CHAPTER LIV.

MOVEMENT BY THE LEFT FLANK--BATTLE OF NORTH ANNA--AN INCIDENT OF THE

MARCH--MOVING ON RICHMOND--SOUTH OF THE PAMUNKEY--POSITION OF THE

NATIONAL ARMY.

We were now to operate in a different country from any we had before

seen in Virginia. The roads were wide and good, and the country well

cultivated. No men were seen except those bearing arms, even the black

man having been sent away. The country, however, was new to us, and we

had neither guides nor maps to tell us where the roads were, or where

they led to. Engineer and staff officers were put to the dangerous duty

of supplying the place of both maps and guides. By reconnoitring they

were enabled to locate the roads in the vicinity of each army corps.

Our course was south, and we took all roads leading in that direction

which would not separate the army too widely.

Hancock who had the lead had marched easterly to Guiney's Station, on

the Fredericksburg Railroad, thence southerly to Bowling Green and

Milford. He was at Milford by the night of the 21st. Here he met a

detachment of Pickett's division coming from Richmond to reinforce Lee.

They were speedily driven away, and several hundred captured. Warren

followed on the morning of the 21st, and reached Guiney's Station that

night without molestation. Burnside and Wright were retained at

Spottsylvania to keep up the appearance of an intended assault, and to

hold Lee, if possible, while Hancock and Warren should get start enough

to interpose between him and Richmond.

Lee had now a superb opportunity to take the initiative either by

attacking Wright and Burnside alone, or by following by the Telegraph

Road and striking Hancock's and Warren's corps, or even Hancock's alone,

before reinforcements could come up. But he did not avail himself of

either opportunity. He seemed really to be misled as to my designs; but

moved by his interior line--the Telegraph Road--to make sure of keeping

between his capital and the Army of the Potomac. He never again had

such an opportunity of dealing a heavy blow.

The evening of the 21st Burnside, 9th corps, moved out followed by

Wright, 6th corps. Burnside was to take the Telegraph Road; but finding

Stanard's Ford, over the Po, fortified and guarded, he turned east to

the road taken by Hancock and Warren without an attempt to dislodge the

enemy. The night of the 21st I had my headquarters near the 6th corps,

at Guiney's Station, and the enemy's cavalry was between us and Hancock.

There was a slight attack on Burnside's and Wright's corps as they moved

out of their lines; but it was easily repulsed. The object probably was

only to make sure that we were not leaving a force to follow upon the

rear of the Confederates.

By the morning of the 22d Burnside and Wright were at Guiney's Station.

Hancock's corps had now been marching and fighting continuously for

several days, not having had rest even at night much of the time. They

were, therefore, permitted to rest during the 22d. But Warren was

pushed to Harris's Store, directly west of Milford, and connected with

it by a good road, and Burnside was sent to New Bethel Church. Wright's

corps was still back at Guiney's Station.

I issued the following order for the movement of the troops the next

day:

NEW BETHEL, VA., May 22, 1864

MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE, Commanding Army of the Potomac.

Direct corps commanders to hold their troops in readiness to march at

five A.M. to-morrow. At that hour each command will send out cavalry

and infantry on all roads to their front leading south, and ascertain,

if possible, where the enemy is. If beyond the South Anna, the 5th and

6th corps will march to the forks of the road, where one branch leads to

Beaver Dam Station, the other to Jericho Bridge, then south by roads

reaching the Anna, as near to and east of Hawkins Creek as they can be

found.

The 2d corps will move to Chesterfield Ford. The 9th corps will be

directed to move at the same time to Jericho Bridge. The map only shows

two roads for the four corps to march upon, but, no doubt, by the use of

plantation roads, and pressing in guides, others can be found, to give

one for each corps.

The troops will follow their respective reconnoitring parties. The

trains will be moved at the same time to Milford Station.

Headquarters will follow the 9th corps.

U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General.

Warren's corps was moved from Harris's Store to Jericho Ford, Wright's

following. Warren arrived at the ford early in the afternoon, and by

five o'clock effected a crossing under the protection of sharpshooters.

The men had to wade in water up to their waists. As soon as enough

troops were over to guard the ford, pontoons were laid and the artillery

and the rest of the troops crossed. The line formed was almost

perpendicular to the course of the river--Crawford on the left, next to

the river, Griffin in the centre, and Cutler on the right. Lee was

found intrenched along the front of their line. The whole of Hill's

corps was sent against Warren's right before it had got in position. A

brigade of Cutler's division was driven back, the enemy following, but

assistance coming up the enemy was in turn driven back into his trenches

with heavy loss in killed and wounded, with about five hundred prisoners

left in our hands. By night Wright's corps was up ready to reinforce

Warren.

On the 23d Hancock's corps was moved to the wooden bridge which spans

the North Anna River just west of where the Fredericksburg Railroad

crosses. It was near night when the troops arrived. They found the

bridge guarded, with troops intrenched, on the north side. Hancock sent

two brigades, Egan's and Pierce's, to the right and left, and when

properly disposed they charged simultaneously. The bridge was carried

quickly, the enemy retreating over it so hastily that many were shoved

into the river, and some of them were drowned. Several hundred

prisoners were captured. The hour was so late that Hancock did not

cross until next morning.

Burnside's corps was moved by a middle road running between those

described above, and which strikes the North Anna at Ox Ford, midway

between Telegraph Road and Jericho Ford. The hour of its arrival was

too late to cross that night.

On the 24th Hancock's corps crossed to the south side of the river

without opposition, and formed line facing nearly west. The railroad in

rear was taken possession of and destroyed as far as possible. Wright's

corps crossed at Jericho early the same day, and took position to the

right of Warren's corps, extending south of the Virginia Central

Railroad. This road was torn up for a considerable distance to the rear

(west), the ties burned, and the rails bent and twisted by heating them

over the burning ties. It was found, however, that Burnside's corps

could not cross at Ox Ford. Lee had taken a position with his centre on

the river at this point, with the two wings thrown back, his line making

an acute angle where it overlooked the river.

Before the exact position of the whole of Lee's line was accurately

known, I directed Hancock and Warren each to send a brigade to Ox Ford

by the south side of the river. They found the enemy too strong to

justify a serious attack. A third ford was found between Ox Ford and

Jericho. Burnside was directed to cross a division over this ford, and

to send one division to Hancock. Crittenden was crossed by this

newly-discovered ford, and formed up the river to connect with

Crawford's left. Potter joined Hancock by way of the wooden bridge.

Crittenden had a severe engagement with some of Hill's corps on his

crossing the river, and lost heavily. When joined to Warren's corps he

was no further molested. Burnside still guarded Ox Ford from the north

side.

Lee now had his entire army south of the North Anna. Our lines covered

his front, with the six miles separating the two wings guarded by but a

single division. To get from one wing to the other the river would have

to be crossed twice. Lee could reinforce any part of his line from all

points of it in a very short march; or could concentrate the whole of it

wherever he might choose to assault. We were, for the time, practically

two armies besieging.

Lee had been reinforced, and was being reinforced, largely. About this

time the very troops whose coming I had predicted, had arrived or were

coming in. Pickett with a full division from Richmond was up; Hoke from

North Carolina had come with a brigade; and Breckinridge was there: in

all probably not less than fifteen thousand men. But he did not attempt

to drive us from the field.

On the 22d or 23d I received dispatches from Washington saying that

Sherman had taken Kingston, crossed the Etowah River and was advancing

into Georgia.

I was seated at the time on the porch of a fine plantation house waiting

for Burnside's corps to pass. Meade and his staff, besides my own

staff, were with me. The lady of the house, a Mrs. Tyler, and an

elderly lady, were present. Burnside seeing us, came up on the porch,

his big spurs and saber rattling as he walked. He touched his hat

politely to the ladies, and remarked that he supposed they had never

seen so many "live Yankees" before in their lives. The elderly lady

spoke up promptly saying, "Oh yes, I have; many more." "Where?" said

Burnside. "In Richmond." Prisoners, of course, was understood.

I read my dispatch aloud, when it was received. This threw the younger

lady into tears. I found the information she had received (and I suppose

it was the information generally in circulation through the South) was

that Lee was driving us from the State in the most demoralized condition

and that in the South-west our troops were but little better than

prisoners of war. Seeing our troops moving south was ocular proof that

a part of her information was incorrect, and she asked me if my news

from Sherman was true. I assured her that there was no doubt about it.

I left a guard to protect the house from intrusion until the troops

should have all passed, and assured her that if her husband was in

hiding she could bring him in and he should be protected also. But I

presume he was in the Confederate army.

On the 25th I gave orders, through Halleck, to Hunter, who had relieved

Sigel, to move up the Valley of Virginia, cross over the Blue Ridge to

Charlottesville and go as far as Lynchburg if possible, living upon the

country and cutting the railroads and canal as he went. After doing

this he could find his way back to his base, or join me.

On the same day news was received that Lee was falling back on Richmond.

This proved not to be true. But we could do nothing where we were

unless Lee would assume the offensive. I determined, therefore, to draw

out of our present position and make one more effort to get between him

and Richmond. I had no expectation now, however, of succeeding in this;

but I did expect to hold him far enough west to enable me to reach the

James River high up. Sheridan was now again with the Army of the

Potomac.

On the 26th I informed the government at Washington of the position of

the two armies; of the reinforcements the enemy had received; of the

move I proposed to make (*32); and directed that our base of supplies

should be shifted to White House, on the Pamunkey. The wagon train and

guards moved directly from Port Royal to White House. Supplies moved

around by water, guarded by the navy. Orders had previously been sent,

through Halleck, for Butler to send Smith's corps to White House. This

order was repeated on the 25th, with directions that they should be

landed on the north side of the Pamunkey, and marched until they joined

the Army of the Potomac.

It was a delicate move to get the right wing of the Army of the Potomac

from its position south of the North Anna in the presence of the enemy.

To accomplish it, I issued the following order:

QUARLES' MILLS, VA., May 25, 1864.

MAJOR GENERAL MEADE, Commanding A. P.

Direct Generals Warren and Wright to withdraw all their teams and

artillery, not in position, to the north side of the river to-morrow.

Send that belonging to General Wright's corps as far on the road to

Hanover Town as it can go, without attracting attention to the fact.

Send with it Wright's best division or division under his ablest

commander. Have their places filled up in the line so if possible the

enemy will not notice their withdrawal. Send the cavalry to-morrow

afternoon, or as much of it as you may deem necessary, to watch and

seize, if they can, Littlepage's Bridge and Taylor's Ford, and to remain

on one or other side of the river at these points until the infantry and

artillery all pass. As soon as it is dark to-morrow night start the

division which you withdraw first from Wright's corps to make a forced

march to Hanover Town, taking with them no teams to impede their march.

At the same time this division starts commence withdrawing all of the

5th and 6th corps from the south side of the river, and march them for

the same place. The two divisions of the 9th corps not now with

Hancock, may be moved down the north bank of the river where they will

be handy to support Hancock if necessary, or will be that much on their

road to follow the 5th and 6th corps. Hancock should hold his command

in readiness to follow as soon as the way is clear for him. To-morrow it

will leave nothing for him to do, but as soon as he can he should get

all his teams and spare artillery on the road or roads which he will

have to take. As soon as the troops reach Hanover Town they should get

possession of all the crossings they can in that neighborhood. I think

it would be well to make a heavy cavalry demonstration on the enemy's

left, to-morrow afternoon, also.

U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General.

Wilson's division of cavalry was brought up from the left and moved by

our right south to Little River. Here he manoeuvred to give the

impression that we were going to attack the left flank of Lee's army.

Under cover of night our right wing was withdrawn to the north side of

the river, Lee being completely deceived by Wilson's feint. On the

afternoon of the 26th Sheridan moved, sending Gregg's and Torbert's

cavalry to Taylor's and Littlepage's fords towards Hanover. As soon as

it was dark both divisions moved quietly to Hanover Ferry, leaving small

guards behind to keep up the impression that crossings were to be

attempted in the morning. Sheridan was followed by a division of

infantry under General Russell. On the morning of the 27th the crossing

was effected with but little loss, the enemy losing thirty or forty,

taken prisoners. Thus a position was secured south of the Pamunkey.

Russell stopped at the crossing while the cavalry pushed on to Hanover

Town. Here Barringer's, formerly Gordon's, brigade of rebel cavalry was

encountered, but it was speedily driven away.

Warren's and Wright's corps were moved by the rear of Burnside's and

Hancock's corps. When out of the way these latter corps followed,

leaving pickets confronting the enemy. Wilson's cavalry followed last,

watching all the fords until everything had recrossed; then taking up

the pontoons and destroying other bridges, became the rear-guard.

Two roads were traversed by the troops in this move. The one nearest to

and north of the North Anna and Pamunkey was taken by Wright, followed

by Hancock. Warren, followed by Burnside, moved by a road farther

north, and longer. The trains moved by a road still farther north, and

had to travel a still greater distance. All the troops that had crossed

the Pamunkey on the morning of the 27th remained quiet during the rest

of the day, while the troops north of that stream marched to reach the

crossing that had been secured for them.

Lee had evidently been deceived by our movement from North Anna; for on

the morning of the 27th he telegraphed to Richmond: "Enemy crossed to

north side, and cavalry and infantry crossed at Hanover Town." The

troops that had then crossed left his front the night of the 25th.

The country we were now in was a difficult one to move troops over. The

streams were numerous, deep and sluggish, sometimes spreading out into

swamps grown up with impenetrable growths of trees and underbrush. The

banks were generally low and marshy, making the streams difficult to

approach except where there were roads and bridges.

Hanover Town is about twenty miles from Richmond. There are two roads

leading there; the most direct and shortest one crossing the

Chickahominy at Meadow Bridge, near the Virginia Central Railroad, the

second going by New and Old Cold Harbor. A few miles out from Hanover

Town there is a third road by way of Mechanicsville to Richmond. New

Cold Harbor was important to us because while there we both covered the

roads back to White House (where our supplies came from), and the roads

south-east over which we would have to pass to get to the James River

below the Richmond defences.

On the morning of the 28th the army made an early start, and by noon all

had crossed except Burnside's corps. This was left on the north side

temporarily to guard the large wagon train. A line was at once formed

extending south from the river, Wright's corps on the right, Hancock's

in the centre, and Warren's on the left, ready to meet the enemy if he

should come.

At the same time Sheridan was directed to reconnoitre towards

Mechanicsville to find Lee's position. At Hawes' Shop, just where the

middle road leaves the direct road to Richmond, he encountered the

Confederate cavalry dismounted and partially intrenched. Gregg attacked

with his division, but was unable to move the enemy. In the evening

Custer came up with a brigade. The attack was now renewed, the cavalry

dismounting and charging as infantry. This time the assault was

successful, both sides losing a considerable number of men. But our

troops had to bury the dead, and found that more Confederate than Union

soldiers had been killed. The position was easily held, because our

infantry was near.

On the 29th a reconnoissance was made in force, to find the position of

Lee. Wright's corps pushed to Hanover Court House. Hancock's corps

pushed toward Totopotomoy Creek; Warren's corps to the left on the Shady

Grove Church Road, while Burnside was held in reserve. Our advance was

pushed forward three miles on the left with but little fighting. There

was now an appearance of a movement past our left flank, and Sheridan

was sent to meet it.

On the 30th Hancock moved to the Totopotomoy, where he found the enemy

strongly fortified. Wright was moved to the right of Hancock's corps,

and Burnside was brought forward and crossed, taking position to the

left of Hancock. Warren moved up near Huntley Corners on the Shady

Grove Church Road. There was some skirmishing along the centre, and in

the evening Early attacked Warren with some vigor, driving him back at

first, and threatening to turn our left flank. As the best means of

reinforcing the left, Hancock was ordered to attack in his front. He

carried and held the rifle-pits. While this was going on Warren got his

men up, repulsed Early, and drove him more than a mile.

On this day I wrote to Halleck ordering all the pontoons in Washington

to be sent to City Point.

In the evening news was received of the arrival of Smith with his corps

at White House. I notified Meade, in writing, as follows:

NEAR HAWES' SHOP, VA., 6.40 P.M., May 30, 1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE, Commanding A. P.

General Smith will debark his force at the White House tonight and start

up the south bank of the Pamunkey at an early hour, probably at 3 A.M.

in the morning. It is not improbable that the enemy, being aware of

Smith's movement, will be feeling to get on our left flank for the

purpose of cutting him off, or by a dash to crush him and get back

before we are aware of it. Sheridan ought to be notified to watch the

enemy's movements well out towards Cold Harbor, and also on the

Mechanicsville road. Wright should be got well massed on Hancock's

right, so that, if it becomes necessary, he can take the place of the

latter readily whilst troops are being thrown east of the Totopotomoy if

necessary.

I want Sheridan to send a cavalry force of at least half a brigade, if

not a whole brigade, at 5 A.M. in the morning, to communicate with Smith

and to return with him. I will send orders for Smith by the messenger

you send to Sheridan with his orders.

U. S. GRANT.

I also notified Smith of his danger, and the precautions that would be

taken to protect him.

The night of the 30th Lee's position was substantially from Atlee's

Station on the Virginia Central Railroad south and east to the vicinity

of Cold Harbor. Ours was: The left of Warren's corps was on the Shady

Grove Road, extending to the Mechanicsville Road and about three miles

south of the Totopotomoy. Burnside to his right, then Hancock, and

Wright on the extreme right, extending towards Hanover Court House, six

miles south-east of it. Sheridan with two divisions of cavalry was

watching our left front towards Cold Harbor. Wilson with his division

on our right was sent to get on the Virginia Central Railroad and

destroy it as far back as possible. He got possession of Hanover Court

House the next day after a skirmish with Young's cavalry brigade. The

enemy attacked Sheridan's pickets, but reinforcements were sent up and

the attack was speedily repulsed and the enemy followed some distance

towards Cold Harbor.