of prisoners, will

necessarily take some time. Again, I can make no stipulations with

regard to the treatment of citizens and their private property. While I

do not propose to cause them any undue annoyance or loss, I cannot

consent to leave myself under any restraint by stipulations. The

property which officers will be allowed to take with them will be as

stated in my proposition of last evening; that is, officers will be

allowed their private baggage and side-arms, and mounted officers one

horse each. If you mean by your proposition for each brigade to march

to the front of the lines now occupied by it, and stack arms at ten

o'clock A.M., and then return to the inside and there remain as

prisoners until properly paroled, I will make no objection to it.

Should no notification be received of your acceptance of my terms by

nine o'clock A.M. I shall regard them as having been rejected, and shall

act accordingly. Should these terms be accepted, white flags should be

displayed along your lines to prevent such of my troops as may not have

been notified, from firing upon your men."

Pemberton promptly accepted these terms.

During the siege there had been a good deal of friendly sparring between

the soldiers of the two armies, on picket and where the lines were close

together. All rebels were known as "Johnnies," all Union troops as

"Yanks." Often "Johnny" would call: "Well, Yank, when are you coming

into town?" The reply was sometimes: "We propose to celebrate the 4th

of July there." Sometimes it would be: "We always treat our prisoners

with kindness and do not want to hurt them;" or, "We are holding you as

prisoners of war while you are feeding yourselves." The garrison, from

the commanding general down, undoubtedly expected an assault on the

fourth. They knew from the temper of their men it would be successful

when made; and that would be a greater humiliation than to surrender.

Besides it would be attended with severe loss to them.

The Vicksburg paper, which we received regularly through the courtesy of

the rebel pickets, said prior to the fourth, in speaking of the "Yankee"

boast that they would take dinner in Vicksburg that day, that the best

receipt for cooking a rabbit was "First ketch your rabbit." The paper

at this time and for some time previous was printed on the plain side of

wall paper. The last number was issued on the fourth and announced that

we had "caught our rabbit."

I have no doubt that Pemberton commenced his correspondence on the third

with a two-fold purpose: first, to avoid an assault, which he knew

would be successful, and second, to prevent the capture taking place on

the great national holiday, the anniversary of the Declaration of

American Independence. Holding out for better terms as he did he

defeated his aim in the latter particular.

At the appointed hour the garrison of Vicksburg marched out of their

works and formed line in front, stacked arms and marched back in good

order. Our whole army present witnessed this scene without cheering.

Logan's division, which had approached nearest the rebel works, was the

first to march in; and the flag of one of the regiments of his division

was soon floating over the court-house. Our soldiers were no sooner

inside the lines than the two armies began to fraternize. Our men had

had full rations from the time the siege commenced, to the close. The

enemy had been suffering, particularly towards the last. I myself saw

our men taking bread from their haversacks and giving it to the enemy

they had so recently been engaged in starving out. It was accepted with

avidity and with thanks.

Pemberton says in his report:

"If it should be asked why the 4th of July was selected as the day for

surrender, the answer is obvious. I believed that upon that day I

should obtain better terms. Well aware of the vanity of our foe, I knew

they would attach vast importance to the entrance on the 4th of July

into the stronghold of the great river, and that, to gratify their

national vanity, they would yield then what could not be extorted from

them at any other time."

This does not support my view of his reasons for selecting the day he

did for surrendering. But it must be recollected that his first letter

asking terms was received about 10 o'clock A.M., July 3d. It then could

hardly be expected that it would take twenty-four hours to effect a

surrender. He knew that Johnston was in our rear for the purpose of

raising the siege, and he naturally would want to hold out as long as he

could. He knew his men would not resist an assault, and one was

expected on the fourth. In our interview he told me he had rations

enough to hold out for some time--my recollection is two weeks. It was

this statement that induced me to insert in the terms that he was to

draw rations for his men from his own supplies.

On the 4th of July General Holmes, with an army of eight or nine

thousand men belonging to the trans-Mississippi department, made an

attack upon Helena, Arkansas. He was totally defeated by General

Prentiss, who was holding Helena with less than forty-two hundred

soldiers. Holmes reported his loss at 1,636, of which 173 were killed;

but as Prentiss buried 400, Holmes evidently understated his losses.

The Union loss was 57 killed, 127 wounded, and between 30 and 40

missing. This was the last effort on the part of the Confederacy to

raise the siege of Vicksburg.

On the third, as soon as negotiations were commenced, I notified Sherman

and directed him to be ready to take the offensive against Johnston,

drive him out of the State and destroy his army if he could. Steele and

Ord were directed at the same time to be in readiness to join Sherman as

soon as the surrender took place. Of this Sherman was notified.

I rode into Vicksburg with the troops, and went to the river to exchange

congratulations with the navy upon our joint victory. At that time I

found that many of the citizens had been living under ground. The

ridges upon which Vicksburg is built, and those back to the Big Black,

are composed of a deep yellow clay of great tenacity. Where roads and

streets are cut through, perpendicular banks are left and stand as well

as if composed of stone. The magazines of the enemy were made by

running passage-ways into this clay at places where there were deep

cuts. Many citizens secured places of safety for their families by

carving out rooms in these embankments. A door-way in these cases would

be cut in a high bank, starting from the level of the road or street,

and after running in a few feet a room of the size required was carved

out of the clay, the dirt being removed by the door-way. In some

instances I saw where two rooms were cut out, for a single family, with

a door-way in the clay wall separating them. Some of these were

carpeted and furnished with considerable elaboration. In these the

occupants were fully secure from the shells of the navy, which were

dropped into the city night and dav without intermission.

I returned to my old headquarters outside in the afternoon, and did not

move into the town until the sixth. On the afternoon of the fourth I

sent Captain Wm. M. Dunn of my staff to Cairo, the nearest point where

the telegraph could be reached, with a dispatch to the general-in-chief.

It was as follows:

"The enemy surrendered this morning. The only terms allowed is their

parole as prisoners of war. This I regard as a great advantage to us at

this moment. It saves, probably, several days in the capture, and

leaves troops and transports ready for immediate service. Sherman, with

a large force, moves immediately on Johnston, to drive him from the

State. I will send troops to the relief of Banks, and return the 9th

army corps to Burnside."

This news, with the victory at Gettysburg won the same day, lifted a

great load of anxiety from the minds of the President, his Cabinet and

the loyal people all over the North. The fate of the Confederacy was

sealed when Vicksburg fell. Much hard fighting was to be done

afterwards and many precious lives were to be sacrificed; but the MORALE

was with the supporters of the Union ever after.

I at the same time wrote to General Banks informing him of the fall and

sending him a copy of the terms; also saying I would send him all the

troops he wanted to insure the capture of the only foothold the enemy

now had on the Mississippi River. General Banks had a number of copies

of this letter printed, or at least a synopsis of it, and very soon a

copy fell into the hands of General Gardner, who was then in command of

Port Hudson. Gardner at once sent a letter to the commander of the

National forces saying that he had been informed of the surrender of

Vicksburg and telling how the information reached him. He added that if

this was true, it was useless for him to hold out longer. General Banks

gave him assurances that Vicksburg had been surrendered, and General

Gardner surrendered unconditionally on the 9th of July. Port Hudson

with nearly 6,000 prisoners, 51 guns, 5,000 small-arms and other stores

fell into the hands of the Union forces: from that day to the close of

the rebellion the Mississippi River, from its source to its mouth,

remained in the control of the National troops.

Pemberton and his army were kept in Vicksburg until the whole could be

paroled. The paroles were in duplicate, by organization (one copy for

each, Federals and Confederates), and signed by the commanding officers

of the companies or regiments. Duplicates were also made for each

soldier and signed by each individually, one to be retained by the

soldier signing and one to be retained by us. Several hundred refused

to sign their paroles, preferring to be sent to the North as prisoners

to being sent back to fight again. Others again kept out of the way,

hoping to escape either alternative.

Pemberton appealed to me in person to compel these men to sign their

paroles, but I declined. It also leaked out that many of the men who

had signed their paroles, intended to desert and go to their homes as

soon as they got out of our lines. Pemberton hearing this, again

appealed to me to assist him. He wanted arms for a battalion, to act as

guards in keeping his men together while being marched to a camp of

instruction, where he expected to keep them until exchanged. This

request was also declined. It was precisely what I expected and hoped

that they would do. I told him, however, that I would see that they

marched beyond our lines in good order. By the eleventh, just one week

after the surrender, the paroles were completed and the Confederate

garrison marched out. Many deserted, and fewer of them were ever

returned to the ranks to fight again than would have been the case had

the surrender been unconditional and the prisoners sent to the James

River to be paroled.

As soon as our troops took possession of the city guards were

established along the whole line of parapet, from the river above to the

river below. The prisoners were allowed to occupy their old camps

behind the intrenchments. No restraint was put upon them, except by

their own commanders. They were rationed about as our own men, and from

our supplies. The men of the two armies fraternized as if they had been

fighting for the same cause. When they passed out of the works they had

so long and so gallantly defended, between lines of their late

antagonists, not a cheer went up, not a remark was made that would give

pain. Really, I believe there was a feeling of sadness just then in the

breasts of most of the Union soldiers at seeing the dejection of their

late antagonists.

The day before the departure the following order was issued:

"Paroled prisoners will be sent out of here to-morrow. They will be

authorized to cross at the railroad bridge, and move from there to

Edward's Ferry, (*14) and on by way of Raymond. Instruct the commands to

be orderly and quiet as these prisoners pass, to make no offensive

remarks, and not to harbor any who fall out of ranks after they have

passed."