CHAPTER XLIV
TRAFFICS AND DISCOVERIES
I. CHINA
THE MISFORTUNES OF KANG YU WEI
On my way up to Pekin, I visited Hong Kong, arriving there on 30th
September. The island of Hong Kong, being British territory, is a city
of refuge; to which sanctuary, just before my arrival, had fled Kang Yu
Wei, the leader of the Reform Party. To the influence of Kang Yu Wei
may be ascribed the conversion of the young Emperor, Kuang Hsu, to
Reform; and the issue by the Son of Heaven of the series of Decrees,
during the Hundred Days of Reform of the preceding summer. The
movement culminated in the plot to seize the person of the Empress
Dowager, which was frustrated by the _coup d'état_. But before that
decisive event occurred, Kang Yu Wei receiving a broad hint from the
Emperor that his arrest had been ordered by the Empress Dowager, took
the next train from Pekin to Tongku, and embarked on board the coasting
steamer _Chungking_ bound for Shanghai.
The Taotai at Shanghai informed Acting-Consul-General Brenan that he
had received orders to arrest Kang Yu Wei upon his arrival, and that a
reward of 2000 dollars was offered for his capture, and requested Mr.
Brenan to search for the fugitive in all British ships arriving at
Shanghai. By this time the Chinese detectives and policemen were
wildly excited by the prospect of securing 2000 dollars that Mr. Brenan
feared they would attempt forcibly to {433} board British ships before
they entered the harbour. He therefore determined to intercept the
_Chungking_ before the Chinese officials could reach her; but desiring
to avoid the open implication of the Consulate in the matter, he
accepted the services volunteered by Mr. J. O. P. Bland (joint author
of _China under the Empress Dowager_). Mr. Bland, who spoke Chinese,
took a steam-launch, met the _Chungking_ some miles out at sea,
transhipped Kang Yu Wei, and put him on board the P. and O. steamer
_Ballaarat_, then lying outside Woosung. Captain Field, commanding the
_Ballaarat_, placed an armed sentry upon Kang Yu Wei's cabin. The
people in the _Chungking_, knowing that H.M.S. _Esk_ was at Woosung,
told the Chinese officials at Shanghai that Kang Yu Wei had been put on
board her. This information diverted attention from the _Ballaarat_
for the moment.
The Chinese officials, however, eventually determined to follow the
_Ballaarat_ in a gunboat, when, two days later (29th September), the
_Ballaarat_ sailed for Hong Kong. The British authorities, learning
also that two more Chinese gunboats were ordered to lie in wait for the
P. and O. boat, arranged that she should be escorted to Hong Kong by
H.M. cruiser _Bonaventure_, commanded by my old friend and
brother-in-arms in the Soudan campaign, Captain R. A. J. Montgomerie.
Being pursued by the Chinese gunboat, Montgomerie cleared for action;
luckily for them, the Chinese declined to risk an affair with one of
the finest fighting officers in Her Majesty's service; and Kang Yu Wei
was landed in safety at Hong Kong. Here, Major-General Black placed
him under police protection. The procedure followed by Captain
Montgomerie in accordance with the orders of Vice-Admiral Sir Edward
Seymour, then commander-in-chief on the China station, not only saved
the life of the patriot Kang Yu Wei, but prevented the occurrence of
the difficulties which would have arisen had the Chinese attempted to
board the _Ballaarat_.
With the object of ascertaining the views of the Reform Party
concerning the future of China and its relation to the {434} extension
of trade and commerce, I invited Kang Yu Wei to visit me. He arrived
surrounded by a bodyguard of policemen, for a price was set on his
head. Apparently the poor man felt it already loose, for, as he
talked, he kept turning it over his shoulder; and little wonder; for it
was only three or four days since his brother and five of his
colleagues had been executed in Pekin.
"Reforms in the East," said Kang Yu Wei, "invariably demanded martyrs;
and, if China did not go to pieces in the meantime, posterity would
honour the six dead gentlemen." In reply to my question as to the
present position of the Reform Party, he said it was "completely
crushed, but not killed," and would ere long revive; a prophecy which
has been fulfilled.
Kang Yu Wei affirmed that, contrary to the general opinion abroad, all
educated Chinamen believed that Reform alone could prevent the
dissolution of an Empire 4000 years old; that by degrees the mass of
the people were accepting the new doctrines; that the Reformers relied
upon Great Britain to help them to carry their schemes into execution;
and that, were they to attain power, they would certainly open China to
the trade and commerce of the world, because such a policy would
increase the strength and riches of the Empire.
The impression left upon my mind by Kang Yu Wei was that he was loyal,
patriotic, and unselfishly devoted to his country, and undoubtedly he
was in earnest.
[Illustration: FROM AN ORIGINAL DRAWING BY PHIL MAY IN THE POSSESSION
OF THE AUTHOR]
In the course of many conversations held with the compradors (managers)
of the great mercantile houses in China, I ascertained that, while
several of them were frankly in favour of Reform, all of them agreed
that the Reformers had acted in haste, neglecting to prepare their way
by means of careful organisation.
THE CHINESE NEW MODEL
Arriving at Pekin on 16th October, 1898, I was kindly invited by Sir
Claude Macdonald, British Minister {435} Plenipotentiary, to stay at
the Legation. To all Foreign Ministers accredited to Pekin I paid my
respects and presented my credentials, which were given to me by the
President of the Associated Chambers of Commerce of Great Britain, Sir
Stafford Northcote, and which showed that I had been asked to make a
report on British trade and commerce, its future development, and what
security existed throughout the Chinese Empire for such trade and
commerce.
On 20th October, I visited the Tsung-li Yamen; a body created, in 1861,
for the purpose of conducting diplomatic negotiations with the
representatives of Foreign Powers, and consisting of eight members, of
whom three are Manchus and five are Chinese. I was presented to Prince
Ching, the President, and was requested to address the members. In my
speech, I dwelt upon the anxiety as to the future on the part of
British traders on account of the want of security for capital, and the
ignoring of treaties by the Chinese; suggested that, unless China
organised her military and police forces in order to give security for
trade and commerce, foreign countries would adopt the policy embodied
in the expression "Spheres of Influence"; affirmed that the British
desired no addition to be made to the British Empire, either in the
nature of dominion, sphere of influence, or protectorate; explained
that what the commercial communities desired was free and uninterrupted
opportunities for trade, with equal rights and privileges for all the
nations of the world, a policy expressed by the words "Open Door"; and
stated that in order to establish such a policy, it was essential that
China should maintain her integrity.
Prince Ching asked me how I thought trade and commerce could be better
protected that it was at present.
I replied that the only effective method would be thoroughly to
reorganise the Chinese army, abolishing the system of maintaining
provincial armies; that, as Great Britain had 64 per cent. of the whole
foreign trade of China, she was naturally anxious as to its adequate
security; and that it was possible that the British Government would
allow {436} a British officer to assist the Chinese in putting their
army in order; adding that I had no official authority whatever to make
the statement, but merely put it forward as a suggestion. I also
suggested that should the Chinese Government consider the proposal, it
might be well for them to invite other nations which had large trading
interests with China, to lend a few officers and non-commissioned
officers to work with the British in the reorganisation of the army.
Prince Ching observed that they already had German officers to drill
some of their troops; and that Captain Lang, the British naval officer,
was in the Chinese service to help them to organise their Fleet. He
did not mention, however, what I afterwards discovered, that Captain
Lang had found the admiral sitting on the quarter-deck playing fan-tan
with his own sentry. Captain Lang subsequently resigned his
appointment.
When Prince Ching and some members of the Tsung-li Yamen returned my
visit, Prince Ching informed me that the Emperor and the Empress
Dowager approved of my suggestions; and that his Excellency Chung Chi
Tung, Viceroy of Hunan and Hupeh, had been ordered to have 2000 of his
troops ready to be placed under a British officer for drill and
organisation, as an experiment, which might possibly lead to the
reorganisation of the army as a whole. I replied that as I was in no
way authorised to take any responsibility with regard to this matter,
any action taken on the part of the Tsung-ii Yamen must go through the
British Minister to the British Government. Prince Ching said that it
was the intention of the Tsung-li Yamen formally to inform Sir Claude
Macdonald of the wishes of the Chinese Government.
My interpreter on these occasions was Mr. Fulford of the British
Legation, and all that passed between myself and the high Chinese
officials in Pekin was made known by Mr. Fulford to the British
Minister.
The question of providing adequate security for British subjects and
for British trade and commerce, was thus {437} frankly raised at the
beginning. Indeed, all hinged upon its solution. The safety of life
and property always depends ultimately upon disciplined force. The
force at the disposal of the Chinese Government was scattered,
ill-organised and largely inefficient. But, with the men, money and
resources actually available, it would have been perfectly feasible to
have formed an army of a million men. Such was my view at the time,
and I have seen no reason to change it since.
At the request of the Tsung-li Yamen, I drew up the entire scheme
complete in every detail for the organisation of the Chinese army; and
on several occasions it was discussed with me by the Chinese Ministers
at great length.
Briefly described, my scheme was based upon the principle upon which
the Imperial Maritime Customs had been formed. The Imperial Maritime
Customs was charged with the duty of collecting Custom House dues,
which were hypothecated to secure the external indebtedness of China.
All nations were represented upon it, and, because Great Britain
possessed by far the larger share of Chinese trade, a British officer
was placed at its head. The business was impartially managed under the
Chinese Government for the common welfare of China and of other
nations; and in the result the arrangement worked admirably.
The proposal was, then, to organise the army upon the same basis;
appointing officers of those nations who owned interests in China; and,
as Great Britain possessed the largest interests, placing a British
officer in command under the Chinese Government. Under these
conditions, the army would be enabled to secure China both against
foreign aggression and internal disturbance. In a word, it would
ensure stable government. Under existing conditions, stable government
was impossible; for the methods of the Empress Dowager consisted in
playing off one party against another, and one viceroy against another.
Tsu Hsi succeeded in maintaining her personal ascendancy; but at the
cost of so weakening the State, that it was liable to fall a prey to
foreign ambition and foreign cupidity.
{438}
The Chinese high officials argued the whole subject with great acumen.
They objected that the commander-in-chief might embark upon a career of
personal aggrandisement. I replied that as he would be under the
Chinese Government, and that as he would be further restricted by his
dependence upon an international body of officers, there could be no
such danger. And I asked the Chinese whether they had any reason to be
dissatisfied with Sir Robert Hart's administration of the Customs.
They answered at once that his services were invaluable to China, and
said that he worked so hard in Chinese interests that "he might have
been a Chinaman."
I then pointed out that a British officer at the head of the army would
occupy the same position with regard to the army as Sir Robert Hart
occupied with regard to the Customs; offered to select for them the
best general I could find for the executive command; and informed them
that I was myself prepared to undertake the administrative command.
The objection that the creation of such an army might offend foreign
susceptibilities, was also met by the argument that foreign officers
would command it.
In reply to a courteous question, I stated that my object in proposing
the scheme was to benefit China; and that the reason why I desired to
benefit China was that an improvement in Chinese administration must
necessarily profit British interests.
I also discussed the subject with his Excellency Yung Lu, he who had
executed the _coup d'état_ which resulted in the defeat of the
Reformers and the imprisonment of the Emperor Kuang Hsu. Yung Lu, who
commanded one of the foreign-drilled armies, stated that the
reorganisation of the Chinese army under British and foreign officers
would be carried into execution; and asked me whether, supposing that
China put the whole of her armies under British officers, Great Britain
would assist her in any quarrel that might arise between her and any
other Power.
{439}
The direct question was highly significant.
My reply, of course, was that I was unable to discuss political
questions; but that Great Britain had no desire to involve herself in
quarrels which might arise among other countries.
Yung Lu courteously invited me to visit the military forces then
quartered round Pekin; a privilege of which I afterwards availed myself.
Having formulated my scheme for the reorganisation of the Chinese army,
founded upon a general knowledge of the requirements of the situation,
I proceeded to fulfil in detail that part of my instructions received
from the President of the Associated Chambers of Commerce directing me
to report "whether the organisation of the Chinese civil and military
administration is sufficiently complete to ensure adequate protection
to commercial ventures." Accordingly, I visited all the forts and
arsenals forming the coast and river defences of the Chinese Empire,
and utilised the opportunities, most courteously extended to me by the
various viceroys, of inspecting the Imperial military forces.
For the sake of simplicity, the results of my investigations into
military and naval conditions are here grouped together; although these
investigations were necessarily conducted side by side with my
inquiries into commercial affairs, the two elements being often present
in the same locality.
China's military forces were then sharply divided between Manchu and
Chinese, or North and South. The Manchu, or Northern, forces were
manned and officered entirely by Manchus, and enjoyed privileges which
were denied to the Chinese army. Nearly every Southern army was
commanded by two generals, a Manchu and a Chinese, the Manchu being the
real head.
The provincial armies are maintained at the expense of the viceroys.
In the Province of Chihli, General Yuan Shih Kai's army, and the
Imperial armies at and around Pekin, are maintained by the Board of
Revenue out of {440} Imperial taxes; so that the Imperial armies
permanently quartered round Pekin are State-paid. The generals in
command of the Provinces administer their armies entirely according to
their own discretion. As these officers are responsible for the
payment and maintenance of the forces under their command, much of the
money which should go to the army is apt to stick with its general.
When I mentioned these circumstances to the members of the Tsung-li
Yamen, one of them blandly asked me if I included his army in my
description.
I replied that his Excellency could not but be aware that he received
supplies of pay, clothes and rice for an establishment of 10,000,
although the actual number was one half or less; and that when his army
was inspected, he filled the ranks by hiring coolies for the occasion.
My response evoked an irreverent outburst of applause from the
interested audience of coolies. "The English Mandarin," they cried,
"knows all about our old mandarins! That is just what happens."
YUAN SHIH KAI
In October, 1898, I went to Hsiao Chao to visit Yuan Shih Kai, the high
official who informed Yung Lu of the plot of the Reformers to seize the
Empress Dowager, and so brought about the _coup d'état_. I remained
two days and a night with the general; witnessed the parade of all his
troops, and their manoeuvres, and examined their equipment and
victualling. I was permitted to examine the pay-sheets, and obtained
every detail connected with the establishment and maintenance of the
force.
General Yuan Shih Kai is a Chinaman, and his army was composed of
Chinese. It numbered 7400 men. They appeared to be smart, of fine
physique, well fed, and their uniforms were well kept. Their parade
and manoeuvres were smartly executed, their discipline was excellent.
All their equipment was serviceable and efficient, with the exception
of their artillery.
{441}
It was on this occasion that I had a conversation with Yuan Shih Kai,
which, in the light of subsequent events in China, it may be not
uninteresting to recall.
Yuan Shih Kai expressed his anxiety concerning the future of his
country; which, he said, was in a lamentable state of weakness, and
which the States of Europe were desirous of dividing among themselves;
and in this connection he was inclined favourably to regard the
proposal to combine the various Chinese armies into one great Imperial
force.
Upon that, I asked Yuan if he were acquainted with the history of
China. Being one of the governing class, and therefore a scholar of
the ancient meticulous pedantic class, he probably knew the whole of it
by heart; and he replied in the affirmative.
"Then," I said, "have you not observed that every Chinese dynasty has
been founded by a successful general?"
The man who is now (1913) President of the Chinese Republic looked at
me impassive as a statue, and held his peace.
Yuan Shih Kai was well aware of the fact that throughout the East the
ruler is always "He," never "They"; and for this reason he subsequently
endeavoured, after the death of the Empress Dowager, to preserve the
authority of the Emperor.
Years afterwards, before leaving England for China, Dr. Sun Yat-sen,
who was accompanied by General Homer Lea of the United States, lunched
with me. General Homer Lea was, I think, to conduct the reorganisation
of the Chinese army.
ARMS AND MEN
The armies which I had the privilege of inspecting, or concerning which
I obtained information, were: the army of General Sung, distributed
along the coast about Kinchow, which apparently consisted of 10,000 men
out of a paper strength of 20,000; the army of General Soon Ching at
{442} Lutai, which was also at half strength, consisting of 7000 men
out of 15,000, distributed among 30 camps, and having some Russian
officers; and the army of General Tung Fu Chan, near Pekin, which was a
disorderly and an undisciplined rabble; the army of General Nieh, which
consisted of about 13,000 men, distributed among 30 camps between Hsiao
Chao and Tientsin, with five Russian instructors; the Pekin Field
Force, which was commanded from the Palace, and which consisted of
10,000 picked men, well armed but badly drilled; the cavalry camp at
Kaiping, theoretically consisting of 1500 men, and having three Russian
officers; and the army of General Yi Ke Tong, consisting of from 8000
to 15,000 men scattered about in Manchuria. I also saw the armies, or
some part of them, of the Viceroys Chung Chai Tung, Liu Kwen Yi, Hsu
Ying Kwei, Tau Chung Liu, and Kwei. Besides these, I was informed that
there were in Mongolia 100,000 cavalry.
Among the various armies were distributed 14 different patterns of
rifles, varying from the Mauser to the gingal. Some contingents were
armed with bows and arrows; others carried bird-cages and fans, being
distinguishable as soldiers only by their badge. The armies exhibited
as many degrees of efficiency among themselves as their weapons.
Nevertheless, I came to the conclusion that here was all the material
from which to evolve an excellent army. The Chinese have all the
qualities of a good soldier: they are sober, obedient, quick to learn
and courageous. The requirements were proper food, pay, clothing,
drill and competent officers.
While I was at Newchwang I obtained what information was available with
regard to the numbers and location of the Russian troops in Eastern
Siberia and in Manchuria The total number was then about 12,000 men.
In the course of my inspection, at the Viceroy's invitation, of the
powerful forts on the Yangtse River, I observed that one fort, which
was intended to fire up the river, was so constructed that only one gun
out of six could be trained in {443} the required direction, so that if
the other guns were brought to bear, the guns' crews would be killed.
The face of the fort, instead of being at right angles to the course of
the river, was parallel to it. At my suggestion, a dummy figure was
placed in position; a gun was fired in the required direction; and sure
enough the shot blew the effigy to pieces and went wandering among the
junks crowding the river. The Chinese said that the English Mandarin
was the cleverest mandarin they had ever seen; and explained that the
fort had not been built in the right position because the ground was
swampy.
Among my observations of forts elsewhere, I noted a battery of 60-ton
muzzle-loading guns, which were loaded by depressing their muzzles into
the magazine. I ventured to suggest that any carelessness in sponging
out the guns might result in the explosion of the magazine. The
general said that the English Mandarin was extraordinarily clever; and
explained that a year previously a magazine had been blown up for the
very reason I had indicated, had killed forty-two men, and had then
been rebuilt upon the same plan.
At another fort I noted that the powder used for the heavy guns was
unsuitable, and ventured to suggest that it might burst the gun.
"Yes, it does," said the general simply. "We have lately blown the
breech off two 12-inch 50-ton Krupp guns, killing and wounding thirty
men." And he congratulated the English Mandarin upon his extraordinary
powers of divination. After the general's explanation I understood how
it was that in another fort two 12-inch Krupp guns were fitted with
Armstrong breech mechanism. The Krupp breech having been blown off,
the Shanghai arsenal had neatly fitted them with Armstrong breeches.
Observing that a powder-mill at Canton had open gratings for windows,
and stood in the midst of a sandy plain, I ventured to suggest that the
sand might blow in, and that a spark from it might cause an explosion.
"Yes, it does," said the mandarin. "It blew up two {444} years ago and
killed and wounded twenty men." He added that although it had been
rebuilt upon the same plan, it was not intended to use it again; and
expressed his admiration for my remarkable penetration.
At one of the arsenals, the workman boring a 6-pounder gun had his
speed too fast and his feed too thick, so that his machine was taking
out chips of metal and jumping under the strain. My guide observed
placidly that the man didn't seem to know how to do it. The European
instructor, he explained, had left. I offered to replace him for the
occasion; took off my coat; and being an old hand at the lathe managed
to set the machine right in about an hour's work. Then there suddenly
arose a great crying and calling among the coolies outside. I thought
a riot was beginning; but the tumult was only the coolies in their
innocent way screaming their delight that "the English Mandarin could
do what their own old mandarins couldn't."
I drew up a report with regard to the forts and arsenals in China. The
general conclusion was that enormous sums of money were being expended
on war material which, in most cases, was totally useless, although the
establishments were often capable, under European instructors, of
turning out work which would compare with the best in Europe. Two or
three of these arsenals, rightly managed, would serve to equip a
million men for less money than was already being expended.
H.I.M. NAVY
I also visited the Chinese Navy, which was divided into two squadrons,
the Peyang squadron in the North and the Nanyang squadron in the South.
The Peyang squadron consisted of three cruisers, one torpedo cruiser,
and one torpedo gunboat. The Nanyang squadron was composed of seven
cruisers, four old gunboats, and four torpedo boats. The Fleet as a
whole was undermanned, but there were many men who had been well
trained by English instructors. The only dockyard is at Foochow.
{445}
Many Chinese authorities having asked my advice as to the fleet, I
recommended them to put their ships in order for police purposes, and
to utilise them for the purpose of checking piracy; advised them not to
spend any more money on their navy, because their army was of greater
importance; and pointed out the waste involved in keeping about the
coasts and in the river hundreds of man-of-war junks.
Throughout China, I found among the high officials at least an
ostensible agreement with my views concerning the necessity of
reorganising the army: agreement which was no doubt largely dictated by
the very present fear of Russian aggression.
His Excellency Li Hung Chang, whom I visited, was an exception to the
rule; for the great Minister, one of the Six Grand Secretaries, was
growing old and infirm; and having offended the Reform Party, it was
not improbable that he was looking to Russia to protect him in case the
Empress Dowager's support failed him. His case was typical of the
Chinese attitude, in which the regard for personal wealth and safety,
threatened so subtly and from so many dark quarters, is naturally apt
to override patriotism.
At the same time, China is one of the most democratic countries in the
world. I have seen the great Li Hung Chang stepping into the Yamen
over the bodies of the coolies, who refused to move and who chaffed him
as he passed. I have seen a whole Council huddle up their fans and
disperse like startled poultry, because a coolie put his head in at the
door and exhorted the old gentlemen to be quick, because it was going
to rain, and the coolies were going home.
It is the rule of the road in China that all passengers must give way
to carriers of burdens, and it was enforced without respect of persons.
Being carried in a sedan, with four bearers and four coolies running
alongside, I was horrified to perceive the head coolie incontinently
knock down an {446} old mandarin who was in the way. The poor old
gentleman rolled over and over, Red Button and all; and when he arose,
his gorgeous silks all befouled with mud, the coolie spat in his face.
China is full of the unexpected.
HIGHLY COMMERCIAL
As already explained, the two aspects of my investigations, the
military conditions and the commercial conditions, are here treated
separately for the sake of simplicity, although at the time they were
necessarily conducted together. The following brief account of the
results of my inquiries into the state of trade and commerce contains
those particulars which may still retain their interest.
From Pekin I went to Tientsin, where I attended a meeting of the
Chamber of Commerce, which vehemently protested against the "Sphere of
Influence" policy, declaring that the future trade of Tientsin would be
entirely dependent on preserving the integrity of China, and upon the
existence of a guarantee of the policy of the "Open Door." The British
section of the Chamber of Commerce presented to me a memorandum, which
they desired me to transmit to the Associated Chambers of Commerce in
England, protesting against the absence of any definite policy, and
stating that considerable anxiety existed with regard to the safety of
capital already invested in China. The fear of Russian aggression had
virtually paralysed the movement of capital in the northern part of
China. The general opinion was that if the "Open Door" policy were
established and secured, these apprehensions would disappear.
I was most courteously received by the Chinese authorities at Tientsin,
who expressed great friendliness towards Great Britain; and who, as
usual, affirmed that China was helpless and that all the European
countries were taking advantage of her weakness. In the case of
Russia, they stated that concessions were being demanded throughout the
whole country which China was unable to refuse.
{447}
From Tientsin I went to Tongshan, travelling upon the Shanhaikwan
railway, which had been built by Scotch engineers under the direction
of Mr. Kinder, a British subject of great talent and energy, who had
married a Japanese lady. Of the two people whom I met who seemed to me
really to possess an intimate knowledge of China and the Chinese, Mr.
Kinder was one. The other was Dr. Morrison, _The Times_ correspondent.
With Mr. Kinder's assistance, I collected the whole of the statistics
regarding the working of the Tongshan railway workshops, of the
Shanhaikwan railway, and of the coal mine, in which Chinese miners were
employed under European foremen.
Upon my arrival at Newchang, I was received by the British residents.
The British merchants here, like the others elsewhere, wished me to
represent to the Associated Chambers of Commerce of Great Britain that
trade in the North of China must be secured against foreign aggression,
and transmitted to me a number of resolutions to this effect.
The Russians had settled at Newchang, taking the land without
permission, and paying the native occupiers nominal prices. Since 1897
the Russians had been pouring troops into Manchuria, and their number
was steadily increasing. I prepared a detailed report upon the trade
of Newchang.
Chefoo I visited twice, first on 13th October and again on 9th
November. The British merchants here complained of the extension of
German interest, which began with the opening of Kiao Chao. I thought,
however, that their alarm was not justified. Kiao Chao had been
declared by Germany to be an open port.
Upon visiting Wei-hai-wei, I observed that with a comparatively small
expenditure of money it could be made into a most efficient and
powerful naval base. Already, in the few months which had elapsed
since the British flag was hoisted on 24th May, 1898, Commander {448}
E. F. A. Gaunt (now Commodore Gaunt, C.M.G.), in command of a party of
bluejackets and Marines, had accomplished a most admirable piece of
administrative work, in cleaning up the place and in enforcing law and
order so tactfully and skilfully that the only punishments inflicted
had consisted in docking the pigtails of two offenders. There were no
guns mounted at Wei-hai-wei; but at Port Arthur, 80 miles distant
northwards across Korea Bay, the Russians had already mounted seventy
guns.
I also observed that the island of Wei-hai-wei, which is two-thirds the
size of Gibraltar, was the best place on the China Station for the
establishment of a sanatorium for the Fleet.
My visit to Kiao Chao was made in response to a cordial invitation sent
to me by Rear-Admiral H.R.H. Prince Henry of Prussia. The harbour is a
difficult place for vessels to make, particularly in foggy weather.
The Germans were as busy as bees, clearing the ground, building
barracks, making parade grounds and preparing emplacements for guns.
Prince Henry was most kind to me, and showed to me everything. His
administration and organisation were admirable; and afforded another
example of the achievements of naval officers.
But the place was still under military rule, which discourages
commerce. On my voyage out, three Germans had come on board at
Singapore. They told me that, although they had been very happy under
British rule, they preferred their own colony, and intended to start a
hotel at Kiao Chao. Some time afterwards I met those three patriotic
Germans again. They were on their way back to Singapore; because, so
they said, they could not make a living at Kiao Chao! They told me
that they were obliged to pay a tax of five per cent. upon their
investment, with the prospect of paying another five per cent. when,
after a period of years, their property should again be surveyed.
At Shanghai, which, being situated at the entrance Of {449} the Yangtse
Valley, is the most important Treaty Port in the Far East, I framed an
elaborate report upon its trade. The China Association presented to me
a memorandum containing the usual protest against the insecurity of
British interests in China.
While I was at Shanghai I had three interviews with the Marquess Ito,
lately Prime Minister of Japan. The Marquess, I believe, was
unofficially employed in endeavouring to extend Japanese interests in
China. He expressed the greatest friendliness towards Great Britain.
During the political disturbances in Japan, the Marquess Ito had fled
to England as a sailor before the mast in a British vessel. He told me
that, landing at Gravesend very hungry, he went into a shop and bought
a loaf, putting down half a sovereign. The shopman, presumably taking
advantage of the fact that he was a Japanese, refused to give him the
change. The Marquess told me that he was sadly shocked; for, until
that moment, he had believed the English to be the most honest people
in the world.
In Shanghai, I learned that one of the leaders of the Reform Party,
Huang Chin, a victim of the _coup d'état_, had been arrested and was
about to be sent to Nanking for execution. I urged his Excellency Kwei
Chun, Viceroy of Szechuan, to use his influence to save Huang's life,
pointing out to him that these political executions were exceedingly
distasteful to the British people. I am glad to say that my
intervention was effectual, in that Huang Chin, instead of being
executed, was banished.
His Excellency Liu-Kwen-Yi having most courteously placed H.I.M.S.
_Nanshin_ at my disposal, I took passage in her to Nanking.
I was much interested in the arrangement and armament of the Chinese
man-of-war; but as she was warmed by means of charcoal stoves, my
investigations were conducted in a condition of partial suffocation
from the fumes.
Upon arriving at Nanking in the Nanshin, I received a salute of fifteen
guns; and proceeded to the Yamen of his {450} Excellency the Viceroy
Liu-Kwen-Yi between the lines of troops and banner-bearers, numbering
some thousands, who were ranged along the whole route of four and a
half miles in my honour. Liu-Kwen-Yi, who received me with the
greatest courtesy and kindness, said that he was anxious to show his
friendship for Great Britain in every way. In the course of two long
and interesting conversations with the Viceroy, who expressed his fear
of the present unstable posture of affairs, I suggested that there were
two contingencies to fear: a rebellion against the Government and an
insurrection against foreigners; either of which would be fatal to
commercial security. His Excellency, however, assured me that there
was no danger of disturbances inspired by dislike of the foreigner.
Herein he was mistaken; for within two years occurred the Boxer
outbreak, which had the approval, secret or overt, of the Empress
Dowager. At the Viceroy's request, I drew up a memorandum containing
my scheme for the reorganisation of the army on the principle of the
Imperial Maritime Customs, which I had proposed at Pekin. A
translation of this document was sent by the Viceroy to Pekin.
On my return journey, I inspected the army, the fleet, the arsenal and
the Imperial naval college.
I arrived at Hong Kong for the second time on Christmas Day, 1898. The
views of the China Association and of the British merchants here were
of the same tenor as those, already described, expressed by the British
communities at all the trading centres visited by me.
To complete my itinerary in brief, other places visited by me were
Wuhu, Kinkiang, Chinkiang, Kiangzin, Hankow, Foochow, Swatow, Amoy,
Canton, and Wuchow. At each place I drew up a report describing the
local conditions and embodying the representations of the British
communities.
Their common complaint was that British trade was declining. But an
examination of the detailed reports which in response to the letters
sent by me beforehand, were ready for my inspection, showed that on the
contrary the branches {451} of trade already possessed by the British
had increased; and that it was in new branches started by foreign
nations that the British were not succeeding. Their comparative
failure in this respect I held to be partly due to the fact that
foreign nations supplied what the people wanted, while the British
insisted on trying to sell to them what the British thought they ought
to want.
CONCLUSION
The following reports were framed by me: report on the railways and
waterways; report upon the British Consulate; a general comprehensive
report upon Trade, Treaties and Tariffs; and a highly elaborate report
upon the complicated question of Finance and Currency. All these are
set forth in my book, _The Break-up of China_, which also includes a
summary of the reforms which appeared to me to be most requisite.
These were:--
1. An Imperial coinage.
2. Reform in the method of collecting the land-tax.
3. Removal of restrictions on the export of grain.
4. Modification of the laws governing the salt monopoly.
5. The right of foreigners to reside in the interior for purposes of
trade.
6. The registration and protection of trade marks and copyright.
7. The removal of the remaining restrictions on inland water navigation.
8. The abolition of the likin, or a change of administration which
would ensure that likin should be collected once only.
9. Greater facilities to be given to respectable foreign syndicates to
work minerals.
10. The establishment of reformed departments for the regulation of
finance, railways, waterways, roads, posts and telegraphs, and a bureau
to deal with all questions connected with trade. The existing {452}
telegraph service was so bad, that a letter sent from Tientsin to
Shanghai has been known to arrive before a telegram sent at the same
time. _The Times_ correspondent at Pekin told me that his telegrams
very often cost as much to send from Pekin to Shanghai as from Shanghai
to London.
11. One other bureau was urgently needed, a Trade Intelligence
Department, to deal with scientific and practical questions relating to
the natural products available in China for commercial purposes. What
is an insignificant export to-day may become a valuable article of
commerce to-morrow. There should be a scientific classification of the
products of China on the same lines as the classification of products
in India.
I may here quote what, in relation to the whole matter, I wrote at the
time:
"If it be said that my policy for the reorganisation of the Chinese
army and police is a warlike policy, I reply that it is the only plan
yet suggested which gives any guarantee of peace. Great Britain's
strongest guarantee of peace has been the reorganisation of her Fleet.
Without peace commerce must perish. To keep the peace, authority must
be properly equipped. Our choice with regard to the Chinese Empire is
simple: we may choose to wreck or we may choose to restore."
The resolutions passed by the British mercantile communities and the
many letters I received from them subsequently, testify to their
approval of my recommendations. The following documents express the
sentiments of the Chinese themselves, and of the foreign merchants:
"At a meeting of Chinese merchants and traders, and other Chinese
gentlemen resident in Hong Kong, held at the Chinese Chamber of
Commerce on 22nd January, 1899, on {453} the motion of Mr. Ho Tung,
seconded by Mr. Leung Shiu Kwong, it was resolved:
"'1. Having closely followed with great and attentive interest, and
carefully considered what Lord Charles Beresford has said and done in
China in connection with his recent mission on behalf of the Associated
Chambers of Commerce, we, the Chinese community of Hong Kong here
assembled, are in accord with and heartily support the policy the noble
lord proposes in regard to the "Open Door" as regards commerce, and
also with regard to the reorganisation of the Chinese army.
"'2. That we recognise the combined proposals, if carried out, will
benefit China quite as much as, if not more, than England, and other
nations, in her trading interest, and we therefore hope that Lord
Charles will be intrusted by the British Government with the carrying
out of the views he has so closely enunciated, as we, the Chinese
people of Hong Kong, observe that his efforts are directed to the
benefit of both his country and our country, and to the benefit of the
trade of China and the trade of England.
"'3. That we recognise and make our cordial acknowledgments for the
sympathetic manner with which he has approached our country; and
"'4. That we desire emphatically to express our full confidence in Lord
Charles Beresford, whose ability, integrity and zeal we are sure
peculiarly fit him successfully to carry out the proposals he has made
for the furtherance of trade and the preservation of the Chinese
Empire.'
"(Signed) Lo CHI TIU, Chairman
H. O. FOOK, Secretary"
The General Foreign Commercial Community of Shanghai, on 8th January,
1899, passed the following resolution:
"That our cordial thanks be tendered to Lord Charles Beresford for the
service he has rendered to the foreign communities in China by personal
investigation into the conditions of the various interests we
represent."
{454}
Upon my return, I represented what I believed to be the real posture of
affairs in China, when the subject was discussed in the House of
Commons. In November, 1899, I read a paper upon "Engineering in China"
before the Institute of Mechanical Engineers.
{455}