CHAPTER VII.

CONCERNING NEW PRINCIPALITIES WHICH ARE ACQUIRED EITHER BY THE ARMS OF

OTHERS OR BY GOOD FORTUNE

Those who solely by good fortune become princes from being private

citizens have little trouble in rising, but much in keeping atop; they

have not any difficulties on the way up, because they fly, but they

have many when they reach the summit. Such are those to whom some state

is given either for money or by the favour of him who bestows it; as

happened to many in Greece, in the cities of Ionia and of the

Hellespont, where princes were made by Darius, in order that they might

hold the cities both for his security and his glory; as also were those

emperors who, by the corruption of the soldiers, from being citizens

came to empire. Such stand simply elevated upon the goodwill and the

fortune of him who has elevated them—two most inconstant and unstable

things. Neither have they the knowledge requisite for the position;

because, unless they are men of great worth and ability, it is not

reasonable to expect that they should know how to command, having

always lived in a private condition; besides, they cannot hold it

because they have not forces which they can keep friendly and faithful.

States that rise unexpectedly, then, like all other things in nature

which are born and grow rapidly, cannot leave their foundations and

correspondencies[1] fixed in such a way that the first storm will not

overthrow them; unless, as is said, those who unexpectedly become

princes are men of so much ability that they know they have to be

prepared at once to hold that which fortune has thrown into their laps,

and that those foundations, which others have laid _before_ they became

princes, they must lay _afterwards_.

[1] “Le radici e corrispondenze,” their roots (i.e. foundations) and

correspondencies or relations with other states—a common meaning of

“correspondence” and “correspondency” in the sixteenth and seventeenth

centuries.

Concerning these two methods of rising to be a prince by ability or

fortune, I wish to adduce two examples within our own recollection, and

these are Francesco Sforza[2] and Cesare Borgia. Francesco, by proper

means and with great ability, from being a private person rose to be

Duke of Milan, and that which he had acquired with a thousand anxieties

he kept with little trouble. On the other hand, Cesare Borgia, called

by the people Duke Valentino, acquired his state during the ascendancy

of his father, and on its decline he lost it, notwithstanding that he

had taken every measure and done all that ought to be done by a wise

and able man to fix firmly his roots in the states which the arms and

fortunes of others had bestowed on him.

[2] Francesco Sforza, born 1401, died 1466. He married Bianca Maria

Visconti, a natural daughter of Filippo Visconti, the Duke of Milan,

on whose death he procured his own elevation to the duchy. Machiavelli

was the accredited agent of the Florentine Republic to Cesare Borgia

(1478-1507) during the transactions which led up to the assassinations

of the Orsini and Vitelli at Sinigalia, and along with his letters to

his chiefs in Florence he has left an account, written ten years

before _The Prince_, of the proceedings of the duke in his

“Descritione del modo tenuto dal duca Valentino nello ammazzare

Vitellozzo Vitelli,” etc., a translation of which is appended to the

present work.

Because, as is stated above, he who has not first laid his foundations

may be able with great ability to lay them afterwards, but they will be

laid with trouble to the architect and danger to the building. If,

therefore, all the steps taken by the duke be considered, it will be

seen that he laid solid foundations for his future power, and I do not

consider it superfluous to discuss them, because I do not know what

better precepts to give a new prince than the example of his actions;

and if his dispositions were of no avail, that was not his fault, but

the extraordinary and extreme malignity of fortune.

Alexander the Sixth, in wishing to aggrandize the duke, his son, had

many immediate and prospective difficulties. Firstly, he did not see

his way to make him master of any state that was not a state of the

Church; and if he was willing to rob the Church he knew that the Duke

of Milan and the Venetians would not consent, because Faenza and Rimini

were already under the protection of the Venetians. Besides this, he

saw the arms of Italy, especially those by which he might have been

assisted, in hands that would fear the aggrandizement of the Pope,

namely, the Orsini and the Colonnesi and their following. It behoved

him, therefore, to upset this state of affairs and embroil the powers,

so as to make himself securely master of part of their states. This was

easy for him to do, because he found the Venetians, moved by other

reasons, inclined to bring back the French into Italy; he would not

only not oppose this, but he would render it more easy by dissolving

the former marriage of King Louis. Therefore the king came into Italy

with the assistance of the Venetians and the consent of Alexander. He

was no sooner in Milan than the Pope had soldiers from him for the

attempt on the Romagna, which yielded to him on the reputation of the

king. The duke, therefore, having acquired the Romagna and beaten the

Colonnesi, while wishing to hold that and to advance further, was

hindered by two things: the one, his forces did not appear loyal to

him, the other, the goodwill of France: that is to say, he feared that

the forces of the Orsini, which he was using, would not stand to him,

that not only might they hinder him from winning more, but might

themselves seize what he had won, and that the king might also do the

same. Of the Orsini he had a warning when, after taking Faenza and

attacking Bologna, he saw them go very unwillingly to that attack. And

as to the king, he learned his mind when he himself, after taking the

Duchy of Urbino, attacked Tuscany, and the king made him desist from

that undertaking; hence the duke decided to depend no more upon the

arms and the luck of others.

For the first thing he weakened the Orsini and Colonnesi parties in

Rome, by gaining to himself all their adherents who were gentlemen,

making them his gentlemen, giving them good pay, and, according to

their rank, honouring them with office and command in such a way that

in a few months all attachment to the factions was destroyed and turned

entirely to the duke. After this he awaited an opportunity to crush the

Orsini, having scattered the adherents of the Colonna house. This came

to him soon and he used it well; for the Orsini, perceiving at length

that the aggrandizement of the duke and the Church was ruin to them,

called a meeting of the Magione in Perugia. From this sprung the

rebellion at Urbino and the tumults in the Romagna, with endless

dangers to the duke, all of which he overcame with the help of the

French. Having restored his authority, not to leave it at risk by

trusting either to the French or other outside forces, he had recourse

to his wiles, and he knew so well how to conceal his mind that, by the

mediation of Signor Pagolo—whom the duke did not fail to secure with

all kinds of attention, giving him money, apparel, and horses—the

Orsini were reconciled, so that their simplicity brought them into his

power at Sinigalia.[3] Having exterminated the leaders, and turned

their partisans into his friends, the duke laid sufficiently good

foundations to his power, having all the Romagna and the Duchy of

Urbino; and the people now beginning to appreciate their prosperity, he

gained them all over to himself. And as this point is worthy of notice,

and to be imitated by others, I am not willing to leave it out.

[3] Sinigalia, 31st December 1502.

When the duke occupied the Romagna he found it under the rule of weak

masters, who rather plundered their subjects than ruled them, and gave

them more cause for disunion than for union, so that the country was

full of robbery, quarrels, and every kind of violence; and so, wishing

to bring back peace and obedience to authority, he considered it

necessary to give it a good governor. Thereupon he promoted Messer

Ramiro d’Orco,[4] a swift and cruel man, to whom he gave the fullest

power. This man in a short time restored peace and unity with the

greatest success. Afterwards the duke considered that it was not

advisable to confer such excessive authority, for he had no doubt but

that he would become odious, so he set up a court of judgment in the

country, under a most excellent president, wherein all cities had their

advocates. And because he knew that the past severity had caused some

hatred against himself, so, to clear himself in the minds of the

people, and gain them entirely to himself, he desired to show that, if

any cruelty had been practised, it had not originated with him, but in

the natural sternness of the minister. Under this pretence he took

Ramiro, and one morning caused him to be executed and left on the

piazza at Cesena with the block and a bloody knife at his side. The

barbarity of this spectacle caused the people to be at once satisfied

and dismayed.

[4] Ramiro d’Orco. Ramiro de Lorqua.

But let us return whence we started. I say that the duke, finding

himself now sufficiently powerful and partly secured from immediate

dangers by having armed himself in his own way, and having in a great

measure crushed those forces in his vicinity that could injure him if

he wished to proceed with his conquest, had next to consider France,

for he knew that the king, who too late was aware of his mistake, would

not support him. And from this time he began to seek new alliances and

to temporize with France in the expedition which she was making towards

the kingdom of Naples against the Spaniards who were besieging Gaeta.

It was his intention to secure himself against them, and this he would

have quickly accomplished had Alexander lived.

Such was his line of action as to present affairs. But as to the future

he had to fear, in the first place, that a new successor to the Church

might not be friendly to him and might seek to take from him that which

Alexander had given him, so he decided to act in four ways. Firstly, by

exterminating the families of those lords whom he had despoiled, so as

to take away that pretext from the Pope. Secondly, by winning to

himself all the gentlemen of Rome, so as to be able to curb the Pope

with their aid, as has been observed. Thirdly, by converting the

college more to himself. Fourthly, by acquiring so much power before

the Pope should die that he could by his own measures resist the first

shock. Of these four things, at the death of Alexander, he had

accomplished three. For he had killed as many of the dispossessed lords

as he could lay hands on, and few had escaped; he had won over the

Roman gentlemen, and he had the most numerous party in the college. And

as to any fresh acquisition, he intended to become master of Tuscany,

for he already possessed Perugia and Piombino, and Pisa was under his

protection. And as he had no longer to study France (for the French

were already driven out of the kingdom of Naples by the Spaniards, and

in this way both were compelled to buy his goodwill), he pounced down

upon Pisa. After this, Lucca and Siena yielded at once, partly through

hatred and partly through fear of the Florentines; and the Florentines

would have had no remedy had he continued to prosper, as he was

prospering the year that Alexander died, for he had acquired so much

power and reputation that he would have stood by himself, and no longer

have depended on the luck and the forces of others, but solely on his

own power and ability.

But Alexander died five years after he had first drawn the sword. He

left the duke with the state of Romagna alone consolidated, with the

rest in the air, between two most powerful hostile armies, and sick

unto death. Yet there were in the duke such boldness and ability, and

he knew so well how men are to be won or lost, and so firm were the

foundations which in so short a time he had laid, that if he had not

had those armies on his back, or if he had been in good health, he

would have overcome all difficulties. And it is seen that his

foundations were good, for the Romagna awaited him for more than a

month. In Rome, although but half alive, he remained secure; and whilst

the Baglioni, the Vitelli, and the Orsini might come to Rome, they

could not effect anything against him. If he could not have made Pope

him whom he wished, at least the one whom he did not wish would not

have been elected. But if he had been in sound health at the death of

Alexander,[5] everything would have been different to him. On the day

that Julius the Second[6] was elected, he told me that he had thought

of everything that might occur at the death of his father, and had

provided a remedy for all, except that he had never anticipated that,

when the death did happen, he himself would be on the point to die.

[5] Alexander VI died of fever, 18th August 1503.

[6] Julius II was Giuliano della Rovere, Cardinal of San Pietro ad

Vincula, born 1443, died 1513.

When all the actions of the duke are recalled, I do not know how to

blame him, but rather it appears to be, as I have said, that I ought to

offer him for imitation to all those who, by the fortune or the arms of

others, are raised to government. Because he, having a lofty spirit and

far-reaching aims, could not have regulated his conduct otherwise, and

only the shortness of the life of Alexander and his own sickness

frustrated his designs. Therefore, he who considers it necessary to

secure himself in his new principality, to win friends, to overcome

either by force or fraud, to make himself beloved and feared by the

people, to be followed and revered by the soldiers, to exterminate

those who have power or reason to hurt him, to change the old order of

things for new, to be severe and gracious, magnanimous and liberal, to

destroy a disloyal soldiery and to create new, to maintain friendship

with kings and princes in such a way that they must help him with zeal

and offend with caution, cannot find a more lively example than the

actions of this man.

Only can he be blamed for the election of Julius the Second, in whom he

made a bad choice, because, as is said, not being able to elect a Pope

to his own mind, he could have hindered any other from being elected

Pope; and he ought never to have consented to the election of any

cardinal whom he had injured or who had cause to fear him if they

became pontiffs. For men injure either from fear or hatred. Those whom

he had injured, amongst others, were San Pietro ad Vincula, Colonna,

San Giorgio, and Ascanio.[7] The rest, in becoming Pope, had to fear

him, Rouen and the Spaniards excepted; the latter from their

relationship and obligations, the former from his influence, the

kingdom of France having relations with him. Therefore, above

everything, the duke ought to have created a Spaniard Pope, and,

failing him, he ought to have consented to Rouen and not San Pietro ad

Vincula. He who believes that new benefits will cause great personages

to forget old injuries is deceived. Therefore, the duke erred in his

choice, and it was the cause of his ultimate ruin.

[7] San Giorgio is Raffaello Riario. Ascanio is Ascanio Sforza.