BOOK IV. *419* Adeimantus said: 'Suppose a person to argue, Socrates, that

you make your citizens miserable, and this by their own free-will; they

are the lords of the city, and yet instead of having, like other men,

lands and houses and money of their own, they live as mercenaries and are

always mounting guard.' *420* You may add, I replied, that they receive no

pay but only their food, and have no money to spend on a journey or a

mistress. 'Well, and what answer do you give?' My answer is, that our

guardians may or may not be the happiest of men,--I should not be

surprised to find in the long-run that they were,--but this is not the aim

of our constitution, which was designed for the good of the whole and not

of any one part. If I went to a sculptor and blamed him for having painted

the eye, which is the noblest feature of the face, not purple but black,

he would reply: 'The eye must be an eye, and you should look at the statue

as a whole.' 'Now I can well imagine a fool's paradise, in which everybody

is eating and drinking, clothed in purple and fine linen, and potters lie

on sofas and have their wheel at hand, that they may work a little when

they please; *421* and cobblers and all the other classes of a State lose

their distinctive character. And a State may get on without cobblers; but

when the guardians degenerate into boon companions, then the ruin is

complete. Remember that we are not talking of peasants keeping holiday,

but of a State in which every man is expected to do his own work. The

happiness resides not in this or that class, but in the State as a whole.

I have another remark to make:--A middle condition is best for artisans;

they should have money enough to buy tools, and not enough to be

independent of business. And will not the same condition be best for our

citizens? If they are poor, they will be mean; *422* if rich, luxurious

and lazy; and in neither case contented. 'But then how will our poor city

be able to go to war against an enemy who has money?' There may be a

difficulty in fighting against one enemy; against two there will be none.

In the first place, the contest will be {lvii} carried on by trained

warriors against well-to-do citizens: and is not a regular athlete an easy

match for two stout opponents at least? Suppose also, that before engaging

we send ambassadors to one of the two cities, saying, 'Silver and gold we

have not; do you help us and take our share of the spoil;'--who would

fight against the lean, wiry dogs, when they might join with them in

preying upon the fatted sheep? 'But if many states join their resources,

shall we not be in danger?' I am amused to hear you use the word 'state'

of any but our own State. *423* They are 'states,' but not 'a state'--many

in one. For in every state there are two hostile nations, rich and poor,

which you may set one against the other. But our State, while she remains

true to her principles, will be in very deed the mightiest of Hellenic

states.

To the size of the state there is no limit but the necessity of unity; it

must be neither too large nor too small to be one. This is a matter of

secondary importance, like the principle of transposition which was

intimated in the parable of the earthborn men. The meaning there implied

was that every man should do that for which he was fitted, and be at one

with himself, and then the whole city would be united. But all these

things are secondary, if education, which is the great matter, be duly

regarded. *424* When the wheel has once been set in motion, the speed is

always increasing; and each generation improves upon the preceding, both

in physical and moral qualities. The care of the governors should be

directed to preserve music and gymnastic from innovation; alter the songs

of a country, Damon says, and you will soon end by altering its laws. The

change appears innocent at first, and begins in play; but the evil soon

becomes serious, working secretly upon the characters of individuals, then

upon social and commercial relations, and lastly upon the institutions of

a state; and there is ruin and confusion everywhere. *425* But if

education remains in the established form, there will be no danger. A

restorative process will be always going on; the spirit of law and order

will raise up what has fallen down. Nor will any regulations be needed for

the lesser matters of life--rules of deportment or fashions of dress. Like

invites like for good or for evil. Education will correct deficiencies and

supply the power of self-government. Far be it from us to enter into the

{lviii} particulars of legislation; let the guardians take care of

education, and education will take care of all other things.

But without education they may patch and mend as they please; they will

make no progress, any more than a patient who thinks to cure himself by

some favourite remedy and will not give up his luxurious mode of living.

*426* If you tell such persons that they must first alter their habits,

then they grow angry; they are charming people. 'Charming,--nay, the very

reverse.' Evidently these gentlemen are not in your good graces, nor the

state which is like them. And such states there are which first ordain

under penalty of death that no one shall alter the constitution, and then

suffer themselves to be flattered into and out of anything; and he who

indulges them and fawns upon them, is their leader and saviour. 'Yes, the

men are as bad as the states.' But do you not admire their cleverness?

'Nay, some of them are stupid enough to believe what the people tell

them.' And when all the world is telling a man that he is six feet high,

and he has no measure, how can he believe anything else? But don't get

into a passion: to see our statesmen trying their nostrums, *427* and

fancying that they can cut off at a blow the Hydra-like rogueries of

mankind, is as good as a play. Minute enactments are superfluous in good

states, and are useless in bad ones.

And now what remains of the work of legislation? Nothing for us; but to

Apollo the god of Delphi we leave the ordering of the greatest of all

things--that is to say, religion. Only our ancestral deity sitting upon

the centre and navel of the earth will be trusted by us if we have any

sense, in an affair of such magnitude. No foreign god shall be supreme in

our realms....

[Sidenote: _Republic IV._ Introduction.]

Here, as Socrates would say, let us 'reflect on' ([Greek: skopô=men]) what

has preceded: thus far we have spoken not of the happiness of the

citizens, but only of the well-being of the State. They may be the

happiest of men, but our principal aim in founding the State was not to

make them happy. They were to be guardians, not holiday-makers. In this

pleasant manner is presented to us the famous question both of ancient and

modern philosophy, touching the relation of duty to happiness, of right to

utility.

First duty, then happiness, is the natural order of our moral ideas. The

utilitarian principle is valuable as a corrective of {lix} error, and

shows to us a side of ethics which is apt to be neglected. It may be

admitted further that right and utility are co-extensive, and that he who

makes the happiness of mankind his object has one of the highest and

noblest motives of human action. But utility is not the historical basis

of morality; nor the aspect in which moral and religious ideas commonly

occur to the mind. The greatest happiness of all is, as we believe, the

far-off result of the divine government of the universe. The greatest

happiness of the individual is certainly to be found in a life of virtue

and goodness. But we seem to be more assured of a law of right than we can

be of a divine purpose, that 'all mankind should be saved;' and we infer

the one from the other. And the greatest happiness of the individual may

be the reverse of the greatest happiness in the ordinary sense of the

term, and may be realised in a life of pain, or in a voluntary death.

Further, the word 'happiness' has several ambiguities; it may mean either

pleasure or an ideal life, happiness subjective or objective, in this

world or in another, of ourselves only or of our neighbours and of all men

everywhere. By the modern founder of Utilitarianism the self-regarding and

disinterested motives of action are included under the same term, although

they are commonly opposed by us as benevolence and self-love. The word

happiness has not the definiteness or the sacredness of 'truth' and

'right'; it does not equally appeal to our higher nature, and has not sunk

into the conscience of mankind. It is associated too much with the

comforts and conveniences of life; too little with 'the goods of the soul

which we desire for their own sake.' In a great trial, or danger, or

temptation, or in any great and heroic action, it is scarcely thought of.

For these reasons 'the greatest happiness' principle is not the true

foundation of ethics. But though not the first principle, it is the

second, which is like unto it, and is often of easier application. For the

larger part of human actions are neither right nor wrong, except in so far

as they tend to the happiness of mankind (cp. Introd. to Gorgias and

Philebus).

The same question reappears in politics, where the useful or expedient

seems to claim a larger sphere and to have a greater authority. For

concerning political measures, we chiefly ask: How will they affect the

happiness of mankind? Yet here too we may observe that what we term

expediency is merely the law of {lx} right limited by the conditions of

human society. Right and truth are the highest aims of government as well

as of individuals; and we ought not to lose sight of them because we

cannot directly enforce them. They appeal to the better mind of nations;

and sometimes they are too much for merely temporal interests to resist.

They are the watchwords which all men use in matters of public policy, as

well as in their private dealings; the peace of Europe may be said to

depend upon them. In the most commercial and utilitarian states of society

the power of ideas remains. And all the higher class of statesmen have in

them something of that idealism which Pericles is said to have gathered

from the teaching of Anaxagoras. They recognise that the true leader of

men must be above the motives of ambition, and that national character is

of greater value than material comfort and prosperity. And this is the

order of thought in Plato; first, he expects his citizens to do their

duty, and then under favourable circumstances, that is to say, in a

well-ordered State, their happiness is assured. That he was far from

excluding the modern principle of utility in politics is sufficiently

evident from other passages; in which 'the most beneficial is affirmed to

be the most honourable' (v. 457 B), and also 'the most sacred' (v. 458 E).

We may note (1) The manner in which the objection of Adeimantus here, as

in ii. 357 foll., 363; vi. ad init., etc., is designed to draw out and

deepen the argument of Socrates. (2) The conception of a whole as lying at

the foundation both of politics and of art, in the latter supplying the

only principle of criticism, which, under the various names of harmony,

symmetry, measure, proportion, unity, the Greek seems to have applied to

works of art. (3) The requirement that the State should be limited in

size, after the traditional model of a Greek state; as in the Politics of

Aristotle (vii. 4, etc.), the fact that the cities of Hellas were small is

converted into a principle. (4) The humorous pictures of the lean dogs and

the fatted sheep, of the light active boxer upsetting two stout gentlemen

at least, of the 'charming' patients who are always making themselves

worse; or again, the playful assumption that there is no State but our

own; or the grave irony with which the statesman is excused who believes

that he is six feet high because he is told so, and having nothing to

measure with is to be pardoned for his ignorance--he is too {lxi} amusing

for us to be seriously angry with him. (5) The light and superficial

manner in which religion is passed over when provision has been made for

two great principles,--first, that religion shall be based on the highest

conception of the gods (ii. 377 foll.), secondly, that the true national

or Hellenic type shall be maintained....

[Sidenote: _Republic IV._ Analysis.]

Socrates proceeds: But where amid all this is justice? Son of Ariston,

tell me where. Light a candle and search the city, and get your brother

and the rest of our friends to help in seeking for her. 'That won't do,'

replied Glaucon, 'you yourself promised to make the search and talked

about the impiety of deserting justice.' Well, I said, I will lead the

way, but do you follow. My notion is, that our State being perfect will

contain all the four virtues--wisdom, courage, temperance, justice. *428*

If we eliminate the three first, the unknown remainder will be justice.

First then, of wisdom: the State which we have called into being will be

wise because politic. And policy is one among many kinds of skill,--not

the skill of the carpenter, or of the worker in metal, or of the

husbandman, but the skill of him who advises about the interests of the

whole State. Of such a kind is the skill of the guardians, *429* who are a

small class in number, far smaller than the blacksmiths; but in them is

concentrated the wisdom of the State. And if this small ruling class have

wisdom, then the whole State will be wise.

Our second virtue is courage, which we have no difficulty in finding in

another class--that of soldiers. Courage may be defined as a sort of

salvation--the never-failing salvation of the opinions which law and

education have prescribed concerning dangers. You know the way in which

dyers first prepare the white ground and then lay on the dye of purple or

of any other colour. Colours dyed in this way become fixed, and no soap or

lye will ever wash them out. *430* Now the ground is education, and the

laws are the colours; and if the ground is properly laid, neither the soap

of pleasure nor the lye of pain or fear will ever wash them out. This

power which preserves right opinion about danger I would ask you to call

'courage,' adding the epithet 'political' or 'civilized' in order to

distinguish it from mere animal courage and from a higher courage which

may hereafter be discussed.

{lxii} Two virtues remain; temperance and justice. More than the preceding

virtues *431* temperance suggests the idea of harmony. Some light is

thrown upon the nature of this virtue by the popular description of a man

as 'master of himself'--which has an absurd sound, because the master is

also the servant. The expression really means that the better principle in

a man masters the worse. There are in cities whole classes--women, slaves

and the like--who correspond to the worse, and a few only to the better;

and in our State the former class are held under control by the latter.

Now to which of these classes does temperance belong? 'To both of them.'

And our State if any will be the abode of temperance; and we were right in

describing this virtue as a harmony which is diffused through the whole,

*432* making the dwellers in the city to be of one mind, and attuning the

upper and middle and lower classes like the strings of an instrument,

whether you suppose them to differ in wisdom, strength or wealth.

And now we are near the spot; let us draw in and surround the cover and

watch with all our eyes, lest justice should slip away and escape. Tell

me, if you see the thicket move first. 'Nay, I would have you lead.' Well

then, offer up a prayer and follow. The way is dark and difficult; but we

must push on. I begin to see a track. 'Good news.' Why, Glaucon, our

dulness of scent is quite ludicrous! While we are straining our eyes into

the distance, justice is tumbling out at our feet. We are as bad as people

looking for a thing which they have in their hands. Have you forgotten our

old *433* principle of the division of labour, or of every man doing his

own business, concerning which we spoke at the foundation of the

State--what but this was justice? Is there any other virtue remaining

which can compete with wisdom and temperance and courage in the scale of

political virtue? For 'every one having his own' is the great object of

government; *434* and the great object of trade is that every man should

do his own business. Not that there is much harm in a carpenter trying to

be a cobbler, or a cobbler transforming himself into a carpenter; but

great evil may arise from the cobbler leaving his last and turning into a

guardian or legislator, or when a single individual is trainer, warrior,

legislator, all in one. And this evil is injustice, or every man doing

another's business. I do not say that as yet we are in a condition to

arrive at a final conclusion. For the {lxiii} definition which we believe

to hold good in states has still to be tested by the individual. Having

read the large letters we will now come back to the small. From the two

together a brilliant light may be struck out....

[Sidenote: _Republic IV._ Introduction.]

Socrates proceeds to discover the nature of justice by a method of

residues. Each of the first three virtues corresponds to one of the three

parts of the soul and one of the three classes in the State, although the

third, temperance, has more of the nature of a harmony than the first two.

If there be a fourth virtue, that can only be sought for in the relation

of the three parts in the soul or classes in the State to one another. It

is obvious and simple, and for that very reason has not been found out.

The modern logician will be inclined to object that ideas cannot be

separated like chemical substances, but that they run into one another and

may be only different aspects or names of the same thing, and such in this

instance appears to be the case. For the definition here given of justice

is verbally the same as one of the definitions of temperance given by

Socrates in the Charmides (162 A), which however is only provisional, and

is afterwards rejected. And so far from justice remaining over when the

other virtues are eliminated, the justice and temperance of the Republic

can with difficulty be distinguished. Temperance appears to be the virtue

of a part only, and one of three, whereas justice is a universal virtue of

the whole soul. Yet on the other hand temperance is also described as a

sort of harmony, and in this respect is akin to justice. Justice seems to

differ from temperance in degree rather than in kind; whereas temperance

is the harmony of discordant elements, justice is the perfect order by

which all natures and classes do their own business, the right man in the

right place, the division and co-operation of all the citizens. Justice,

again, is a more abstract notion than the other virtues, and therefore,

from Plato's point of view, the foundation of them, to which they are

referred and which in idea precedes them. The proposal to omit temperance

is a mere trick of style intended to avoid monotony (cp. vii. 528).

There is a famous question discussed in one of the earlier Dialogues of

Plato (Protagoras, 329, 330; cp. Arist. Nic. Ethics, vi. 13. 6), 'Whether

the virtues are one or many?' This receives an answer which is to the

effect that there are four cardinal virtues {lxiv} (now for the first time

brought together in ethical philosophy), and one supreme over the rest,

which is not like Aristotle's conception of universal justice, virtue

relative to others, but the whole of virtue relative to the parts. To this

universal conception of justice or order in the first education and in the

moral nature of man, the still more universal conception of the good in

the second education and in the sphere of speculative knowledge seems to

succeed. Both might be equally described by the terms 'law,' 'order,'

'harmony;' but while the idea of good embraces 'all time and all

existence,' the conception of justice is not extended beyond man.

[Sidenote: _Republic IV._ Analysis.]

... Socrates is now going to identify the individual and the State. But

first he must prove that there are three parts of the individual soul. His

argument is as follows:--Quantity makes no difference in quality. The word

'just,' whether applied to the individual or to the State, has the same

meaning. And the term 'justice' implied that the same three principles in

the State and in the individual were doing their own business. But are

they really three or one? The question is difficult, and one which can

hardly be solved by the methods which we are now using; but the truer and

longer way would take up too much of our time. 'The shorter will satisfy

me.' Well then, you would admit that the qualities of states mean the

qualities of the individuals who compose them? The Scythians and Thracians

are passionate, our own race intellectual, *436* and the Egyptians and

Phoenicians covetous, because the individual members of each have such and

such a character; the difficulty is to determine whether the several

principles are one or three; whether, that is to say, we reason with one

part of our nature, desire with another, are angry with another, or

whether the whole soul comes into play in each sort of action. This

enquiry, however, requires a very exact definition of terms. The same

thing in the same relation cannot be affected in two opposite ways. But

there is no impossibility in a man standing still, yet moving his arms, or

in a top which is fixed on one spot going round upon its axis. There is no

necessity to mention all the possible exceptions; *437* let us

provisionally assume that opposites cannot do or be or suffer opposites in

the same relation. And to the class of opposites belong assent and

dissent, desire and avoidance. And one form {lxv} of desire is thirst and

hunger: and here arises a new point--thirst is thirst of drink, hunger is

hunger of food; not of warm drink or of a particular kind of food, *438*

with the single exception of course that the very fact of our desiring

anything implies that it is good. When relative terms have no attributes,

their correlatives have no attributes; when they have attributes, their

correlatives also have them. For example, the term 'greater' is simply

relative to 'less,' and knowledge refers to a subject of knowledge. But on

the other hand, a particular knowledge is of a particular subject. Again,

every science has a distinct character, which is defined by an object;

medicine, for example, is the science of health, although not to be

confounded with health. *439* Having cleared our ideas thus far, let us

return to the original instance of thirst, which has a definite

object--drink. Now the thirsty soul may feel two distinct impulses; the

animal one saying 'Drink;' the rational one, which says 'Do not drink.'

The two impulses are contradictory; and therefore we may assume that they

spring from distinct principles in the soul. But is passion a third

principle, or akin to desire? There is a story of a certain Leontius which

throws some light on this question. He was coming up from the Piraeus

outside the north wall, and he passed a spot where there were dead bodies

lying by the executioner. He felt a longing desire to see them and also an

abhorrence of them; at first he turned away and shut his eyes, then, *440*

suddenly tearing them open, he said,--'Take your fill, ye wretches, of the

fair sight.' Now is there not here a third principle which is often found

to come to the assistance of reason against desire, but never of desire

against reason? This is passion or spirit, of the separate existence of

which we may further convince ourselves by putting the following

case:--When a man suffers justly, if he be of a generous nature he is not

indignant at the hardships which he undergoes: but when he suffers

unjustly, his indignation is his great support; hunger and thirst cannot

tame him; the spirit within him must do or die, until the voice of the

shepherd, that is, of reason, bidding his dog bark no more, is heard

within. This shows that passion is the ally of reason. *441* Is passion

then the same with reason? No, for the former exists in children and

brutes; and Homer affords a proof of the distinction between them when he

says, 'He smote his breast, and thus rebuked his soul.'

{lxvi} And now, at last, we have reached firm ground, and are able to

infer that the virtues of the State and of the individual are the same.

For wisdom and courage and justice in the State are severally the wisdom

and courage and justice in the individuals who form the State. Each of the

three classes will do the work of its own class in the State, and each