CHAPTER XXXVII

H.M.S. _UNDAUNTED_

I. WITH THE MEDITERRANEAN FLEET

"Undaunteds be ready,

Undaunteds be steady,

Undaunteds stand by for a job!"

Bugle call of H.M.S. _Undaunted_

It was invented by the first lieutenant, William Stokes Rees (now

Vice-Admiral W. S. Rees, C.B.), who was one of the best gunnery

officers I have known. I was appointed to the command of the

_Undaunted_ in November, 1889. The commander was Robert S. Lowry (now

Vice-Admiral Sir Robert S. Lowry, K.C.B.). It was the _Undaunted's_

first commission. She was a twin-screw, first-class armoured cruiser

of 5600 tons displacement and 8500 h.p., ordered to join the

Mediterranean Fleet, under the command of Vice-Admiral Sir Anthony H.

Hoskins, K.C.B. He was succeeded in September, 1891, by my old friend,

Admiral Sir George Tryon, K.C.B., whose tragic death was so great a

loss to the Service and to the country.

The first essential of good discipline is to make officers and men as

happy and as comfortable as the exigencies of the Service permit. I

believe that the _Undaunted_ was a happy ship; I know that the loyalty,

enthusiasm and hard work of the officers and men under my command

earned her a good record.

In every vessel there are improvements to be made which, perhaps

trifling in themselves, greatly add to the {365} welfare of the

officers and ship's company. At that time, for instance, the

arrangements for the stokers were so bad, that there was only one bath

available for twenty men. My recommendation was that tubs of

galvanised iron should be supplied, fitting one into another in nests,

so that the extra baths occupied less space than the one regulation

bath. I also had lockers of lattice-work supplied for the stokers'

dirty clothing, instead of closed and insanitary lockers. It is true

that at first the men objected to the open-work, because their pipes

dropped through it. Again, the hatchway ladders were made with sharp

nosings, against which the men injured their legs; and I suggested that

these should be formed with rounded nosings instead. A ship of war is

naturally uncomfortable; but why make it unnecessarily disagreeable?

At that time, too, the rate of second-class petty officer did not exist

among the stokers. The result was that if a leading stoker was

disrated he was reduced to stoker. For this reason, I urged the

institution of the rate of second-class petty officer stoker, a reform

which was eventually instituted. Some years afterwards, the rate of

second-class officer was abolished altogether, a retrograde measure

which I believe to be injurious.

When a petty officer loses his rate in consequence of a mistake or a

lapse, he should be enabled to recover it by good behaviour.

One of my countrymen on board, whom we will call Patrick, an able

seaman of long service, perpetually failed to attain to the rating of

petty officer owing to his weakness for strong waters. In other

respects he was admirably qualified to rise. I sent for him, told him

I would give him a chance, and made him a second-class petty officer.

I believe that he succumbed once or twice, and that the commander let

him off. But one fine day Patrick returned on board from leave ashore,

fully attired--cap, coat, boots and socks--with the single exception of

his trousers. The case having been officially reported to me, I had up

the delinquent before the assembled petty officers. I made it a rule

{366} not to disrate a petty officer in the presence of the ship's

company.

The charge having been duly read, I asked Patrick what he had to say on

the subject.

"Do you moind now, sir," says Pat, "that I was drunk the same day last

year?"

I told him I did not remember anything of the sort.

"Well, sir," continued Patrick, unabashed, "to tell you the truth, 'tis

my mother's birthday, and I had a drop of drink taken."

I told him that it was impossible to allow petty officers to disgrace

the ship by coming on board without their trousers; that I should take

away his petty officer's rate, but that I would leave him his badges.

He had three badges. Had he lost them, he would have lost his badge

pay during a period of six months for each badge, so that it would take

him eighteen months of "very good" conduct to regain them. In

addition, he would have lost the good conduct medal, a part of his

pension and a part of his gratuity on leaving the Service. The

severity of the punishment in comparison with what is not perhaps a

serious offence, is not always recognised by authority.

"May I say a word to you, sir?" asked Patrick, having received his

sentence.

"You can say what you like," said I, "but I am afraid it won't save

your rate."

"Well, sir," says he, "'tis this way, sir. If you'll think over it the

way it is, I was fourteen years getting th' rate, and you'll be takin'

it away from me in one moment."

Pat used to delight his audiences at the ship's concerts. He sang

among other beautiful legends, the Irish ditty, "Brannagan's Pup." He

led upon the stage my bull-dog, who came very sulkily. It never could

be (as Pat would have said) that the concertina accompaniment began

when he began. When the concertina started ahead of him, Pat shifted

the bull-dog's leash to his other hand, put his hand to the side of his

mouth, and staring straight upon the {367} audience, uttered the

following stage direction in a furious whisper which was heard all over

the ship.

"Don't you shtart that ruddy pump till I hould up me hand!"

Some years after I had left the _Undaunted_, arriving in a P. and O.

steamer off a Chinese port, I semaphored to a man-of-war asking the

captain to send me a boat, as I wished to have the pleasure of calling

upon him. The coxswain of the captain's boat was no other than my old

friend.

"I'm very glad to see you've kept the rate," said I. "I suppose you

run straight now and keep clear of liquor?"

"Well, sir," says Paddy, "to tell you the truth, I've taken an odd toss

or two since I saw you, but I've got it back again!"

He meant that he had been disrated again once or twice but had won back

his rate again; indeed, he had won it back while under my command. I

always told my men that if they were tried by court-martial--as the men

now desire to be tried--it would go harder with them. Had Patrick been

tried by court-martial, it is very unlikely that he would have got back

his rate; and his deprivation, being endorsed upon his certificate,

would have affected his chance of gaining employment in civil life upon

leaving the Service.

I had a case of a man who, because he put his helm over the wrong way,

ran into another boat, with the result that a man was drowned. The

culprit was disrated; but I gave him his rate again before I left the

ship. It is the personal knowledge of a man possessed by his captain

which alone enables his captain to make distinctions. A court-martial

must judge of the offence without personal knowledge of the character

of the offender.

I had a sergeant of Marines, a man with an excellent record, a strict

disciplinarian, popular among his men, who, within nine months of the

expiration of his time, came aboard blind drunk and disorderly. The

penalty was to be reduced to the ranks. But it is often forgotten what

under {368} such circumstances that penalty involves. The

non-commissioned officer loses his N.C.O.'s time and pension, his badge

pay for six months, and the gratuity of his rank. It is a tremendous

penalty to pay, when, except for the one mistake, he has a clean sheet

all through. I had the man up before the petty officers and

non-commissioned officers, explained that there were only two courses

of action: either to reduce him or to let him off altogether; and told

them that I intended to count his long and excellent service and

exemplary character as outweighing a single failure.

Here was an exceptional case; and because it was exceptional, it was

wise to depart from the rule, and to give reasons for disciplinary

action. Had no explanation been given, the next man disrated or

reduced might have considered that he had been unfairly treated; but he

could have no such grievance, when the circumstances in which the

non-commissioned officer had his punishment remitted had been made

known at the time.

Ships, like men, have their weaknesses; and the weakness of our fine

new steam navy consisted in the unprotected ends of our armoured

vessels, in which respect they were inferior to the French ships. The

section of a wooden man-of-war was, roughly speaking, V-shaped below

the water-line; and when she was pierced in action, the water entering

through the shot-holes ran down to the bottom of the vessel, where the

extra weight, although it might sink her lower in the water, acted as

additional ballast, resisting any tendency to capsize. But the section

of a steel man-of-war is roughly a square, with the lower edges

rounded. The protective steel deck, covering the engines, extends the

whole length and width of the ship. Above the water-line there are the

immense weights of armour and guns. If the ship is pierced in her

unprotected ends above the steel deck, the water, entering through the

holes, is held high up in the section, giving her a list, and dragging

her over, so that a badly wounded ship must capsize. Such was my

theory, which I set forth at length in a letter sent to the

commander-in-chief, {369} Sir Anthony Hoskins. He considered the point

of importance, but held that it was a matter rather for the constructor

than the seaman, a view with which I did not agree.

Sir Anthony Hoskins, who was about to haul down his flag, turned the

letter over to Sir George Tryon, who sent it to the Admiralty. The

Admiralty, I believe, considered that, under certain conditions, the

theory was correct.

Those conditions occurred on 22nd June, 1893, when the _Victoria_ was

rammed by the _Camperdown_ off Beyrout. The _Camperdown_ struck the

flagship on the starboard bow, and in ten minutes she had capsized and

sunk. As the _Victoria_ was carrying her scuttles open, and received

an injury equivalent to the damage which would be inflicted by a large

shell, the conditions of an action, in which the hull would be pierced

with many small holes and further wounded by heavy projectiles, were

produced, with the result whose probability, if not certainty, I had

indicated.

In dealing with this subject, I also represented that the French ships

of the period, having a powerful fore and aft fire, might choose in

time of war to fight a retreating action, in which case they could so

damage the unarmoured ends of our vessels, that our vessels could not

be steered, and, being forced to ease speed, would be placed at a

serious disadvantage.

The _Hecla_, torpedo school ship in the Mediterranean, was commanded by

my old friend, Captain John Durnford (now Admiral Sir John Durnford,

K.C.B., D.S.O.). Together with the officers under my command, I

attended the torpedo classes on board.

Captain Durnford accompanied me in the _Undaunted_ when we conducted

experiments in the dropping of mines. The mines were the clever

invention of Lieutenant Ottley (now Rear-Admiral Sir Charles C. Ottley,

K.C.M.G., C.B., M.V.O.). By means of an ingenious mechanical

contrivance, they sank themselves to the required depth. We designed

and constructed the dropping gear, rigging it abaft the propellers.

The mines were dropped by hand, the ship {370} steaming at 18 knots. A

certain area was fixed within which the mines were to be sown. We

steamed across it at night, in thick darkness, along a narrow channel.

Unable to take bearings, as the position of the scattered lights on

shore was unknown, we sent out two boats carrying lights. We touched

the ground once, the shock throwing Captain Durnford and myself against

the rail. In four minutes all the mines were dropped without a single

mistake. The experiment was also carried into execution in daylight.

In those days there were no mine-laying vessels, and the _Undaunted_

was somewhat of a pioneer in the science of mining waters at full speed.

My experience while in office at the Admiralty had led me profoundly to

suspect (among other things) the adequacy of the provision for reserve

ammunition. And upon making inquiries at Malta, I found that if the

_Undaunted_ in the event of war had expended the whole of her

ammunition, the renewal of the supply for her main armament of 6-inch

guns would (excluding practice ammunition) exhaust the whole reserve

supply. There were no spare guns in reserve at all. My

representations on the subject were by no means gratefully received by

the Admiralty, which considered that the supply of reserve ammunition

and guns was not the business of a captain. I suggested that the

ammunition papers should go to every captain; an arrangement which was

afterwards carried into execution. At this time I also represented

(but in other quarters) the urgent necessity of building a new mole at

Gibraltar, which was then not a naval but a military base, although in

time of war it would be required to serve as one of the most important

naval bases in the world, either for the blue water route or the narrow

sea route. My representations were made with the object of inducing

the Government to transform Gibraltar from a merely military fortress

to a properly equipped naval base. I took soundings and drew out a

scheme. The plan eventually adopted was an improvement upon mine.

It is not of course implied that I was alone in urging {371} these

reforms and such as these; there were many patriotic men, both in the

Service and outside it, who were engaged in the same endeavour. What I

did must be taken to represent the unrequited labours of others as

well. Sir George Tryon, my commander-in-chief, that splendid seaman

and admirable officer, was always most sympathetic and showed to me the

greatest kindness. I am proud to say that I never served under a

commander-in-chief with whom I was not upon the best of terms.

Sir George Tryon having received letters from H.H. the Khedive and from

the British Minister Plenipotentiary in Egypt, instructed me to proceed

to Alexandria with a small squadron. H.H. the Khedive welcomed me with

great cordiality, being so kind as to say that I had saved his father's

life during the troubles of 1882, when the _Condor_ kept guard over the

Ramleh Palace. I remained at Alexandria for some time, being senior

officer there.

In order to relieve the monotony of sea-routine, the men were landed by

companies in the Mex lines, a place with which I had many interesting

associations dating from 1882, for rifle practice, sleeping under

canvas. The water on shore being undrinkable, the men were ordered to

use the distilled water supplied daily from the ship.

Visiting the hospital tent, I thought one of the patients had cholera.

"It looks very like it," said the staff-surgeon.

"Have you been drinking the shore water?" I asked the patient.

He confessed that he had. I asked him why he had done so.

"Please, sir," said he, "the distilled water had no taste in it."

Having arranged with my old friend, Sir William Butler, commanding the

garrison at Alexandria, to combine with the soldiers in field exercise,

I took a landing-party ashore at Ras-el-Tin. We started early in the

morning, embarking the field-guns. The seamen waded ashore with them,

and {372} attacked a position held by the soldiers on the top of the

hill. It looked impregnable, the ground being a steep, sandy slope

covered with scrub. But the bluejackets dragged the guns up through

the sand and bushes. We battled all the morning with great enjoyment;

returned on board, and shifted into dry clothes in time for dinner.

The benefit of such exercises is that all learn something.

In July, 1891, was held at Alexandria the great regatta, in which 26

boats of all classes were entered, including a cutter from the

Portuguese sloop _Fieja_ and Arab boats. It was on this occasion that

the galley of the _Undaunted_ ran upon the breakwater, was knocked into

smithereens, and sank. By an extraordinary coincidence, she was an old

boat which the Admiralty had persistently refused to replace.

Upon leaving Alexandria, the _Undaunted_ touched a rock. We had been

helping the contractor to blow up the rocks in the Borghiz Channel (a

proceeding for which I was subsequently reproved) and left the harbour

steering by stern marks. The staff-commander knew exactly where he was

going, but by a slip of the tongue he gave the order "port" instead of

"starboard," adding that he wanted to close certain buoys marking the

passage. The injury to the ship was very slight, but peculiar. Her

bottom was pierced, and a little fish swam into the ship. I have the

fish with a small piece broken off the keel by the impact, in a bottle.

In December, 1891, the second annual regatta of the Mediterranean Fleet

was held in Marmorice Bay. In the officers' race, I pulled stroke in

the galley of the _Undaunted_, in spite of Sir George Tryon's kindly

warning that my heart would give way. We beat the _Australia's_ boat

by about two seconds. In the next race, held the following year, the

_Australia_ beat us.

There were seventeen ships on the station, and 9000 men. The

_Undaunted_ won 22 prizes (12 of them, I think, first prizes) out of

29. All her ratings were regularly practised in all her boats, each

boat racing against the other. In {373} order to equalise chances, the

boats started in rotation, the time allowance being given at the start,

instead of being calculated at the end as in yacht racing, so that the

boat first across the line at the end of the course won the race. The

launch, being the heaviest boat, started last, manned with four men to

the midship oars, three men to the after oars, and two men to the

foremost oars. The boats would often all come in together. The

enthusiasm of the men was immense. At that time the island of Crete

was in a state of chronic agitation, which culminated in the troubles

of 1897, and their suppression by the Council of Admirals, of which

Admiral Sir Robert H. Harris, who represented Great Britain with so

great ability and resource, gives an excellent account in his book,

_From Naval Cadet to Admiral_. In the meantime, Christians and

Mohammedans were joyfully shooting one another, while the Turkish

garrison endeavoured to keep order by shooting both parties

impartially. Riding up from Suda Bay to call upon a certain

distinguished Turkish Pasha, an old friend, I passed several corpses,

both of Christians and Mohammedans, lying on the roadside.

"Cannot you stop these murders?" I said to the Pasha. "It is really

very distressing to see so many dead bodies."

"Yes, Lord," said the Pasha (he always called me Lord). "Very sad,

Lord. I am sure you must feel it very much, Lord. It must make you

think you are back in your own country."

The retort was apposite enough, for moonlighting was then the joy of

Ireland.

Not that the Turkish soldiers neglected musketry practice. Riding up

to Canea, I was met by bullets whistling past my head. I pulled off

the road, and was joined by an old Turk, who was riding a donkey and

carrying a large white umbrella. Presently we perceived a pot placed

in the middle of the highway, and then we came upon a party of Turkish

soldiers lying in a row and firing at it; whereupon the aged Turk

climbed from his donkey, rolled up his umbrella, and belaboured the

soldiers with it.

{374}

I once asked my friend the Pasha why he had not ere then been promoted.

"I do not know, Lord. The Government does not know. God Almighty does

not know. Even his Imperial Majesty the Sultan does not know!" quoth

the Pasha.

The _Undaunted_ visited Sorrento in 1891, when Lord Dufferin was

staying there. None who had the privilege of his acquaintance will

need to be reminded of the singular charm of a talented, witty and

urbane personality. Lord Dufferin had the unconscious art of

impressing upon those whom he met that he had been waiting all his life

for that moment. The small sailing yacht, _Lady Hermione_, which he

kept at Sorrento, was a marvel of ingenious contrivance. She was a

decked boat, with a well into which the ropes and gear were led and

were attached to all sorts of levers, tackles and winches, to enable

her to be sailed single-handed. Lord Dufferin, accompanied by Lady

Dufferin, frequently sailed her in the Bay of Naples. On one such

voyage, wishing to tauten up the peak halliards, he told Lady Dufferin

to heave upon a certain lever. She seized the wrong handle, and away

went the anchor with 130 fathoms of chain, which ran out to the clinch.

Then the rest of the equipment became really useful, Lord Dufferin

rigging up purchase on purchase with it, and so heaving up the anchor.

After four hours' incessant toil he succeeded in getting it berthed,

and returned in a state of exhaustion.

The _Lady Hermione_ persuaded Lord Dufferin to learn Morse and

semaphore. She was moored at the foot of the cliff, beneath Lord

Dufferin's hotel, from whose balcony he used to shout his orders for

the day to the boy who was in charge of her, and who often

misunderstood his instructions. I suggested that he should learn to

communicate with his ship's company by signal, and drew up both the

Morse and semaphore codes for his benefit. In six weeks he sent

letters to me written in both codes; an instance of determined

application. During that time he insisted on practising for so many

hours every day with his wife and daughter, so {375} that at the end of

it the whole family were proficient in signals.

An interesting example of the manoeuvres of those days occurred at

Volo, when Captain Wilson, V.C., disguised his ship, the _Sanspareil_,

in olive trees. The _Undaunted_ was told off to make a torpedo attack

at night in the narrow channel where lay the _Sanspareil_. Captain

Wilson (now Admiral of the Fleet Sir A. K. Wilson, V.C., G.C.B., O.M.,

G.C.V.O.) had constructed a dummy ship on the side of the channel

opposite to which lay the _Sanspareil_, completely clothed in olive

trees. I sent a midshipman to cut the cable of the searchlight playing

upon the entrance to the channel. The _Undaunted_ steamed into the

channel, discovered first the wrong ship, and then the right one, at

which I discharged two torpedoes, which were found next morning under

the bottom of the _Sanspareil_.

At the conclusion of all manoeuvres, Sir George Tryon invariably gave a

critical lecture upon them to his officers; a method which I adopted in

later years. No practice can be more useful; for, while the events are

fresh in mind, it demonstrates what was wrong, and why. Often what

looks wrong at first, turns out to have been a good idea. But for

years all reports of manoeuvres remained locked in the Admiralty. Many

of the manoeuvres were useless; but for lack of information admirals

afloat continued to repeat them.

During my time in the _Undaunted_, my knowledge of signalling saved

Captain Harry Rawson (afterwards Vice-Admiral Sir H. H. Rawson, K.C.B.)

and myself a deal of trouble on one occasion. We had been out shooting

all day, had missed the way, and as darkness fell, found ourselves on

the wrong side of the bay in which the Fleet lay at anchor, with the

prospect of a further tramp of twelve or fourteen miles. Rawson used

to chaff me for doing what he called "boatswain's work."

"You always want," he used to say, "to go down to the store-room and

cut off 30 fathoms of rope yourself."

To which I used to reply that I wanted to do nothing of {376} the sort;

but what I did want to do was to see that a piece of 30 fathoms of rope

_was_ cut off. On the same principle, Rawson used to deride my

acquaintance with signals. Now that we either had to attract the

attention of the Fleet or walk for another three or four hours, I told

Rawson that if I could find a shepherd's hut I would get a boat over.

He did not believe me.

But we found a hut, and in the hut, an oil lamp and a bucket, out of

which I constructed a signalling apparatus. I had hardly made the

_Undaunted_ pennant, when it was answered from the ship, and inside a

quarter of an hour the boat waiting for us on the other side of the bay

had been recalled, and another boat was rapidly approaching us. Rawson

left off chaffing me after that.

It was at this time that my old friend, Captain Gerard Noel (now

Admiral of the Fleet Sir G. H. U. Noel, G.C.B., K.C.M.G.), one of the

smartest seamen in the Service, performed a brilliant feat of

seamanship. Captain Noel commanded the twin-screw, rigged ironclad

_Téméraire_, of 8540 tons displacement, one of the types in which

sail-power was employed as well as steam. She was brig-rigged, and I

think her main-yard measured 104 feet, or about four feet longer than

the main-yards of the sailing line-of-battleships of, say, 1850-60. On

the 3rd October, 1890, Captain Noel beat her under sail alone against a

head wind up Suda Bay, a long narrow arm of the sea, with shoal water

in places, which added to the difficulty of handling the ship. If I am

not mistaken, that occasion was the first and last time an ironclad

beat her way under sail into an anchorage. The _Téméraire_ made

thirteen tacks and anchored within two cables (400 yards) of her

appointed berth with the Fleet. By that time the wind had failed and

it was useless to attempt to tack again.

It was early in the commission of the _Undaunted_ that I read Captain

(now Admiral) A. T. Mahan's admirable book, _The Influence of Sea Power

upon History_; of which it is not too much to say that it has changed

the whole trend of {377} modern thought in respect of the relation of

sea warfare to land warfare. Preparation for war now turns upon a new

pivot. The result has been that extraordinary increase of foreign

navies which necessarily imposes upon us a proportionate increase of

our own Navy. I was so greatly impressed with the work of Captain

Mahan, that I wrote to him to express my admiration for it. I received

in reply the interesting letter which follows, and which Admiral Mahan

has kindly permitted me to quote:

"75, EAST 54TH STREET, NEW YORK

7_th February_, 1891

"DEAR LORD CHARLES BERESFORD,--I thank you very much for your letter,

which was received a few days since. The reception my book has had on

your side of the water has been very grateful to me. Commendation is

pleasant, but there has been a degree of thoughtful appreciation in

England, both by the Press and naval officers which has exceeded my

expectations and, I fear, the deserts of the work. That it will

produce any effect upon our people is unlikely; too many causes concur

to prevent a recognition of the truth that even the most extensive

countries need to make themselves outside. After our own, nothing will

give me greater pleasure than that it should contribute in your country

to a sense of your vital interest in this matter. Your naval officers

have an inducement to study those great questions which is almost

wanting in ours; for if your Fleet is not all that you could wish, you

still have some instruments to work with, a force superior to any other

if not adequate to all your needs, and the inadequacy can be greatly

remedied by judicious and careful planning and preparation.

"... The number and dissemination of your external interests throws

England largely on the defensive, necessarily so. It was so in the

great days of Pitt and Nelson, though the fact is obscured by the great

naval preponderance you then had. You have now greater and more

extensive interests to defend....--Believe me to be, very truly yours,

"A. T. MAHAN"

{378}