CHAPTER XXXVI
THE TWENTY-ONE MILLION
In January, 1887, my routine work at the Admiralty was varied by a trip
in the new submarine _Nautilus_ to the bottom of Tilbury Dock, which
was very nearly the last voyage of the party in this world. The owners
of the boat, Mr. Edward Wolseley and Mr. C. E. Lyon, had invited
several guests, among whom was Mr. William White (afterwards Sir
William Henry White, K.C.B., F.R.S., etc.), together with some
officials of the Admiralty. The theory was that by pushing air
cylinders to project from each side of the boat, her buoyancy would be
so increased that she would rise to the surface. We sank gently to the
bottom and stayed there. The cylinders were pushed out, and still we
remained there. I was looking through the glass scuttle, and, although
in a submarine the motion or rising or sinking is not felt by those
within, I knew that we had not moved, because I could see that the
muddy particles suspended in the water remained stationary. The Thames
mud had us fast. In this emergency, I suggested rolling her by moving
the people quickly from side to side. The expedient succeeded, none
too soon; for by the time she came to the surface, the air was very
foul.
During the same month, Mr. William White, Chief Constructor to the
Admiralty, read a paper at the Mansion House dealing with the design of
modern men-of-war, which marked an era in shipbuilding. Sir William
White restored to the ship of war that symmetry and beauty of design
which {351} had been lost during the transition from sails to steam.
The transition vessels were nightmares. Sir William White designed
ships. A man of genius, of a refined and beautiful nature, a loyal
servant of the Admiralty, to which he devoted talents which, applied
outside the Service, would have gained him wealth, his recent death was
a great loss to his country. The later Victorian Navy is his splendid
monument: and it may yet be that history will designate those noble
ships as the finest type of steam vessels of war.
About the same time, I brought forward another motion in the House of
Commons, to abolish obsolete vessels, of which I specified fifty-nine,
and to utilise the money saved in their maintenance, in new
construction. The scheme was carried into execution by degrees.
In June of 1887, I invited a large party of members of the House of
Commons to visit Portsmouth, where they were shown something of the
Navy.
In December of the same year, speaking in public, I affirmed the
following principles: that in time of war our frontiers were the ports
of the enemy; that our main fleets could be required to watch those
ports; and that the strength of the Fleet required should be calculated
upon the basis of the work it would be required to perform. I also
urged that the line of communications should be instituted, by means of
establishing a system of signalling between the ships of the Navy and
the ships of the mercantile marine, and between all ships and the
shore. At that time there was no such system.
The Press and the public received the exposition of these elementary
principles of organisation for war as a complete novelty; by many they
were welcomed like a revelation; circumstances which exemplify the
general ignorance prevailing at the time.
Of even more significance were the official declarations on the
subject. The First Lord of the Admiralty, Lord George Hamilton, had
publicly stated in November, 1886, that this country had more ships in
commission than the {352} three other European Naval Powers next in
order of strength. The statement was correct; but among the ships in
commission were included many vessels of no fighting value, such as the
_Indus_, _Asia _and _Duke of Wellington_. As an estimate of
comparative fighting strength, the statement, like many another
official statement before and since, required qualification; as I
remarked in the House of Commons in the course of my reply to Lord
George Hamilton.
In December, 1886, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Lord Randolph
Churchill, suddenly resigned. He afterwards explained that his
resignation was a protest against extravagance and waste in the
administration of the Services. There were extravagance and waste;
but, in my view, which I represented to Lord Randolph, it would take
several years to reform the administration, and it was far more
important to set right our defences, even if their administration cost
more in the meantime.
I recall these things because they serve to illustrate the trend of
events. On the one side were the Government and their official
advisers at the Admiralty, convinced that all was very well as it was.
On the other side, were the rapid development of the fighting ship in
all countries, which owing to Mr. W. H. White, was particularly marked
in this country; the greatly increased public interest in naval
affairs; and the constant representations of a number of naval
officers, myself among them, to the effect that great reforms were
urgently required.
We believed that there existed at the Board of Admiralty no system of
direct responsibility; that Parliament and the nation had no means
either of ascertaining upon what principle the money was expended upon
our defences or of affixing responsibility whether it were expended ill
or well; that there existed no plan of campaign at the Admiralty; that
the Navy and the Army had no arrangement for working together in the
event of war; and that, in point of fact, the Navy was dangerously
inadequate. And in attempting to achieve reform, we were confronted
{353} by a solid breastwork, as though built of bales of wool, of
official immovability. Had it been a hard obstacle, we might have
smashed it.
Towards the end of 1887, the Admiralty did a very foolish thing. They
decided to cut down the salaries of the officers of the new
Intelligence Department by £950. In my view, this proceeding both
involved a breach of faith with the officers concerned, and would be
highly injurious to the efficiency of the department for whose success
I felt peculiarly responsible. My protests were, however, disregarded;
the First Lord asserted his supreme authority; and the thing was done.
The efficiency of the whole Service was, in my view, bound up with the
efficiency of the Intelligence Department; because that department was
created for the express purpose of estimating and reporting what was
required to enable the Navy to fulfil its duties. It was in view of
the main question of the necessity of strengthening the Fleet, that I
decided to resign my position upon the Board of Admiralty, and to
declare publicly my reasons for so doing. On the 9th January, 1888, I
sent my resignation to Lord Salisbury; who, courteously expressing his
regret, accepted it on 18th January.
In making my decision to take this extreme action, I was influenced by
the conviction that nothing short of the resignation of a member of the
Board of Admiralty would induce the authorities to reorganise and
strengthen our defences. Whether or not I was right in that belief, I
do not know to this day; but, as the strengthening of the Fleet was
shortly afterwards carried into execution in precise accordance with my
recommendations, there is some evidence in my favour. My constituents
in East Marylebone were strongly adverse to my course of action. Many
of my friends begged me not to resign. General Buller, in particular,
pointed out to me that no good was ever done by an officer resigning
his post, because the officer who resigned ceased by his own act to
occupy the position which entitled {354} him to a hearing. I daresay
he was right. At any rate, I was well aware that I was jeopardising my
whole career. For an officer to resign his seat upon the Board of
Admiralty in order to direct public attention to abuses, is to commit,
officially speaking, the unpardonable sin. When, three or four years
later, Sir Frederick Richards, the First Sea Lord, threatened to resign
if the Government would not accept his shipbuilding programme, although
I am certain he would have pursued exactly the same course had he stood
alone, he had the support of the rest of the Board. I had the rest of
the Sea Lords against me. That is a different affair. A united Board
of Admiralty can generally in the last resort prevail against the
Government. A single member of that Board who attempts the same feat,
knows, at least, that never again will he be employed at the Admiralty.
But when Sir Frederick Richards and his colleagues threatened
resignation, they were in fact risking the loss of employment and
incurring the possibility of spending the rest of their lives in
comparative penury. A later Liberal administration has dismissed one
Naval Lord after another, without a scruple.
In my case, I had the advantage of possessing a private income, so that
I was independent of the Service as a means of livelihood. It is
necessary to speak plainly upon this matter of resignation. It is most
unfair to expect naval officers to resign in the hope of bringing about
reform, when by so doing their income is greatly reduced. If the
British public desire it to be understood that a Sea Lord is expected
to resign should the Government in power fail to make what he believes
to be the necessary provision for the national security, then the
public must insist that the Sea Lords be granted an ample retiring
allowance.
In the following February (1888) Lord George Hamilton made a speech at
Ealing, in which he dealt with my protests in the most courteous
manner. He stated that I had resigned because I objected to the
exercise of the supreme authority of the First Lord over the Board of
Admiralty. I had certainly objected to its exercise in a particular
instance. {355} And at that time I was constantly urging that
Parliament and the country had a right to know who was responsible for
the actions of the Admiralty. My theory was that there should be some
means by which Parliament and the public should be assured that any
given course of action was founded upon professional advice. That no
such means existed was notorious. It was within the legal right of a
First Lord to announce a policy contravening or modifying the views of
the rest of the Board.
My view was, and is, the view tersely stated by Admiral Phipps Hornby,
who said that it was the right of the Cabinet to formulate a policy,
and that it was the duty of the Sea Lords to provide what was required
in order to carry that policy into execution; but that the Cabinet had
no right whatever to dictate to the Sea Lords in what the provision
should consist, for that was a matter of which the Sea Lords alone were
competent to judge.
But if the Board of Admiralty be placed under the supreme jurisdiction
of the First Lord, a civilian and a politician, the country has no
means of knowing whether or no the recommendations of the Sea Lords are
being carried into execution. I said at the time that some such means
should be instituted; afterwards, perceiving that no such demand would
be granted, I urged that the Cabinet at least ought to be precisely
informed what were the requirements stated by the Sea Lords to be
necessary in order to carry into execution the policy of the Government.
In claiming supreme authority as First Lord over the Board of
Admiralty, Lord George Hamilton was legally and constitutionally in the
right. The Royal Commission on the administration of the Navy and
Army, over which Lord Hartington presided, reported in 1890 (when I was
at sea) that the Admiralty had long ceased to be administered in
accordance with the terms of its original Patent, and that "the present
system of administration in the Admiralty is the result of
Parliamentary action upon what was once in fact as well as name an
executive and administrative {356} Board. The responsibility, and
consequently the power of the First Lord has continually increased, and
he is at present practically the Minister of Marine." In other words,
by slow degrees the politician had transferred the powers of the Board
to himself, where they remain; the other members of the Board becoming
merely his advisers. The result is that there is nothing, except the
personal influence of the Naval Lords upon the First Lord, to prevent
the Navy from being governed in accordance with party politics, without
reference to national and Imperial requirements; a system which
produces intermittent insecurity and periodical panics involving
extravagant expense.
The Commissioners also found that there was a difference of opinion
among the Naval Lords themselves concerning their responsibility with
regard to the strength and efficiency of the Fleet. It was, in a word,
nobody's business to state what were the requirements of the Fleet.
The First Lord might ask for advice, if he chose, in which case he
would get it. If he did not so choose, there was no one whose duty it
was to make representations on the subject. Admiral Sir Arthur Hood
stated that never in the whole course of his experience had he known a
scheme comprehending the naval requirements of the Empire to be laid
before the Board. He also stated that the method of preparing the Navy
Estimates was that the First Lord stated what sum the Cabinet felt
disposed to grant for the Navy, and that the Naval Lords then proceeded
to get as much value for their money as they could.
No wonder the Sea Lords were expected to sign the Estimates without
looking at them. When I was junior lord, responsible for the provision
of coal and stores among other trifles, a clerk came into my room with
a sheaf of papers in one hand and a wet quill pen in the other.
"Will you sign the Estimates?" says he.
"What?" said I.
"Will you sign the Estimates for the year?" he repeated.
"My good man," I said, "I haven't seen them."
{357}
The clerk looked mildly perturbed. He said:
"The other Lords have signed them, sir. It will be very inconvenient
if you do not."
"I am very sorry," said I. "I am afraid I am inconvenient in this
office already. But I certainly shall not sign the Estimates."
The clerk's countenance betrayed consternation.
"I must tell the First Lord, sir," said he, as one who presents an
ultimatum.
"I don't care a fig whom you tell," said I. "I can't sign the
Estimates, because I have not read them."
Nor did I sign them. They were brought before the House of Commons
without my signature. The First Lord said it did not really matter.
My point was that I would not take responsibility for a document I had
not seen. The fact was, that the custom of obtaining the signatures of
the Board is a survival of the time when the Sea Lords wielded the
power and responsibility conferred upon them by the original Patent.
The Commissioners also reported that the lack of "sufficient provision
for the consideration by either Service of the wants of the other" ...
was an "unsatisfactory and dangerous condition of affairs."
Here, then, were all the points for which my brother officers and
myself were contending, and in order to illuminate which I had
resigned, explicitly admitted. But the proofs did not appear until a
year after my resignation took effect, when the Select Committee on the
Navy Estimates began to take evidence; nor were they published for
another year.
In the meantime, the naval reformers fought as best they might. Freed
from the restraint necessarily imposed upon me by my official position
at the Admiralty, I was able to devote my whole energies to making
known the real state of affairs.
Upon the introduction of the Navy Estimates of 1888-9 I challenged the
votes for shipbuilding, the Secretary's {358} Department, the
Intelligence Department, the Reserve of merchant cruisers, the Royal
Naval Reserve and naval armaments, in order to call attention to
requirements.
In the course of the debates, the official formula was: "At no time was
the Navy more ready or better organised for any work which it might be
called upon to do than to-day." My reply was that these words "have
rung in our ears as often as the tune '_Britannia_ rules the waves,'
and have been invariably falsified when war appeared imminent." And
who would have to do the work? The officials who said that all was
ready, or the admirals who said that all was unready?
In May, a meeting to consider the needs of national defence was held in
the City, at which I delivered an address. Speaking at the Lord
Mayor's banquet in November, the First Lord admitted that there might
be room for improvement in the Navy. It was a dangerous, if a candid,
admission. For if the Navy were not strong enough, _how weak was it_?
Exactly how weak it was in June, 1888, in the opinion of the First Sea
Lord, Admiral Sir Arthur Hood, was explained by him before the Select
Committee on Navy Estimates (13th June, 1888). "I should have
preferred by the end of 1890 to have had six more fast cruisers. I do
not consider it a point of vital importance," said Admiral Hood. But
as, upon his own showing, within his recollection no one at the
Admiralty had ever produced a scheme comprehending the naval
requirements of the Empire, his view was hardly conclusive. I had the
audacity to consider that if no one had ever attempted, or thought of
attempting, to estimate the requirements of the naval defence of the
Queen's dominions, it was time that some one did attempt to do so, even
if that some one were myself. Accordingly, I made a careful
calculation of the work the Fleet might under probable contingencies be
required to perform, and upon that calculation based an estimate of the
classes and numbers of ships which would be needed.
{359}
I showed my estimate to Admiral Hornby, who said that, although the
ships were absolutely necessary, I was asking too much and I should in
consequence get nothing. He also pointed out that I had made no
provision for the increase of personnel required to man the proposed
new ships. I replied that if the ships were laid down, the authorities
would be obliged to find the men for them. The sequel showed that I
was wrong and that Admiral Hornby was right. He knew his responsible
authority better than I did. Six years later, when what should have
been the increased personnel would have been trained and available, the
Fleet was short of 20,000 men.
My cousin, General Sir Reginald Talbot, reminds me of a conversation
which befell between Mr. Goschen, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, and
myself, in November of the same year, 1888, when we were staying at
Wilton, the house of my cousin, Lady Pembroke. Mr. Goschen began to
talk about the Navy, and he was so good as to express high disapproval
of my course of action. He said I was doing a great deal of harm, that
I was presuming to set my rash opinion above the considered judgment of
old and distinguished officers who had commanded ships before I was
born, and so forth.
"Do you know what I am shortly going to propose to Parliament?" said I.
"No? I'll tell you. I am going to ask for seventy ships to cost
twenty million sterling."
Mr. Goschen became really angry. He said the notion was preposterous.
"You won't get them," he said. "You wouldn't get even three ships, if
you asked for them. And for a very simple reason. They are not
wanted."
"Mr. Goschen," said I, "I shall bring in that programme, and it will
cost twenty million; and you will all object to it and oppose it; and
yet I'll venture to make a prophecy. Before very long you will order
seventy ships at the cost of twenty million. And for a very simple
reason. Because you must."
{360}
On the 13th December, 1888, speaking on Vote 8 (ship-building, repairs
and maintenance), I expounded my ship-building programme to the House
of Commons. I based it upon the following principles:
"The existence of the Empire depends upon the strength of the Fleet,
the strength of the Fleet depends upon the Shipbuilding Vote.... I
maintain the Shipbuilding Vote is based on no policy, no theory, no
business-like or definite idea whatever, to enable it to meet the
requirements of the country, the primary object of its expenditure....
I hold that the Government, which is and must be solely responsible,
should first lay down a definite standard for the Fleet, which standard
should be a force capable of defending our shores and commerce,
together with the punctual and certain delivery of our food supply,
against the Fleets of two Powers combined, one of which should be
France; and that the experts should then be called together and say
what is necessary to get that standard, and give the reasons for their
statement...."
The programme included four first-class ironclads, 10 second-class
ironclads, 40 cruisers of various classes, and torpedo craft: 70
vessels in all, to be built at a cost of £20,100,000.
I also affirmed the proposition made by Admiral Sir Anthony Hoskins,
the Secretary of the Admiralty, and the Civil Lord, to the effect that
"the British Fleet should be more than a match for the combined fleets
of any two European Powers that were likely to be our foes, one of
which must necessarily be France." Here, so far as I am aware, was the
first definite demand for the Two-Power Standard; which was maintained
until it was abandoned by the Government which came into power in 1906.
[Illustration: THE AUTHOR SPEAKING IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON HIS
TWENTY-ONE MILLION SHIPBUILDING PROGRAMME, 13TH DECEMBER 1888. FROM
THE DRAWING, BY J. WALTER WILSON, IN THE POSSESSION OF THE AUTHOR]
Lord George Hamilton received my proposals with caution. He was "far
from saying it (the Fleet) was strong enough." And he told the House
that next year he hoped {361} to lay before the House a larger and more
comprehensive programme than was provided by the current estimates,
"desiring that when they moved their movement should be genuine and
prolonged."
Twelve weeks later, Lord George Hamilton brought in a shipbuilding
programme consisting of 70 vessels, to be built at a cost of
£21,500,000.
Yet nothing had happened since the previous June, when Sir Arthur Hood
declared that he would have preferred six more cruisers, but that they
were not of vital importance?
Nothing, that is to say, with regard to the international situation,
and the increase of foreign navies, and the requirements of Imperial
defence. But several things had happened at home. Of the most
important of these, I knew nothing until many years afterwards. It was
that Captain W. H. Hall, Director of the new Intelligence Department,
whose institution I had recommended for this very purpose, had worked
out the problem of naval requirements independently, and, with all the
sources of information available in the Admiralty at his command, had
arrived at precisely the same result (except for an increase of cost)
as that to which I had arrived, without the information possessed by
Captain Hall. I may mention here that Captain Hall was a most
distinguished and patriotic officer, with whom no considerations of
personal interest ever weighed for an instant against what he conceived
to be his duty to his Sovereign and to his country. What happened at
the Admiralty when his report was laid before the Board, I do not know,
as I never had any communication with Captain Hall on the subject. All
I know is that his scheme, which was identical with the scheme which I
had presented to the House, was accepted by the First Lord.
Another circumstance which may have influenced the Government was the
very remarkable evidence, which I have already summarised, given before
the Select Committee on the Navy Estimates. And another factor, of
enduring import, was the famous Report of the Three Admirals: {362}
Admiral Sir William Dowell, K.C.B., Admiral Sir R. Vesey Hamilton,
K.C.B., and Vice-Admiral Sir Frederick Richards, K.C.B., on the Naval
Manoeuvres of 1888, presented to both Houses of Parliament in February,
1889. Sir Frederick Richards was mainly responsible for drawing up
that masterly document, which, extending beyond its terms of reference,
formulated the principles of British sea-power; and definitely affirmed
the absolute necessity for establishing and maintaining the Two-Power
Standard.
With reference to the condition of the Navy at the time, the Three
Admirals reported that the Navy was "altogether inadequate to take the
offensive in a war with only one Great Power"; and that "supposing a
combination of even two Powers to be allied as her enemies, the balance
of maritime strength would be against England."
How swiftly is the false coin of "official assurances" consumed by the
acid of professional knowledge! The whole episode of the Twenty-One
Million is so typical of the methods of British governance, that I have
thought it worth while to relate it somewhat at length. Those methods,
in a word, consist in the politicians very nearly losing the Empire,
and the Navy saving it just in time. The same thing happened all over
again in 1892. It occurred again 1909, with a difference. Both in
1892 and in 1909 I drew up shipbuilding proposals. In 1892, the
Government eventually adopted the Spencer programme, which was actually
larger than mine. In 1909, the opportunity of restoration was lost;
and the failure cost, and will cost, the country many millions.
One of these days we shall be hit, and hit hard, at the moment when the
politicians have been found out, and before the Navy has had time to
recover.
Something to this effect was said to me by Bismarck, when I visited
him, in February, 1889. In truth, I had a little wearied of the polite
and stubborn opposition of my own people, and I went to Berlin to see
what was happening abroad. Prince Bismarck invited me to lunch.
{363}
Bismarck said that he could not understand why my own people did not
listen to me (nor could I!); for (said he) the British Fleet was the
greatest factor for peace in Europe. We had a most interesting
conversation upon matters of defence and preparation for war; and his
tone was most friendly towards the English. He very kindly presented
me with his signed photograph. I stayed with him for two hours; and we
drank much beer; and all the time his gigantic boar-hound, lying beside
him, stared fixedly at me with a red and lurid eye.
{364}