CHAPTER LVI.

LEFT FLANK MOVEMENT ACROSS THE CHICKAHOMINY AND JAMES--GENERAL LEE

--VISIT TO BUTLER--THE MOVEMENT ON PETERSBURG--THE INVESTMENT OF

PETERSBURG.

Lee's position was now so near Richmond, and the intervening swamps of

the Chickahominy so great an obstacle to the movement of troops in the

face of an enemy, that I determined to make my next left flank move

carry the Army of the Potomac south of the James River. (*34)

Preparations for this were promptly commenced. The move was a hazardous

one to make: the Chickahominy River, with its marshy and heavily

timbered approaches, had to be crossed; all the bridges over it east of

Lee were destroyed; the enemy had a shorter line and better roads to

travel on to confront me in crossing; more than fifty miles intervened

between me and Butler, by the roads I should have to travel, with both

the James and the Chickahominy unbridged to cross; and last, the Army of

the Potomac had to be got out of a position but a few hundred yards from

the enemy at the widest place. Lee, if he did not choose to follow me,

might, with his shorter distance to travel and his bridges over the

Chickahominy and the James, move rapidly on Butler and crush him before

the army with me could come to his relief. Then too he might spare

troops enough to send against Hunter who was approaching Lynchburg,

living upon the country he passed through, and without ammunition

further than what he carried with him.

But the move had to be made, and I relied upon Lee's not seeing my

danger as I saw it. Besides we had armies on both sides of the James

River and not far from the Confederate capital. I knew that its safety

would be a matter of the first consideration with the executive,

legislative and judicial branches of the so-called Confederate

government, if it was not with the military commanders. But I took all

the precaution I knew of to guard against all dangers.

Sheridan was sent with two divisions, to communicate with Hunter and to

break up the Virginia Central Railroad and the James River Canal, on the

7th of June, taking instructions to Hunter to come back with him (*35).

Hunter was also informed by way of Washington and the Valley that

Sheridan was on the way to meet him. The canal and Central Road, and

the regions penetrated by them, were of vast importance to the enemy,

furnishing and carrying a large per cent. of all the supplies for the

Army of Northern Virginia and the people of Richmond. Before Sheridan

got off on the 7th news was received from Hunter reporting his advance

to Staunton and successful engagement with the enemy near that place on

the 5th, in which the Confederate commander, W. S. Jones, was killed.

On the 4th of June the enemy having withdrawn his left corps, Burnside

on our right was moved up between Warren and Smith. On the 5th Birney

returned to Hancock, which extended his left now to the Chickahominy,

and Warren was withdrawn to Cold Harbor. Wright was directed to send

two divisions to the left to extend down the banks of that stream to

Bottom's Bridge. The cavalry extended still farther east to Jones's

Bridge.

On the 7th Abercrombie--who was in command at White House, and who had

been in command at our base of supplies in all the changes made from the

start--was ordered to take up the iron from the York River Railroad and

put it on boats, and to be in readiness to move by water to City Point.

On the 8th Meade was directed to fortify a line down the bank

overlooking the Chickahominy, under cover of which the army could move.

On the 9th Abercrombie was directed to send all organized troops

arriving at White House, without debarking from their transports, to

report to Butler. Halleck was at this time instructed to send all

reinforcements to City Point.

On the 11th I wrote:

COLD HARBOR, VA., June 11, 1864.

MAJOR-GEN. B. F. BUTLER, Commanding Department of Va. and N. C.

The movement to transfer this army to the south side of the James River

will commence after dark to-morrow night. Col. Comstock, of my staff,

was sent specially to ascertain what was necessary to make your position

secure in the interval during which the enemy might use most of his

force against you, and also, to ascertain what point on the river we

should reach to effect a crossing if it should not be practicable to

reach this side of the river at Bermuda Hundred. Colonel Comstock has

not yet returned, so that I cannot make instructions as definite as I

would wish, but the time between this and Sunday night being so short in

which to get word to you, I must do the best I can. Colonel Dent goes

to the Chickahominy to take to you the 18th corps. The corps will leave

its position in the trenches as early in the evening, tomorrow, as

possible, and make a forced march to Cole's Landing or Ferry, where it

should reach by ten A.M. the following morning. This corps numbers now

15,300 men. They take with them neither wagons nor artillery; these

latter marching with the balance of the army to the James River. The

remainder of the army will cross the Chickahominy at Long Bridge and at

Jones's, and strike the river at the most practicable crossing below

City Point.

I directed several days ago that all reinforcements for the army should

be sent to you. I am not advised of the number that may have gone, but

suppose you have received from six to ten thousand. General Smith will

also reach you as soon as the enemy could, going by the way of Richmond.

The balance of the force will not be more than one day behind, unless

detained by the whole of Lee's army, in which case you will be strong

enough.

I wish you would direct the proper staff officers, your chief-engineer

and your chief-quartermaster, to commence at once the collection of all

the means in their reach for crossing the army on its arrival. If there

is a point below City Point where a pontoon bridge can be thrown, have

it laid.

Expecting the arrival of the 18th corps by Monday night, if you deem it

practicable from the force you have to seize and hold Petersburg, you

may prepare to start, on the arrival of troops to hold your present

lines. I do not want Petersburg visited, however, unless it is held,

nor an attempt to take it, unless you feel a reasonable degree of

confidence of success. If you should go there, I think troops should

take nothing with them except what they can carry, depending upon

supplies being sent after the place is secured. If Colonel Dent should

not succeed in securing the requisite amount of transportation for the

18th corps before reaching you, please have the balance supplied.

U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General.

P. S.--On reflection I will send the 18th corps by way of White House.

The distance which they will have to march will be enough shorter to

enable them to reach you about the same time, and the uncertainty of

navigation on the Chickahominy will be avoided.

U. S. GRANT.

COLD HARBOR, VA., June 11,1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL G. G. MEADE, Commanding Army of the Potomac.

Colonel Comstock, who visited the James River for the purpose of

ascertaining the best point below Bermuda Hundred to which to march the

army has not yet returned. It is now getting so late, however, that all

preparations may be made for the move to-morrow night without waiting

longer.

The movement will be made as heretofore agreed upon, that is, the 18th

corps make a rapid march with the infantry alone, their wagons and

artillery accompanying the balance of the army to Cole's Landing or

Ferry, and there embark for City Point, losing no time for rest until

they reach the latter point.

The 5th corps will seize Long Bridge and move out on the Long Bridge

Road to its junction with Quaker Road, or until stopped by the enemy.

The other three corps will follow in such order as you may direct, one

of them crossing at Long Bridge, and two at Jones's Bridge. After the

crossing is effected, the most practicable roads will be taken to reach

about Fort Powhattan. Of course, this is supposing the enemy makes no

opposition to our advance. The 5th corps, after securing the passage of

the balance of the army, will join or follow in rear of the corps which

crosses the same bridge with themselves. The wagon trains should be

kept well east of the troops, and if a crossing can be found, or made

lower down than Jones's they should take it.

U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General.

P. S.--In view of the long march to reach Cole's Landing, and the

uncertainty of being able to embark a large number of men there, the

direction of the 18th corps may be changed to White House. They should

be directed to load up transports, and start them as fast as loaded

without waiting for the whole corps or even whole divisions to go

together.

U. S. GRANT.

About this time word was received (through the Richmond papers of the

11th) that Crook and Averell had united and were moving east. This,

with the news of Hunter's successful engagement near Staunton, was no

doubt known to Lee before it was to me. Then Sheridan leaving with two

divisions of cavalry, looked indeed threatening, both to Lee's

communications and supplies. Much of his cavalry was sent after

Sheridan, and Early with Ewell's entire corps was sent to the Valley.

Supplies were growing scarce in Richmond, and the sources from which to

draw them were in our hands. People from outside began to pour into

Richmond to help eat up the little on hand. Consternation reigned

there.

On the 12th Smith was ordered to move at night to White House, not to

stop until he reached there, and to take boats at once for City Point,

leaving his trains and artillery to move by land.

Soon after dark some of the cavalry at Long Bridge effected a crossing

by wading and floundering through the water and mud, leaving their

horses behind, and drove away the cavalry pickets. A pontoon bridge was

speedily thrown across, over which the remainder of the army soon passed

and pushed out for a mile or two to watch and detain any advance that

might be made from the other side. Warren followed the cavalry, and by

the morning of the 13th had his whole corps over. Hancock followed

Warren. Burnside took the road to Jones's Bridge, followed by Wright.

Ferrero's division, with the wagon train, moved farther east, by Window

Shades and Cole's Ferry, our rear being covered by cavalry.

It was known that the enemy had some gunboats at Richmond. These might

run down at night and inflict great damage upon us before they could be

sunk or captured by our navy. General Butler had, in advance, loaded

some vessels with stone ready to be sunk so as to obstruct the channel

in an emergency. On the 13th I sent orders to have these sunk as high

up the river as we could guard them, and prevent their removal by the

enemy.

As soon as Warren's corps was over the Chickahominy it marched out and

joined the cavalry in holding the roads from Richmond while the army

passed. No attempt was made by the enemy to impede our march, however,

but Warren and Wilson reported the enemy strongly fortified in their

front. By the evening of the 13th Hancock's corps was at Charles City

Court House on the James River. Burnside's and Wright's corps were on

the Chickahominy, and crossed during the night, Warren's corps and the

cavalry still covering the army. The material for a pontoon bridge was

already at hand and the work of laying it was commenced immediately,

under the superintendence of Brigadier-General Benham, commanding the

engineer brigade. On the evening of the 14th the crossing commenced,

Hancock in advance, using both the bridge and boats.

When the Wilderness campaign commenced the Army of the Potomac,

including Burnside's--which was a separate command until the 24th of May

when it was incorporated with the main army--numbered about 116,000 men.

During the progress of the campaign about 40,000 reinforcements were

received. At the crossing of the James River June 14th-15th the army

numbered about 115,000. Besides the ordinary losses incident to a

campaign of six weeks' nearly constant fighting or skirmishing, about

one-half of the artillery was sent back to Washington, and many men were

discharged by reason of the expiration of their term of service.* In

estimating our strength every enlisted man and every commissioned

officer present is included, no matter how employed; in bands, sick in

field hospitals, hospital attendants, company cooks and all. Operating

in an enemy's country, and being supplied always from a distant base,

large detachments had at all times to be sent from the front, not only

to guard the base of supplies and the roads to it, but all the roads

leading to our flanks and rear. We were also operating in a country

unknown to us, and without competent guides or maps showing the roads

accurately.

The manner of estimating numbers in the two armies differs materially.

In the Confederate army often only bayonets are taken into account,

never, I believe, do they estimate more than are handling the guns of

the artillery and armed with muskets (*36) or carbines. Generally the

latter are far enough away to be excluded from the count in any one

field. Officers and details of enlisted men are not included. In the

Northern armies the estimate is most liberal, taking in all connected

with the army and drawing pay.

Estimated in the same manner as ours, Lee had not less than 80,000 men

at the start. His reinforcements were about equal to ours during the

campaign, deducting the discharged men and those sent back. He was on

the defensive, and in a country in which every stream, every road, every

obstacle to the movement of troops and every natural defence was

familiar to him and his army. The citizens were all friendly to him and

his cause, and could and did furnish him with accurate reports of our

every move. Rear guards were not necessary for him, and having always a

railroad at his back, large wagon trains were not required. All

circumstances considered we did not have any advantage in numbers.

General Lee, who had led the Army of Northern Virginia in all these

contests, was a very highly estimated man in the Confederate army and

States, and filled also a very high place in the estimation of the

people and press of the Northern States. His praise was sounded

throughout the entire North after every action he was engaged in: the

number of his forces was always lowered and that of the National forces

exaggerated. He was a large, austere man, and I judge difficult of

approach to his subordinates. To be extolled by the entire press of the

South after every engagement, and by a portion of the press North with

equal vehemence, was calculated to give him the entire confidence of his

troops and to make him feared by his antagonists. It was not an

uncommon thing for my staff-officers to hear from Eastern officers,

"Well, Grant has never met Bobby Lee yet." There were good and true

officers who believe now that the Army of Northern Virginia was superior

to the Army of the Potomac man to man. I do not believe so, except as

the advantages spoken of above made them so. Before the end I believe

the difference was the other way. The Army of Northern Virginia became

despondent and saw the end. It did not please them. The National army

saw the same thing, and were encouraged by it.

The advance of the Army of the Potomac reached the James on the 14th of

June. Preparations were at once commenced for laying the pontoon

bridges and crossing the river. As already stated, I had previously

ordered General Butler to have two vessels loaded with stone and carried

up the river to a point above that occupied by our gunboats, where the

channel was narrow, and sunk there so as to obstruct the passage and

prevent Confederate gunboats from coming down the river. Butler had had

these boats filled and put in position, but had not had them sunk before

my arrival. I ordered this done, and also directed that he should turn

over all material and boats not then in use in the river to be used in

ferrying the troops across.

I then, on the 14th, took a steamer and ran up to Bermuda Hundred to see

General Butler for the purpose of directing a movement against

Petersburg, while our troops of the Army of the Potomac were crossing.

I had sent General W. F. Smith back from Cold Harbor by the way of White

House, thence on steamers to City Point for the purpose of giving

General Butler more troops with which to accomplish this result.

General Butler was ordered to send Smith with his troops reinforced, as

far as that could be conveniently done, from other parts of the Army of

the James. He gave Smith about six thousand reinforcements, including

some twenty-five hundred cavalry under Kautz, and about thirty-five

hundred colored infantry under Hinks.

The distance which Smith had to move to reach the enemy's lines was

about six miles, and the Confederate advance line of works was but two

miles outside of Petersburg. Smith was to move under cover of night, up

close to the enemy's works, and assault as soon as he could after

daylight. I believed then, and still believe, that Petersburg could

have been easily captured at that time. It only had about 2,500 men in

the defences besides some irregular troops, consisting of citizens and

employees in the city who took up arms in case of emergency. Smith

started as proposed, but his advance encountered a rebel force

intrenched between City Point and their lines outside of Petersburg.

This position he carried, with some loss to the enemy; but there was so

much delay that it was daylight before his troops really got off from

there. While there I informed General Butler that Hancock's corps would

cross the river and move to Petersburg to support Smith in case the

latter was successful, and that I could reinforce there more rapidly

than Lee could reinforce from his position.

I returned down the river to where the troops of the Army of the Potomac

now were, communicated to General Meade, in writing, the directions I

had given to General Butler and directed him (Meade) to cross Hancock's

corps over under cover of night, and push them forward in the morning to

Petersburg; halting them, however, at a designated point until they

could hear from Smith. I also informed General Meade that I had ordered

rations from Bermuda Hundred for Hancock's corps, and desired him to

issue them speedily, and to lose no more time than was absolutely

necessary. The rations did not reach him, however, and Hancock, while

he got all his corps over during the night, remained until half-past ten

in the hope of receiving them. He then moved without them, and on the

road received a note from General W. F. Smith, asking him to come on.

This seems to be the first information that General Hancock had received

of the fact that he was to go to Petersburg, or that anything particular

was expected of him. Otherwise he would have been there by four o'clock

in the afternoon.

Smith arrived in front of the enemy's lines early in the forenoon of the

15th, and spent the day until after seven o'clock in the evening in

reconnoitering what appeared to be empty works. The enemy's line

consisted of redans occupying commanding positions, with rifle-pits

connecting them. To the east side of Petersburg, from the Appomattox

back, there were thirteen of these redans extending a distance of

several miles, probably three. If they had been properly manned they

could have held out against any force that could have attacked them, at

least until reinforcements could have got up from the north of Richmond.

Smith assaulted with the colored troops, and with success. By nine

o'clock at night he was in possession of five of these redans and, of

course, of the connecting lines of rifle-pits. All of them contained

artillery, which fell into our hands. Hancock came up and proposed to

take any part assigned to him; and Smith asked him to relieve his men

who were in the trenches.

Next morning, the 16th, Hancock himself was in command, and captured

another redan. Meade came up in the afternoon and succeeded Hancock,

who had to be relieved, temporarily, from the command of his corps on

account of the breaking out afresh of the wound he had received at

Gettysburg. During the day Meade assaulted and carried one more redan

to his right and two to his left. In all this we lost very heavily.

The works were not strongly manned, but they all had guns in them which

fell into our hands, together with the men who were handling them in the

effort to repel these assaults.

Up to this time Beauregard, who had commanded south of Richmond, had

received no reinforcements, except Hoke's division from Drury's

Bluff,(*37) which had arrived on the morning of the 16th; though he had

urged the authorities very strongly to send them, believing, as he did,

that Petersburg would be a valuable prize which we might seek.

During the 17th the fighting was very severe and the losses heavy; and

at night our troops occupied about the same position they had occupied

in the morning, except that they held a redan which had been captured by

Potter during the day. During the night, however, Beauregard fell back

to the line which had been already selected, and commenced fortifying

it. Our troops advanced on the 18th to the line which he had abandoned,

and found that the Confederate loss had been very severe, many of the

enemy's dead still remaining in the ditches and in front of them.

Colonel J. L. Chamberlain, of the 20th Maine, was wounded on the 18th.

He was gallantly leading his brigade at the time, as he had been in

the habit of doing in all the engagements in which he had previously

been engaged. He had several times been recommended for a

brigadier-generalcy for gallant and meritorious conduct. On this

occasion, however, I promoted him on the spot, and forwarded a copy of

my order to the War Department, asking that my act might be confirmed

and Chamberlain's name sent to the Senate for confirmation without any

delay. This was done, and at last a gallant and meritorious officer

received partial justice at the hands of his government, which he had

served so faithfully and so well.

If General Hancock's orders of the 15th had been communicated to him,

that officer, with his usual promptness, would undoubtedly have been

upon the ground around Petersburg as early as four o'clock in the

afternoon of the 15th. The days were long and it would have given him

considerable time before night. I do not think there is any doubt that

Petersburg itself could have been carried without much loss; or, at

least, if protected by inner detached works, that a line could have been

established very much in rear of the one then occupied by the enemy.

This would have given us control of both the Weldon and South Side

railroads. This would also have saved an immense amount of hard

fighting which had to be done from the 15th to the 18th, and would have

given us greatly the advantage in the long siege which ensued.

I now ordered the troops to be put under cover and allowed some of the

rest which they had so long needed. They remained quiet, except that

there was more or less firing every day, until the 22d, when General

Meade ordered an advance towards the Weldon Railroad. We were very

anxious to get to that road, and even round to the South Side Railroad

if possible.

Meade moved Hancock's corps, now commanded by Birney, to the left, with

a view to at least force the enemy to stay within the limits of his own

line. General Wright, with the 6th corps, was ordered by a road farther

south, to march directly for the Weldon road. The enemy passed in

between these two corps and attacked vigorously, and with very serious

results to the National troops, who were then withdrawn from their

advanced position.

The Army of the Potomac was given the investment of Petersburg, while

the Army of the James held Bermuda Hundred and all the ground we

possessed north of the James River. The 9th corps, Burnside's, was

placed upon the right at Petersburg; the 5th, Warren's, next; the 2d,

Birney's, next; then the 6th, Wright's, broken off to the left and

south. Thus began the siege of Petersburg.