CHAPTER LV.

ADVANCE ON COLD HARBOR--AN ANECDOTE OF THE WAR--BATTLE OF COLD HARBOR

--CORRESPONDENCE WITH LEE--RETROSPECTIVE.

On the 31st Sheridan advanced to near Old Cold Harbor. He found it

intrenched and occupied by cavalry and infantry. A hard fight ensued

but the place was carried. The enemy well knew the importance of Cold

Harbor to us, and seemed determined that we should not hold it. He

returned with such a large force that Sheridan was about withdrawing

without making any effort to hold it against such odds; but about the

time he commenced the evacuation he received orders to hold the place at

all hazards, until reinforcements could be sent to him. He speedily

turned the rebel works to face against them and placed his men in

position for defence. Night came on before the enemy was ready for

assault.

Wright's corps was ordered early in the evening to march directly to

Cold Harbor passing by the rear of the army. It was expected to arrive

by daylight or before; but the night was dark and the distance great, so

that it was nine o'clock the 1st of June before it reached its

destination. Before the arrival of Wright the enemy had made two

assaults on Sheridan, both of which were repulsed with heavy loss to the

enemy. Wright's corps coming up, there was no further assault on Cold

Harbor.

Smith, who was coming up from White House, was also directed to march

directly to Cold Harbor, and was expected early on the morning of the

1st of June; but by some blunder the order which reached Smith directed

him to Newcastle instead of Cold Harbor. Through this blunder Smith did

not reach his destination until three o'clock in the afternoon, and then

with tired and worn-out men from their long and dusty march. He landed

twelve thousand five hundred men from Butler's command, but a division

was left at White House temporarily and many men had fallen out of ranks

in their long march.

Before the removal of Wright's corps from our right, after dark on the

31st, the two lines, Federal and Confederate, were so close together at

that point that either side could detect directly any movement made by

the other. Finding at daylight that Wright had left his front, Lee

evidently divined that he had gone to our left. At all events, soon

after light on the 1st of June Anderson, who commanded the corps on

Lee's left, was seen moving along Warren's front. Warren was ordered to

attack him vigorously in flank, while Wright was directed to move out

and get on his front. Warren fired his artillery at the enemy; but lost

so much time in making ready that the enemy got by, and at three o'clock

he reported the enemy was strongly intrenched in his front, and besides

his lines were so long that he had no mass of troops to move with. He

seemed to have forgotten that lines in rear of an army hold themselves

while their defenders are fighting in their front. Wright reconnoitred

some distance to his front: but the enemy finding Old Cold Harbor

already taken had halted and fortified some distance west.

By six o'clock in the afternoon Wright and Smith were ready to make an

assault. In front of both the ground was clear for several hundred

yards and then became wooded. Both charged across this open space and

into the wood, capturing and holding the first line of rifle-pits of the

enemy, and also capturing seven or eight hundred prisoners.

While this was going on, the enemy charged Warren three separate times

with vigor, but were repulsed each time with loss. There was no officer

more capable, nor one more prompt in acting, than Warren when the enemy

forced him to it. There was also an attack upon Hancock's and

Burnside's corps at the same time; but it was feeble and probably only

intended to relieve Anderson who was being pressed by Wright and Smith.

During the night the enemy made frequent attacks with the view of

dispossessing us of the important position we had gained, but without

effecting their object.

Hancock was moved from his place in line during the night and ordered to

the left of Wright. I expected to take the offensive on the morning of

the 2d, but the night was so dark, the heat and dust so excessive and

the roads so intricate and hard to keep, that the head of column only

reached Old Cold Harbor at six o'clock, but was in position at 7.30 A.M.

Preparations were made for an attack in the afternoon, but did not take

place until the next morning. Warren's corps was moved to the left to

connect with Smith: Hancock's corps was got into position to the left

of Wright's, and Burnside was moved to Bethesda Church in reserve. While

Warren and Burnside were making these changes the enemy came out several

times and attacked them, capturing several hundred prisoners. The

attacks were repulsed, but not followed up as they should have been. I

was so annoyed at this that I directed Meade to instruct his corps

commanders that they should seize all such opportunities when they

occurred, and not wait for orders, all of our manoeuvres being made for

the very purpose of getting the enemy out of his cover.

On this day Wilson returned from his raid upon the Virginia Central

Railroad, having damaged it considerably. But, like ourselves, the

rebels had become experts in repairing such damage. Sherman, in his

memoirs, relates an anecdote of his campaign to Atlanta that well

illustrates this point. The rebel cavalry lurking in his rear to burn

bridges and obstruct his communications had become so disgusted at

hearing trains go whistling by within a few hours after a bridge had

been burned, that they proposed to try blowing up some of the tunnels.

One of them said, "No use, boys, Old Sherman carries duplicate tunnels

with him, and will replace them as fast as you can blow them up; better

save your powder."

Sheridan was engaged reconnoitring the banks of the Chickahominy, to

find crossings and the condition of the roads. He reported favorably.

During the night Lee moved his left up to make his line correspond to

ours. His lines extended now from the Totopotomoy to New Cold Harbor.

Mine from Bethesda Church by Old Cold Harbor to the Chickahominy, with a

division of cavalry guarding our right. An assault was ordered for the

3d, to be made mainly by the corps of Hancock, Wright and Smith; but

Warren and Burnside were to support it by threatening Lee's left, and to

attack with great earnestness if he should either reinforce more

threatened points by drawing from that quarter or if a favorable

opportunity should present itself.

The corps commanders were to select the points in their respective

fronts where they would make their assaults. The move was to commence

at half-past four in the morning. Hancock sent Barlow and Gibbon

forward at the appointed hour, with Birney as a reserve. Barlow pushed

forward with great vigor, under a heavy fire of both artillery and

musketry, through thickets and swamps. Notwithstanding all the

resistance of the enemy and the natural obstructions to overcome, he

carried a position occupied by the enemy outside their main line where

the road makes a deep cut through a bank affording as good a shelter for

troops as if it had been made for that purpose. Three pieces of

artillery had been captured here, and several hundred prisoners. The

guns were immediately turned against the men who had just been using

them. No (*33) assistance coming to him, he (Barlow) intrenched under

fire and continued to hold his place. Gibbon was not so fortunate in

his front. He found the ground over which he had to pass cut up with

deep ravines, and a morass difficult to cross. But his men struggled on

until some of them got up to the very parapet covering the enemy.

Gibbon gained ground much nearer the enemy than that which he left, and

here he intrenched and held fast.

Wright's corps moving in two lines captured the outer rifle-pits in

their front, but accomplished nothing more. Smith's corps also gained

the outer rifle-pits in its front. The ground over which this corps

(18th) had to move was the most exposed of any over which charges were

made. An open plain intervened between the contending forces at this

point, which was exposed both to a direct and a cross fire. Smith,

however, finding a ravine running towards his front, sufficiently deep

to protect men in it from cross fire, and somewhat from a direct fire,

put Martindale's division in it, and with Brooks supporting him on the

left and Devens on the right succeeded in gaining the outer--probably

picket--rifle-pits. Warren and Burnside also advanced and gained

ground--which brought the whole army on one line.

This assault cost us heavily and probably without benefit to compensate:

but the enemy was not cheered by the occurrence sufficiently to induce

him to take the offensive. In fact, nowhere after the battle of the

Wilderness did Lee show any disposition to leave his defences far behind

him.

Fighting was substantially over by half-past seven in the morning. At

eleven o'clock I started to visit all the corps commanders to see for

myself the different positions gained and to get their opinion of the

practicability of doing anything more in their respective fronts.

Hancock gave the opinion that in his front the enemy was too strong to

make any further assault promise success. Wright thought he could gain

the lines of the enemy, but it would require the cooperation of

Hancock's and Smith's corps. Smith thought a lodgment possible, but was

not sanguine: Burnside thought something could be done in his front,

but Warren differed. I concluded, therefore to make no more assaults,

and a little after twelve directed in the following letter that all

offensive action should cease.

COLD HARBOR, June 3, 1864.-12.30 P.M. MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE,

Commanding A. P.

The opinion of corps commanders not being sanguine of success in case an

assault is ordered, you may direct a suspension of farther advance for

the present. Hold our most advanced positions and strengthen them.

Whilst on the defensive our line may be contracted from the right if

practicable.

Reconnoissances should be made in front of every corps and advances made

to advantageous positions by regular approaches. To aid the expedition

under General Hunter it is necessary that we should detain all the army

now with Lee until the former gets well on his way to Lynchburg. To do

this effectually it will be better to keep the enemy out of the

intrenchments of Richmond than to have them go back there.

Wright and Hancock should be ready to assault in case the enemy should

break through General Smith's lines, and all should be ready to resist

an assault.

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

The remainder of the day was spent in strengthening the line we now

held. By night we were as strong against Lee as he was against us.

During the night the enemy quitted our right front, abandoning some of

their wounded, and without burying their dead. These we were able to

care for. But there were many dead and wounded men between the lines of

the contending forces, which were now close together, who could not be

cared for without a cessation of hostilities.

So I wrote the following:

COLD HARBOR, VA., June 5, 1864.

GENERAL R. E. LEE, Commanding Confederate Army.

It is reported to me that there are wounded men, probably of both

armies, now lying exposed and suffering between the lines occupied

respectively by the two armies. Humanity would dictate that some

provision should be made to provide against such hardships. I would

propose, therefore, that hereafter, when no battle is raging, either

party be authorized to send to any point between the pickets or skirmish

lines, unarmed men bearing litters to pick up their dead or wounded,

without being fired upon by the other party. Any other method, equally

fair to both parties, you may propose for meeting the end desired will

be accepted by me.

U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General.

Lee replied that he feared such an arrangement would lead to

misunderstanding, and proposed that in future, when either party wished

to remove their dead and wounded, a flag of truce be sent. I answered

this immediately by saying:

COLD HARBOR, VA., June 6, 1864.

GENERAL R. E. LEE, Commanding Army of N. Va.

Your communication of yesterday's date is received. I will send

immediately, as you propose, to collect the dead and wounded between the

lines of the two armies, and will also instruct that you be allowed to

do the same. I propose that the time for doing this be between the

hours of 12 M. and 3 P.M. to-day. I will direct all parties going out

to bear a white flag, and not to attempt to go beyond where we have dead

or wounded, and not beyond or on ground occupied by your troops.

U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General.

Lee's response was that he could not consent to the burial of the dead

and removal of the wounded in the way I proposed, but when either party

desired such permission it should be asked for by flag of truce and he

had directed that any parties I may have sent out, as mentioned in my

letter, to be turned back. I answered:

COLD HARBOR, VA, June 6, 1864.

GENERAL R. E. LEE. Commanding Army, N. Va.

The knowledge that wounded men are now suffering from want of attention,

between the two armies, compels me to ask a suspension of hostilities

for sufficient time to collect them in, say two hours. Permit me to say

that the hours you may fix upon for this will be agreeable to me, and

the same privilege will be extended to such parties as you may wish to

send out on the same duty without further application.

U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General.

Lee acceded to this; but delays in transmitting the correspondence

brought it to the 7th of June--forty-eight hours after it commenced

--before parties were got out to collect the men left upon the field.

In the meantime all but two of the wounded had died. And I wrote to

Lee:

COLD HARBOR, VA., June 7, 1864. 10.30 A.M.

GEN. R. E. LEE, Commanding Army of N. Va.

I regret that your note of seven P.M. yesterday should have been

received at the nearest corps headquarters, to where it was delivered,

after the hour which had been given for the removal of the dead and

wounded had expired; 10.45 P.M. was the hour at which it was received at

corps headquarters, and between eleven and twelve it reached my

headquarters. As a consequence, it was not understood by the troops of

this army that there was a cessation of hostilities for the purpose of

collecting the dead and wounded, and none were collected. Two officers

and six men of the 8th and 25th North Carolina Regts., who were out in

search of the bodies of officers of their respective regiments, were

captured and brought into our lines, owing to this want of

understanding. I regret this, but will state that as soon as I learned

the fact, I directed that they should not be held as prisoners, but must

be returned to their commands. These officers and men having been

carelessly brought through our lines to the rear have not determined

whether they will be sent back the way they came, or whether they will

be sent by some other route.

Regretting that all my efforts for alleviating the sufferings of wounded

men left upon the battle-field have been rendered nugatory, I remain,

&c.,

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

I have always regretted that the last assault at Cold Harbor was ever

made. I might say the same thing of the assault of the 22d of May,

1863, at Vicksburg. At Cold Harbor no advantage whatever was gained to

compensate for the heavy loss we sustained. Indeed, the advantages

other than those of relative losses, were on the Confederate side.

Before that, the Army of Northern Virginia seemed to have acquired a

wholesome regard for the courage, endurance, and soldierly qualities

generally of the Army of the Potomac. They no longer wanted to fight

them "one Confederate to five Yanks." Indeed, they seemed to have given

up any idea of gaining any advantage of their antagonist in the open

field. They had come to much prefer breastworks in their front to the

Army of the Potomac. This charge seemed to revive their hopes

temporarily; but it was of short duration. The effect upon the Army of

the Potomac was the reverse. When we reached the James River, however,

all effects of the battle of Cold Harbor seemed to have disappeared.

There was more justification for the assault at Vicksburg. We were in a

Southern climate, at the beginning of the hot season. The Army of the

Tennessee had won five successive victories over the garrison of

Vicksburg in the three preceding weeks. They had driven a portion of

that army from Port Gibson with considerable loss, after having flanked

them out of their stronghold at Grand Gulf. They had attacked another

portion of the same army at Raymond, more than fifty miles farther in

the interior of the State, and driven them back into Jackson with great

loss in killed, wounded, captured and missing, besides loss of large and

small arms: they had captured the capital of the State of Mississippi,

with a large amount of materials of war and manufactures. Only a few

days before, they had beaten the enemy then penned up in the town first

at Champion's Hill, next at Big Black River Bridge, inflicting upon him

a loss of fifteen thousand or more men (including those cut off from

returning) besides large losses in arms and ammunition. The Army of the

Tennessee had come to believe that they could beat their antagonist

under any circumstances. There was no telling how long a regular siege

might last. As I have stated, it was the beginning of the hot season in

a Southern climate. There was no telling what the casualties might be

among Northern troops working and living in trenches, drinking surface

water filtered through rich vegetation, under a tropical sun. If

Vicksburg could have been carried in May, it would not only have saved

the army the risk it ran of a greater danger than from the bullets of

the enemy, but it would have given us a splendid army, well equipped and

officered, to operate elsewhere with. These are reasons justifying the

assault. The only benefit we gained--and it was a slight one for so

great a sacrifice--was that the men worked cheerfully in the trenches

after that, being satisfied with digging the enemy out. Had the assault

not been made, I have no doubt that the majority of those engaged in the

siege of Vicksburg would have believed that had we assaulted it would

have proven successful, and would have saved life, health and comfort.