CHAPTER LXI.

EXPEDITION AGAINST FORT FISHER--ATTACK ON THE FORT--FAILURE OF THE

EXPEDITION--SECOND EXPEDITION AGAINST THE FORT--CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER.

Up to January, 1865, the enemy occupied Fort Fisher, at the mouth of

Cape Fear River and below the City of Wilmington. This port was of

immense importance to the Confederates, because it formed their

principal inlet for blockade runners by means of which they brought in

from abroad such supplies and munitions of war as they could not produce

at home. It was equally important to us to get possession of it, not

only because it was desirable to cut off their supplies so as to insure

a speedy termination of the war, but also because foreign governments,

particularly the British Government, were constantly threatening that

unless ours could maintain the blockade of that coast they should cease

to recognize any blockade. For these reasons I determined, with the

concurrence of the Navy Department, in December, to send an expedition

against Fort Fisher for the purpose of capturing it.

To show the difficulty experienced in maintaining the blockade, I will

mention a circumstance that took place at Fort Fisher after its fall.

Two English blockade runners came in at night. Their commanders, not

supposing the fort had fallen, worked their way through all our fleet

and got into the river unobserved. They then signalled the fort,

announcing their arrival. There was a colored man in the fort who had

been there before and who understood these signals. He informed General

Terry what reply he should make to have them come in, and Terry did as

he advised. The vessels came in, their officers entirely unconscious

that they were falling into the hands of the Union forces. Even after

they were brought in to the fort they were entertained in conversation

for some little time before suspecting that the Union troops were

occupying the fort. They were finally informed that their vessels and

cargoes were prizes.

I selected General Weitzel, of the Army of the James, to go with the

expedition, but gave instructions through General Butler. He commanded

the department within whose geographical limits Fort Fisher was

situated, as well as Beaufort and other points on that coast held by our

troops; he was, therefore, entitled to the right of fitting out the

expedition against Fort Fisher.

General Butler conceived the idea that if a steamer loaded heavily with

powder could be run up to near the shore under the fort and exploded, it

would create great havoc and make the capture an easy matter. Admiral

Porter, who was to command the naval squadron, seemed to fall in with

the idea, and it was not disapproved of in Washington; the navy was

therefore given the task of preparing the steamer for this purpose. I

had no confidence in the success of the scheme, and so expressed myself;

but as no serious harm could come of the experiment, and the authorities

at Washington seemed desirous to have it tried, I permitted it. The

steamer was sent to Beaufort, North Carolina, and was there loaded with

powder and prepared for the part she was to play in the reduction of

Fort Fisher.

General Butler chose to go in command of the expedition himself, and was

all ready to sail by the 9th of December (1864). Very heavy storms

prevailed, however, at that time along that part of the sea-coast, and

prevented him from getting off until the 13th or 14th. His advance

arrived off Fort Fisher on the 15th. The naval force had been already

assembled, or was assembling, but they were obliged to run into Beaufort

for munitions, coal, etc.; then, too, the powder-boat was not yet fully

prepared. The fleet was ready to proceed on the 18th; but Butler, who

had remained outside from the 15th up to that time, now found himself

out of coal, fresh water, etc., and had to put into Beaufort to

replenish. Another storm overtook him, and several days more were lost

before the army and navy were both ready at the same time to co-operate.

On the night of the 23d the powder-boat was towed in by a gunboat as

near to the fort as it was safe to run. She was then propelled by her

own machinery to within about five hundred yards of the shore. There

the clockwork, which was to explode her within a certain length of time,

was set and she was abandoned. Everybody left, and even the vessels put

out to sea to prevent the effect of the explosion upon them. At two

o'clock in the morning the explosion took place--and produced no more

effect on the fort, or anything else on land, than the bursting of a

boiler anywhere on the Atlantic Ocean would have done. Indeed when the

troops in Fort Fisher heard the explosion they supposed it was the

bursting of a boiler in one of the Yankee gunboats.

Fort Fisher was situated upon a low, flat peninsula north of Cape Fear

River. The soil is sandy. Back a little the peninsula is very heavily

wooded, and covered with fresh-water swamps. The fort ran across this

peninsula, about five hundred yards in width, and extended along the sea

coast about thirteen hundred yards. The fort had an armament of 21 guns

and 3 mortars on the land side, and 24 guns on the sea front. At that

time it was only garrisoned by four companies of infantry, one light

battery and the gunners at the heavy guns less than seven hundred men

with a reserve of less than a thousand men five miles up the peninsula.

General Whiting of the Confederate army was in command, and General

Bragg was in command of the force at Wilmington. Both commenced calling

for reinforcements the moment they saw our troops landing. The Governor

of North Carolina called for everybody who could stand behind a parapet

and shoot a gun, to join them. In this way they got two or three

hundred additional men into Fort Fisher; and Hoke's division, five or

six thousand strong, was sent down from Richmond. A few of these troops

arrived the very day that Butler was ready to advance.

On the 24th the fleet formed for an attack in arcs of concentric

circles, their heavy iron-clads going in very close range, being nearest

the shore, and leaving intervals or spaces so that the outer vessels

could fire between them. Porter was thus enabled to throw one hundred

and fifteen shells per minute. The damage done to the fort by these

shells was very slight, only two or three cannon being disabled in the

fort. But the firing silenced all the guns by making it too hot for the

men to maintain their positions about them and compelling them to seek

shelter in the bomb-proofs.

On the next day part of Butler's troops under General Adelbert Ames

effected a landing out of range of the fort without difficulty. This

was accomplished under the protection of gunboats sent for the purpose,

and under cover of a renewed attack upon the fort by the fleet. They

formed a line across the peninsula and advanced, part going north and

part toward the fort, covering themselves as they did so. Curtis pushed

forward and came near to Fort Fisher, capturing the small garrison at

what was called the Flag Pond Battery. Weitzel accompanied him to

within a half a mile of the works. Here he saw that the fort had not

been injured, and so reported to Butler, advising against an assault.

Ames, who had gone north in his advance, captured 228 of the reserves.

These prisoners reported to Butler that sixteen hundred of Hoke's

division of six thousand from Richmond had already arrived and the rest

would soon be in his rear.

Upon these reports Butler determined to withdraw his troops from the

peninsula and return to the fleet. At that time there had not been a

man on our side injured except by one of the shells from the fleet.

Curtis had got within a few yards of the works. Some of his men had

snatched a flag from the parapet of the fort, and others had taken a

horse from the inside of the stockade. At night Butler informed Porter

of his withdrawal, giving the reasons above stated, and announced his

purpose as soon as his men could embark to start for Hampton Roads.

Porter represented to him that he had sent to Beaufort for more

ammunition. He could fire much faster than he had been doing, and would

keep the enemy from showing himself until our men were within twenty

yards of the fort, and he begged that Butler would leave some brave

fellows like those who had snatched the flag from the parapet and taken

the horse from the fort.

Butler was unchangeable. He got all his troops aboard, except Curtis's

brigade, and started back. In doing this, Butler made a fearful

mistake. My instructions to him, or to the officer who went in command

of the expedition, were explicit in the statement that to effect a

landing would be of itself a great victory, and if one should be

effected, the foothold must not be relinquished; on the contrary, a

regular siege of the fort must be commenced and, to guard against

interference by reason of storms, supplies of provisions must be laid in

as soon as they could be got on shore. But General Butler seems to have

lost sight of this part of his instructions, and was back at Fort Monroe

on the 28th.

I telegraphed to the President as follows:

CITY POINT, VA., Dec. 28, 1864.--8.30 P.M.

The Wilmington expedition has proven a gross and culpable failure. Many

of the troops are back here. Delays and free talk of the object of the

expedition enabled the enemy to move troops to Wilmington to defeat it.

After the expedition sailed from Fort Monroe, three days of fine weather

were squandered, during which the enemy was without a force to protect

himself. Who is to blame will, I hope, be known.

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

Porter sent dispatches to the Navy Department in which he complained

bitterly of having been abandoned by the army just when the fort was

nearly in our possession, and begged that our troops might be sent back

again to cooperate, but with a different commander. As soon as I heard

this I sent a messenger to Porter with a letter asking him to hold on.

I assured him that I fully sympathized with him in his disappointment,

and that I would send the same troops back with a different commander,

with some reinforcements to offset those which the enemy had received.

I told him it would take some little time to get transportation for the

additional troops; but as soon as it could be had the men should be on

their way to him, and there would be no delay on my part. I selected A.

H. Terry to command.

It was the 6th of January before the transports could be got ready and

the troops aboard. They sailed from Fortress Monroe on that day. The

object and destination of the second expedition were at the time kept a

secret to all except a few in the Navy Department and in the army to

whom it was necessary to impart the information. General Terry had not

the slightest idea of where he was going or what he was to do. He

simply knew that he was going to sea and that he had his orders with

him, which were to be opened when out at sea.

He was instructed to communicate freely with Porter and have entire

harmony between army and navy, because the work before them would

require the best efforts of both arms of service. They arrived off

Beaufort on the 8th. A heavy storm, however, prevented a landing at

Fort Fisher until the 13th. The navy prepared itself for attack about

as before, and the same time assisted the army in landing, this time

five miles away. Only iron-clads fired at first; the object being to

draw the fire of the enemy's guns so as to ascertain their positions.

This object being accomplished, they then let in their shots thick and

fast. Very soon the guns were all silenced, and the fort showed evident

signs of being much injured.

Terry deployed his men across the peninsula as had been done before, and

at two o'clock on the following morning was up within two miles of the

fort with a respectable _abatis_ in front of his line. His artillery was

all landed on that day, the 14th. Again Curtis's brigade of Ame's

division had the lead. By noon they had carried an unfinished work less

than a half mile from the fort, and turned it so as to face the other

way.

Terry now saw Porter and arranged for an assault on the following day.

The two commanders arranged their signals so that they could communicate

with each other from time to time as they might have occasion. At day

light the fleet commenced its firing. The time agreed upon for the

assault was the middle of the afternoon, and Ames who commanded the

assaulting column moved at 3.30. Porter landed a force of sailors and

marines to move against the sea-front in co-operation with Ames's

assault. They were under Commander Breese of the navy. These sailors

and marines had worked their way up to within a couple of hundred yards

of the fort before the assault. The signal was given and the assault

was made; but the poor sailors and marines were repulsed and very badly

handled by the enemy, losing 280 killed and wounded out of their number.

Curtis's brigade charged successfully though met by a heavy fire, some

of the men having to wade through the swamp up to their waists to reach

the fort. Many were wounded, of course, and some killed; but they soon

reached the palisades. These they cut away, and pushed on through. The

other troops then came up, Pennypacker's following Curtis, and Bell, who

commanded the 3d brigade of Ames's division, following Pennypacker. But

the fort was not yet captured though the parapet was gained.

The works were very extensive. The large parapet around the work would

have been but very little protection to those inside except when they

were close up under it. Traverses had, therefore, been run until really

the work was a succession of small forts enclosed by a large one. The

rebels made a desperate effort to hold the fort, and had to be driven

from these traverses one by one. The fight continued till long after

night. Our troops gained first one traverse and then another, and by 10

o'clock at night the place was carried. During this engagement the

sailors, who had been repulsed in their assault on the bastion, rendered

the best service they could by reinforcing Terry's northern line--thus

enabling him to send a detachment to the assistance of Ames. The fleet

kept up a continuous fire upon that part of the fort which was still

occupied by the enemy. By means of signals they could be informed where

to direct their shots.

During the succeeding nights the enemy blew up Fort Caswell on the

opposite side of Cape Fear River, and abandoned two extensive works on

Smith's Island in the river.

Our captures in all amounted to 169 guns, besides small-arms, with full

supplies of ammunition, and 2,083 prisoners. In addition to these,

there were about 700 dead and wounded left there. We had lost 110

killed and 536 wounded.

In this assault on Fort Fisher, Bell, one of the brigade commanders, was

killed, and two, Curtis and Pennypacker, were badly wounded.

Secretary Stanton, who was on his way back from Savannah, arrived off

Fort Fisher soon after it fell. When he heard the good news he promoted

all the officers of any considerable rank for their conspicuous

gallantry. Terry had been nominated for major-general, but had not been

confirmed. This confirmed him; and soon after I recommended him for a

brigadier-generalcy in the regular army, and it was given to him for

this victory.