CHAPTER XLIII
THE INTROMISSION OF THE ADMIRALS
In August, 1898, I received from the Associated Chambers of Commerce of
Great Britain, whose President was Sir Stafford Northcote, an
invitation to proceed on their behalf to China, "to obtain accurate
information as to how security is to be ensured to commercial men who
may be disposed to embark their capital in trade enterprise in China."
Sir Stafford Northcote added that he desired to obtain a report on
these matters from a "non-official source," and that, further, it
should be supplied by an officer of naval or military experience, by
reason of the importance of the question of adequate protection for
British commercial ventures.
Accompanied by Mr. Robin Grey, who acted as an additional secretary,
and by my secretary, Mr. Macdonald, I sailed for China towards the end
of August. My commission, to report on the future prospects of British
trade and commerce in China and especially to what extent the Chinese
Government would guarantee the safe employment of British capital, was
sufficiently wide in its scope.
At that time, there was much public discussion concerning the rivalry
manifesting itself among the European nations interested in China,
particularly with regard to railway concessions and like privileges.
The public in general were of opinion that the British Government was
very slow to assert British rights. In July, 1898, Sir Claude
Macdonald, British Plenipotentiary at the Court of Pekin, was
"authorised to inform the Chinese Government that Her Majesty's
Government {425} will support them in resisting any Power which commits
an act of aggression on China or on account of China having granted
permission to make or support any railway or public work to a British
subject."
This was something, but it was not much; for China, comparing British
assurances with Russian actions, entertained her own opinion concerning
their comparative value. Nevertheless, the British policy was quite
definitely the policy of the "Open Door"; which Mr. Balfour defined
(10th August, 1898) as "the right of importing goods at the same rate
that every nation imports goods, the same right of using railways that
other nations possess. In other words, equal trade opportunities."
The alternative policy of "Spheres of Influence," Mr. Balfour
oracularly described as "a wholly different set of questions connected
with concessions, and they cannot be treated in the same simple and
obvious manner." But in what the treatment should consist, the public
were not told.
It was not, perhaps, understood by the public at the time, how delicate
was the international situation, nor how serious might be the
consequences, not only of hasty action but, of any decisive action; and
although it did not necessarily follow that nothing should be done, the
difficulties and complications, many of which were known only to the
Government, should be taken into consideration.
Russia was establishing herself in Manchuria, and was arming Port
Arthur and Talienwan. Germany had declined to pledge herself not to
levy preferential duties at Kiao Chao, and claimed exclusive rights
over railway construction through the Shantung Province. France was
claiming preferential rights with regard to her leasehold in Southern
China. France and Russia were interesting themselves in the sanctioned
trunk line from Pekin to Hankow and from Hankow to the south.
Nothing was settled with regard to the important question of the rights
over the Yangtse basin.
Lord Salisbury had stated that he did not consider it to {426} be the
duty of Her Majesty's Government to make railways in China, or to find
the money to make them; and both Lord Salisbury and Mr. Curzon
(afterwards Viscount Curzon of Kedleston) affirmed that the failure of
British syndicates to apply for concessions in China was due to their
lack of initiative.
On the other hand, it was argued in the Press that the lack of
initiative on the part of British enterprise was due to the lack of
support and to the absence of a definite policy on the part of the
Government, a criticism which, among others, was formulated by Sir
Edward Grey, who was then of course in Opposition.
At the same time, underlying these controversies, there was the
consciousness that detailed practical information concerning the real
posture of affairs in China was lacking. Under these conditions,
considerable responsibility attached to the task upon which I had
entered. Its rapid and successful fulfilment clearly depended upon the
method of its organisation. Before starting, a letter was addressed by
me to every Chamber of Commerce in China, requesting it to prepare a
report giving details of:
1. The State of British trade now.
2. The state of British trade ten years ago.
3. The state of foreign trade.
4. Increase and decrease of trade.
By this means, the reports were ready for me upon my arrival; and I was
immediately placed in possession of the material which served to guide
my inquiries and upon which I could base my observations. As these are
set forth in detail, in my book _The Break-up of China_, published by
Messrs. Harper and Brothers in 1899, and as the conditions have since
changed, I do not propose to repeat them at length in these pages. I
have here to acknowledge the courtesy of Messrs. Harper and Brothers in
granting me permission to quote from _The Break-up of China_.
I wrote that work in thirty-one days; a feat of which I was {427} not
unjustly proud; for it was a long book, crammed with facts and
statistics, extracted from a pile of memoranda and documents three feet
high. I used to ride before breakfast in Richmond Park; after
breakfast, I worked all day until 7.30; and when I had finished the
book, I said I would never write another.
While I was on my way to China--while all the Chambers of Commerce in
China were hard at it compiling reports for me--a brother officer,
Rear-Admiral Noel, was engaged in settling, in his own supreme way, a
difficulty which had long exercised the Chancelleries of Europe in
vain, and which might at any moment have given rise to what are called
European complications.
In January, 1897, broke out the insurrection of the Christians in
Crete; which, put shortly, was the result of two centuries of
oppression under Moslem rule. During the previous year (to go no
farther back) the Sultan of Turkey, at the request of the Powers of
Europe, had promised to introduce certain reforms. As these were not
carried into execution, the Cretan Christians, encouraged thereto by
Greece and aided by Greek soldiery, rose in rebellion. Roughly
speaking, the Christians held the country districts, and the Turkish
garrison, reinforced by an irregular and undisciplined horde of
Bashi-Bazouks, occupied the towns. No doubt but Turkey could have put
down the revolt by extensive bloodshed; but the Powers of Europe had
forbidden the Sultan either to reinforce his garrison in Crete, or (at
first) to make war upon the insurgents. The Powers were therefore
morally bound to restore order themselves. Recognising this
obligation, they dispatched men-of-war to Crete. Italy, France,
Russia, Austria, Great Britain and Germany were represented.
Vice-Admiral Count N. Canevaro, the Italian, being senior officer, was
president of the Council of Admirals. Great Britain was represented by
Rear-Admiral Sir Robert Harris. The admirals arrived off Canea in
February, 1897; intercepted and sent away a Greek squadron of
reinforcements; {428} established a blockade; and proceeded, as best
they might, to enforce order. They succeeded for the time being; but
it was not within their province to attempt a radical remedy. So long
as the Turks remained in Crete, so long would the trouble continue.
The Christians dared not resume their occupations, for fear of a
further outbreak of Moslem aggression, when they could not rely upon
the Turkish garrison for protection; the Moslems, dreading Christian
reprisals, clung to the Turkish troops as their only salvation.
In the face of this dilemma, Germany and Austria withdrew from the
concert, and the island remained in charge of Great Britain, France,
Russia and Italy, each Power being assigned a district. Great Britain
retained Candia, where the British garrison was reduced to one
regiment, the Highland Light Infantry. The discontent, temporarily
quelled, soon became acute.
The decision of the Council of Admirals to collect a proportion of the
export duties aroused intense indignation. When, on 6th September,
1898, the British came to take over the Custom House at Candia, the mob
rose, attacked the tiny force of British seamen and soldiers and the
British camp and hospital, and massacred some 500 Christians in the
town. The British fought like heroes and lost heavily; but for the
moment they were helpless; the only man-of-war off Candia being the
gunboat _Hazard_.
Then, on 11th September, Rear-Admiral Gerard Noel (now Admiral of the
Fleet Sir Gerard H. U. Noel, G.C.B., K.C.M.G.), who had relieved Sir
Robert Harris early in the year, arrived at Candia in H.M.S. _Revenge_.
The next day, he landed, inspected the scenes of the recent fighting
and ordered the Turkish governor, Edhem Pasha, to repair on board the
_Revenge_.
Admiral Noel required the governor to demolish all houses from which
the insurgents had fired upon the British camp and hospital; to give up
to British troops certain forts and positions; and to surrender the
principal persons concerned in the rioting and attack. The admiral
also {429} informed the governor that the Moslem population would be
disarmed.
The governor broke into a cold perspiration and accepted the admiral's
demands. He was then suffering under the delusion that he could evade
them. He never made a bigger mistake. When he tried to avoid the
demolition of the houses, he was suddenly confronted with the spectacle
of two hundred British seamen coming ashore to do the work, and
hurriedly gave in. When he endeavoured to postpone the delivery of the
prisoners, he was informed that if they were not delivered by the hour
appointed, they would be taken. His every excuse and pretext were met
by the same composed and invincible determination. At the last moment,
when the scaffold awaiting the malefactors stood stark upon the highest
point of the bastions, Edhem Pasha's frantic plea for delay was
received by a terse intimation that if he did not hang the prisoners,
he, Edhem Pasha, would himself be hanged.
The disturbers of peace were hanged at the precise time appointed; and
swung in a row until sundown, in sight of all the city. Twice again
the bodies of murderers darkened above the ramparts, to the abiding
terror of evil-doers.
The Powers ordered the evacuation of the island by the Turks within a
month, which expired on 5th December. On the evening of the 4th, some
600 troops had still to leave, together with their women, horses and
baggage. Admiral Noel ordered the baggage to be embarked on board the
British transport _Ocampo_ and a small Turkish transport that night.
Next day, the governor, Shefket Bey (who had succeeded Edhem Pasha),
informed the admiral that he had received orders from the Governor of
Crete to keep the remaining troops and to disembark the baggage. What
followed is described in an account of the affair contributed by "A
Naval Officer" to _The United Service Magazine_, February, 1899.
"An armed boat was sent to prevent interference with {430} the Turkish
transport. The admiral signalled to the Fleet: 'Prepare to man and arm
boats. I intend to compel the Turkish troops to embark by force after
noon'; and to the commandant of British troops, 'All Turkish troops
remaining in the town after noon are to be made prisoners and compelled
to embark at the quay.'"
It was a bold decision, worthy of the Royal Navy. For all the admiral
knew, the Turks might have fought, in which case they would have been
reinforced by some thousands of Bashi-Bazouks. But they gave in, and
were marched on board. Their "furniture, beds, pianos, carpets and
general loot and rubbish, making a pile as big as a frigate," says the
eye-witness aforesaid, "which, together with nearly three hundred
horses, was bundled into boats and lighters by the seamen of the
_Revenge_ and _Empress of India_, and stowed away on board the
transports, the work taking all night."
Thus did Rear-Admiral Gerard Noel cut the knot which all the
diplomatists in Europe had failed to unloose. The Marquess of
Salisbury publicly complimented the admirals upon their diplomatic
ability, saying that he wished the Cabinets of Europe could work
together with equal unanimity and rapidity.
In December, 1908, H.R.H. Prince George of Greece took over the
government of Crete from the admirals.
The settlement of the Cretan difficulty undoubtedly exercised an
appreciable effect upon the international situation, with which my own
enterprise in China was necessarily connected. For Admiral Noel had
removed what had been a chronic danger to the peace of Europe; and in
so doing had demonstrated that combined action on the part of the Great
Powers (if entrusted to naval officers) could be both cordially
conducted and successfully accomplished. I have recalled the affair,
not only because it gives me pleasure to record the ability, courage
and resolution of my old friend and brother officer, but because no
account of the time, lacking the Cretan episode, can be wholly
intelligible. For, {431} although it is consistently neglected by
political historians, whose views are usually distorted by party, it
remains, and will remain, a classic example of the consummate exercise
of British sea-power for the inspiration and instruction of honest men.
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