CHAPTER LVII.
RAID ON THE VIRGINIA CENTRAL RAILROAD--RAID ON THE WELDON RAILROAD
--EARLY 'S MOVEMENT UPON WASHINGTON--MINING THE WORKS BEFORE PETERSBURG
--EXPLOSION OF THE MINE BEFORE PETERSBURG--CAMPAIGN IN THE SHENANDOAH
VALLEY--CAPTURE OF THE WELDON RAILROAD.
On the 7th of June, while at Cold Harbor, I had as already indicated
sent Sheridan with two divisions of cavalry to destroy as much as he
could of the Virginia Central Railroad. General Hunter had been
operating up the Shenandoah Valley with some success, having fought a
battle near Staunton where he captured a great many prisoners, besides
killing and wounding a good many men. After the battle he formed a
junction at Staunton with Averell and Crook, who had come up from the
Kanawha, or Gauley River. It was supposed, therefore, that General
Hunter would be about Charlottesville, Virginia, by the time Sheridan
could get there, doing on the way the damage that he was sent to do.
I gave Sheridan instructions to have Hunter, in case he should meet him
about Charlottesville, join and return with him to the Army of the
Potomac. Lee, hearing of Hunter's success in the valley, started
Breckinridge out for its defence at once. Learning later of Sheridan's
going with two divisions, he also sent Hampton with two divisions of
cavalry, his own and Fitz-Hugh Lee's.
Sheridan moved to the north side of the North Anna to get out west, and
learned of the movement of these troops to the south side of the same
stream almost as soon as they had started. He pushed on to get to
Trevilian Station to commence his destruction at that point. On the
night of the 10th he bivouacked some six or seven miles east of
Trevilian, while Fitz-Hugh Lee was the same night at Trevilian Station
and Hampton but a few miles away.
During the night Hampton ordered an advance on Sheridan, hoping, no
doubt, to surprise and very badly cripple him. Sheridan, however, by a
counter move sent Custer on a rapid march to get between the two
divisions of the enemy and into their rear. This he did successfully, so
that at daylight, when the assault was made, the enemy found himself at
the same time resisted in front and attacked in rear, and broke in some
confusion. The losses were probably very light on both sides in killed
and wounded, but Sheridan got away with some five hundred prisoners and
sent them to City Point.
During that day, the 11th, Sheridan moved into Trevilian Station, and
the following day proceeded to tear up the road east and west. There
was considerable fighting during the whole of the day, but the work of
destruction went on. In the meantime, at night, the enemy had taken
possession of the crossing which Sheridan had proposed to take to go
north when he left Trevilian. Sheridan learned, however, from some of
the prisoners he had captured here, that General Hunter was about
Lynchburg, and therefore that there was no use of his going on to
Charlottesville with a view to meet him.
Sheridan started back during the night of the 12th, and made his way
north and farther east, coming around by the north side of White House,
and arriving there on the 21st. Here he found an abundance of forage
for his animals, food for his men, and security while resting. He had
been obliged to leave about ninety of his own men in the field-hospital
which he had established near Trevilian, and these necessarily fell into
the hands of the enemy.
White House up to this time had been a depot; but now that our troops
were all on the James River, it was no longer wanted as a store of
supplies. Sheridan was, therefore, directed to break it up; which he
did on the 22d of June, bringing the garrison and an immense wagon train
with him. All these were over the James River by the 26th of the month,
and Sheridan ready to follow.
In the meantime Meade had sent Wilson's division on a raid to destroy
the Weldon and South Side roads. Now that Sheridan was safe and Hampton
free to return to Richmond with his cavalry, Wilson's position became
precarious. Meade therefore, on the 27th, ordered Sheridan over the
river to make a demonstration in favor of Wilson. Wilson got back,
though not without severe loss, having struck both roads, but the damage
done was soon repaired.
After these events comparative quiet reigned about Petersburg until late
in July. The time, however, was spent in strengthening the
intrenchments and making our position generally more secure against a
sudden attack. In the meantime I had to look after other portions of my
command, where things had not been going on so favorably, always, as I
could have wished.
General Hunter who had been appointed to succeed Sigel in the Shenandoah
Valley immediately took up the offensive. He met the enemy on the 5th
of June at Piedmont, and defeated him. On the 8th he formed a junction
with Crook and Averell at Staunton, from which place he moved direct on
Lynchburg, via Lexington, which he reached and invested on the 16th. Up
to this time he was very successful; and but for the difficulty of
taking with him sufficient ordnance stores over so long a march, through
a hostile country, he would, no doubt, have captured Lynchburg. The
destruction of the enemy's supplies and manufactories had been very
great. To meet this movement under General Hunter, General Lee sent
Early with his corps, a part of which reached Lynchburg before Hunter.
After some skirmishing on the 17th and 18th, General Hunter, owing to a
want of ammunition to give battle, retired from before the place.
Unfortunately, this want of ammunition left him no choice of route for
his return but by the way of the Gauley and Kanawha rivers, thence up
the Ohio River, returning to Harper's Ferry by way of the Baltimore and
Ohio Railroad. A long time was consumed in making this movement.
Meantime the valley was left open to Early's troops, and others in that
quarter; and Washington also was uncovered. Early took advantage of this
condition of affairs and moved on Washington.
In the absence of Hunter, General Lew Wallace, with headquarters at
Baltimore, commanded the department in which the Shenandoah lay. His
surplus of troops with which to move against the enemy was small in
number. Most of these were raw and, consequently, very much inferior to
our veterans and to the veterans which Early had with him; but the
situation of Washington was precarious, and Wallace moved with
commendable promptitude to meet the enemy at the Monocacy. He could
hardly have expected to defeat him badly, but he hoped to cripple and
delay him until Washington could be put into a state of preparation for
his reception. I had previously ordered General Meade to send a
division to Baltimore for the purpose of adding to the defences of
Washington, and he had sent Ricketts's division of the 6th corps
(Wright's), which arrived in Baltimore on the 8th of July. Finding that
Wallace had gone to the front with his command, Ricketts immediately
took the cars and followed him to the Monocacy with his entire division.
They met the enemy and, as might have been expected, were defeated; but
they succeeded in stopping him for the day on which the battle took
place. The next morning Early started on his march to the capital of
the Nation, arriving before it on the 11th.
Learning of the gravity of the situation I had directed General Meade to
also order Wright with the rest of his corps directly to Washington for
the relief of that place, and the latter reached there the very day that
Early arrived before it. The 19th corps, which had been stationed in
Louisiana, having been ordered up to reinforce the armies about
Richmond, had about this time arrived at Fortress Monroe, on their way
to join us. I diverted them from that point to Washington, which place
they reached, almost simultaneously with Wright, on the 11th. The 19th
corps was commanded by Major-General Emory.
Early made his reconnoissance with a view of attacking on the following
morning, the 12th; but the next morning he found our intrenchments,
which were very strong, fully manned. He at once commenced to retreat,
Wright following. There is no telling how much this result was
contributed to by General Lew Wallace's leading what might well be
considered almost a forlorn hope. If Early had been but one day earlier
he might have entered the capital before the arrival of the
reinforcements I had sent. Whether the delay caused by the battle
amounted to a day or not, General Wallace contributed on this occasion,
by the defeat of the troops under him a greater benefit to the cause
than often falls to the lot of a commander of an equal force to render
by means of a victory.
Farther west also the troubles were threatening. Some time before,
Forrest had met Sturgis in command of some of our cavalry in Mississippi
and handled him very roughly, gaining a very great victory over him.
This left Forrest free to go almost where he pleased, and to cut the
roads in rear of Sherman who was then advancing. Sherman was abundantly
able to look after the army that he was immediately with, and all of his
military division so long as he could communicate with it; but it was my
place to see that he had the means with which to hold his rear. Two
divisions under A. J. Smith had been sent to Banks in Louisiana some
months before. Sherman ordered these back, with directions to attack
Forrest. Smith met and defeated him very badly. I then directed that
Smith should hang to Forrest and not let him go; and to prevent by all
means his getting upon the Memphis and Nashville Railroad. Sherman had
anticipated me in this matter, and given the same orders in substance;
but receiving my directions for this order to Smith, he repeated it.
On the 25th of June General Burnside had commenced running a mine from
about the centre of his front under the Confederate works confronting
him. He was induced to do this by Colonel Pleasants, of the
Pennsylvania Volunteers, whose regiment was mostly composed of miners,
and who was himself a practical miner. Burnside had submitted the
scheme to Meade and myself, and we both approved of it, as a means of
keeping the men occupied. His position was very favorable for carrying
on this work, but not so favorable for the operations to follow its
completion. The position of the two lines at that point were only about
a hundred yards apart with a comparatively deep ravine intervening. In
the bottom of this ravine the work commenced. The position was
unfavorable in this particular: that the enemy's line at that point was
re-entering, so that its front was commanded by their own lines both to
the right and left. Then, too, the ground was sloping upward back of
the Confederate line for a considerable distance, and it was presumable
that the enemy had, at least, a detached work on this highest point.
The work progressed, and on the 23d of July the mine was finished ready
for charging; but I had this work of charging deferred until we were
ready for it.
On the 17th of July several deserters came in and said that there was
great consternation in Richmond, and that Lee was coming out to make an
attack upon us the object being to put us on the defensive so that he
might detach troops to go to Georgia where the army Sherman was
operating against was said to be in great trouble. I put the army
commanders, Meade and Butler, on the lookout, but the attack was not
made.
I concluded, then, a few days later, to do something in the way of
offensive movement myself, having in view something of the same object
that Lee had had. Wright's and Emory's corps were in Washington, and
with this reduction of my force Lee might very readily have spared some
troops from the defences to send West. I had other objects in view,
however, besides keeping Lee where he was. The mine was constructed and
ready to be exploded, and I wanted to take that occasion to carry
Petersburg if I could. It was the object, therefore, to get as many of
Lee's troops away from the south side of the James River as possible.
Accordingly, on the 26th, we commenced a movement with Hancock's corps
and Sheridan's cavalry to the north side by the way of Deep Bottom,
where Butler had a pontoon bridge laid. The plan, in the main, was to
let the cavalry cut loose and, joining with Kautz's cavalry of the Army
of the James, get by Lee's lines and destroy as much as they could of
the Virginia Central Railroad, while, in the mean time, the infantry was
to move out so as to protect their rear and cover their retreat back
when they should have got through with their work. We were successful
in drawing the enemy's troops to the north side of the James as I
expected. The mine was ordered to be charged, and the morning of the
30th of July was the time fixed for its explosion. I gave Meade minute
orders (*38) on the 24th directing how I wanted the assault conducted,
which orders he amplified into general instructions for the guidance of
the troops that were to be engaged.
Meade's instructions, which I, of course, approved most heartily, were
all that I can see now was necessary. The only further precaution which
he could have taken, and which he could not foresee, would have been to
have different men to execute them.
The gallery to the mine was over five hundred feet long from where it
entered the ground to the point where it was under the enemy's works,
and with a cross gallery of something over eighty feet running under
their lines. Eight chambers had been left, requiring a ton of powder
each to charge them. All was ready by the time I had prescribed; and on
the 29th Hancock and Sheridan were brought back near the James River
with their troops. Under cover of night they started to recross the
bridge at Deep Bottom, and to march directly for that part of our lines
in front of the mine.
Warren was to hold his line of intrenchments with a sufficient number of
men and concentrate the balance on the right next to Burnside's corps,
while Ord, now commanding the 18th corps, temporarily under Meade, was
to form in the rear of Burnside to support him when he went in. All
were to clear off the parapets and the _abatis_ in their front so as to
leave the space as open as possible, and be able to charge the moment
the mine had been sprung and Burnside had taken possession. Burnside's
corps was not to stop in the crater at all but push on to the top of the
hill, supported on the right and left by Ord's and Warren's corps.
Warren and Ord fulfilled their instructions perfectly so far as making
ready was concerned. Burnside seemed to have paid no attention whatever
to the instructions, and left all the obstruction in his own front for
his troops to get over in the best way they could. The four divisions
of his corps were commanded by Generals Potter, Willcox, Ledlie and
Ferrero. The last was a colored division; and Burnside selected it to
make the assault. Meade interfered with this. Burnside then took
Ledlie's division--a worse selection than the first could have been. In
fact, Potter and Willcox were the only division commanders Burnside had
who were equal to the occasion. Ledlie besides being otherwise
inefficient, proved also to possess disqualification less common among
soldiers.
There was some delay about the explosion of the mine so that it did not
go off until about five o'clock in the morning. When it did explode it
was very successful, making a crater twenty feet deep and something like
a hundred feet in length. Instantly one hundred and ten cannon and
fifty mortars, which had been placed in the most commanding positions
covering the ground to the right and left of where the troops were to
enter the enemy's lines, commenced playing. Ledlie's division marched
into the crater immediately on the explosion, but most of the men
stopped there in the absence of any one to give directions; their
commander having found some safe retreat to get into before they
started. There was some delay on the left and right in advancing, but
some of the troops did get in and turn to the right and left, carrying
the rifle-pits as I expected they would do.
There had been great consternation in Petersburg, as we were well aware,
about a rumored mine that we were going to explode. They knew we were
mining, and they had failed to cut our mine off by countermining, though
Beauregard had taken the precaution to run up a line of intrenchments to
the rear of that part of their line fronting where they could see that
our men were at work. We had learned through deserters who had come in
that the people had very wild rumors about what was going on on our
side. They said that we had undermined the whole of Petersburg; that
they were resting upon a slumbering volcano and did not know at what
moment they might expect an eruption. I somewhat based my calculations
upon this state of feeling, and expected that when the mine was exploded
the troops to the right and left would flee in all directions, and that
our troops, if they moved promptly, could get in and strengthen
themselves before the enemy had come to a realization of the true
situation. It was just as I expected it would be. We could see the men
running without any apparent object except to get away. It was half an
hour before musketry firing, to amount to anything, was opened upon our
men in the crater. It was an hour before the enemy got artillery up to
play upon them; and it was nine o'clock before Lee got up reinforcements
from his right to join in expelling our troops.
The effort was a stupendous failure. It cost us about four thousand
men, mostly, however, captured; and all due to inefficiency on the part
of the corps commander and the incompetency of the division commander
who was sent to lead the assault.
After being fully assured of the failure of the mine, and finding that
most of that part of Lee's army which had been drawn north of the James
River were still there, I gave Meade directions to send a corps of
infantry and the cavalry next morning, before Lee could get his forces
back, to destroy fifteen or twenty miles of the Weldon Railroad. But
misfortunes never come singly. I learned during that same afternoon
that Wright's pursuit of Early was feeble because of the constant and
contrary orders he had been receiving from Washington, while I was cut
off from immediate communication by reason of our cable across
Chesapeake Bay being broken. Early, however, was not aware of the fact
that Wright was not pursuing until he had reached Strasburg. Finding
that he was not pursued he turned back to Winchester, where Crook was
stationed with a small force, and drove him out. He then pushed north
until he had reached the Potomac, then he sent McCausland across to
Chambersburg, Pa., to destroy that town. Chambersburg was a purely
defenceless town with no garrison whatever, and no fortifications; yet
McCausland, under Early's orders, burned the place and left about three
hundred families houseless. This occurred on the 30th of July. I
rescinded my orders for the troops to go out to destroy the Weldon
Railroad, and directed them to embark for Washington City. After
burning Chambersburg McCausland retreated, pursued by our cavalry,
towards Cumberland. They were met and defeated by General Kelley and
driven into Virginia.
The Shenandoah Valley was very important to the Confederates, because it
was the principal storehouse they now had for feeding their armies about
Richmond. It was well known that they would make a desperate struggle
to maintain it. It had been the source of a great deal of trouble to us
heretofore to guard that outlet to the north, partly because of the
incompetency of some of the commanders, but chiefly because of
interference from Washington.
It seemed to be the policy of General Halleck and Secretary Stanton to
keep any force sent there, in pursuit of the invading army, moving right
and left so as to keep between the enemy and our capital; and, generally
speaking, they pursued this policy until all knowledge of the
whereabouts of the enemy was lost. They were left, therefore, free to
supply themselves with horses, beef cattle, and such provisions as they
could carry away from Western Maryland and Pennsylvania. I determined
to put a stop to this. I started Sheridan at once for that field of
operation, and on the following day sent another division of his
cavalry.
I had previously asked to have Sheridan assigned to that command, but
Mr. Stanton objected, on the ground that he was too young for so
important a command. On the 1st of August when I sent reinforcements
for the protection of Washington, I sent the following orders:
CITY POINT, VA.,
August 1, 1864, 11.30 A.M.
MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK, Washington D. C.
I am sending General Sheridan for temporary duty whilst the enemy is
being expelled from the border. Unless General Hunter is in the field
in person, I want Sheridan put in command of all the troops in the
field, with instructions to put himself south of the enemy and follow
him to the death. Wherever the enemy goes let our troops go also. Once
started up the valley they ought to be followed until we get possession
of the Virginia Central Railroad. If General Hunter is in the field,
give Sheridan direct command of the 6th corps and cavalry division. All
the cavalry, I presume, will reach Washington in the course of
to-morrow.
U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
The President in some way or other got to see this dispatch of mine
directing certain instructions to be given to the commanders in the
field, operating against Early, and sent me the following very
characteristic dispatch:
OFFICE U. S. MILITARY TELEGRAPH, WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C.,
August 3, 1864.
Cypher. 6 P.M.,
LT. GENERAL GRANT, City Point, Va.
I have seen your despatch in which you say, "I want Sheridan put in
command of all the troops in the field, with instructions to put himself
south of the enemy, and follow him to the death. Wherever the enemy
goes, let our troops go also." This, I think, is exactly right, as to
how our forces should move. But please look over the despatches you may
have received from here, even since you made that order, and discover,
if you can, that there is any idea in the head of any one here, of
"putting our army south of the enemy," or of "following him to the
death" in any direction. I repeat to you it will neither be done nor
attempted unless you watch it every day, and hour, and force it.
A. LINCOLN.
I replied to this that "I would start in two hours for Washington," and
soon got off, going directly to the Monocacy without stopping at
Washington on my way. I found General Hunter's army encamped there,
scattered over the fields along the banks of the Monocacy, with many
hundreds of cars and locomotives, belonging to the Baltimore and Ohio
Railroad, which he had taken the precaution to bring back and collect at
that point. I asked the general where the enemy was. He replied that
he did not know. He said the fact was, that he was so embarrassed with
orders from Washington moving him first to the right and then to the
left that he had lost all trace of the enemy.
I then told the general that I would find out where the enemy was, and
at once ordered steam got up and trains made up, giving directions to
push for Halltown, some four miles above Harper's Ferry, in the
Shenandoah Valley. The cavalry and the wagon trains were to march, but
all the troops that could be transported by the cars were to go in that
way. I knew that the valley was of such importance to the enemy that,
no matter how much he was scattered at that time, he would in a very
short time be found in front of our troops moving south.
I then wrote out General Hunter's instructions. (*39) I told him that
Sheridan was in Washington, and still another division was on its way;
and suggested that he establish the headquarters of the department at
any point that would suit him best, Cumberland, Baltimore, or elsewhere,
and give Sheridan command of the troops in the field. The general
replied to this, that he thought he had better be relieved entirely. He
said that General Halleck seemed so much to distrust his fitness for the
position he was in that he thought somebody else ought to be there. He
did not want, in any way, to embarrass the cause; thus showing a
patriotism that was none too common in the army. There were not many
major-generals who would voluntarily have asked to have the command of a
department taken from them on the supposition that for some particular
reason, or for any reason, the service would be better performed. I
told him, "very well then," and telegraphed at once for Sheridan to come
to the Monocacy, and suggested that I would wait and meet him there.
Sheridan came at once by special train, but reached there after the
troops were all off. I went to the station and remained there until he
arrived. Myself and one or two of my staff were about all the Union
people, except General Hunter and his staff, who were left at the
Monocacy when Sheridan arrived. I hastily told Sheridan what had been
done and what I wanted him to do, giving him, at the same time, the
written instructions which had been prepared for General Hunter and
directed to that officer.
Sheridan now had about 30,000 men to move with, 8,000 of them being
cavalry. Early had about the same number, but the superior ability of
the National commander over the Confederate commander was so great that
all the latter's advantage of being on the defensive was more than
counterbalanced by this circumstance. As I had predicted, Early was
soon found in front of Sheridan in the valley, and Pennsylvania and
Maryland were speedily freed from the invaders. The importance of the
valley was so great to the Confederates that Lee reinforced Early, but
not to the extent that we thought and feared he would.
To prevent as much as possible these reinforcements from being sent out
from Richmond, I had to do something to compel Lee to retain his forces
about his capital. I therefore gave orders for another move to the
north side of the James River, to threaten Richmond. Hancock's corps,
part of the 10th corps under Birney, and Gregg's division of cavalry
were crossed to the north side of the James during the night of the
13th-14th of August. A threatening position was maintained for a number
of days, with more or less skirmishing, and some tolerably hard
fighting; although it was my object and my instructions that anything
like a battle should be avoided, unless opportunities should present
themselves which would insure great success. General Meade was left in
command of the few troops around Petersburg, strongly intrenched; and
was instructed to keep a close watch upon the enemy in that quarter, and
himself to take advantage of any weakening that might occur through an
effort on the part of the enemy to reinforce the north side. There was
no particular victory gained on either side; but during that time no
more reinforcements were sent to the valley.
I informed Sheridan of what had been done to prevent reinforcements
being sent from Richmond against him, and also that the efforts we had
made had proven that one of the divisions which we supposed had gone to
the valley was still at Richmond, because we had captured six or seven
hundred prisoners from that division, each of its four brigades having
contributed to our list of captures. I also informed him that but one
division had gone, and it was possible that I should be able to prevent
the going of any more.
To add to my embarrassment at this time Sherman, who was now near
Atlanta, wanted reinforcements. He was perfectly willing to take the
raw troops then being raised in the North-west, saying that he could
teach them more soldiering in one day among his troops than they would
learn in a week in a camp of instruction. I therefore asked that all
troops in camps of instruction in the North-west be sent to him.
Sherman also wanted to be assured that no Eastern troops were moving out
against him. I informed him of what I had done and assured him that I
would hold all the troops there that it was possible for me to hold, and
that up to that time none had gone. I also informed him that his real
danger was from Kirby Smith, who commanded the trans-Mississippi
Department. If Smith should escape Steele, and get across the
Mississippi River, he might move against him. I had, therefore, asked
to have an expedition ready to move from New Orleans against Mobile in
case Kirby Smith should get across. This would have a tendency to draw
him to the defence of that place, instead of going against Sherman.
Right in the midst of all these embarrassments Halleck informed me that
there was an organized scheme on foot in the North to resist the draft,
and suggested that it might become necessary to draw troops from the
field to put it down. He also advised taking in sail, and not going too
fast.
The troops were withdrawn from the north side of the James River on the
night of the 20th. Before they were withdrawn, however, and while most
of Lee's force was on that side of the river, Warren had been sent with
most of the 5th corps to capture the Weldon Railroad. He took up his
line of march well back to the rear, south of the enemy, while the
troops remaining in the trenches extended so as to cover that part of
the line which he had vacated by moving out. From our left, near the
old line, it was about three miles to the Weldon Railroad. A division
was ordered from the right of the Petersburg line to reinforce Warren,
while a division was brought back from the north side of the James River
to take its place.
This road was very important to the enemy. The limits from which his
supplies had been drawn were already very much contracted, and I knew
that he must fight desperately to protect it. Warren carried the road,
though with heavy loss on both sides. He fortified his new position,
and our trenches were then extended from the left of our main line to
connect with his new one. Lee made repeated attempts to dislodge
Warren's corps, but without success, and with heavy loss.
As soon as Warren was fortified and reinforcements reached him, troops
were sent south to destroy the bridges on the Weldon Railroad; and with
such success that the enemy had to draw in wagons, for a distance of
about thirty miles, all the supplies they got thereafter from that
source. It was on the 21st that Lee seemed to have given up the Weldon
Railroad as having been lost to him; but along about the 24th or 25th he
made renewed attempts to recapture it; again he failed and with very
heavy losses to him as compared with ours.
On the night of the 20th our troops on the north side of the James were
withdrawn, and Hancock and Gregg were sent south to destroy the Weldon
Railroad. They were attacked on the 25th at Reams's Station, and after
desperate fighting a part of our line gave way, losing five pieces of
artillery. But the Weldon Railroad never went out of our possession
from the 18th of August to the close of the war.