CHAPTER LXII.

SHERMAN'S MARCH NORTH--SHERIDAN ORDERED TO LYNCHBURG--CANBY ORDERED TO

MOVE AGAINST MOBILE--MOVEMENTS OF SCHOFIELD AND THOMAS--CAPTURE OF

COLUMBIA, SOUTH CAROLINA--SHERMAN IN THE CAROLINAS.

When news of Sherman being in possession of Savannah reached the North,

distinguished statesmen and visitors began to pour in to see him. Among

others who went was the Secretary of War, who seemed much pleased at the

result of his campaign. Mr. Draper, the collector of customs of New

York, who was with Mr. Stanton's party, was put in charge of the public

property that had been abandoned and captured. Savannah was then turned

over to General Foster's command to hold, so that Sherman might have his

own entire army free to operate as might be decided upon in the future.

I sent the chief engineer of the Army of the Potomac (General Barnard)

with letters to General Sherman. He remained some time with the

general, and when he returned brought back letters, one of which

contained suggestions from Sherman as to what ought to be done in

co-operation with him, when he should have started upon his march

northward.

I must not neglect to state here the fact that I had no idea originally

of having Sherman march from Savannah to Richmond, or even to North

Carolina. The season was bad, the roads impassable for anything except

such an army as he had, and I should not have thought of ordering such a

move. I had, therefore, made preparations to collect transports to

carry Sherman and his army around to the James River by water, and so

informed him. On receiving this letter he went to work immediately to

prepare for the move, but seeing that it would require a long time to

collect the transports, he suggested the idea then of marching up north

through the Carolinas. I was only too happy to approve this; for if

successful, it promised every advantage. His march through Georgia had

thoroughly destroyed all lines of transportation in that State, and had

completely cut the enemy off from all sources of supply to the west of

it. If North and South Carolina were rendered helpless so far as

capacity for feeding Lee's army was concerned, the Confederate garrison

at Richmond would be reduced in territory, from which to draw supplies,

to very narrow limits in the State of Virginia; and, although that

section of the country was fertile, it was already well exhausted of

both forage and food. I approved Sherman's suggestion therefore at

once.

The work of preparation was tedious, because supplies, to load the

wagons for the march, had to be brought from a long distance. Sherman

would now have to march through a country furnishing fewer provisions

than that he had previously been operating in during his march to the

sea. Besides, he was confronting, or marching toward, a force of the

enemy vastly superior to any his troops had encountered on their

previous march; and the territory through which he had to pass had now

become of such vast importance to the very existence of the Confederate

army, that the most desperate efforts were to be expected in order to

save it.

Sherman, therefore, while collecting the necessary supplies to start

with, made arrangements with Admiral Dahlgren, who commanded that part

of the navy on the South Carolina and Georgia coast, and General Foster,

commanding the troops, to take positions, and hold a few points on the

sea coast, which he (Sherman) designated, in the neighborhood of

Charleston.

This provision was made to enable him to fall back upon the sea coast,

in case he should encounter a force sufficient to stop his onward

progress. He also wrote me a letter, making suggestions as to what he

would like to have done in support of his movement farther north. This

letter was brought to City Point by General Barnard at a time when I

happened to be going to Washington City, where I arrived on the 21st of

January. I cannot tell the provision I had already made to co-operate

with Sherman, in anticipation of his expected movement, better than by

giving my reply to this letter.

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES, WASHINGTON, D. C., Jan. 21,

1865.

MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN, Commanding Mill Div. of the Mississippi.

GENERAL:--Your letters brought by General Barnard were received at City

Point, and read with interest. Not having them with me, however, I

cannot say that in this I will be able to satisfy you on all points of

recommendation. As I arrived here at one P.M., and must leave at six

P.M., having in the meantime spent over three hours with the Secretary

and General Halleck, I must be brief. Before your last request to have

Thomas make a campaign into the heart of Alabama, I had ordered

Schofield to Annapolis, Md., with his corps. The advance (six thousand)

will reach the seaboard by the 23d, the remainder following as rapidly

as railroad transportation can be procured from Cincinnati. The corps

numbers over twenty-one thousand men. I was induced to do this because

I did not believe Thomas could possibly be got off before spring. His

pursuit of Hood indicated a sluggishness that satisfied me that he would

never do to conduct one of your campaigns. The command of the advance

of the pursuit was left to subordinates, whilst Thomas followed far

behind. When Hood had crossed the Tennessee, and those in pursuit had

reached it, Thomas had not much more than half crossed the State, from

whence he returned to Nashville to take steamer for Eastport. He is

possessed of excellent judgment, great coolness and honesty, but he is

not good on a pursuit. He also reported his troops fagged, and that it

was necessary to equip up. This report and a determination to give the

enemy no rest determined me to use his surplus troops elsewhere.

Thomas is still left with a sufficient force surplus to go to Selma

under an energetic leader. He has been telegraphed to, to know whether

he could go, and, if so, which of the several routes he would select.

No reply is yet received. Canby has been ordered to act offensively

from the sea-coast to the interior, towards Montgomery and Selma.

Thomas's forces will move from the north at an early day, or some of his

troops will be sent to Canby. Without further reinforcements Canby will

have a moving column of twenty thousand men.

Fort Fisher, you are aware, has been captured. We have a force there of

eight thousand effective. At New Bern about half the number. It is

rumored, through deserters, that Wilmington also has fallen. I am

inclined to believe the rumor, because on the 17th we knew the enemy

were blowing up their works about Fort Caswell, and that on the 18th

Terry moved on Wilmington.

If Wilmington is captured, Schofield will go there. If not, he will be

sent to New Bern. In either event, all the surplus forces at the two

points will move to the interior toward Goldsboro' in co-operation with

your movements. From either point, railroad communications can be run

out, there being here abundance of rolling-stock suited to the gauge of

those roads.

There have been about sixteen thousand men sent from Lee's army south.

Of these, you will have fourteen thousand against you, if Wilmington is

not held by the enemy, casualties at Fort Fisher having overtaken about

two thousand.

All these troops are subject to your orders as you come in communication

with them. They will be so instructed. From about Richmond I will

watch Lee closely, and if he detaches much more, or attempts to

evacuate, will pitch in. In the meantime, should you be brought to a

halt anywhere, I can send two corps of thirty thousand effective men to

your support, from the troops about Richmond.

To resume: Canby is ordered to operate to the interior from the Gulf.

A. J. Smith may go from the north, but I think it doubtful. A force of

twenty-eight or thirty thousand will co-operate with you from New Bern

or Wilmington, or both. You can call for reinforcements.

This will be handed you by Captain Hudson, of my staff, who will return

with any message you may have for me. If there is anything I can do for

you in the way of having supplies on ship-board, at any point on the

sea-coast, ready for you, let me know it.

Yours truly, U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General.

I had written on the 18th of January to General Sherman, giving him the

news of the battle of Nashville. He was much pleased at the result,

although, like myself, he had been very much disappointed at Thomas for

permitting Hood to cross the Tennessee River and nearly the whole State

of Tennessee, and come to Nashville to be attacked there. He, however,

as I had done, sent Thomas a warm congratulatory letter.

On the 10th of January, 1865, the resolutions of thanks to Sherman and

his army passed by Congress were approved.

Sherman, after the capture, at once had the debris cleared up,

commencing the work by removing the piling and torpedoes from the river,

and taking up all obstructions. He had then intrenched the city, so

that it could be held by a small garrison. By the middle of January all

his work was done, except the accumulation of supplies to commence his

movement with.

He proposed to move in two columns, one from Savannah, going along by

the river of the same name, and the other by roads farther east,

threatening Charleston. He commenced the advance by moving his right

wing to Beaufort, South Carolina, then to Pocotaligo by water. This

column, in moving north, threatened Charleston, and, indeed, it was not

determined at first that they would have a force visit Charleston.

South Carolina had done so much to prepare the public mind of the South

for secession, and had been so active in precipitating the decision of

the question before the South was fully prepared to meet it, that there

was, at that time, a feeling throughout the North and also largely

entertained by people of the South, that the State of South Carolina,

and Charleston, the hot-bed of secession in particular, ought to have a

heavy hand laid upon them. In fact, nothing but the decisive results

that followed, deterred the radical portion of the people from

condemning the movement, because Charleston had been left out. To pass

into the interior would, however, be to insure the evacuation of the

city, and its possession by the navy and Foster's troops. It is so

situated between two formidable rivers that a small garrison could have

held it against all odds as long as their supplies would hold out.

Sherman therefore passed it by.

By the first of February all preparations were completed for the final

march, Columbia, South Carolina, being the first objective;

Fayetteville, North Carolina, the second; and Goldsboro, or

neighborhood, the final one, unless something further should be

determined upon. The right wing went from Pocotaligo, and the left from

about Hardeeville on the Savannah River, both columns taking a pretty

direct route for Columbia. The cavalry, however, were to threaten

Charleston on the right, and Augusta on the left.

On the 15th of January Fort Fisher had fallen, news of which Sherman had

received before starting out on his march. We already had New Bern and

had soon Wilmington, whose fall followed that of Fort Fisher; as did

other points on the sea coast, where the National troops were now in

readiness to co-operate with Sherman's advance when he had passed

Fayetteville.

On the 18th of January I ordered Canby, in command at New Orleans, to

move against Mobile, Montgomery and Selma, Alabama, for the purpose of

destroying roads, machine shops, etc. On the 8th of February I ordered

Sheridan, who was in the Valley of Virginia, to push forward as soon as

the weather would permit and strike the canal west of Richmond at or

about Lynchburg; and on the 20th I made the order to go to Lynchburg as

soon as the roads would permit, saying: "As soon as it is possible to

travel, I think you will have no difficulty about reaching Lynchburg

with a cavalry force alone. From there you could destroy the railroad

and canal in every direction, so as to be of no further use to the

rebellion. * * * This additional raid, with one starting from East

Tennessee under Stoneman, numbering about four or five thousand cavalry;

one from Eastport, Mississippi, ten thousand cavalry; Canby, from Mobile

Bay, with about eighteen thousand mixed troops--these three latter

pushing for Tuscaloosa, Selma and Montgomery; and Sherman with a large

army eating out the vitals of South Carolina--is all that will be wanted

to leave nothing for the rebellion to stand upon. I would advise you to

overcome great obstacles to accomplish this. Charleston was evacuated

on Tuesday last."

On the 27th of February, more than a month after Canby had received his

orders, I again wrote to him, saying that I was extremely anxious to

hear of his being in Alabama. I notified him, also, that I had sent

Grierson to take command of his cavalry, he being a very efficient

officer. I further suggested that Forrest was probably in Mississippi,

and if he was there, he would find him an officer of great courage and

capacity whom it would be difficult to get by. I still further informed

him that Thomas had been ordered to start a cavalry force into

Mississippi on the 20th of February, or as soon as possible thereafter.

This force did not get off however.

All these movements were designed to be in support of Sherman's march,

the object being to keep the Confederate troops in the West from leaving

there. But neither Canby nor Thomas could be got off in time. I had

some time before depleted Thomas's army to reinforce Canby, for the

reason that Thomas had failed to start an expedition which he had been

ordered to send out, and to have the troops where they might do

something. Canby seemed to be equally deliberate in all of his

movements. I ordered him to go in person; but he prepared to send a

detachment under another officer. General Granger had got down to New

Orleans, in some way or other, and I wrote Canby that he must not put

him in command of troops. In spite of this he asked the War Department

to assign Granger to the command of a corps.

Almost in despair of having adequate service rendered to the cause in

that quarter, I said to Canby: "I am in receipt of a dispatch * * *

informing me that you have made requisitions for a construction corps

and material to build seventy miles of railroad. I have directed that

none be sent. Thomas's army has been depleted to send a force to you

that they might be where they could act in winter, and at least detain

the force the enemy had in the West. If there had been any idea of

repairing railroads, it could have been done much better from the North,

where we already had the troops. I expected your movements to be

co-operative with Sherman's last. This has now entirely failed. I

wrote to you long ago, urging you to push promptly and to live upon the

country, and destroy railroads, machine shops, etc., not to build them.

Take Mobile and hold it, and push your forces to the interior--to

Montgomery and to Selma. Destroy railroads, rolling stock, and

everything useful for carrying on war, and, when you have done this,

take such positions as can be supplied by water. By this means alone

you can occupy positions from which the enemy's roads in the interior

can be kept broken."

Most of these expeditions got off finally, but too late to render any

service in the direction for which they were designed.

The enemy, ready to intercept his advance, consisted of Hardee's troops

and Wheeler's cavalry, perhaps less than fifteen thousand men in all;

but frantic efforts were being made in Richmond, as I was sure would be

the case, to retard Sherman's movements. Everything possible was being

done to raise troops in the South. Lee dispatched against Sherman the

troops which had been sent to relieve Fort Fisher, which, including

those of the other defences of the harbor and its neighborhood,

amounted, after deducting the two thousand killed, wounded and captured,

to fourteen thousand men. After Thomas's victory at Nashville what

remained, of Hood's army were gathered together and forwarded as rapidly

as possible to the east to co-operate with these forces; and, finally,

General Joseph E. Johnston, one of the ablest commanders of the South

though not in favor with the administration (or at least with Mr.

Davis), was put in command of all the troops in North and South

Carolina.

Schofield arrived at Annapolis in the latter part of January, but before

sending his troops to North Carolina I went with him down the coast to

see the situation of affairs, as I could give fuller directions after

being on the ground than I could very well have given without. We soon

returned, and the troops were sent by sea to Cape Fear River. Both New

Bern and Wilmington are connected with Raleigh by railroads which unite

at Goldsboro. Schofield was to land troops at Smithville, near the

mouth of the Cape Fear River on the west side, and move up to secure the

Wilmington and Charlotteville Railroad. This column took their pontoon

bridges with them, to enable them to cross over to the island south of

the city of Wilmington. A large body was sent by the north side to

co-operate with them. They succeeded in taking the city on the 22d of

February. I took the precaution to provide for Sherman's army, in case

he should be forced to turn in toward the sea coast before reaching

North Carolina, by forwarding supplies to every place where he was

liable to have to make such a deflection from his projected march. I

also sent railroad rolling stock, of which we had a great abundance, now

that we were not operating the roads in Virginia. The gauge of the

North Carolina railroads being the same as the Virginia railroads had

been altered too; these cars and locomotives were ready for use there

without any change.

On the 31st of January I countermanded the orders given to Thomas to

move south to Alabama and Georgia. (I had previously reduced his force

by sending a portion of it to Terry.) I directed in lieu of this

movement, that he should send Stoneman through East Tennessee, and push

him well down toward Columbia, South Carolina, in support of Sherman.

Thomas did not get Stoneman off in time, but, on the contrary, when I

had supposed he was on his march in support of Sherman I heard of his

being in Louisville, Kentucky. I immediately changed the order, and

directed Thomas to send him toward Lynchburg. Finally, however, on the

12th of March, he did push down through the north-western end of South

Carolina, creating some consternation. I also ordered Thomas to send

the 4th corps (Stanley's) to Bull Gap and to destroy no more roads east

of that. I also directed him to concentrate supplies at Knoxville, with

a view to a probable movement of his army through that way toward

Lynchburg.

Goldsboro is four hundred and twenty-five miles from Savannah. Sherman's

march was without much incident until he entered Columbia, on the 17th

of February. He was detained in his progress by having to repair and

corduroy the roads, and rebuild the bridges. There was constant

skirmishing and fighting between the cavalry of the two armies, but this

did not retard the advance of the infantry. Four days, also, were lost

in making complete the destruction of the most important railroads south

of Columbia; there was also some delay caused by the high water, and the

destruction of the bridges on the line of the road. A formidable river

had to be crossed near Columbia, and that in the face of a small

garrison under General Wade Hampton. There was but little delay,

however, further than that caused by high water in the stream. Hampton

left as Sherman approached, and the city was found to be on fire.

There has since been a great deal of acrimony displayed in discussions

of the question as to who set Columbia on fire. Sherman denies it on the

part of his troops, and Hampton denies it on the part of the

Confederates. One thing is certain: as soon as our troops took

possession, they at once proceeded to extinguish the flames to the best

of their ability with the limited means at hand. In any case, the

example set by the Confederates in burning the village of Chambersburg,

Pa., a town which was not garrisoned, would seem to make a defence of

the act of firing the seat of government of the State most responsible

for the conflict then raging, not imperative.

The Confederate troops having vacated the city, the mayor took

possession, and sallied forth to meet the commander of the National

forces for the purpose of surrendering the town, making terms for the

protection of property, etc. Sherman paid no attention at all to the

overture, but pushed forward and took the town without making any

conditions whatever with its citizens. He then, however, co-operated

with the mayor in extinguishing the flames and providing for the people

who were rendered destitute by this destruction of their homes. When he

left there he even gave the mayor five hundred head of cattle to be

distributed among the citizens, to tide them over until some arrangement

could be made for their future supplies. He remained in Columbia until

the roads, public buildings, workshops and everything that could be

useful to the enemy were destroyed. While at Columbia, Sherman learned

for the first time that what remained of Hood's army was confronting

him, under the command of General Beauregard.

Charleston was evacuated on the 18th of February, and Foster garrisoned

the place. Wilmington was captured on the 22d. Columbia and Cheraw

farther north, were regarded as so secure from invasion that the wealthy

people of Charleston and Augusta had sent much of their valuable

property to these two points to be stored. Among the goods sent there

were valuable carpets, tons of old Madeira, silverware, and furniture.

I am afraid much of these goods fell into the hands of our troops.

There was found at Columbia a large amount of powder, some artillery,

small-arms and fixed ammunition. These, of course were among the

articles destroyed. While here, Sherman also learned of Johnston's

restoration to command. The latter was given, as already stated, all

troops in North and South Carolina. After the completion of the

destruction of public property about Columbia, Sherman proceeded on his

march and reached Cheraw without any special opposition and without

incident to relate. The railroads, of course, were thoroughly destroyed

on the way. Sherman remained a day or two at Cheraw; and, finally, on

the 6th of March crossed his troops over the Pedee and advanced straight

for Fayetteville. Hardee and Hampton were there, and barely escaped.

Sherman reached Fayetteville on the 11th of March. He had dispatched

scouts from Cheraw with letters to General Terry, at Wilmington, asking

him to send a steamer with some supplies of bread, clothing and other

articles which he enumerated. The scouts got through successfully, and

a boat was sent with the mail and such articles for which Sherman had

asked as were in store at Wilmington; unfortunately, however, those

stores did not contain clothing.

Four days later, on the 15th, Sherman left Fayetteville for Goldsboro.

The march, now, had to be made with great caution, for he was

approaching Lee's army and nearing the country that still remained open

to the enemy. Besides, he was confronting all that he had had to

confront in his previous march up to that point, reinforced by the

garrisons along the road and by what remained of Hood's army. Frantic

appeals were made to the people to come in voluntarily and swell the

ranks of our foe. I presume, however, that Johnston did not have in all

over 35,000 or 40,000 men. The people had grown tired of the war, and

desertions from the Confederate army were much more numerous than the

voluntary accessions.

There was some fighting at Averysboro on the 16th between Johnston's

troops and Sherman's, with some loss; and at Bentonville on the 19th and

21st of March, but Johnston withdrew from the contest before the morning

of the 22d. Sherman's loss in these last engagements in killed,

wounded, and missing, was about sixteen hundred. Sherman's troops at

last reached Goldsboro on the 23d of the month and went into bivouac;

and there his men were destined to have a long rest. Schofield was

there to meet him with the troops which had been sent to Wilmington.

Sherman was no longer in danger. He had Johnston confronting him; but

with an army much inferior to his own, both in numbers and morale. He

had Lee to the north of him with a force largely superior; but I was

holding Lee with a still greater force, and had he made his escape and

gotten down to reinforce Johnston, Sherman, with the reinforcements he

now had from Schofield and Terry, would have been able to hold the

Confederates at bay for an indefinite period. He was near the sea-shore

with his back to it, and our navy occupied the harbors. He had a

railroad to both Wilmington and New Bern, and his flanks were thoroughly

protected by streams, which intersect that part of the country and

deepen as they approach the sea. Then, too, Sherman knew that if Lee

should escape me I would be on his heels, and he and Johnson together

would be crushed in one blow if they attempted to make a stand. With

the loss of their capital, it is doubtful whether Lee's army would have

amounted to much as an army when it reached North Carolina. Johnston's

army was demoralized by constant defeat and would hardly have made an

offensive movement, even if they could have been induced to remain on

duty. The men of both Lee's and Johnston's armies were, like their

brethren of the North, as brave as men can be; but no man is so brave

that he may not meet such defeats and disasters as to discourage him and

dampen his ardor for any cause, no matter how just he deems it.