CHAPTER IX.

CONCERNING A CIVIL PRINCIPALITY

But coming to the other point—where a leading citizen becomes the

prince of his country, not by wickedness or any intolerable violence,

but by the favour of his fellow citizens—this may be called a civil

principality: nor is genius or fortune altogether necessary to attain

to it, but rather a happy shrewdness. I say then that such a

principality is obtained either by the favour of the people or by the

favour of the nobles. Because in all cities these two distinct parties

are found, and from this it arises that the people do not wish to be

ruled nor oppressed by the nobles, and the nobles wish to rule and

oppress the people; and from these two opposite desires there arises in

cities one of three results, either a principality, self-government, or

anarchy.

A principality is created either by the people or by the nobles,

accordingly as one or other of them has the opportunity; for the

nobles, seeing they cannot withstand the people, begin to cry up the

reputation of one of themselves, and they make him a prince, so that

under his shadow they can give vent to their ambitions. The people,

finding they cannot resist the nobles, also cry up the reputation of

one of themselves, and make him a prince so as to be defended by his

authority. He who obtains sovereignty by the assistance of the nobles

maintains himself with more difficulty than he who comes to it by the

aid of the people, because the former finds himself with many around

him who consider themselves his equals, and because of this he can

neither rule nor manage them to his liking. But he who reaches

sovereignty by popular favour finds himself alone, and has none around

him, or few, who are not prepared to obey him.

Besides this, one cannot by fair dealing, and without injury to others,

satisfy the nobles, but you can satisfy the people, for their object is

more righteous than that of the nobles, the latter wishing to oppress,

while the former only desire not to be oppressed. It is to be added

also that a prince can never secure himself against a hostile people,

because of there being too many, whilst from the nobles he can secure

himself, as they are few in number. The worst that a prince may expect

from a hostile people is to be abandoned by them; but from hostile

nobles he has not only to fear abandonment, but also that they will

rise against him; for they, being in these affairs more far-seeing and

astute, always come forward in time to save themselves, and to obtain

favours from him whom they expect to prevail. Further, the prince is

compelled to live always with the same people, but he can do well

without the same nobles, being able to make and unmake them daily, and

to give or take away authority when it pleases him.

Therefore, to make this point clearer, I say that the nobles ought to

be looked at mainly in two ways: that is to say, they either shape

their course in such a way as binds them entirely to your fortune, or

they do not. Those who so bind themselves, and are not rapacious, ought

to be honoured and loved; those who do not bind themselves may be dealt

with in two ways; they may fail to do this through pusillanimity and a

natural want of courage, in which case you ought to make use of them,

especially of those who are of good counsel; and thus, whilst in

prosperity you honour them, in adversity you do not have to fear them.

But when for their own ambitious ends they shun binding themselves, it

is a token that they are giving more thought to themselves than to you,

and a prince ought to guard against such, and to fear them as if they

were open enemies, because in adversity they always help to ruin him.

Therefore, one who becomes a prince through the favour of the people

ought to keep them friendly, and this he can easily do seeing they only

ask not to be oppressed by him. But one who, in opposition to the

people, becomes a prince by the favour of the nobles, ought, above

everything, to seek to win the people over to himself, and this he may

easily do if he takes them under his protection. Because men, when they

receive good from him of whom they were expecting evil, are bound more

closely to their benefactor; thus the people quickly become more

devoted to him than if he had been raised to the principality by their

favours; and the prince can win their affections in many ways, but as

these vary according to the circumstances one cannot give fixed rules,

so I omit them; but, I repeat, it is necessary for a prince to have the

people friendly, otherwise he has no security in adversity.

Nabis,[1] Prince of the Spartans, sustained the attack of all Greece,

and of a victorious Roman army, and against them he defended his

country and his government; and for the overcoming of this peril it was

only necessary for him to make himself secure against a few, but this

would not have been sufficient had the people been hostile. And do not

let any one impugn this statement with the trite proverb that “He who

builds on the people, builds on the mud,” for this is true when a

private citizen makes a foundation there, and persuades himself that

the people will free him when he is oppressed by his enemies or by the

magistrates; wherein he would find himself very often deceived, as

happened to the Gracchi in Rome and to Messer Giorgio Scali[2] in

Florence. But granted a prince who has established himself as above,

who can command, and is a man of courage, undismayed in adversity, who

does not fail in other qualifications, and who, by his resolution and

energy, keeps the whole people encouraged—such a one will never find

himself deceived in them, and it will be shown that he has laid his

foundations well.

[1] Nabis, tyrant of Sparta, conquered by the Romans under Flamininus

in 195 B.C.; killed 192 B.C.

[2] Messer Giorgio Scali. This event is to be found in Machiavelli’s

“Florentine History,” Book III.

These principalities are liable to danger when they are passing from

the civil to the absolute order of government, for such princes either

rule personally or through magistrates. In the latter case their

government is weaker and more insecure, because it rests entirely on

the goodwill of those citizens who are raised to the magistracy, and

who, especially in troubled times, can destroy the government with

great ease, either by intrigue or open defiance; and the prince has not

the chance amid tumults to exercise absolute authority, because the

citizens and subjects, accustomed to receive orders from magistrates,

are not of a mind to obey him amid these confusions, and there will

always be in doubtful times a scarcity of men whom he can trust. For

such a prince cannot rely upon what he observes in quiet times, when

citizens have need of the state, because then every one agrees with

him; they all promise, and when death is far distant they all wish to

die for him; but in troubled times, when the state has need of its

citizens, then he finds but few. And so much the more is this

experiment dangerous, inasmuch as it can only be tried once. Therefore

a wise prince ought to adopt such a course that his citizens will

always in every sort and kind of circumstance have need of the state

and of him, and then he will always find them faithful.