CHAPTER LIII.

HANCOCK'S ASSAULT-LOSSES OF THE CONFEDERATES--PROMOTIONS RECOMMENDED

--DISCOMFITURE OF THE ENEMY--EWELL'S ATTACK-REDUCING THE ARTILLERY.

In the reconnoissance made by Mott on the 11th, a salient was discovered

at the right centre. I determined that an assault should be made at that

point. (*28) Accordingly in the afternoon Hancock was ordered to move

his command by the rear of Warren and Wright, under cover of night, to

Wright's left, and there form it for an assault at four o'clock the next

morning. The night was dark, it rained heavily, and the road was

difficult, so that it was midnight when he reached the point where he

was to halt. It took most of the night to get the men in position for

their advance in the morning. The men got but little rest. Burnside

was ordered to attack (*29) on the left of the salient at the same hour.

I sent two of my staff officers to impress upon him the importance of

pushing forward vigorously. Hancock was notified of this. Warren and

Wright were ordered to hold themselves in readiness to join in the

assault if circumstances made it advisable. I occupied a central

position most convenient for receiving information from all points.

Hancock put Barlow on his left, in double column, and Birney to his

right. Mott followed Birney, and Gibbon was held in reserve.

The morning of the 12th opened foggy, delaying the start more than half

an hour.

The ground over which Hancock had to pass to reach the enemy, was

ascending and heavily wooded to within two or three hundred yards of the

enemy's intrenchments. In front of Birney there was also a marsh to

cross. But, notwithstanding all these difficulties, the troops pushed

on in quick time without firing a gun, and when within four or five

hundred yards of the enemy's line broke out in loud cheers, and with a

rush went up to and over the breastworks. Barlow and Birney entered

almost simultaneously. Here a desperate hand-to-hand conflict took

place. The men of the two sides were too close together to fire, but

used their guns as clubs. The hand conflict was soon over. Hancock's

corps captured some four thousand prisoners among them a division and a

brigade commander twenty or more guns with their horses, caissons, and

ammunition, several thousand stand of arms, and many colors. Hancock,

as soon as the hand-to-hand conflict was over, turned the guns of the

enemy against him and advanced inside the rebel lines. About six

o'clock I ordered Warren's corps to the support of Hancock's. Burnside,

on the left, had advanced up east of the salient to the very parapet of

the enemy. Potter, commanding one of his divisions, got over but was

not able to remain there. However, he inflicted a heavy loss upon the

enemy; but not without loss in return.

This victory was important, and one that Lee could not afford to leave

us in full possession of. He made the most strenuous efforts to regain

the position he had lost. Troops were brought up from his left and

attacked Hancock furiously. Hancock was forced to fall back: but he

did so slowly, with his face to the enemy, inflicting on him heavy loss,

until behind the breastworks he had captured. These he turned, facing

them the other way, and continued to hold. Wright was ordered up to

reinforce Hancock, and arrived by six o'clock. He was wounded soon

after coming up but did not relinquish the command of his corps,

although the fighting lasted until one o'clock the next morning. At

eight o'clock Warren was ordered up again, but was so slow in making his

dispositions that his orders were frequently repeated, and with

emphasis. At eleven o'clock I gave Meade written orders to relieve

Warren from his command if he failed to move promptly. Hancock placed

batteries on high ground in his rear, which he used against the enemy,

firing over the heads of his own troops.

Burnside accomplished but little on our left of a positive nature, but

negatively a great deal. He kept Lee from reinforcing his centre from

that quarter. If the 5th corps, or rather if Warren, had been as prompt

as Wright was with the 6th corps, better results might have been

obtained.

Lee massed heavily from his left flank on the broken point of his line.

Five times during the day he assaulted furiously, but without dislodging

our troops from their new position. His losses must have been fearful.

Sometimes the belligerents would be separated by but a few feet. In one

place a tree, eighteen inches in diameter, was cut entirely down by

musket balls. All the trees between the lines were very much cut to

pieces by artillery and musketry. It was three o'clock next morning

before the fighting ceased. Some of our troops had then been twenty

hours under fire. In this engagement we did not lose a single

organization, not even a company. The enemy lost one division with its

commander, one brigade and one regiment, with heavy losses

elsewhere.(*30) Our losses were heavy, but, as stated, no whole company

was captured. At night Lee took a position in rear of his former one,

and by the following morning he was strongly intrenched in it.

Warren's corps was now temporarily broken up, Cutler's division sent to

Wright, and Griffin's to Hancock. Meade ordered his chief of staff,

General Humphreys, to remain with Warren and the remaining division, and

authorized him to give it orders in his name.

During the day I was passing along the line from wing to wing

continuously. About the centre stood a house which proved to be

occupied by an old lady and her daughter. She showed such unmistakable

signs of being strongly Union that I stopped. She said she had not seen

a Union flag for so long a time that it did her heart good to look upon

it again. She said her husband and son, being, Union men, had had to

leave early in the war, and were now somewhere in the Union army, if

alive. She was without food or nearly so, so I ordered rations issued

to her, and promised to find out if I could where the husband and son

were.

There was no fighting on the 13th, further than a little skirmishing

between Mott's division and the enemy. I was afraid that Lee might be

moving out, and I did not want him to go without my knowing it. The

indications were that he was moving, but it was found that he was only

taking his new position back from the salient that had been captured.

Our dead were buried this day. Mott's division was reduced to a

brigade, and assigned to Birney's division.

During this day I wrote to Washington recommending Sherman and Meade

(*31) for promotion to the grade of Major-General in the regular army;

Hancock for Brigadier-General; Wright, Gibbon and Humphreys to be

Major-Generals of Volunteers; and Upton and Carroll to be Brigadiers.

Upton had already been named as such, but the appointment had to be

confirmed by the Senate on the nomination of the President.

The night of the 13th Warren and Wright were moved by the rear to the

left of Burnside. The night was very dark and it rained heavily, the

roads were so bad that the troops had to cut trees and corduroy the road

a part of the way, to get through. It was midnight before they got to

the point where they were to halt, and daylight before the troops could

be organized to advance to their position in line. They gained their

position in line, however, without any fighting, except a little in

Wright's front. Here Upton had to contend for an elevation which we

wanted and which the enemy was not disposed to yield. Upton first drove

the enemy, and was then repulsed in turn. Ayres coming to his support

with his brigade (of Griffin's division, Warren's corps), the position

was secured and fortified. There was no more battle during the 14th.

This brought our line east of the Court House and running north and

south and facing west.

During the night of the 14th-15th Lee moved to cover this new front.

This left Hancock without an enemy confronting him. He was brought to

the rear of our new centre, ready to be moved in any direction he might

be wanted.

On the 15th news came from Butler and Averill. The former reported the

capture of the outer works at Drury's Bluff, on the James River, and

that his cavalry had cut the railroad and telegraph south of Richmond on

the Danville road: and the latter, the destruction of a depot of

supplies at Dublin, West Virginia, and the breaking of New River Bridge

on the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad. The next day news came from

Sherman and Sheridan. Sherman had forced Johnston out of Dalton,

Georgia, and was following him south. The report from Sheridan embraced

his operations up to his passing the outer defences of Richmond. The

prospect must now have been dismal in Richmond. The road and telegraph

were cut between the capital and Lee. The roads and wires were cut in

every direction from the rebel capital. Temporarily that city was cut

off from all communication with the outside except by courier. This

condition of affairs, however, was of but short duration.

I wrote Halleck:

NEAR SPOTTSYLVANIA C. H., May 16, 1864, 8 A.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK, Washington, D. C.:

We have had five days almost constant rain without any prospect yet of

it clearing up. The roads have now become so impassable that ambulances

with wounded men can no longer run between here and Fredericksburg. All

offensive operations necessarily cease until we can have twenty-four

hours of dry weather. The army is in the best of spirits, and feel the

greatest confidence of ultimate success. * * * *

* * You can assure the President and Secretary of War that the

elements alone have suspended hostilities, and that it is in no manner

due to weakness or exhaustion on our part.

U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General.

The condition of the roads was such that nothing was done on the 17th.

But that night Hancock and Wright were to make a night march back to

their old positions, and to make an assault at four o'clock in the

morning. Lee got troops back in time to protect his old line, so the

assault was unsuccessful. On this day (18th) the news was almost as

discouraging to us as it had been two days before in the rebel capital.

As stated above, Hancock's and Wright's corps had made an unsuccessful

assault. News came that Sigel had been defeated at New Market, badly,

and was retreating down the valley. Not two hours before, I had sent

the inquiry to Halleck whether Sigel could not get to Staunton to stop

supplies coming from there to Lee. I asked at once that Sigel might be

relieved, and some one else put in his place. Hunter's name was

suggested, and I heartily approved. Further news from Butler reported

him driven from Drury's Bluff, but still in possession of the Petersburg

road. Banks had been defeated in Louisiana, relieved, and Canby put in

his place. This change of commander was not on my suggestion. All this

news was very discouraging. All of it must have been known by the enemy

before it was by me. In fact, the good news (for the enemy) must have

been known to him at the moment I thought he was in despair, and his

anguish had been already relieved when we were enjoying his supposed

discomfiture, But this was no time for repining. I immediately gave

orders for a movement by the left flank, on towards Richmond, to

commence on the night of the 19th. I also asked Halleck to secure the

cooperation of the navy in changing our base of supplies from

Fredericksburg to Port Royal, on the Rappahannock.

Up to this time I had received no reinforcements, except six thousand

raw troops under Brigadier General Robert O. Tyler, just arrived. They

had not yet joined their command, Hancock's corps, but were on our

right. This corps had been brought to the rear of the centre, ready to

move in any direction. Lee, probably suspecting some move on my part,

and seeing our right entirely abandoned, moved Ewell's corps about five

o'clock in the afternoon, with Early's as a reserve, to attack us in

that quarter. Tyler had come up from Fredericksburg, and had been

halted on the road to the right of our line, near Kitching's brigade of

Warren's corps. Tyler received the attack with his raw troops, and they

maintained their position, until reinforced, in a manner worthy of

veterans.

Hancock was in a position to reinforce speedily, and was the soldier to

do it without waiting to make dispositions. Birney was thrown to

Tyler's right and Crawford to his left, with Gibbon as a reserve; and

Ewell was whirled back speedily and with heavy loss.

Warren had been ordered to get on Ewell's flank and in his rear, to cut

him off from his intrenchments. But his efforts were so feeble that

under the cover of night Ewell got back with only the loss of a few

hundred prisoners, besides his killed and wounded. The army being

engaged until after dark, I rescinded the order for the march by our

left flank that night.

As soon as it was discovered that the enemy were coming out to attack, I

naturally supposed they would detach a force to destroy our trains. The

withdrawal of Hancock from the right uncovered one road from

Spottsylvania to Fredericksburg over which trains drew our supplies.

This was guarded by a division of colored troops, commanded by General

Ferrero, belonging to Burnside's corps. Ferrero was therefore promptly

notified, and ordered to throw his cavalry pickets out to the south and

be prepared to meet the enemy if he should come; if he had to retreat to

do so towards Fredericksburg. The enemy did detach as expected, and

captured twenty-five or thirty wagons which, however, were soon retaken.

In consequence of the disasters that had befallen us in the past few

days, Lee could be reinforced largely, and I had no doubt he would be.

Beauregard had come up from the south with troops to guard the

Confederate capital when it was in danger. Butler being driven back,

most of the troops could be sent to Lee. Hoke was no longer needed in

North Carolina; and Sigel's troops having gone back to Cedar Creek,

whipped, many troops could be spared from the valley.

The Wilderness and Spottsylvania battles convinced me that we had more

artillery than could ever be brought into action at any one time. It

occupied much of the road in marching, and taxed the trains in bringing

up forage. Artillery is very useful when it can be brought into action,

but it is a very burdensome luxury where it cannot be used. Before

leaving Spottsylvania, therefore, I sent back to the defences of

Washington over one hundred pieces of artillery, with the horses and

caissons. This relieved the roads over which we were to march of more

than two hundred six-horse teams, and still left us more artillery than

could be advantageously used. In fact, before reaching the James River

I again reduced the artillery with the army largely.

I believed that, if one corps of the army was exposed on the road to

Richmond, and at a distance from the main army, Lee would endeavor to

attack the exposed corps before reinforcements could come up; in which

case the main army could follow Lee up and attack him before he had time

to intrench. So I issued the following orders:

NEAR SPOTTSYLVANIA C. H., VA., May 18, 1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE, Commanding Army of the Potomac.

Before daylight to-morrow morning I propose to draw Hancock and Burnside

from the position they now hold, and put Burnside to the left of Wright.

Wright and Burnside should then force their way up as close to the enemy

as they can get without a general engagement, or with a general

engagement if the enemy will come out of their works to fight, and

intrench. Hancock should march and take up a position as if in support

of the two left corps. To-morrow night, at twelve or one o'clock, he

will be moved south-east with all his force and as much cavalry as can

be given to him, to get as far towards Richmond on the line of the

Fredericksburg Railroad as he can make, fighting the enemy in whatever

force he can find him. If the enemy make a general move to meet this,

they will be followed by the other three corps of the army, and

attacked, if possible, before time is given to intrench.

Suitable directions will at once be given for all trains and surplus

artillery to conform to this movement.

U. S. GRANT.

On the 20th, Lee showing no signs of coming out of his lines, orders

were renewed for a left-flank movement, to commence after night.